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THE first edition of' the present lectures,  published  in  1844, 
was based entirely upon notes taken  during their  delivery  in 
tile University of  Bonn, in the ycars 1828 and  1829, the last 
time that  Nicbuhr  lectured  on  Roman  history.  When Dr. 
Isler  wa,s afterwards  entrusted  with  tlie  preparation  of  a 
German  edition  of  the same  lcctures, hc thought it right  to 
avail  himself also of the notes of  an earlier course of lectures 
on the same  subjcct, which  Niebuhr  had  delivered  during 
the winter  of  1826 and  1827.  In  this  earlier  course,  tlie 
historian  did  not  embrace thc whole  history  of  Rome,  but 
only  the portion  from  the carliest  tirnes  down to the death 
of  Sertoriusl, and  he was conscquently  enabled  to treat his 
subject more in dctail than in the later course.  In preparing 
the new  edition,  I have made  use  of  everything which  Dr. 
Isler has thus incorporated in his  edition  from  the course  of 
1826 and 1827.  The amount of this additional matter is very 
considerable, occupying nearly one hundred  pages of  the pre- 
sent edition.  In the lectures relating to the period subsequent 
to the death of Sertorius, the additions and corrections are less 
numerous and i~nportant;  as  for  this portion  of  the history, 
the German  editor  had  no  other notes than such as had been 
talcen during the course  of  1828 and  1829; that part of  the 
German  edition  therefore presents  no  other differences from 
the first English edition, than thosc arising from the fact, that 
the two cditions were  formed  froin  sets  of  notcs  taken  by 
different students. 
In the latcst  part  of  the  history,  however,  an important 
addition has been introduced from the German edition, namely, 
the history from the death of  Constantine  down to the  over- 
throw of the Western Empire.  The history of that period was 
not published in the first edition, because I had no manuscript 
notes referring  to that  time, having, along  with  most  other 
students, left  the university before Kiebuhr  ceased lecturing. 
This  part has  now been  translated from the German edition, 
'  See Lecture lxxxix., voI ii. p.40b. note I 1. ... 
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and divided  into  eight lectures,  from  p.  320  to  the end  of 
I1  As the German edition is not divided into lectures, 
I  applied to Dr. Islcr  to  inform  me  of  the precise  point  at 
xvllich  each  of  these  additional  lectules  begins ;  but  it 
unfortunately  happcns,  that  in  his  own  manuscript  notes, 
the lectures are not marked.  He kindly pointed  out  to  me, 
however, the passages,  where  the  difYerent  style  of  writing 
and thc appearance of  the ink, seemed  to  him to indicate the 
beginning of  a new lecture.  According to these hints, I have 
divided the additional portion of the history into eight lectures, 
without, howcver, being able to  answer for  the correctncss of 
that division,  which will  appcar the more doubtful when we 
consider  the extrernc  brevity  of  those  last  lectures.  It is, 
however, not impossible  that this brcvity may arise from  thc 
fact,  that the students  on whose  notes  they are based, were 
less  anxious  to  take  down  every remark  of  Niebuhr,  and 
noticed  only thc principal  events  mentioned  by thc lecturer. 
Few students, moreover, wcrc  present  during the concluding 
part  of  the course, so  that thc  llanuscript  notes  collatcd  by 
the German  editor, were  much fewer  in number  than those 
relating to the earlier history. 
As regards the relation in which  thc present edition stands 
to that of  Dr. Isler, it must be obscrvcd that I have incorpora- 
ted in nly edition, every word and sentiment  in the  Gcrman 
edition, which  was  not contained  in my cdition  of  1844, so 
that the German work  comprises  nothing  which is not to be 
found in the present volumes.  Dr. Isler,  who,  in his cdition, 
has not  adhered  to thc  form  of  lectures,  has  by that very 
circumstance, often been obliged to transfer  passages from one 
place to another:  this nccessity did not exist for me, and hence 
I may lay claim to having produced a inore  faithful  represcn- 
tation  of  the  course  of  lectures,  as  actually  delivered  by 
Niebuhr,  than  Dr.  Isler, who,  I  may  observe  by  the  way, 
declared  to me last autumn,  that if he had  to do thc  work 
again, he would  not be inclined  to make  thoee  transpositions 
as often as he has done. 
It may, perhaps, at first sight appear presumptuous when I 
assert that the present edition is  even more complete than thc 
German; but a comparison  of the two  editions will soon con- 
vince any one who will  take  the trouble, that in making that 
assertion, 1 do not  go beyond  the bounds  ol'  truth, and  t,hc 
following facts will at once explain the tnatter.  I\Iy first edition 
was foundcd upon a set of manuscript notes inaccessible to Dr. 
Isler : they werc partly my own-partly  those collected by me 
in Germany.  Every one knows that notes taken by one student 
in a lecture-room  may, ancl do differ widely from those taken 
by another, every one noting down only that xvllich he happens 
to think important or  interesting.  Hence Dr. Isler found in 
his notes many statements which did not occur in rninc, and I, 
on thc  other hand, found in my notes  many things  of which 
there was no trace in his.  Now all such statements as I found 
in his edition, have been translated and transferred to the pre- 
sent cdition : but Dr. Isler's position was different; for although 
in preparing his work hc had my first edition before him, still 
when he nlet wit11 a  passage which did not occur in his notes, 
11c  was not at liberty to translate it from the English, as he was 
bound scrupulously to preservc the very words and expressions 
of Niebuhr;  and how could  he have  done so by re-translating 
from the English into Gcrman?  Thus it happens that a great 
Inany  remarks  and  observations  are  found  in  thc  present 
edition, which do not appear in the German one. 
Sevcral crrors occurring in my first edition  have been  cor- 
rected  with the aid of  Dr. Islcr's  edition,  and  some  of  the 
clificulties noticed by rne in the former edition have been solved 
t~y  the same meails. 
In now offering to the public Niebuhr's  Lectures on Roman 
IIistory in thc completest form which it is rational to expect, 
in tllc  circumstances  of  the case,  they will  ever  be  able  to 
assume, I indulge thc hope that  they may contribute  to keep 
alive  and  increase  the intcrcst  in a  branch  of  stJudy which 
can  never  fail  to be  of  thc  deepest  interest  to  enlightelled 
Englishmen. 
L.  SCIIMITZ. 
Edinburgh, May, 1849. 
Note.-Whcycvcr,  in these volumcs, roferencc is made simply to Vol. I.,  Vol. II., 
or Vol. III., tllc  rcatlcr  will  understand, that tl~esc  references are to thc  three 
volumes of  Nlrlruhr's  History  ot' Rome, translated hy Bishop Thirlwall, Arch- 
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UPWARDS  of thirteen years have now elapsed since the death 
of  Niebuhr,  and  none  of  the  many  courses  of  lectures 
delivered by him  have yet been  ~ublished. It must  at  first 
sight,  appear  strange that  those  lectures,  which,  as  far  as 
their intrinsic merits and their suggestive nature are concerned, 
cannot easily be surpassed, should so long have been neglected 
by Niebuhr's  countrymen; and it will  probably  appear  still 
more strange that  the  first  attempt  to rescue  these  precious 
relics is made  in this  country.  But there  are circumstances 
which will account for this apparent  ncglect of  a  man, whose 
opinions on subjects of ancient history must be of  the highest 
interest to every scholar.  The main cause  is the pietas which 
Niebuhr's pupils  feel  for  their  great  master,  and which  has 
deterred  them from publishing  anything  that  might possibly 
place him before the public in an unfi~ir  light.  This apprehen- 
sion arises from the condition of the notcs which were taken by 
his pupils in the lecture-room, and which are the only materials 
out of which the lecturcs can be re-constructed, for Niebuhr him- 
self never committed thein to paper.  The difficulty of  casting 
these  confnscd,  fragmentary,  and  sometimes  unintelligible, 
notes into a proper and  intclligible  form  is  indeed  so  great, 
that this of  itself  would be  suficient to  deter  any one  from 
undertaking a  task  which is  far  more  irksome  than  that  of 
~roducing  an original work, and the result of  which, howcver 
carefully  it may  be  performed, cannot  fail  to  be  far  indeed 
from completely satisfactory. 
It is not  indiffercnce  thereforc  on  the part  of  Niebuhr's 
pupils,  that  has so long dclayed  the publication of  any of  his 
courses  of  lectures,  but simply  anxicty  to  do justice  to his 
memory, and the difficulties  which present themselves at almost 
every step.  The anxiety to be just towards Niebuhr has gone 
so far indeed, that when 1  applied to one of  his most eminent 
pupils to undertake the publication of  the lectures on  Roman 
history, or at least to give me his assistance, if  he declined the 
task, he declared that  no one ought  to venture upon  ~uch  an 
undertaking,  unless he felt that he could  accomplish it in the 
manner  in  which  Niebuhr  himself  would  have  done  it, if 
the thought of  pblishing his  lectures had  occurred  to him. 
Honourable as this feeling is, still, if  we were to wait  till any 
of Niebuhrls pupils could, without presumption, say that he  was 
to his master, the lectures would in all probability remain 
buried for ever.  1  am as  anxious as any  one to do justice to 
Niebuhr;  but although I  am  very far  from  believing  that I 
have attained that competency which  my  late  fcllow-student 
regards as the conditio sine qua non, I have  been  induced  by 
various favourable  circumstances to  undertake  the  task;  and 
the completion of  thc work, with all  its  defects affords  me at 
least this consolation,-that  I have made my best efforts;  and 
that I have spared neither time nor trouble to malie the areatest  ? 
possible use of  my materials, without altering any of  Niebuhr's 
sentiments  and  opinions.  With regard  to  the difficulties of 
accomplishing  this,  I  think  I  may  say  that  I  have  felt 
them inore strongly than  othcrs who  have  merely  looked at, 
without actually trying to overcome them; and  the  reader of 
the present work will find indications enough of  my  inability 
to solve them in all instances.  This fact would  have deterred 
me, like other pupils of  Niebuhr, from the undertaking, had I 
not bcen favoured by circumstances, among  which I mention 
with  gratitude  the advice,  encouragement, and  assistance  of 
my  distinguished  friends,  Bishop  Thirlwall,  the  Chevalier 
Bunsen, the Rev. Philip Smith, and Dr. William  Smith. 
In order to put the rcader in a position f~illy  to understand 
these preliminary remarks,  it will be necessary for me  to give 
some account of  the matcrials I had to work upon, and of  the 
principles  I  have  endeavoured  to follow.  The notes,  upon 
which the prescnt work is founded, were made in the winter of 
1828-29 and the summer of 1829, when Niebuhr gavc a course 
of lectures on the History of Rome in the University of Bonn, 
the last tiinc that he ever lectured on that subject.  His inten- 
tion was to rclate  the history of  Rome from the earliest timcs 
to the downfall  of  thc Western  Empire,  during  the winter 
course  of  1828-29: but though  he delivered five  lecturcs  of 
three quarters  of  an hour each, every week, the time devoted 
to them  proved  insufficient,  and he was not able to carry the 
history further than the reign of  Augustus.  In order to fulfil 
his engagement, he resumed the lectures in the summer of 1829, xii  PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 
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when  the history of  the einperors was related,  an  hour  encl~ 
week being  occupied with  this subject. 
It must  be  observed  that  Niebuhr  delivered  his  lectures 
befbre  young men who were supposed  to be  acquainted with 
the leading events of  lZolllan history,  or at least  to possess  2~11 
acquaintance with  thc ancient  languages sufficient to enable 
theln to read the Greek and Latin works which are the sources 
of  our knowledge.  It was  therefore  Niebuhr's  object  not  so 
mnch to fill their memory with a11  the details of'l~istory,  as to 
enable  them  to understand  its important events, and to form 
correct notions of  the men ancl il~stitutions  which occur in the 
history of Rome.  Hence some events were passed over altoge- 
ther, and others were only slightly alluded to, especially where 
he could refer his hearers  to  the ancients themselves  for  ac- 
curate and satisfactory information. 
Nicbuhr,  as  a  lecturer,  was  a singular  phenomenon;  hc 
delivered  his  discourses  extempore,  and without having  any 
written  notes  before him  to assist  his  memory.  The form of 
his lectures was that of a familiar and lively conversation with 
friends,  in which he made  use  of  his  most varied  and inex- 
haustible  stores  of  knowledge  and  personal  experience  to 
illustrate the subjects of his discourses,  and abandoned himself 
witlzout  restraint  to the expression of  his  strong feelings,  as 
they inight be called forth by the subjects under consiclcration. 
A few harsh  expressions wlliclz  escaped  him  under the influ- 
ence of such passionate feclings have been softened down in the 
present work, for an expression when printed makes an inlprcs- 
sion very different from thatwhich it conveys when spoke11  in the 
hcat of the moment.  When Niebuhr spoke, it always appeared 
as if the rapidity with which the thou~hts  occurred to him in- 
P  terfered with the power of  comrnunicatlng thcin in their regular 
order of succession.  Nearly all his sentcnccs, therefore,  were 
anacoluths;  for, before having iinished one, he began anotller, 
~er~etually  mixing  up one  thought with another, so that few 
were  completely expressed.  This peculiarity was more parti- 
cularly striking  when  he  was  labouring  under  any melltal 
excitement, which occurrcd the oftener, as, with his great sen- 
sitiveness,  he felt  that warmth  of  interest  in  treating  of  the 
history of  past ages, which we are accnston~ed  to witness only 
in discussions  on  thc  political  affairs  of  our  om11  time  and 
country.  This  sing~~lar  manner of  rlelive~in~  his thonghts- 
% deficiency of which Niebuhr hinlself was painfully conscious 
-rendered  it often extremely difficult to understand hinl; and 
it may easily be inferred in what a state of conf~sion  the notes 
are, which were taken by the students under such circ~instaaces. 
fiut, notwithstanding this deficiency in Niebuhr as a lecturer, 
there was an indescribable charin  in the manner  in which he 
treated his subjects:  the warmth of  his feelings, the sympathy 
which he felt with the persons  and things he was speaking of, 
his strong conviction of  the truth of' what he was  saying, his 
earnestness,  and, above all,  the vividness with which  he con- 
ceived and described the characters of the most prominent men, 
who were to him living realities, with souls, feclings,  and pns- 
sions like ourselves,  carried his hearers  away,  and  produced 
effects which are usually the results of the most powerful oratory 
only.  Would  that my materials had enabled me in all cases 
to  preserve  these  features  in  the lectures  which  I  am  now 
bringing before the public ! 
Another circumstance, which gave rise to mistakes and con- 
fusion in the notes,  was  the ignorance  of  Niebuhr's  hearers 
about a  countless  number  of  things  which  he introduced as 
illustrations  of the history  of  Rome,  and  which  were taken 
from the history of countries with wlzose  languages  we pupils 
were  unacquainted.  Hence  proper  names  were  constantIy 
misunclerstood  or  misspelt.  Niebuhr, moreover,  spoke  very 
rapidly;  and in addition to all this it must be remembered that 
students  are  not  trained  as  short-hand  writers,  like the re- 
porters of lectures in this country, and that every student notcs 
down as much as he can, or as much as he may  think proper 
or useful to himself, no one  being  able to write with  the ra- 
pidity  with  which  a  lecturer  like  Niebuhr  speaks.  Some 
slight mistakes also were made by Kiebuhr  himself, but these 
were chiefly such as any one  engaged in a  Iively conversation 
would be apt to commit:  for example, the name of one person 
was occasioilally mentioned for that of another, dates were con- 
founded, or the order of events was reversed.  Sometimes also 
he forgot to mention  an event in  its proper  place,  and after- 
wards, when the oversight occurred to him, he stated what  lie 
had  omitted.  All  such  mistakes,  inaccuracies,  and  incon- 
sistencies, I have endeavoured to remedy tacitly,  wherever  it 
was possible for me to do so.  These corrections could of course 
be made only by tracing Niebuhr's statements to their sources, xiv  PREFACE  TO THE  FIRST  EDITION.  PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION.  XV 
both ancient and modern; and I have never inade them except 
where  they  were  commanded  by  positive  evidence.  There 
are a few poillts which I was obliged to leave as I found them, 
alld  which I could  not  consider as mistakes, although the au- 
thorities which I had before me seemed  to justify  such a SUP- 
position.  But Niebuhr may have had other authorities which 
were unknown t~ me.  Wherever such a case occurred, I have 
pointed it out in a  note.  There  are  lastly  a  very few state- 
ments which  I was  unable  to  substantiate by any authority, 
but which I have nevertheless preserved, in the hope that they 
may  induce others to search, and with better success than myself. 
It would  perhaps have  been  desirable  to  pnblish the com- 
plete course of lectures at once, but I thought it preferable, on 
mature consideration,  first to  give  to the world  only  the lec- 
tures on that portion  of  the history  of  Rome,  which  is  not 
contained in the three  volumes  already before  the public, so 
that the present  lectures  will  form a  sort  of  continuation to 
Niebuhr's great work.  But  in determining upon this plan  I 
have added two things, which at first sight may seem to be out 
of place and inconsistent with  my plan,-viz.  thc  twelve In- 
troductory Lectures, and  those on the first Punic war.  With 
regard to the Introductory  Lectures, it is true, the translators 
of the first two volumes of the History have prefixed to Vol. I. 
a short introduction by Niebuhr;  but that contains only a few 
general remarks, and  was  written as  early  as the year  1810, 
whereas the twelve Introductory Lectures now published givc 
a complete summary of all that has ever bcen clone  for Roman 
history;  they  contain  some  very  valuable  remarks  on  both 
ancient  and modern  works,  and  are  intended to  direct  the 
student to the materials upon which our knowledge of  Roman 
history  is based,  and  to  instruct  him  about  the manner in 
which he should make  use of  them.  An account of  the first 
Punic war is  contained at the end of Vol. 111. but it is only  a 
fragment, and was moreover written as early as the year 1811. 
These were  reasons  sufficient  in  themselves to induce me  to 
publish the lectures on t,he first Punic war, which also contain 
discussions  not  to  be  found  elsewhere,  upon  a  variety  of 
subjects. 
When I had made up my mind to set about the task of pre- 
paring these lectures for publication, I soon found that my own 
notes alone would be too  insecure  a  basis  to found the work 
upon, as no one of  Niebuhr's  pupils was  able, even if he had 
wished to do so, to make  his  notes coinplete and accurate.  I 
therefore procured  from Germany as many and as good manu- 
scripts as I could, by  meails of  which I have  endeavoured  to 
correct and complete my own.  But I am well aware that not- 
withstanding all this, some of the lectures cannot be complete, 
considering the small  space they occupy in this work, and the 
fact,  that the  delivery of  each  occupied  three-quarters  of  an 
hour.  This incompleteness,  however, is  only  apparent,  and 
affects only the form; for the substance of Niebuhr's discourses 
is preserved throughout, and  there are only a very few instan- 
ces in which the omission of explanatory matter is perceptible. 
The students  in Gerinan  universities seldom  write down  the 
remarks of the lecturer  on things  not  closely connected with 
the snbject under consideration, although the remarks of a man 
like Niebuhr, even  when  they appeared less  important to an 
inexperienced student, were  always of the greatest interest and 
highly  suggestive.  But  I  am  happy  to  say  that my own 
manuscript, as well as the others which  I have collated, have 
few omissions of  this kind,  all the students  seeming to have 
bcei? well  aware  of  the importance of  Niebuhr's  remarks  on 
extraneous  subjects.  The very few  lectures  in  which  such 
omissions occur, are for  this reason  somewhat briefer than the 
rest.  In a spokcn discourse, the introduction  of  explanatory 
or extraneous matter always appears to iiztcrrupt  the context 
less than in a written or printed one.  111  most cases, therefore, 
where such'observations  by the way seemed  to interrupt  the 
narrative  and could  be  conveniently  removed,  I have  taken 
them out of the text and put them at  the foot  of  the page  as 
notes.  In order to distinguish them from the notes  which  I 
have added myself, I have always marked them with Niebuhr's 
initial-N. 
All these  lectures  arc  only  brief  summaries,  that  is,  the 
results  of  Nicbuhr's  investigations.  He nevcr  gave  any 
references to his authorities except in the gcneral way in which 
they occur in the text.  Wherever  I have  been  able to  find 
the passages of  his authorities, and thought them useful to the 
studcnt, I havc given the exact references.  It  would have been 
easy to multiply their number; but I was not inclined to swell 
the bulk of  the book with a useless display of learning;  suffice 
it  to  say that I have  endeavoured  to  verify  every  one  of xvi  PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 
Niebuhr's  statcrnents  by ref'ening  to  the  ancient  as  well  as 
to the inodein authoiitles.  1  have  purposely  abstained  fioin 
giving  rcfcrenccs  to  the  nu~nberless  modern  walks  on  the 
History of  Ronlc or on scparate portions of  it, except in a few 
cases in which Niebuhr's  words scemed to suggest the propriety 
of  doing  so,  and  a  few  otheis  in  which I  could  refcr  to 
Niebuhr's own wolks  Still less  did  I  feel  called  upon  to 
controvert opinion's of  Niebuhr; and it is only in one  or  two 
instances that I have macle any rernaiks of  this  kind,  because 
on referring to  the autl~orities,  staterncnts  at once  prcseiltcd 
themselves  to  rnc,  which  were  at variance  with  Niebuhr's 
opinion.  In these cases, however, I am vcry fa1 from asserting 
that Niebuhr is wrong;  all  that I meall  to suggest is,  that 1 
have not been  able  to  discover  the authorities  on  which  his 
opinions or statements may be founded 
If I have not succeedcd in reproducing  these  lectures  in a 
manner worthy of  Niebul~r  in all lespccts,  I venturc to hope 
that a.  coilsideration of  the difficulties  with which I have  had 
to struggle, will suggest some excuse at least for my inadequate 
performance.  I have often  been  on the point  of  giving up 
the undertaking altogether in despair; but my love and admi- 
ration for Nicbuhr,  my conviction of  the peculiar interest and 
value of  his lectures, and the cncouragemcnt of learncd friends, 
always urged me on, and gave  mc  fresh  strength  to  proceed 
with my task.  And now that the work is coinplcted, I would 
rather see all its defects attributed to my own incapacity, than 
that any one of  them should, through  my  fault,  be  imputed 
to Niebuhr. 
L.  SCI-IMITZ 
London, Aprrl, 1844. 
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THE 
HISTORY  OF  EOME,  FROM  THE 
FIRST  PUNIC WAR. 
LECTURE  LII.  (CONTINUED). 
THE  punishment inflicted  by the Romans on tlzc  Campanian 
legion  stationed at Rhegium, is the most  important event of 
thls period, as it brought  the Carthaginians in conflict wit11 
the Romans.  Cainpania cont~ibuted  one legion to the Roman 
armies,  and  was  on  terms  of  perfect  equality  with  Rome, 
according  to  the  ancient  right  of  municipium,'  although 
Rome  had,  in reality,  decided  advantages ovcr  it  Of  the 
eight  legions  sent  against  Pyr~hus,  one  was  composed  of 
Campsanians,  and  was  placed  as  a  garrison  at  Rhegium, 
to  keep  that  town  in  submission ; for  though  fear  of  the 
Bruttians had, in folmer  times,  induced  the Greek towns of 
Ttaly to entertain friendly relations with  Rome, yet aftcr thc 
arlival  of Pyrrhus in Italy, their iidclity was  more  than  sus- 
picious, and it was found neccssaiy to sccure them by garrisons. 
Scvclal  of  thcm  had  already  got  rid  of  these  galrisons  by 
t~cacher~,  and the inhabitants of Rhegiuin were said to harboul 
a  similar  design;  at least,  Dccius  Jubellius,  the commander 
of  the  Campanian  legion,  clialged  them  with  this  crime, ' 
and exacted  a  truly  Satanic vengeance.  In order to remove 
any scruplcs which his  soldieis  might  otheiwiqc  have felt, hc 
caused  forged  letters  of  the Rhegines  to  Pyrrhus,  in wl~ich 
they ofrered to surrendel the garrison to the king, to be  read 
aloud to thcm.  Thereupon the soldicrs  began  their  rccklcsr 
butchery:  the men were  ~nassacred,  the women  and children 
were  sold as  slaves, and the  city  fell  into the hands  of  thc 
soldiers.  About eight years before this occurrencc, the Mamci- 
tines,  Oscan  mercenaries  and  lcinsmen  of  thc  Campanlan., 
' ~01111  p. 144  id  p 464,  11  p 58,  wlth the note of  the transl&tole. 
vol  111  p 477.  ~d.  p.  480 
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had done the same at Messana, and their common  crime now 
united them together  still  inore  closely.  The R~lnans  them- 
selves took  no part in these  horrors, but after  the  Was 
over, marched against Rhegium, where the rebellious  soldiers 
had already maintained themsclves for  ten  years.  Had they 
delivered  up to the  Romans  thcir  gllilty lcadcrs, tl1cy might 
havc cscaped witl1.a  mild  punishment;  but thcir  crirncs  had 
brought  thcm into a state  of  savageness, and they thought it 
impossible  that  the  Roinans  should  pardon  their  conduct. 
They conscqucntly detcrlnincd to offer  resistance to the last, 
and indulged  in the hope that they might, after all, maintain 
thcmsclvcs with the aid  of  the  Carthaginians.  The Cartha- 
ginian  gencral  in Sicily  ought  to have acted with  decision; 
but this was too dangerous, considering  the disposition  of  his 
countryinen,  for  if  he  had  been  unsuccessful,  he  would 
certainly havc been sacrificed.  The siege lasted for a long time 
without the Carthaginians interfering.  At last  the city was 
stormed: of the 4,000 men, only 300 survived, who were sent 
to  Rome  and beheaded.  The Carthaginians had  hesitated, 
pcrhaps  on  account  of  their  alliance  with  Rome;  for  the 
memorable treaty which had been concluded between the two 
states after the expulsion  of  the Tarquilzs, had been renewed 
several times,5 especially with regard to the boundary of  thcir 
dominions  in Sicily and Sardinia.  At the beginning  of  the 
war  with  Pyrrllus,  they  had  cntered  into  a  formal  alliance 
which  had  not  previously  e~isted,~  and  which  bound  them 
to mutual assistance;  neither of  the two  states being allowed 
to  conclude  peacc  with  Pyrrhus  without  the  conscnt  of 
the other.  Whcn Pyrrhus was in  Sicily, both nations wcrc 
in  the  highest  degree jealous  of  each  other; and when, in 
the second  year  of  the war  with  Pyrrhus,  a  Carthaginian 
fleet  of  120  vessels  appeared  before  Ostia  to  assist  the 
Romans, it was dismissed with  thanks without being  used. 
Aftcr  Pyrrhus  had  quitted  Italy, and mhile the war  a, cramst  ' 
Tarcntum was still going on slowly, a  Carthaginian fleet cast 
anchor in front of the harbour of Tarentum, to assist the town 
against  thc  Romans.'  The Carthaginian admiral entered into 
negotiations with  Milo, which, however, only  accelerated  the 
peacc with the Romans, and Milo availccl himself of the oppor- 
tunity of obtaining several thousands of gold-pieces more than 
701. iii.  1).  86, foil.  id. p.  506.  VOI.  iii. p.  506.  iil. p. 538,  foll. 
he  would  otherwise  have  received.  Thia  was  thc first inis- 
between the Roinans and Carthaginians, which, 
strangely enough, is not noticed by Polybius, while it is inen- 
tioned by othcr writers.  This is the inorc surprising, as there 
mas nothing  to induce Polybius to suppress the circumstance; 
alld Ilc is, bcsidcs, thc inost honest of  historians. 
During  the  sicge  of  Rhegium,  the  Romans  concluded  a 
treaty with Hicro  of  Syracuse which  was  the  first  treaty of 
Rome  with  a  Greek  state  beyond  the  bo~ildarics  of  Italy. 
EIicro  supported  thc  Rolnans  with  energy ;  for  his  great 
object was  to recover Mcssaaa,  and to expel  the Mamertincs, 
which could be effected much more easily if Rhegium fell first, 
and might  have  been  acco~nplished  indeed,  if  the  war  had 
been  prosecuted with greater vigour.  But the sicge was pro- 
tracted,  the assistance  whicli Romc had  receivcd  fiom I-liero 
was  almost  lost sight of,  and the Romans now did what they 
would before have been ashaincd of doing. 
The iirst  cause of  the n~isery  inflicted upon Sicily, was the 
unfortunate expcdition of the Athenian flcet against Sicily; it 
was, to speak with the poet, the vteq ApXC~a~os,  the first link 
in the long chain of  misfortunes.  That expcdition was a mis- 
take, for even if it had succeeded, it would havc bccn extremely 
diGcult  to  derive advantages from it; but it is nevcrtlzclcss a 
pardonable error, that a pcople full of  imagination and love of 
activity, should  have  allowed  itsclf  to  be  persuaded  to  such 
an undcrtalring.  The Athenians  were  first  invitcd  by the 
Chalcidian  towns, in  consequence  of  the sad  hatred existing 
between thc Doric and Ionic races, which was propagated even 
in the colonies;  but the  great  expedition  undcr  Alcibiadei, 
was undertaken at the requcst of  the Segestani, a Pelasgian or 
Doric people, at the foot of Mount Eryx, in the west of Sicily, 
who were hard pressed  by the  Sclinuntians, a  people  of  the 
Ionic race.  The expedition, as  is wcll  known, utterly failed. 
As the Syracusans were becoming  sole  mastcrs  of  the island, 
the Scgcstani, fearing  that they might be attacked  in conse- 
quencc of thcir having solicitcd the assistance of the Athcnians, 
thrcw  thcinsclvcs  into the arms of  the Carthaginians,  who, 
with a largc army, conquered Gela, Camarina, and other towns, 
and e~lcalnpcd  bcforc  the walls  of  Syracuse, where Dionysius 
was  thcn bccoming  tyrant.  The war  was  carried  on  with 
9.  541, wit11 notc 98 1. 
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varying success;  but in the second canlpaign, Dionysius seemed 
by the conquest of  Motye (the surviving inhabitants of  which 
founded Lilybaeum) to gain the ascendancy; so that it  appeared 
probal~lc  th:~t  the Carthaginians would  be  expelled  froin the 
island  altogether, %hen  a  peace  was  coacluded,  which  left 
Carthage in possession of the territories of Sclinus and 14imera, 
that is, of  one third of  Sicily.  The country was  now shame- 
f~~ll~  governed by Dionysius, the younger;  under Dion, it was 
torn  to  pieces  by  intcrnal  struggles,  but  was  pacified  by 
Timoleon.  The latter defeated the Carthaginians, and altl~ough 
they retained their conquered province, the Greeks were enabled 
to  restore  their towns in it.  There now follo~~cd  a period  of 
peace  and  happiness  in the  Greek  part  of  Sicily; but  thcn 
came  the  fearful  usurpation  of  Agathocles  and  his  stor~ny 
rcign, which, with all its vicissitudes,  was long and victorious; 
but it was  a  terrible  time, and the reign  of  Dionysius  was, 
colnparativcly speaking, looked  upon  as  having been  an age 
of  humanity  and happiness.  Agatl~ocles  was  a  man  of  no 
ordinary talents, but he was  a monster.  His reign, although 
so~neti~ncs  surrounded  with  splendour,  was  for  Syracuse  a 
period  of  the greatest  misery.  He lavished  the marrow and 
heart's  blood  of  the  country, while  he  surrounded  hilnself 
with  the splendour  of  magnificent palaces and the like.  The 
dcvastntions of  Sicily under this tyrant were SO fearful, that it 
is scarcely  conceivable  how agriculture  and population  could 
maintain  themselves;  and  especially how  Syracuse  could  bc 
one of  the greatest cities  of  the world.  His wars are, on the 
wllole, incmorable on account of their awful calamities;  but, as 
his adversaries had likewise severe reverses, these wars still cast 
some lustre upon his reign.  His peace with Carthage was con- 
cluded on tolerable terms, although it  did not answer his previous 
expectations.  Agathocles was  one  of  those  mcn  who  suffer 
thc punishment of  their  crimes even  in this world.  Contcn- 
tions divided his family, and it can  scarcely be  doubted  that 
he was poisoned  by his own son, or grandson; he did not die, 
but was burnt half-alive, as the poison  acted  too  slowly; and 
his  whole  family  was  at last  extirpated.  The curse  which 
rested  upon  the house  of  Lysimachus, passed over to that of 
Agathoclcs.  After his death, the democratic form  of  govern- 
ment was restored at Syracuse, but could not maintain  itself, 
and the island  fell  into  complete  decay.  The Carthaginians 
llad destroyed Agrigent~~m  in the reign  of  Dionysius;  it had 
been restored to soinc extent, and after the death of Agathocles 
became an independent  city, under a  prince  of  the name  of' 
l'hintias.  Sicily, as early as the time described in the letters 
which bear the name of  Plato, was  in  such  a  condition, that 
the  I-Icllcnic races  were in danger  of  being oppressed by the 
Carthaginians and Oscans.  This was the case  after  the death 
of Agnthocles,  whence I believe  that  the lettcrs ascribed  to 
l'lato,  at least the earlier ones,  among them, the  seventh  and 
ciglltll, bclong  to that period;  for there can be no doubt  that 
tlicy are ancient, and  belong  to the  classical  period, though 
they arc not  genuine, that is, they were  not writtcn  as  early 
as  the tilnc  of  Plato.  Bentley says  therc  are  two  ways  of 
proving  the spuriousness  of a book;  the one, by ineans  of its 
contents;  the other, by means  of  its  language.  Very  little 
can be said i11  this case against the contents.  As to the seventli 
and eighth letters, people may have different opinions in regard 
to the language, but their contents  shew that  they belong  to 
a later age than that of  Plato.  One  instance, among  others, 
is the prophesy that the Greel;  race would perish, and that the 
inhabitants of  the island would  speak  Oscan and Phoenician. 
Agnthocles  had  carried on his wars by  lneans of  mercenaries, 
who were  for  the most part barbarians;  many also were Sam- 
nitcs, Lucnnians, and  Oscans, which  last  name  at that  time 
comprised all the Sabelliaii tribes.  We  never hear of Ronlans 
having served  as  ~nercenaries,  whereas  Etruscan  soldiers  arc 
rncntioncd  in  Sicily,  and  especially  Mamertines,  which was 
the common name for Oscan mercenaries;  and the latter occur 
in Sicily at a ti~iic  when  Rome was  at mar with their motl~cr 
country.  This {act  shews  that  the relation of individuals to 
the state was  quite different  at Rome  from  that which sub- 
sisted among  other nations, and this accounts for the strength 
of  the  Romans.  The feeble  hands  which! after Agathocles, 
undertook  the task  of  government,  were  unable  to manage 
those  troops, and therefore gave thein money that they might 
return to Italy.  The  troops  accordingly went  to Mcssana  to 
embarli; but the Messanians, quitc forgetting  the curse which 
the Zanclaeans,  once  faithlessly  expelled  by them,  had  pro- 
nounced, received  them  into  their  houses;  soon  afterwards, 
Iiowever, they mere  lnavsacred by their guests, and  thcn those 
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people, under the name of Blainertines, and many other Oscans 
joined  them.  The horrors  which  these  inercenaries perpe- 
trated, resemble those  which  were  colninitted  in tbc Nether- 
lands  in  1576, where  bands  of mercenarics plundered whole 
towns, as a meails of  procuring  their hirc:  such, for instance, 
was the fate of Maestrjcht.  This Oscan colony was allied with 
thc Rhegines, and supported  them;  and  it mas only with thc 
aid of Niero that the Romans were cnabled to conquer theln. 
After Pyrrhus had  left Locri, the whole  island appeared to 
be in a  state  of  dissolution.  Not  long  ancr this,  howcvcr, 
Hiero, then a young man, was at the  head  of  the  Syracusan 
army, and the soldicrs,  fortunately for  Syracuse, proclaimed 
him king.  Hc was a great  man, and as  good  a king as they 
could  have  wished  for.  He was  descendcd from an ancicnt 
noblc  family  at  Syracuse,  and some,  perhaps  from  flattery, 
traced  his origin to Hiero, the son of  Dinomencs, so  that  his 
circumstances  favoured  his  usurpation,  at  a  time  when  the 
state could be happily governed only by a monarch, and when 
a monarchy could  be  established  only by usurpation.  In his 
rcign, which lasted upwards of  fifty years, the first  Punic war 
brolie  out.  The  strength  of  his  little  kingdom  became,  of 
course, much exhausted by the support he gave to the Romans, 
although he reigned  with  the greatest wisdom and economy. 
I-Ie made a gentle  use  of  his  power, ruled  likc a citizen over 
his equals, and never insulted thc feelings of his subjects.'O  Thc 
last twenty years of  his reign werc very prospcrous, and Syra- 
cuse began to rccovcr from its sufferings."  But notwithsanding 
all  this, Syracusc, after  the death  of  Hiero, was  still  a  very 
decayed place.  IIiero, had in his youth been of a warlike dis- 
position, but this afterwards  almost entirely vanished.  There 
is a  circumstance  connccted  with  his  history, whicli  is  men- 
tioned  by the Scholiast on Ovid's Ibis, but is  seldom  noticed. 
Hiero is there said  to have  ordered  Theocritus  to be put to 
death, on  account of  soinc  satire;  and such a thing is by no 
means unlikely in the case of a Greek ruler of that time. 
Hiero was anxious to  expel  the Mamcrtines  from Mcssan:~ 
and to take possession of  the town;  he would thcn havc been 
a neighbour of the Romans, and he hoped  tl~at  he might be 
able to fall back upon them, if thc Carthagi~lians  should  be- 
come too powerful in the island.  Carthage had  extencled her 
'"  vol. iii  p.  561, foll.  " id. 1'.  G17, 
dominions, had gained possession of Agrigentum, and advanced 
as Gar  as Gela and Camarina, so that shc now occupied as great 
a portion of  the island as after the first peace with Dionysius. 
Hiero's external relations  to Carthage, however, were at that 
time of a friendly nature, and there is little doubt that an actual 
peace  had  been  concluded  between  Carthage and  Syracuse. 
The latter  city had  bnt  few  dependent  towns,  Catana  and 
Tauroincnium being allies. 
Whcn aHiero had,  by an  excusable strctcli  of  power,  got 
rid  of  his  old  mercenaries,  whom  he betrayed  in war, and 
mused to be cut to pieccs by the Mamertines, and when he had 
firmly established his authority, he formed  a  new army, and 
undertook the war against the b1amertincs,12  who had cxtended 
their sway over almost the whole  of  the north-eastern  part of 
the island.  Hicro was successful, and being supported by the 
Carthaginisns, with whom he still kept up a good understand- 
ing, lie gaincd a great battle.  Messana was bcsieged  by both 
in concert; and under thesc circumstances the Manicrtines saw 
no means of escape.  It was the wish of Hiero to destroy them, 
because they endcavoured to annihilate the Greek population; 
but thc Carthaginians had not  the same  interest in so doing, 
and merely wished to expel them from the island;  for as they 
were Oscans and Italicans, and of the same race as the Romans, 
thc Carthaginians mistrusted them, and feared lest they should 
open to the Romans the way into Sicily, which they themselves 
werc anxious to keep clear  of  an Italian population.  It  was, 
morcover, the intention of thc Carthaginians, in casc of success, 
to kec?  Messana for themselves, and to use I-Iiero as their tool.13 
The Romans had, in thc meantime, punished  their faithless 
allies, ar,d compelled the Icgion bcsicgcd  at Rhegiuin  to sur- 
render.  Tllc Mamertines, in their distress, solicited the assist- 
ancc of the Romans.  This was,  as Polybius  exprcsses  it, an 
~/TOTOV,  or something the absurdity of whicli must strike every 
onc.  The Romans, wlio had just punished thcir own allics for the 
vcry  crime  of  whicli  the  Mamertines  werc  guilty,  at first 
l2  The beautiful idyl  of  Tl~eocritus,  called  Chz~ritcs,  or  Hioro (xvi.),  refers 
to this war.  Thcocritus is a poct in whom we pcrceive the intellectual freshness 
of  Sicily at that time.--N.-Comparc  vol. iii. p.  562. 
l3 The Caltl~aginians  had  moral princi1,les which  differed from those of  the 
nomans, and thcrc may be  some  truth  in  the  charge  of  faithlessness brought 
against thcin; hnt it is wrong to  say that jdes  Pu~zica  was  the  same  as: tho 
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scrupled, aiid  rcf~~sed  to  coiiiply with  their  request;  but the 
dcinoii  of  ambition  had  already  talcen  possession  of  their 
minds.  They reasoned with thclnselves thus : tliat  they must 
not take  too  strict  a  inoral  view  of  the case, and that they 
could not be made to answer for the sins of the Mainertines in 
a foreign  country:  moreover, they owed it to  themselves not 
to allow the Carthaghians to become  masters of  Messana and 
its cxcellent  harbour, which would  givc them an opportunity 
of scnding a fleet  to Calabria without  any difficulty;  whereas 
now their nearest port was that of  Yalerlno, froin which such 
an undertaking could not  be ventured  on.  Tlicir  calculatioil 
was quitc correct, for Cartlzage, in possession of Mcssana, woulct 
havc  bccome  as  invulnerable  to  Rome  as  England  was  to 
Nap~leon.'~  What intentions the Cartliaginians entcrtained in 
regnrd to Italy, might be inferred from the fact of their having 
scnt a fleet to Tarentum; and  if they wcre allowed to acquire 
thc full possessioii of  Sicily and  Sardinia, Rome, tllrough her 
false dclicacy, would  soon see the war transfcrrcd  to  her own 
tcrritory, which would  be  the more dangerous, as the flcct of 
thc Carthaginians  might  sail  wherever they liked.  It woulcl 
have becn in accordance with true moral ancl political priiiciplcs, 
against which  nothing  could  havc bcen said, if  thcy had en- 
clcavourcd to put  Hiero in possession  of  Messana.  The state 
of  things requircd  a  quick  rcsolution, since  thc Mamertines 
might  casily  sccurc  the  protcction  of  the Carthaginians,  by 
merely throwinv the gates open to tlicm.  Thc senate took no  9  rcsolution,  and ~t seems that it even  rejected  thc  proposal, 
either from timidity, or on account of moral scruples.  Had thc 
ancicnt  regulations  bccn  still  in force,  according  to  which, 
nothing  could  bc brought bcfore the centuries without a pro- 
posal of  the scnate  &i-poPoZ;h~u~ov),  thc niattcr  would 
havc  bcen  decided;  but  the  tribunes  now  could  bring  thc 
clucstion bcfore the assembly of  the people without a rcsolutioli 
of the scnate, and there it was  dccrccd  that  assistance  slioLlld 
bc scnt to the Mamertincs.  Polybius  attributes  this  step  to 
what  he  believcs  was  the fact, that the people, oppressed by 
clcbt, were  alixious  for  a war  in  order  to  enrich themselves. 
If this view is correct, it ~OWS  that even as early as that timc, 
the poor pcoplc predominated  in the asscinbly.  But Polybius 
 roba ably assumed  this motive, only because  he conceived that 
'I vol. ni.  p. 563.  Compare Poljh. 1.  10. 
it might  have  existed ; there  may  liavc  been  illany  otl~cr 
lnotives.  At any rate, ho~vevcr,  thc resolutioil  was  rash  mid 
t~lougl~tlcss,  for the Carthaginians mere masters of  the sea, and 
tile  Ronians had  not a  single ship  of  war.  In the maritime 
to~vns  which they hacl taken, they had even clcstroyed  all  thc 
plleys  of the  Etruscans  and  other  nations, perhaps in order 
to prcvcnt piracy, and to avoid the responsibilities which they 
would  have  thereby iacurrcd.  According  to  Pol~bius,  they 
had  only a  few  triremes  and pentecontors  froin  the  Grcelc 
towns to carry their troops across from  lihegiuin  to  Messana. 
l'liny,  on  the other  hand, states  that within  forty days they 
built 300 triremes;  and a few ships  woulcl  certainly not  have 
suficed.  ITroin Rhcgiuin they negotiated with the Mamertines, 
who, as the Roinans had  becn  too  slow  in their  moven~cnts, 
had admitted the Carthaginian gcneral with a vcry few Cartha- 
ginian troops, or pcrliaps none at all, into tllc town.  A legate 
of  Appius Claudius went to Messana, and ncgotiatccl with the 
Mamertines, who were glad to obtain a peace which was quitc 
unworthy of  the Romans,  and the Cartliaginian  commander 
was obligctl to quit the town.  The Carthaginians, whose fleet 
was stationecl at Pelorus, although war  was  not  yet  clcclared, 
had  wislicd  to prevent  the Romans from  crossing  ovcr  into 
Sicily; but  the  Roinans  were  favoured  by thc  currclit and 
wind, aiid  with  incrcdible boldness crossed the straits in small 
bodies.  The Carthaginians, who had  undertaken  to protect 
Mcssana against Rome, now allied themselves, as I have already 
stated, with Hiero; and wlieil the Roinans were  in  possession 
of  Messana,  they  were  bcsicged  by  the Syracusans and  the 
Carthaginians in separate camps; the Carthaginians were prob- 
ably cncxnped  to  the  north, and  Iliero  to the south of  the 
city, and the  communication between the two may have been 
dificult.  As Mcssana  was  situated  on  the slope of a hill of 
coiisiclerable extcnt, the Ro~naiis  could easily sally forth against 
Icing Hicro,  who offered a powcrful resistance indced; but the 
Sicilian soldiers could not hold out against the Roman legions, 
and hc was defeated.  After  this victory, the  Romans  turned 
against the Carthaginians, apparently without  any dcclaration 
of  war, whereupon the latter retreated  with  their insufficient 
forces, and the Romans  advanccd  without  encountering  any 
resistance.  In the  following  year,  489,  when  thc  consuls, 
M'.  Otacilius  and  Al'.  Valerius  (surnamed  Alesealla,  from 10  BEGINNING OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 
Alessana)  landed  in  Sicily, the Roinans  appeared  before  the 
walls  of  Syracuse.  A  number of  Greek towlis,  as Tauronlc- 
nium, Catana, and  others  opened  their  gates  to  them; and 
~vhcn  preparations  were  made  for  laying  siege to S~racusc, 
Hiero, following the  of  his  people, made  overtures to 
thc Romans, and faun$ a favourable reception, as it  was evident 
that Cartliage woulcl not continue to look on while the Roruans 
were  making  such  progress  in  Sicily.  I-Iiero  remained  the 
sovereign of  only a small state, becaine the ally of  the Iiolnan 
people,  and paid  down  a  slnall  contribution of  one hundred 
talents.15  The alliance thus  established  between  thc Romans 
and I-Iicro was both offensive and defensive. 
Tllc beginning of  the first Punic war is usually dated fi.01~1 
the passagc of  the Romans into Sicily; but their alliance with 
Hiero  must  be  looked  upon  as its real commencement.  The 
condition of  Carthage  at that time  is very obscure, although 
much has been written  abont it.  The Carthaginians were an 
Oriental people, and of a character widely diffcrcnt  froin  that 
of  the Romans or the Greeks, who, for this reason, should not 
bc our guides in  judging of the Carthaginians.  The first Punic 
war was, on  the whole, conducted very awkwardly; and prc- 
viously to the time when  the grcat  Hamilcar Barca  appeared 
in the field, it grescnts no such  claims  upon  our  sympathy as 
we meet with in the history of  the wars  against  Pyrrhus  and 
the Samnites. 
LECTURE LIIT. 
EVERYBODY  knows that Carthagc was a colony of Tyre.  We 
may adopt the statement,  that  the building of  Carthage took 
pl:~ce scvcnty-two  years  l~eforc thc  alleged  fi)undation  of 
1iome.l  This  statement  is  quite  historical,  and,  likc many 
which  occur  in  Joscphus'  work  a,gainst Apion;  of  infiiiitc 
Polyb. i.  16.  Compare vol. iii. p.569, whcre Nicbuhr follows the account 
of  Orosius (iv. 7),  according to whom I-Iiero had to pay 200 talents. 
vol. I. 13.  272. 
" It is  strange  that  Joiephus  did  not  look  into  the  Phoenician  originals 
themselves, hot 1% as sati5ficd with Greek translations and extracts.-N. 
importance ; it is in all  probability founded upon  Phoenician 
c]lyoaicles, of  which  he used  a  Greck  translation  inade  by 
h.lcnander of  Ephesus.  They are  as  genninc  as  Bcrosus and 
S;~l~chuni:~thon,  and arc  closely connected with the history of 
tllc Jewish  kings.  To suspect n forgery by Josephus is  quite 
out of  the question.  It  is evident that Tiinaeus had the same 
statement in view, though  he made  the fouadation of  Romc 
contemporaneous  with  that  of  Carthage ; but the difference 
is not great, if we calculate the saccula at 110 years.  Historical 
~vorlts  existed  at Carthage  and were  known to the Roinans ; 
but after  the destruction of Carthage they were  given to  the 
kings of  N~inidia.~  Whenever  we  meet  with  such  dates  in 
history,  and wish  to  act  in a  truly philosophic  manner,  we 
lnust endeavour to understand them with grcat precision,  and 
acccpt them with gratit~de.~  Carthage was not the first Tyrian 
scttlement  in  those  regions.  Utica  (in  Phoenician  Athica) 
had been previously founded; its establishlnent belongs  to the 
timc when  the power  of  tllc  Phoenicians was  at  its hcight, 
when they founded scttleincnts inCyprus and many otlicr places. 
Thc  stories  about Pyginalion,  Elisa,  etc.,  although we  look 
upon them as somcthing more than mere fables, are beautiful 
and  truly poetical  lcgends.  The  Phoenician  settlements in 
Cythera, Thasos,  and other places belong to a much later date 
than is commonly supposed.  I bclievc that Cadiz cxistcd before 
the foundation of Carthage. 
The original name of  Carthage was  Bozra (a  town  Bhpcra, 
whence the story of a cow's hidc and of the lnode of purchasing 
the ground).  Ey  the sidc of  Bozra there soon arosc a ncw town 
Carthachadta,  contracted  Carchadta  (Carthago,  KU~X~G&V), 
Pliny, Hist. Nut. xviii. 5 ;  Sdlnst, JU~IC~  tl~.  17. 
Some time  ago I founil  a wiil~  expressed somewhere by  a  writer of  our 
nineteenth ce~~tlu-y,  that hiitorians wotxltl t~dhcre  to the old-fashioned cl~ror~ology 
which  counted the  years from the  creation of  tho world.  But whoever writcs 
such things, sl~cws  that he does not kn01v  history, and that he has no notion of 
tlle  rnanner in which  it  should be  trcated.  That  system  of  chronology 11as 
hcron~e  ridic~~lons  by  the nbuie which has been made of  it.  If  a man will now 
write il chronology, .and  like Calvisias ascend to the heginning of the world, and 
according to this plan give  ns, in his  table, for instance, a list  of  the kings of 
Atticn, it  is  something more than  old-fashioned, it  is  langhable.  I may add 
lmre, that a true  philologer  does not  att:wh  any great importance to his being 
able to state exactly in what month  or on what day a Roman emperor ascended 
the throne : such thmqs  are  trifles, although  in  certain  instances they may be 
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just  as Neapolis  arose by the side of  Parthenope.  This town 
remained,  perhaps  for  two  hundred  years,  an  illsignificant 
place,  and rose very slowly; it mas in a state of dependancc 
upon Tyre, and paid tcibute to the neighbouring Libyan tribes. 
Thc relation between Carthage and its mother-city is a beautiful 
featarc in its history, and Carthagc never ncglectcd the duty it 
owed to its pareht Tyre, even wlien the condition of Tyre had 
becolnc  completely  altercd.  The manner in which,  and the 
ti~nc  ~11~11,  Carthage  began  to  extend.  its  dominion,  are 
unknown;  situated  In  the  midst  of  barbarous  tribes  which 
were incapable  of assimilation, it could  not thrive as quickly 
as the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia, which were inhabitccl 
by nations  closely  related  to the Pclasgians,  if  not  in their 
language, at least in their  purely huinan character which was 
so peculiar  to them.  Such nations were, e.g. thc Lycians and 
Carians, who, evcn previously to their being  EIellenised, pos- 
sessed  a  high  degree  of  civilisation,  as  we  see  from  their 
nlonuments  and  institutions.  The  Carthaginians  wcrc  not 
compcllcd  to attend  to  agriculture,  and therefore  could  not 
incrcase  at  the rate  which we  find when  families  are much 
s~~bdividcd.  The  Libyans were  hard  and  oppressive  neigh- 
bours; they  wcre  barbarians (they arc  called Berbers  to  this 
day)  who became  mixecl  with the Phocnicians  only by slow 
degrees.  It was  not till the middle of  the third  century  of 
Rome, that is, more than 300 years after its foundation, that Car- 
thage appears in history as a political power.  The early times of 
Carthage arc involved in impenetrable darl~ness;  we have only 
a few statcinents in Justin from Trogus, and in Diodorus who 
probably derivecl his information from Tiinacus.  From Jnstin5, 
we  hear  of  a  civil  war  in  which  Maleus,  a  Carthaginiall 
general, concl~~crcd  his  native  town; but I cannot dwell upon 
any detail, and shall give you only a rapid sketch of the history 
of Carthage.  This much is certain, that for a long period Car- 
thage paid  tribute to the Libyans; and the first  sylnptoln 
strength was that they shooli  off  the yoke in a great war.  ~t 
seems  to  have  been  particularly  fortunate for Carthage,  that 
the position  of its mother-country Phoeizicia was so  peculiar; 
it had  struggled  long and  vigorously  agninst Egypt, and zt 
length obtained the protection of Persia, under which its con- 
dition was so~netilnes  tolerable incl(.ed, but still at times it felt 
xvill. 7. 
foreign dominion  to  be vcry oppressive, and many Phoe- 
nicilxns may  have  emigrated  to  their  free  and indcpenclent 
which now began to flourish the more, as by its connec- 
tion ~vith  Persia, Tyre became the port for all Asia, even as far 
India.  The treaty of  Cartliagc with EO~IIC,  in the year  of 
the city 245, shews that the Carthaginians  then ruled over  a 
1)nt of  Sicily, Sardinia and Libpt, and formed  a large  state, 
~oin~aratively  speaking. 
About the year  of Rome 272, the Carthaginians are said to 
have crossed  over  into Sicily  with a  great army of  300,000 
Inen, against Gclo of Syracuse and Theroil of Agrigent~nn:  but 
this expeclition is fabulous; I do not mcan  to say  tliat  therc 
was no expedition at all, but its reputed greatness is fia,bulous. 
Their defeat  at Hinzera, and the battle of  Salamis, are said to 
have occurred on the same day ;%but  a more correct chronology 
founded on  Timaeus shews, that Gelo, to whom this victory is 
ascribed, did not ascend  the throne  until after  the battle  of 
Salamis.  The synchronism  is  altogether  visionary,  and de- 
stroys the whole chronology  of  the history of  Sicily, nor is it 
possible  that the expedition  of  tho Carthaginians  can  have 
been  so  important.  The only things that can be regarded as 
certain are, that the  expedition took place  about  Olymp. 76 
or  77,  that the Carthaginians were  defeated, and  tliat  for  a 
long time afterwards they did not think of any fresh attempt 
against Sicily; but they strengthened theinselves in other parts. 
At the time when the  Athenians were  in Sicily, the Cartha- 
ginians  wcre  confined to three points, viz.:  Motye,  a  Punic 
settlement in the island, and the two Greelr towns of Panormus 
and Solocis,' and during the Athenian expeclition no mention 
is made of the Carthaginians.  After the unfortunate  issue  of 
that enterprise the implacable enmity of  the victorious  towns 
against the towns which had admitted the Athenians, brought 
great  calamities upon  the  island.  The  Carthaginians  were 
invited by the inhabitants  of  the former,  and came over with 
a  considerable  army.  In  this  campaign,  about  350  u.c., 
Selinus, Agrigenturn, Camarina, and Gcla were destroyed, and 
the  very  existence  of  the  Greeks  in  Sicily was  thrcatencd. 
Dionysius, the elder,  concluded  a disadvantageous peacc,  and 
in some  measure  restored  the former boundaries; but after- 
wards hc was  more fortunate.  In the rcign of Dionysius 11. 
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the war with  the  Carthaginians was  renewed, but Tiilloleon 
defeated them, and coinpellccl them to withdraw to &lotye and 
Lilybaeum.  A favourablc pcacc, howcvcr, was then concluded, 
and the western  part of  Sicily, including  Selinus, was  ccdcd 
to the Carthaginians, and a line fi-om Hitnera to Agrigentum, 
(the rivers  Himera  and 13alycus,) ~narkcd  the liniits  which 
afterwards remained  the normal  boundary,  and was  usu:~ll~ 
rcstored on thc conclusion of a peace.  I11  the tiinc of Agatho- 
clcs the Carthaginians bcsieged  Syracuse, but He  twice Iaiidcd 
with an army in Africa,  and having dcstroyed Motye  he con- 
finecl  them for  a  time to Lilybaeum; but aftcrwards he was 
compelled  to  restore  tlic  normal boundary.  Soon  aftcr  thc 
death of Agathocles there  followed  the war of  Pyrrh~s,~  who 
prosecuted  the plans of Agatlloclcs.  Aftcr his departure, the 
Carthaginians again extended  their dominion, and recovered 
Agrigentum. 
At the commenccinent  of  the lirst Punic war, the Cartl~a- 
ginians werc in posscssion of the whole of the wcstcrn half  of 
the island, and of the north coast tts  far as Myle and Mcssana. 
Their empire in Africa extenclcd as far as the great n~arshes  in 
the east, and  c,ompriscd nearly  the whole  of  modern  Tunis. 
Along a great part of the coast they had a nuinbcr of colonies, 
and probably in thc interior also.  The coast of Algicrs, as far 
as the straits of Gibraltar, was covered with  fortified  factories, 
or properly speaking, colonies; but in thosc parts  of the coast 
where the mountains advance  too near the sea, they appear to 
have had no strong settlcments."ll  Sardinia was subjcct to 
them, with the exception  of the mountainous  districts, 
wcrc inhabited  by savage  tribcs, who  then lived  in the same 
manner as they do at the prcscnt day.1° Tlzere were also a few 
vol. iii. p.  5  11. foll. 
The Lihyan.; had received a Punic civilisation, and adoptcd t11e Punic  Ian- 
fillage,  Saint A~rglistine  says, that Pllnic was his mother tongnc.  The Lil~yans 
are a  remarliable instance of  the great inflllence of  a  people  like  the  Car- 
thaginians.  It is very l~robablc,  that when the Aral)s conql~cred  those colmtries, 
they found a people there, which, to some  extent, was  able to nnderstand their 
language ;  and this milst have  greatly facilitated their progress.  The idioms of 
Ti~nis  and Malta un(1oubtedly contain Punic elements, modified by the influcncc 
of the Arabic, and are certainly worthy to be  investigated by Orientalists ;  bat, 
unfortunately, those  scholars (10  not often write  about  things of  any historical 
importance.-N. 
'0  They still wear  the  same  dress  of  goat  skins which Cicero (Pro Scauro, 
c.  2.) calls mastiiicca.-N. 
cartlIaginian settle~ncnts  in Corsica, probably near its excellent 
harbours.  Carthagc  was  moreover  thc  sovereign  of  the 
BJearian  islands.  In  Spain  she  possessed  the  coasts  of 
Grannda and Murcia, and Gades was  in a state of  depenclence, 
$t~~ough  it was a sister-town. 
In regard to thc political  constitution  of  Carthage, we  arc 
quite in the dark.  I have made several attempts to sce my way 
clearly, and lia,ve read  all  that has been  writtcn upon it,, but 
no important result is to  be gained.  It is  evident, howcver, 
that when Aristotle" speaks of  a  64poy  at Carthage, we must 
conceivc  it  as  a  perfect  colnmonalty  which  was  gradually 
forrncd  out  of  colonial  citizens  and Libyans."  Thc Siipoy  of 
Cartl~agc  consisted  of such  airyrchu8eq,  Libyans 2nd Punians, 
who though quite distinct from each other, even  in their lan- 
page, could easily be forrncd into a cS+~ov, like the patricians 
and plebeians of  Rome, though they belongcd to one  and thc 
same nation.  The relation between  the l'unisns  and Libyans 
was  analogous  to  that  existing  between  thc  Lettian  and 
Lithuanian tribcs  and the German  colonists, or  bctween  the 
Slavonic population about Lubcck and thc Gcrnlans, the formcr 
of  whoin likewise becainc completely Gerinanised.  We Iinow 
that Carthage had a senate, yQpovre~,  which  held  the reins of 
government  down  to  thc  first  Punic  war.  Accordi~ig to 
Aristotle, the 2~+~ov  of Carthage  had  not  niucli more  power 
than  that  of  Sparta,  where  the  people  wcre  like the thrcc 
hundred legislators  of  Napolcon, who werc obligcd to submit 
to his will.  At Sparta, the magistrates  alone wcrc permitted 
to speak  in the assembly,  and the  S+jpov  was  silent.  The 
people might, it is true, rcject what was brought before them, 
but it would not have been very advisable to make use of  this 
right.  At Carthage, says Aristotle, matters werc different, for 
any one might at least come forward and speak.  Those whom 
'I  Polit. ii.  8. p  63, foll. ed. Gottling. 
There is a prejl~dicc  which might seem to be opposed to this supposition.  In 
speaking of Africans, we are apt to think only of  ncgrocs, and to forget that the 
Libyans,  or  thc Amazirgs (Shilhas, Maxyes, Masscsylians),  as  they call  tthem- 
selves,  do  not  diffcr in their whole physical constitntion from the inhabitants of 
sonthcrn Europe.  The Libyan  tribes had,  it  is  true,  a  peculiar  Iangiage; 
hut  all the  coasts  of  the Mediterranean, including t!le  principal pmt of  Egypt, 
previously to its conquest by  the  Ethiopians, were occi~pied  by  white nations, 
which  although  differing in language, did not  find any greater  difficulties  in 
assimilating themselves to the Romans, than an Iberian or Celtic population.-N. 16  CONSTITUTION  OF  CARTI~AGE.  NATIONAL  CI3ARACTER.  l'i 
he calls  ParsX~iq,'~  (the  suffetes,  schoffetim,) had  in former 
tirnes  been  the highest  military  officers ; after- 
wards, wllCn  powers were scrupulously divided, they became a 
lnere administrative  authority, and their power  was  carefully 
kept distinct  from  that of  the military commanders.  More- 
over, we find mention of a body called the Hundred,  roba ably 
the same  as  the One  Hundred  and  Pour of  Aristotle, who 
cornpares  them  to the Spartan  ephors.  I have  shewn  else- 
whcre14  that this numbcr bears a relati011 to the fifty-two weeks 
of the year, just as in the Greek  constitutions so many things 
are  connected  with  the  divisions  of  the  year  into twelve 
months.  There were  also  magistrates,  whom Aristotle calls 
re~rap~lab,'~  but what  they were we  do not know; they were 
elcctcd by thc body of  One Hundred and Four.  The council 
of the One Hundred and Four were unqucstionably the centum 
senatores before whom, according to Justin, kings and gcnerals 
had to nizclergo the e&BBv7: perhaps they were a council which, 
like tllc ephors at Sparta (rapa.rrX?jasos 2+dposq), had the right 
to  interfere  with  the administration  of  the  senate  and  the 
kings.  Aristotle  further remarks, that in reality  the scnatc 
was  invested  with  the  entire  power  of  administration  and 
govcrnment, and that only the decision  of  certain cases rested 
with the people.  There existed, accordingly, no reprcscnta- 
tives of the people  to set thcm in motion, like the tribunes at 
Rome.  The highest offices at Carthagc were given ripsc~lv8~v 
aid n-Xour1v8qv7 and  were  hv7rai,  as  Aristotle  says.  This 
statement agrees with a passagc in Polybi~s,~G  who says that it 
was custoinary at Carthagc to purchase offices from those who 
liar1 thcm to dispose of, without any scruple;  a practice which 
we also find in the smaller cantons of Switzerland, especially ill 
tllc Grisons, wherc  the office of  high-bailiff is sold  in a most 
disgraceful  manner.  At Venice,  too, the practice  was  once 
very  notorious,  though  there,  indeed,  tlic  offices  were  not 
formally sold, but  it was  understood  that  every  ollc  should 
pay for them.  At Vcnice, persons  sought thc great  offices of 
state as  a provvigione,  to  restore  thcir  ruined  estates.  The 
rich were never punished, not even for murder, but paid clown 
l3 Polit. as above.  '901. i.  p.  339, llote 851. 
15  Polit. ii. 8. p. 64,  ed.  Giittling, if  the  reading  is  correct.  Our test of 
Aristotlc's  Politics is derived  from a single Par~s  MS.  of  the 14th centuly, and 
is one of the most corrupt tcxts of ancient writers.-N.  l6  vi.  66. 
filles, and cartes blanches for murder were regularly sold.  Such 
a]so was the c,haracter of  the Carthaginians.  They were, it is 
true, a commercial people, but this should not  have deadened 
their feelings of  honour,  any more  than it does,  for example, 
in  England.  But sentiments  like  tllosc  which  we  find  in 
modern  times in America, were quite general among the Car- 
thaginians,  and were the source of their misfortunes.l7  As far 
as  their  wealth  reached,  they were  all-powerful;  but  their 
avarice  drew  upon  them  t11e  hatred of  their neighbours and 
subjects.  Lybia had to pay exceedingly heavy taxes,  and had, 
like India, to give up a fourth, or in extraordinary emergencies, 
even half of  its produce.  To these heavy taxes, we must add 
all  that  the  Carthaginian  governors  received  or  extorted. 
When Aristotle l8 says  that the  Carthaginians kept the com- 
monalty  in good  humour by sending  its  members  to  other 
towns, not  to settle  there, but to suck out the blood of  their 
inhabitants, we must  own  that  Cartliage  was  altogether  in a 
very bad  condition.  Hence,  the contrast  between  Carthagc 
and  Roine  in its better days is very striking.  Certain  great 
men, however,  such  as  Hamilcar,  Hasdrubal, and Hannibal, 
succeeded nevertheless  in gaining the affections of  the people 
in subject countries; for  they acted like kings, with  perfcct 
independence.  When  Hamilcar  was  in  Spain, the Cartha- 
ginians  were  really  popular  there.  Hacl  Mago  or  Himilco 
been  sent thither,  the state of  tllings  would  have  been  far 
different. 
The  Carthaginians  themselves  were  very unwarlikc,  and 
thought  that money would  indeed  be worth nothing, if, not- 
withstanding their wealth, they tl~emsclvcs  should be cornpelled 
to serve as soldiers.  Their armies, therefore, consisted of mer- 
cenaries,  only  the  cavalry  being  formed  of  Carthaginians. 
Their military system  had  its advantages as well as its disad- 
vantages.  The mercenaries were an evil, but the circumstance 
that their generals were not magistrates at the same time, had 
its advantages; for the same general might often be allowed to 
pursue  his  plans  for a number  of years, whereas the Romans 
allowed  their consuls to act during one  year only, or at most 
during  a second  year as proconsuls.  The Carthaginian wen-  t? 
erals, therefore, were intimately acquainted with their soldiers, 
l7  In some parts of  America, any profit which a person can make is thought 
lawful. -N.  Is polit. p. 66. 
VOL.  11.  C 18  PHYSICAL  NATURE  OF  SICILY.  PHYSICAL  NATURE  OF SICILY.  19 
and a great general like Hamilcar could  accolnplisl~  incredible 
tllings.  Previously to the time  of  Hamilcar,  however,  the 
choice  of  their  generals was  often  so  unfortlmate,  that  it 
would  have  been  better  if  changes  had  been  made  more 
frequently. 
LECTURE LIV. 
IN order to understand the operations of the belligerents during 
the first Punic war, it is necessary to havc a clear view of  thc 
physical  structure of  Sicily.  The heart and kernel of  Sicily 
is Mount Actna, from which  a  chain  of  mountains  stretches 
along  the coast towards the Apennines, and procceds throug1l 
Bruttium as far as  Hipponium.  The range  of  mountains  in 
southern Italy belongs, if we consider it geologically, to Sicily, 
and forms a continuation of  Mount Pclorus.  The Apennines, 
which are of quite a different structure, terminate in the neigh- 
bourl~ood  of  Hipponium, and are connected with the Sicilian 
mountains  only by low hills, so that the Greeks  often  enter- 
tained  the idea  of  making  a canal across the isthmus, which 
would  at present  be a very easy undertaking.  The range  of 
inountains from  Aetna  to  Messana  often  runs so close to the 
shore, that there is hardly a narrow road  between the sea and 
the mountains.  South of  Aetna, the mountains leave a con- 
siderable plain towards the sea, especially about Leontini.  In 
the south of  Sicily, between  Syracuse and the western part of 
the island, there are only low hills.  West of Aetna, there run 
chains of mountains which are designated by the names, Heraei 
montes  and Nebrodes montes.  From Pelorus to Himera, the 
mountains  run  close  by  the sea-shore; the  sea  washes  the 
foot  of  the mountains, and in many places  there  is  no road 
at all  between  the mountains and the sea.  An artificial road 
might  indeed  be  built, as  is the case on Mount Posilipo near 
Naples;  but  that  has  not  yet been  done.  To the  west  of 
Himera, there is a slnall  extent  of  flat  coast,  and the moun- 
tains become gradually lower.  A short distance from Palermo 
there is a perfect plain, out of  which there rises only one hill, 
the ancient Hercte (Monte Pellegrino), which is crowned with 
the  collvent  of  Snnta Rosalia.  Further west, the  mountains 
rise awnin, and  Mount Sail Giuliano (Eryx) is, next to Aetna, 
?  the lllgllest  point  in  Sicily, and rises  in an unusual manner 
froin groups of  lower hills.  The country about Enna is  flat. 
TIle  soutl~-westen~  portion,  as  far  as Agrigentum, is for the 
lnost p~rt  a flat coast;  near Gela and Camarina, the country is 
liliewise  flat; and furthcr east from Agrigentum, the mountains 
are  at a  considerable  distance  from  the coast, so  that if we 
imagine a line drawn fiom Agrigentum to Catana, the country 
south  of  this line is a perfect plain, which is only interrupted 
here and there by low hills.  By means of  this general outline 
we shall be able, I hope, to estimate the manner in which the 
war  was conducted.  Persons  have asked, "  Why did not the 
Romans, who  were  in possession  of  Messana, procced  along 
the coast to Panormus, which would  have facilitated the com- 
munication?"  The answer  to  this  lies  in the nature of  the 
country, with which  I have  become  acquainted, not through 
the description  of travellers  alone, but through paying  strict 
attention  to  the  events  of  the year 1812, when tlic English 
sent an expedition to Palermo.  This expedition  also, could 
not reach Palcrmo by land, but was obliged  to be transported 
in ships.  And  as  it is  now,  so  it was  with  the ancients: 
the communication between  Messana  and Panormus was  not 
practicable by land. 
In  ordcr to avoid filling  our heads with a mass of  confused 
detail, we must divide the first  Punic war  into  five  periods. 
The  first comprises the first four years, from 488 to 491, during 
which the Romans carried on the war without a fleet, and the 
Carthaginians were masters  of  the sea;  the Romans  had  the 
greatest difficulty in crossing, and could reach their enemies in 
Sicily only by land. 
The sccond  extends  from 492  to 496 ; the  Romans  now 
built a fleet, and were more  successful  than  could have been 
expected;  the Carthaginians were defeated by sea, and Rcgulus 
effected a landing in Africa. 
The third contains the campaign of Regulus in Africa during 
the years 496 and 497. 
The  fourth  bcgins  with  the  destruction  of  the  army of 
Regulus, and ends with the victory of  L. Caecilius Metellus, at 
Panormus, from  497 to 501.  Fortune during that time was 
almost equally balanced ; the Romans lost two fleets by storms, 
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and the Carthaginians had the ascendancy in Sicily; but the 
Romans, neverthelcss, conquered in the end. 
The fifth period  is a struggle of ten years, about Lilybaeum 
and Drepana, from 502 to the victory near the Aevates insule  b 
m 511.  During this last  period, the war was confincd  to the 
extremely limited  space about Lilybaeu~n  and Drepana.  The 
diversion which Hamilcar Barca made, and of which we unfor- 
tunately know so little, is one of  the most brilliant exploits in 
the history of ancient or of  modern  warfare, on account of  his 
taking  Hercte  and  Eryx, although it is more important in a 
military than in an historical  point of view:  it was a military 
game at chess, which shewed a general who  created  his  own 
resources, and had them under his full control. 
Wars which  have  been  protracted  through  a  considerable 
number  of  years, cannot  be  properly uiiderstood, unless they 
are divided  into  such  separate  and distinct masses as I have 
just made in regard  to the first Punic war.  The thirty-years' 
war is generally related without such divisions;  and it is for no 
other reason that people  find  it so difficult to form a distinct 
and accurate idea of it. 
Rcspecting  the  tactics  of  the  Carthaginians, we  know in 
reality nothing; but it can scarcely be doubted, that each kind 
of mercenaries retained its own peculiar weapons and mode of 
fighting;  the Carthaginians  themselves, when  they did serve 
in  their  armies,  formed  most  probably  a  phalanx,  like  the 
Greeks.  The Spaniards and Celts fought, I believe, catervatim, 
with small swords, and wore  linen breast-plates.  The Gauls, 
no doubt, fought in great masses. 
In the year 490, the third of  the war,  the Romans besieged 
Agrigentum with two armies.l  This  city was  of  very  great 
extent; but, as a city, it was  only a  shadow  of  what  it had 
been 140 years before, that is, previously to its first destruction 
by the Carthaginians.  A Carthaginian  army of  50,000 men, 
under the command of a general of thc name of Hannibal,2 had 
tllrown itself within its extensive and very strong walls.  The 
Romans besieged them very closelyfor a period of seven months. 
vol. iii. p.  570, foll. 
The Carthaginians are mentioned  only by  their praenomen,  and we might 
be easily led to think that they werc all related to one another, as  tllere  arc so 
few praenomina,  such as Hannibal, Hanno, Hamilcar, and a few others.  They 
answer  to our Christian names, and to the Roman praenomina,  such as Gaius. 
There can be  no doubt, however, that all had, at the same time,  family  names, 
The  Roman consuls advanced from the south, formed two camps, 
and drew  two  lines  of  fortifications against  the city and any 
one  lnight attempt to relieve it.  At the commencc~ilent 
of  the war, tlze Carthaginian generals werc very inferior men, 
alld  it was unfortunate for Carthage that Hamilcar Barca came 
too late, and at a time when it was no longer in his  power  to 
recover what had been lost.  During the first period, the Car- 
thaginians seem to have made little or no use of elephants, and 
to have  shrunk  from entering upon an open contest with the 
Romans.  Hannibal had been careless enough to allow himself 
to be thus shut in; and as Agrigentum was not situated  close 
to the  sea, he was  unable  to obtain  any  succour  from  that 
quarter; but he succeeded in convcying urgent requests to the 
Carthaginians for support, by means of  messengers and letters. 
The siege had  already lasted  for  five months, when the Car- 
thaginians did  at last  send a large army, and fifty elephants, 
under  Hanno, to  the relicf  of  the bcsiegcd  in Agrigentum; 
but not having sufficient courage to fight, he protected himsclf 
and his  troops  in a fortified  camp near  EIeraclea, whcncc  he 
hoped  to compel  the Romans to raise the siege by cutting off 
their neccssary supplies.  I-Ie took Erbessus, the placc of  arms 
of  the Romans, and encircled them by ineans of abattisses and 
the like, in such a manner that they came into great difficulties 
in regard  to provisions  and the health of  the troops.  Thus 
Agrigentum  suffercd  for  want  of  provisions  through  the 
Romans, and the Romans through the Carthaginians.  As the 
latter were masters of thc sea, the Romans were much confined 
by the Nuinidian horsemen, the Cossacks of  the ancient?, and 
in foraging  excursions  thcy often  sustained  grcat losses ; it 
seemed as if they must raise the siege and retreat; but to this 
they could not make up their minds, and their perseverance in 
this instance also  led  thcm  to  victory.  They continucd  the 
blockade with such strictness, that Hannibal saw no way of im- 
proving  the condition  of  his  troops.  After Hanllo had been 
cncampcd  in the manner above described  for two months, he 
lnay have seen reasons  for making an attack;  but the Roma1ls 
Pined a coinplete victory, and indeinnified themselves by the 
which were not used then;  they even had sarnames which, however, are almost 
lost to us.  The generals hearing the name of  H'mnibd,  throl~ghout  the history 
of Carthagc, are so lns~gnlficant,  compared nlth the one great man who gaye to 
the name its celebrity, that they are but rarely ment~oned. 22  TAKING  OF AGRIGENTUM.  ANCIENT  SHIPS.  23 
booty they found i11  his cainp.  Meantime, EIiero had afforded 
all possible assistance; and without him they would have 
been  annihilated.  Hannibal,  whose  situation was  one  of  ex- 
treine difficulty, availed  hiinself  of  an opportunity, while  the 
Romans,  ill  tlle night after their  victory, were  indulging  in 
rejoicings, for  making  preparations  for a sally.  Whether the 
Romans  allowed  the besieged  to escape, in order not to drive 
the enemy to desperation, or whether the Carthaginians forced 
their way through  the Roman camp, cannot be said with cer- 
tainty; hut the Carthaginian army left  the city, and made  its 
way  through the Roman  fortifications : all those  who could 
bear arms followed  them; and the rest of  the population, the 
defenceless  and the sick,  remained  behind.  Next  morning 
the Romans  took  the town,  and committed  a11  the horrors 
which  usually accolnpany such  an  event:  the soldiers indem- 
nified  themselves  for  the sufferings  and  hardships they had 
endured during the seven months of  the siege, and  the whole 
of the unfortunate population was carried away. 
After  this fearful  catastrophe,  a  year  passed  without  any 
events  of  importance.  The  Carthaginians  had  their  other 
places  in tlie  west  well  provided  and fortified, but they also 
acted on the offensive:  their  fleet  was  cruising off  the coasts 
of  Italy, which they ravaged; and the northern coast of  Sicily 
s~~rrcndercd  to them fiom fear, while the Romans occupied the 
interior  and  the eastern  coast.  The taking  of  Agrigentum 
suggested to the Romans entirely new ideas respecting the ob- 
jects  of  the  war.  At its  commencement,  they had  merely 
wished to have Messana and Syracuse as their dependent allies, 
but they now cherished the plan which Dionysius, Agathocles, 
and Pyrrhus had cndeavoureci to redisc, namely, the expulsion 
of  the Carthaginians from  the island  altogether.  But they 
saw at the same time, that it was impossible to accomplish this 
without a  fleet.  The difficulty was  the same  as  at Athens, 
where, during the  Peloponnesian war, and the period  imme- 
diately succeeding it, no other vessels were built than triremes, 
lembi, and pentccontors.  A  trireme  contained from  200  to 
220  men  who  partly  ~.otvers and  partly epibatae  and 
was provided with a deck.  The pentccontors were open boats, 
and contained 50 men.3  The benches of the rowers in both, ran 
?  This  number  is  found  in  the  Lexic.  Rhetoricurn  (in  Bekker's  Anecd. 
i. p. 298);  Herodotus  (vii. 184)  mentions  that  pentecontors  contained  eighty 
across the sl1ip,  and one before the other.  These ships had lollg 
since been  surpassed by others.  After the Peloponllesian war, 
larger  were first built at Sy~~cuse,  the Clli~f  seat of lne- 
cllanical science  :  at  first, quadriremes, and so011 afterwards, quin- 
(I~~~~CS;  the latter were larger, but not round sllips, and inay 
be  terlned  "  &ips  of  the  line,"  for  the diffcrence  between 
triremes  and  quinquerernes cannot have consisted in the num- 
ber of  benches  and rowers  alone, but must  have been visible 
in their construction, otherwise it would have required 
no  particular  art to build  them.  They  were  used  in  the 
Macedonian fleets, as early as the time of Alexander the Grcat, 
and in Sicily, and they afterwards occur during the first Punic 
war ; but  the Romans,  as  well  as  their  subjects,  had  only 
triremes.*  IVllere  ships  of  the A~ltiataus  arc inclitioned, we 
inust  understand  triremes.  Although  the ancients, like the 
modern Greeks, had cxcellent  sails, their  object  was  to  niake 
their ships independent of  the wind, current, and waves, like 
our steam-boats;  and they found  the power which gave thein 
this  independence,  in their  oars.  A  quinquereme  had  300 
rowers, and 120 marincs;  and a trireme with 120 rowers bore 
the same  proportion to a quinquereme, which a steam-boat  of' 
twelve-horse  power  bears  to one of  thirty,  and could  do as 
little against  it as a frigate or a brigantine can effect against a 
ship  of  the  line.  At the  corninencement  of  the war,  the 
Romans had  transported their  soldiers  to Sicily in triremes, 
and hence it is %&id,  that they  had  no armed vessels.  It is 
certain  that they were  not  acquainted with the art of  ship- 
building.  Thc most natural course for the Romans would now 
have been, to send  some sllipbuilders  to Greece  or  to  Egypt 
(for they had conncxions with l'tolemy  Philadelphus) to obtain 
models;  for  the ancients,  like  oursclvcs,  built  from  models, 
which  is the most  natural method, and is also expressly men- 
tioned.  13ut this they did not do, and it fortunately happened 
that a Carthaginian quinquereme was  thrown upon  the coast 
of  Bruttiurn, after which model the Romans built  120 ships5 
They wcrc of a clumsy construction, and in no way to be com- 
pared with the Carthaginian  ships.  In addition  to this, the 
men.  The nunher given in the text occurs only in one, but a very careful copy 
notes taken down in the 1eeture.room.  4  vol. iii. p.  575, note 1052. 
'  vol. iii. P.  ,576,  note  1053.  These ships were  100 qninrlueremes,  and 20 
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Romans  had  no sailors, or  only a few;  and as a fleet  of  one 
hundred  yuinyueremes  required  30,000  rowers,  they  were 
obliged to man their ships chiefly with men from  the interior 
of  the country,  and  with  slaves,  for  the number  of  sailors 
from Etruria and the Greek towns was far  too small.6  The 
Romans had to learn the service in the fleet, just as in Russia 
and Francc  those  Inen  who  come  from  the inland  districts. 
Polybius goes too far in saying that they had no trained sailors 
at all.  But what seems to us most  ludicrous  is, that the men 
wcrc cxercised on scaffoldings : if the Carthaginisms were at all 
like modern nations, such a method of drilling men must have 
called  forth a host of  caricatures,  for  it was truly laughable. 
The contrast  between a Roman and a ~artha~illiai  vessel was 
the same as  there  is at present betwcen a ~uisian  ship of  the 
line  and an  English  or  an  American one.  But tllc Romans 
U 
were  great  in all  things, and devised  means  by which  they 
overcame their difficultics.  Their fleet could not possibly stand 
against  that  of  thc  Carthaginians, unless  the ordinary.tactics 
were changed.  The idea of getting rid of  artificial evolutions 
in  maritime  warfire, and of  letting  ship  fight  against  ship, 
must have prcsentcd itself at this very time, and not afterwards, 
as is  commonly believed.  For it required the greatest skill to 
manage and dircct a ship against wind and wavcs, in the same 
manner as a horseman manages his horse, and so as to destroy, 
by means of  the rostrum, the enemy's ship, and tear away the 
benches of  the romcrs.  The Romans could not hope to effect 
any such  thing.  If we  havc  to  figlit  against  an  enemy  of 
supcrior skill, the only means by which wc  can  hope  to con- 
yucr him, is to oppose him with greater masscs, or with some 
ulzfozeseen contrivance.7  In order to make up for the awkward- 
ness of  their ships, the Romans attached  boarding  bridges  to 
8  A different opinion is cxprcssed in vol. iii. p. 576. 
7  Tho grcat Carnot 5aw  this,  and rejected  thc old tactics  of  lines which our 
forefathers  had used, and with which  the French commenccd thc wars of  the 
revolution and werc dcplorahly bcatcn.  Carnot was  one  of  the greatest  men 
of  modern timcs:  he saw thc problem  at once, and solved it.  He formed  the 
troops into masses, with which  hc  rnshcd  upon  the cnemy.  These masses, if 
once broken through, would havc been lost;  but they had confidcnce, and threw 
themselves irresistibly  upon  the thln lincs.  A whole year passed away before 
the enemy comprehended  this new method.  It  was with these new tactics that 
Camot dec~ded  tho battle of  Wattignles (on the 15th and 16th of  October, 1793), 
which forms the crisis of modern m~litary  hlstory, and  the Importance of  which 
ha5 never yet been rlghtlj unrlerstood.  General Hot he  made  nbe  of  thr  same 
theln.8  It  was a  idea  to form  wooden bridges which 
lleld two or three men abreast;  both sides  were  protected  by 
parapets,  to prevent the inen  falling  into  the water.  In the 
forc part of  every ship a tall mast was set up, along which the 
bridge was drawn up, and at the upper end of the bridge there 
was  an iron  ring, through  which  ran a  cable.  The bridges 
were drawn up and lct down by means of a pulley;  they were 
thrown upon the ships of the enemy by the help of this simple 
mechanism, and took a firm hold  of  them  by means  of  grap- 
pling irons.  When a Carthaginian  vesscl  was  thus boarded, 
the advantage of its greater  speed and lightness was  lost, and 
the Romans were able to make use of thc best soldiers of  their 
Icgions.  As the Carthaginian  soldiers  were bad, or at least, 
far  inferior  to the Roman legionaries, the lattcr had  decided 
advantages.  But the  object now was, to get so near 
the enemy's  ships  as  to be  able to make use of  the boarding 
machines.  In the first  attempt  at maritime  warfare  in  the 
year  492  according to Cato, or 494 according  to Varro, the 
Roman squadron was lost near Lipara, through the imprudence 
of  its commander Cn. Cornelius Scipio.  But a few days after, 
the Carthaginians had likcwise to sustain a heavy loss, for one 
of  their  squadrons, under Hannibal, fell  in with  the  Roman 
fleet and was almost completely destroyed.  The victory of the 
consul,  C. Duilius, off  Mylac,  which  soon  followed,  was  de- 
cisive.  The Carthaginians began  the engagement with great 
contempt of  the Roman navy:  they had 130 ships against 100 
of  the Romans; but they soon discovered  their delusion, and 
clcspair came over them when they saw the sea-fight  changed 
into a land-fight.  Fifty Carthaginian ships were taken; many 
others were destroyed, and  the Romans, intoxicated with joy 
at this brilliant victory, landed in Sicily and rclievcd Scgesta, 
which,  like  Rome,  boasted  of  its  Trojan  origin.  Fortune 
thus favoured  their first  enterprise on  the unstable element, 
and thenceforth remained faithful to them on it. 
lnilitary syrtem in Lorraine:  it was by mean8 of  heavy masses, that the Amen- 
cans  defeated  the English  bhips, which  they could  not have done in any other 
way.--N.  vol. iii. p. 577, foll. VICTORY  OF  THE  ROMANS  NEAR  ECNOMUS.  27 
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Ev~lcu  one kllows the great lioilours with which C. Duilius was 
rewarded for his victory; he was the first who celebrated a naval 
triumph;  and was afterwards allowed to be accompanied home 
in thc cvcning from banquets by torch-light and a flute-player, 
~vhich  must otherwise have been forbidden, and the celebrated 
columna rostrata,  the shapc  of  which  is  unknown to us,l was 
erected,  with inscriptions recording  the details of his victory. 
A small fragment of these inscriptions is still preserved;  but it 
is not generally known, that the present table which contains it 
is not the original one,-the  antiquaries at Rome are aware of 
this, but  not  thosc  of  Germany,-for  it is a piece  of  Greek 
marble, which was unknown  at Rome in tlie time of  Dnilius. 
The original  column,  according  to  Tacitus,  was  struck  by 
lightning in the reign of Tiberius, and rcstored by Gcnnanicus, 
who  retained  the old  spclling and languagc.  Thc forins of 
the lettcrs, also, agree with those of the agc of  Tibcrius;  those 
on the tombs of  thc Scipios arc quite different. 
::After  this victory, thc hopes of the Ronlans knew no bounds; 
the war in Sicily was coinmenccd with redoubled  energy, and 
in the following  ycar, a Roman  fleet proceeded  to  Sardinia. 
The conquest  of  this  island  was  difficult, because the Punic 
language and civilisation had become  establislled  in the coast 
districts;  however,  all  these  subjccts  had  been  kept  in  an 
nnwarlike  condition, in conscquencc  of  the jealousy  of  the 
mother country, so that  the proceedings  of the lZomans were 
facilitated;  but still no great progress was made. 
Thc  two  following  ycars  were  spcnt  in  that expedition 
against  Sardinia, and in making conclucsts in Sicily.  In the 
lattcr war, A.  Atilius Calatinus found himself in an impassable 
district, and a tribune, whose name is differently stated, sorne 
calling  him  M.  Calpurnius  Flamma,  others, $. Caeditius  or 
Laberius, sacrificed himself with a small band for the safety of 
the army, just as Decius had done in Samni-din.  According to 
I  It  was, pcrhaps,  a  hrass  pillar  made  of  tho beaks  of  the conqueled ships. 
The common description of it, as a pillar w~th  the brass  beaks  projecting  from 
it, is quite modern and without any authonty whate1er.-N. 
Ceto's  Origines, hc was  severely wounded  in the battle,  but 
being  found  still  breathing  ainong  the  slain,  he afterwards 
recovered. 
In the third  ycar after the victory of  Duilius, the Romans 
with a large naval arnialneat appeared off  the coast of  Sicily, 
alld  an  indccieive  battle  was  fought  off  Tyndaris  on  the 
northern coast;  but as the war in Sicily could not  be brought 
to a close, ycar after  year  bcillg  spcnt in conquering a  few 
s~nall  placcs,  while the Carthaginians  still  maintained  them- 
selves from  Sclinus to Lil~bacun~,  and on the whole northern 
coast of  the island, from  Lilybaeum  to  Mylae,  the  Romans 
in the year 496, thc ninth of the war, dctcrmincd to attack the 
Carthaginians in Africa.  Agathocles had shewn that thcy were 
most vulnerable in thcir own country, and thc Ronlans accord- 
inglyresolvcd to coinpel the Carthaginians to make peace.  There 
can bc no doubt that at that timc tllc Romans only wanted to 
make themselves masters of  Sicily.  In order that thcy might 
be able to act with the necessary energy, they increased  their 
navy to no less  than 330 men of  war, which were, according 
to Polybius, for the most part quinqucremes ;  the Carthaginians, 
on being informed  of  these preparations, increased  their  fleet 
to 350 quinquercmes.  Polybius, in his  preface, draws atten- 
tion  to the tremendous  efforts  of  this war, and with justice; 
for  as every quinquereme  had  300 rowers, and  120 marines, 
the Romans employed about 140,000 men, and had, besides, a 
numbcr of  transports for their horses (I~~q~ol).  He observes 
that even the great battlcs of  the Macedonian kings, of Deme- 
trius,  Ptolemy and  others,  and  aftcrwards  of  thc  Rhodians, 
were small in comparison. 
Such immense masses have nothing  pleasing  in history, for 
barbarians  too  can  muster  them.  Thc victory of  talent and 
art ovcr physical strength cannot shcw itself on such occasions. 
The victory cven  of  Duilins, with  his boarding-bridges, was, 
~roperly  speaking,  the  result  only  of  a  rudc  invcntion, by 
which the true  art of  the  Carthaginian  navy was  frustrated. 
In the Seven ycars' war, when  the tactics  of  lines  werc cus- 
tomary, the military art was at a higher point than now, when 
battles are  fought  with  masses.  In likc manner, the use  of 
great masses of artillcry is a manifest sign of the decay of intel- 
lectual  power  and  humanity in modern  warfare.  At a later 
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of  their ships,  which were increased even to enneres, as, e. g. 
the  ship which Archimedes built  for  Hiero, who  sent  it to 
Alexandria.  They were useless colossuses, surpassing in mag- 
nitude  even  our  ships  of  the line.  Subsequently,  however, 
they returned to vcry light ships, liburnae and bmbi, of  which 
we cannot form any accurate idea.  In the most brilliant times 
of  the Byzantines and Venetians, battles were fought in small 
ships.  The  Carthaginian  forces  were  equally  strong ; the 
Rornan  ships  were  still  awkward,  and their success still  dc- 
pcnded  upon  their boarding-bridges.  They sailed  along  the 
eastern  and southern  coasts  of  Sicily,  because  the  nortlicrn 
coast was  in the enemy's possession, and bccause  thcy had  to 
take in provisions at Syracuse.  The Carthaginians met them 
between  Agrigentum  and Pachynus  (near  Ecnomu~).~  The 
Romans adoptcd the system of  fighting in masses, and divided 
their fleet into four squadrons.  Each consul colnmanded one; 
the  third  and  fourth  were  comma,nded  by  generals  whose 
names are unknown.  As thcy sailed  against  the enemy, the 
first and second  squadrons  formed two sides  of  a triangle, so 
that only two ships were  facing the enemy.  These two lines 
gradually formed a right angle, and the triangle was closed by 
the third squadron.  The fourth was  placed behind to protect 
the  transports.  They  accordingly  formed  an  gppohov ; a 
manoeuvre  which required many favourablc  circumstances for 
its execution.~Thc  Carthaginians, who met thein near Ecno- 
mus, had  made a more  skilful  division  of  their  forces:  their 
left wing, about one quarter of the whole fleet, sailed in a long 
linc along  the  coast, and  was  joined  at a right angle by the 
immense  fleet, one ship after  another, so as to cxtend  far  out 
into the sea.  The Romans sailed past the linc along the coast, 
and  threw  themselves  upon the centre of the linc which was 
drawn out.  The Carthaginian admiral did not intend that the 
latter  should  resist  the point  of  the advancing wedge;  and, 
drawing up their sails, the Carthaginians pretended  to flee, in 
vol. iii. p.  583. 
ql,  2,  3, 4, are the numbers of  the squadrons;  5, the transports. 
order to separate the Romans froin their third and fourth lines. 
The Rolllans  pursued  them; but two  parts  of  the long line 
returned  and  attacked  the two  foremost  Roinan  squadrons. 
~h~ third part of the Carthaginian fleet, which was  sailing i11 
tile open sea, likewise returned and threw itself upon the fourth 
Roman squadron.  Meantime, the line along the coast advanced 
to attack tile third, which now left the transports to their fate. 
Thus there  arose  three  naval  engagements.  The  first  and 
second Roinan squadrons speedily conquered; the fourth gained 
all eq~zivocal  victory, and the third came into great difficulties. 
The centre retreated to protect them, and the boarding-bridges 
clid good  service on this occasion.  The engagement ended in 
the coinplete defeat of  the Carthaginians : 30 ships were sunk 
or thrown upon the coast, and 64 were captured.  From 30,000 
to 40,000 men fell into the hands of  the Eomans. 
After this defeat, the Carth~ginian  fleet made for Africa, to pro- 
tect Carthage against any attack.  They had lost  their strength 
and courage  to an  inconceivable  degree.  The sea  was now 
open to the Romans for executing their plan, and both the con- 
sular armies under L.  Manlius and M. Atilius Replus, sailed 
to Africa.  They landed south-east of  cape Hermaeum, which, 
opposite  to Carthage, closes the gulf of  Tunis, near the town 
of Clupea (in Greek Aspis, the Punic name is not known),  and 
took the place aftcr a brave defence.  They made this town their 
place of arms, and hence spread into other parts of Africa.  The 
main army of the Carthaginians was still in Sicily, as they had 
entertained to the last the firm hope of preventing the Romans 
froin landing in Africa, where they were  consequently unpre- 
pared  to  meet  the enemy.  The Romans found the people 
everywhere inclined to desert thcir cruel masters.  Their fortified 
colonies existed only on the coast.  In the interior they had, 
except in a  few inunicipia, adopted the policy of  the Vandals, 
tvho, from fear of  rebellions  pulled down  the walls of  all the 
towns just as at a later period the Lombards did in Italy.  The 
Carthaginians, therefore, had but few fortified places in Africa to 
keep their subjects in submission; most of the towns belonging 
to them being open places.  Although the Carthaginians were 
not barbarians,  still they treated  their subjects very harshly; 
they followed the system which is found throughout the East, 
where the sovereign is the owner  of  the soil,  and  everybody 
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king.  They  required  ilnnlense sums  of  money  to pay  the 
Celtic and  Ibcrian  mercenaries,  and  were  therefore,  obliged 
to  extort them from their subjects.  The consequences of this 
system had been seen in thc wars of Agathocles:  the progress 
of  an elleiny in Africa could not be stopped; but the Africans 
were  perhaps  discouraged from  attempting to revolt, by  the 
unfortunate issue  of  the  war  of  Agathocles;  for,  aftcr  his 
departure,  the  Carthaginians  had  taken cruel vengeance  on 
those who had joined hiin;  but, nevcrtllcless, thcy did not now 
promote  the interest of Cartllage.  It is almost  inconceivable 
what could induce the Roman  Senatc at this juncture to call 
back L. Manlius and his army, and to think that Regulus and 
his army would alone be  sufficient to carry on  the operations 
against the Cartllaginians.  Manlius  sailed  back  with  nearly 
the wholc flcet and carried the booty to Rome. 
After the departure of Manlius in 497, Regulus nevertheless 
defeated  the  Carthaginians  near  Adis.4  Their  militia  was 
excessively  timid, and withdrew into inaccessible  districts  to 
protect  itself;  unwarlike  and  without  zeal  as  thcir  soldiers 
werc,  they were  easily  driven  out of  their  strong  placcs,  so 
that Regulus found no difficulty in taking the fortified town of 
Tunes, in the immediate vicinity of  Carthage.  He encamped 
on thc river  Bagradas, and thc Cartlzaginians werc in extreme 
difficulties.  Africa  seems to have been  looked upon  at that 
time as a,  land of  fabulous  monsters and dragons.  The story 
about the huge serpent on the river Bagradas, whose  skin is 
said  to have  measured  one hundred  and twenty  cubits,  and 
whose  dcfcat  could  only be  effected  by the exertions  of  the 
whole Roman army, with their ballists and catapults, although 
Livy5 rclated  it quite seriously, must be regarded  as a fablc. 
It is very surprising to find such a story in the midst  of  an 
historical narrative.  There may indced have been  a gigantic 
serpent, for it cannot be absolutely denied that the earth and sca 
contain creatures which are so rare that we are inclined to con- 
sider them as fabulous;  it is also not unlikely, that the Roinans 
had to sustain losses through large serpents; but this particular 
tale is worth  nothing,  and was,  perhaps,  like  many  others, 
borrowed  from  the Bellum  Punicum  of  Naevius,  who  had 
served  in the war, and,  as  a  poet,  might  with  all propriety 
invent  such a  marvellous  occurrence.  At any rate it would 
701.  iii. p. 587.  Epitome xviii. 
be most wonderful,  if thc inonster had measured exactly that 
nulnber of cubits, wllich so often occurs in Roman institutions, 
llamely a multiple of 10 and 12. 
TIle  Cartlzaginians were reduced to the last extremity; their 
courage failed  them, and they could not withdraw their army 
from  Sicily  without  giving  up  the island  altogether.  An 
embassy  was  therefore  sent  to  Regulus  to  suc  for  peace. 
Regulus  is one of  those Inen who, without  deserving it, have 
acquired a great name through apophthegmatic Bistories : in his 
prosperity  he was  without  mercy,  intoxicated  with  victory, 
and ungenerous.  There  is  a  story,  according  to  which  he 
petitioned the senate for his recall, because his farm was going 
to ruin during his  ab~ence.~  But we  know  from  Polybius, 
that he had sct his heart upon concluding the war hiinsell',  in 
ordcr  that  his  successors might  not  reap  the  fruits  of  his 
labours; and this  shews  the more  clearly  how  unreasonably 
he  acted,  in  demanding  from  the  Carthaginians  things 
which  wcre  utterly  impossible ;  for  just  as  if  hc  had 
wished  to  drive  them  to  despair,  he made  tlzc  terms  of 
peace  even more  distressing  than those  which  they  actually 
obtained  at  the  end  of  the  war.7  Had  he  demanded 
the surrender of  Sicily, and a sum of  moncy to indemnify the 
Romans for thc cxpenses of  the war, the Carthaginians would 
have consented; but he had  the foolish  conceit to think that 
he could crush Carthage at onc  blow.  His terms werc sense- 
less;  the Carthaginians could not have been  dealt with more 
severely, if their vcry capital had been besieged.  He demanded 
the recognition  of  the suprcmacy of Rome; an offensive and 
defensi~c  alliance  with  Rorne;  assistance  in  all  her  under- 
takings; thc surrender  of  a11  thcir  ships  of  war  cxcept  onc; 
they were  to have ollly triremes,  and if the Romans  should 
require it, then  Cartllage was  to send  fifty trircmcs to assist 
them; they  were  not  to conclude  a  treaty  with  any  other 
nation  without  the  permission  of  Rome.  It was  further 
demanded that they should  give  up Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, 
and the Liparian  islands;  surrender  all  the Roman  prisoners 
and dcserters  without ransom, but pay ransom  for the Punic 
ones, and defray  all the expenses  of  the war,  and a  military 
tribute besides.  These  terms were  unreasonable,  and Regulus 
deserved  thc fate  which  awaited  him.  Carthage  would  not 
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subinit to them, and declared that it would rather fight  to the 
last.  It was fortullate  for  the Carthaginians that the Rolnans 
conducted the war unskilfully;  the latter  ought  to have esta- 
blished  tllemselves  opposite  to  Cartl~age,  within  tlle  Gulf  of 
Tunes.  But they had  sent back  thcir fleet,  and the Cartha- 
ginisns,  by  means  of  their ships,  enlisted  mercenaries  in all 
parts  of  the Mediterranean,  and  all  the citizens  capable  of 
bearing  arms were  enrolled.  Among those  mercenaries was 
the celebrated  Xanthippus.  Diodorusa  calls lliin  a  Spartan, 
which  he certainly was not.  He was  a  Lacedaemonian,  or, 
according to Polybius, a Neodalnodes (v~06a~~6~~),  who in his 
education had been  s~~bjected  to the rigid  Spartan  discipline,g 
and had thereby acquired an inferior kind of franchise.  The 
accounts which we have of  the Spartan affairs at this time are 
obscure;  but it may  be  regarded  as a  fact,  that while  every 
Spartan was obliged to obey the laws  of  Lycurgus,  strangers, 
and not merely  Lacedaemonians (TE~~OLKOL),  or  Neodamodes, 
but  even  the children  of  foreign  proxcni,  were  allowed  to 
adopt  the same &v~y$. This matter,  however,  has  not  yet 
been  made  quite  clear.  Xanthippus  came  to  Carthage  as 
the  leader  of  a  band  of  Peloponnesians,  which  he  himself 
had probably collected at Taenarus, the chief  recruiting place 
at that time.  When he saw the preparations  of  the Cartha- 
ginians,  hc declared opcnly that they had been defeated,  not 
by the superiority of  the Romans, but through the ignorance 
of their own  generals.  It was  now a fortunate circumstance 
that civil and military powers were kept  distinct at Carthage. 
When Xanthippus was introduced into the scnate of Carthage, 
and requested to propose a better plan for carrying on the war, 
he reminded them that they had a great number of elephants,10 
and in their Numidians  a better and more numerous cavalry 
than  the  Romans; that  they  possessed  a  formidable  power 
compared with thc small  army  of  the Romansll in a  hostile 
xxiii. Eclog. 13. p. 504.  Polyl)ius,  i. 32. 
lo The Carthaginians had not becn long famihar with tllc use of  clel~hmts  in 
war;  and I believe that it was at the hcginning of  this war that they used them 
for the first time, for we do not find them mentioned either in the war agaiilst 
Dionysius, or in those against Agnthocles.  In India, elephants have been uqed 
in war from time immemorial, and it must have been there that the Macedoninns 
became acquaintcd with their use.-N. 
11  Regulus, according to Polybius, had not more than 16,000 legionaries, and 
in all  perhaps about 20,000  men; consequently his army could  not  have con- 
country; that they or~ght  to seek the plains, for that the advan- 
tage of tile Rolllans was in the hills;  and that it  was co~vardice 
could wish to transfer the war into the mountains. 
Xnntllippu~  TV~S  appointed to  the suprellle  conlmand  of  the 
army of mercenaries;  a  grcat rcsolutioll  on  the part  of  Car- 
tllage !  He arranged  the army according to his  own views; 
TYllsLt  he  did excited astonishment; the soldiers  thought  that 
under  his  command  they must  conquer,  and all  demanded 
him  as  their comrnantler : the Carthnginian  general, who  in 
this instance  probably rcccived  his orders from the city,  sur- 
rendered  the  command  to  him.  After  the  soldiers  were 
wcll  drilled  and exercised,  he  marched  out  into  the  open 
field to the great surprise of tlle Romans, which was increased 
on the appearance of tlle elephants.  He compelled  the enemy 
to  cngage  in battle,  and drew  up  his  army  in  a  masterly 
manner.  The Roman army had no centre, but the Greeks had 
three divisions, and he drew up his forces in this manner:  the 
Carthaginians occupied the centre as  a phalanx,  because they 
were citizens,  and could be  useful  only in masses;l"he  mer- 
cenaries formed  the wings,  and were flanked  by the cavalry. 
The Romans likewise placed  their cavalry on their flanks, but 
in drawing up thcir infantry they abandoned the usual method, 
for one hundred elephants were postcd in front  of the Cartha- 
ginian centre, and against these they f~rmed  very deep masses. 
But the  shock  was  irresistible,  and  although  the left  wing 
defeated the mercenaries, yet the cavalry of the Carthaginians 
in the meantime attacked the right wing of  the Romans,  and 
the elephants trod  clown  cvcry thing before them.  The pha- 
lanx then advanced, and the whole Roman army was destroyed. 
Only 2000  of the left wing escaped in the rear of the Cartha- 
ginians to Clupea;  and Regulus, having  retreated  with  500 
Romans to a hill, was obliged to surrender. 
Xanthippus was  now  the hero  of  the  day,  and  proposals 
were  made  to him  to remain  at Carthagc; but he had  the 
wisdom to return to his own country with the rich presents of 
the Carthaginians, and to withdraw himself  from  the jealousy 
and heartlessness of  a nation like the Carthaginians.  Polybius 
informs us  that  there was  another  account,  stating  that  the 
tained more than from 1500 to  1600 horsemen.  The Numidian cavally in the 
Carthaginian armies was always +cry considerable.-N. 
The legiones urbanae of  the Romans were likewise only phalangite6.-N. 
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Cartllaginians  gave hinl  a bad ship that he ininlrt  9. peris11 on his 
voyage ; and that according  to  soiile  authontles he actually 
became their victim, while  accordillg to others he escaped  to 
another ship.  The Ronlans sent out their wllolc fleet to rescue 
the gmimn  of CILlpea  ; the Cartlmginians, encouraged by their 
victory, equipped their fleet and sailed out to meet the enemy, 
but were defeated.  The statement wllicll we read in Pol~bius, 
that a hurldrcd and fourteen Carthagiaim ships werc taken, is 
probably false:  the word  inarhv should be omitted in his text, 
and then we have the right number of ships, that is, fourteca.ll 
The Roman consuls then sailed to Clupca, took their soldicrs 
on board, and after having evacuated their last post in Africa, 
they sailed along the southern coast of Sicily towards Syracuse, 
with the view of returning to Rome by the Straits of Messins. 
The pilots cautioned the Romans; for it was just  the season, 
about the beginning of the dog-days, in the first days of  July, 
when the Sirocco is soinetimes  accompanied by fearful  hurri- 
canes;14 but the Rornan commanders despised the warning of 
the strangers, and a terrible storm arose while the Roman fleet 
was returning.  When vessels, which depended solely on their 
oars, were overtaken by a storn? of  this kind, they were com- 
pletely destroyed among the breakers on the harbourless coast. 
It was impossible  for  the Roman  ships to  escape:  nearly the 
whole fleet was wrecked on the coast between Agrigentum and 
Pachynus.  Nearly 300 ships out of  a fleet of  360 were com- 
pletely  destroyed  (a.u.497).15  This was  the first  great dis- 
aster; but  in  the very same year it was to be followed  by a 
second, in which a fleet and an army werc destroyed. 
The Carthaginians  had  now  reason  to  believe  that  the 
Rcmans would  make  peace  011  fair  conditions; but, as  they 
wcre disappointed in this hope, and as  the Romans, notwith- 
standing their disasters, wcre determined to continue the war, 
the Carthaginians prepared  themselves with  double  couragc: 
they sent  considerable  reinforcements  to  Sicily,  and  applied 
t'le  system  of  tactics  which  Xanthippus  had  taught  them. 
The Romans were somewhat  intimidated, and retreated to the 
mountains.  The expenses  of  building a fleet  were immense; 
hence the Carthaginians wished to carry on the war either  by 
sea  or  by land,  for  to  do both at once  was  too  expensive. 
13 Polybius, i. 36.  Comp. vol. iii. p. 592.  l4 ~ol.  iii. p. 592, foll. 
15  Not long afterwards Seleucus Callinicus suffered n similar shipwreck.-N. 
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The Rolllans,  aftcr receiving the news  of  the disastcr  which 
bef;tllcl~  tllcir  fleet,  immediately  turned  their  tlloughts 
towards building a new one.  They now made considerable coa- 
qllests on  const of Sicily, and also took possession of Pallor- 
 US.  Thereupon they sailed  again with a large fleet towarcls 
the coast  of  Africa;  but  aftcr  thcy  had  laid  waste the coast 
between Carthagre  and Tripolis,  and had with  great ditliculty 
escaped  destruction  on  the sands of  the Lesser  Syrtis,  thcy 
returned to Sicily;  and while they wcre boldly stecrillg across 
the sea towards the rnouth  of  the Tiber,  they were  surprised 
by a fearful storm, in which nearly the whole flcet was wrecked. 
It is of importance  to know that south winds are always most 
dangerous storms in the Mediterranean-the  Noti  in Horace 
arc heavy grnlcs  and of  the same character as our north-west 
winds,  which  are harnllcss  in  the Mediterranean,  where  all 
south winds, from south-wcst to south-east, are equally destruc- 
tive.  The danger  is  all the greater,  as  the coast of  Italy is 
almost without  a  harbour  and  full  of  breakers.  But in the 
neighbourhood of the Syrtes (from the verb uvpc6) the north- 
mcst wind is equally dangerous.  Vessels,  which approach too 
near, are in such a  wind driven upon  the sandban1.s  with  in- 
credible force.  The danger  is  increased by the circumstance, 
that the currents which come from the Adriatic and the Euxinc 
tlrive the ships with  irresistible  violence  into  the  Syrtes,  so 
that they are in them before any one is aware of it.  The ac- 
counts which the ancients  give of  the dangcrs  of  the Syrtes 
are by no means exaggerated.  At the present  time, attention 
has  again been directed towards those dangerous places. 
The loss  of the second flcet was a blow which bowed down 
the courage of the Romans; however they were resolved not to 
make peace,  but to  try how  far  they could carry on the war 
with  more  moderate  exertions.  The  Carthaginians  wcre 
masters of the sea, and availed  themselves  of  the opportunity 
for ravaging the coasts of Italy; but they conductccl the war in 
:I  wretched  manner.  The  Romans  rcmained  unshaken  iii 
Sicily,  so that, although  avoiding  any general  engagement, 
they yet took several places under the very eyes of the enemy, 
and confined  the Carthaginians to the north-western  part  of 
the island.  In this manner the year  501,  according to Cato, 
approached, four years after the defeat of  Regulus.  From the 
Year  499  fortune  had,  on  the ~vl~ole,  favoured the  Cartha- 
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ginians.  But  fourth period of the war now ended with the 
victory Eslined  by  L. Caecilius  Metellus over Hasdrubal near 
Panormus.  The Carthaginian general had hoped to turn to his 
advantagc the fear of the Nuinidian horsemen and the cavalry, 
which the Romans had shewiz ever since the defeat of Reg~~lus, 
and to conquer Panormus.  Hc advanced  to  the distance  of 
about  two  miles  from  the  town,  where  he encamped  in a 
beautiful plain-hc  may have had a secret understanding with 
some pcrgons in the place.  It  was harvest tiilzc, and he ravaged 
the ficlds.  Metellus  proved  himself  to bc a great gcncral, for 
hc remained  in his  fortified  camp ;  and in order to draw the 
Carthaginians into a position where thcir elephants would be of 
no avail, lie drew up his  lines of light-armed troops before the 
trenches of the camp,which was close by the walls of l'anormus. 
The legions actcd on  thc wings, and the light-armed infantry 
was driven back  by the  elephants  into the camp.  The Car- 
thaginians  followed,  and  advanced nearer  the camp and the 
town.  The Romans, who were constantly supplied with fresh 
missiles  from the  town,  sent  showers  of javclills  and  darts 
upon  the Carthaginians and their  elephants.  The wounded 
animals  grew  wild,  and  threw  tl~emselves up011  the  Car- 
thaginian cavalry and infantry.  This was the moment which 
Metellus had been waiting for.  During the confusion  which 
was thus produced, and while the Carthaginians were making 
a  valiant  attack, the  Roman  legions  sallied  forth  from  the 
camp on the left flank of the enemy.  The Carthaginians were 
routed, and  their  disorder  was  so  great, that more than one 
hundred  elephants  fell  into  the hands of  the Romans; they 
were conveyed  to Rome on rafts  specially constructed  for the 
purpose.  In  the Circus they were killed with missiles, perhaps 
to  give to the people an idea of  the battle in which they had 
been  taken.  This  was  the  greatest  defeat  which  the  Car- 
thaginians  had  yet  suffered  in the open field.lVt revived 
the courage  of  the Romans,  and disheartened  their  enemies. 
The Carthaginians were now confined to the extreme west of the 
island, where they possessed only Lilybaeum, Eryx,  and Drcpana. 
The conclusion  of  the war,  howevcr, was  extremely difficult, 
the Romans not daring again to sail to Africa, and the Cartha- 
ginians endeavouring to recover what had been lost in Sicily. 
In the year  after this victory (u. C. 502), the siege of  Lily- 
l6  Com2arc vol. ili. p. 597. foll. 
baeulll  was  commenced,  and  during the  whole  of  this  last 
period of  the war  we  hear  of  nothing  but  sieges, which  are 
interrupted only by blockades.  The siege of  Lilybaeum is one 
of  the most obstinate efforts against  onc place on record;  and 
from  thc moment  it began, the war may be called the Lily- 
baean war, just  as one part of  the Peloponncsiai~  war is called 
the Decelcan.  ,411  the  five  periods  of  the  first  Punic war 
might, in fact, be  called  by particular  names,  which  would 
indced assist our memory greatly;  but I will  not  recorninend 
such a metllod, for there is much that may be said  against  it. 
The fifth and last act of this war is, for Carthage, the noblest 
and most glorious:  the Romans shewed only perseverance and 
obstinacy.  Concerning the civil history of  Rome during this 
time, little can be said, for  few changes  were  made, and  the 
crisis was over for a tiinc. 
LECTURE  LVI. 
I DID  not mention ycsterday the embassy of ltegulus to Mome. 
Every one remembers the beautiful verses of Horacc, and what 
Cicero  says,  concerning  Regulus.  After  the  defeat  of  the 
Romans in Africa under Regulus, the Carthaginians, it is said, 
sent Regulus to Rome with proposals of peace, with thc under- 
standing that if he should  not  succeed, he  should  endeavour 
at least to effect an exchange of prisoners.  Iiegulus, however, 
is  stated  to  have  dissuaded  his  fellow  citizens  froin  either 
measure, to have returned to Carthage, and there to have becn 
torturcd to death.  The first  who, with  great  indepcndcnce 
of  mind,  demonstrated  the untenablencss  of  this  story,  was 
the  excellent  Frcnch  philologcr,  Paulmier de Grentcmesnil 
(Palrneriu~).~  Beaufort  afterwards  adduced  further reasons 
to prove that this  tragedy is  a  cornplete  fiction,2 and  that  it 
was probably invented because  thc  IZomans  allowed  that the 
tcrms of peace proposed by llcgulus were abaininable, and that 
he  had  to  inakc  amends for his shanieful conduct.  Eeaufort 
' EIe  was  a  contemporary  of  the brothcrs Henry  and  Hadrian Valcsius 
(Vdois);  he  was  particulztrly well  read in Polybins, and remarked how unac- 
countable it was that Polyl)~us,  relating tho Instory of Regulos with great lmute- 
lless, does not rnent~oli  tlns occurrence at all.-N. 
Col11l)arc vol. II~.  p  598, foll.  Palmenus, Exerczt. tn Auct. Graec. p.  151, f011. 112s drawn attention to a  fragment  of  lliodor~s,~  according  to 
xvllich,  two  noble  Carthagiilians  were  retained  at Ruinc  as 
hostages for the life of  Regulus, and  were  give11  over  to  his 
wife and f~3inily.  The same  fragment  states, that  they mere 
toitured by the relatives  of  Regulus  in a  frightful  manner, 
ancl that the tribunes sumlnoned the senatc, and colllpelled the 
inonstcrs  to  release  one  of  the hostages, who  mas kept  shut 
up in a case containing the dead body of his commdc.  Now, 
as both  Palmerius  and Bcaufort justly observe,  if the Cartlla- 
ginians actually  ~licl  torture  Regnlus to cleath,  it was o~lly  an 
act of  retaliation.  It was  probably this crimc,  comiuitted  by 
the  family  of  Bcgulus, which  caused  the  fabrication  of  the 
whole story about thc cleat11  of  Regnlus.  But evcn this story 
is  not  the sa~ne  in all  authors: accortling to some,  his  eyes 
wcrc put out; others say that hc was tortured with iron nails; 
othcrs a~ain,  that he was killed by beins  exposed  to  the sun 
and insects.  Some middle-age writers take especial delight in 
inventing  the most  fearful  and  complicate torturcs, e. g. the 
authors  of  the  forged Acta Martyrurn.  Such also is thc case 
with the story of  Regulus.  It surely cannot have been lcnown 
previously  to  the  time  of  Polybius;  for  had  hc  been  ac- 
quainted with it, as told  by later writers, he would  not have 
passed it ovcr in silence.  The common account  of  the clcath 
of  Rcgulus may be effaced  frorn the pages  of  history without 
any scruple.  It may be, that it was  taken  froin Nacvius, for 
Diodorns was not acquainted wit11 it, as is clear from  his frag- 
mcnts.  He kncw  the history of  Rome but very imperfectly, 
:~ncl  only from  the earlier,  allnost  contemporary  writers,  as 
Philinus of A(rri~entuin,  Timaeus, and Fabius Pictor.  I-Ie had  9 
not read Naevus, and hence the latest Eoirian historians wcrc 
probably those who gave currency to  the story from Naevius. 
Cicero kncw it, ancl it must  thcreforc have been related cithcv 
in Cuto's  Origines, or  by Nacvius.4  If it originated witll later 
iiuthors, it arose,  at the earliest, from  100 to  120 years after 
the time of  IZegulus. 
Although the war had now lastcd for rlcarly fourtccn years, 
T~raym.  lib. xxiv. 17.  566, eil. Wcsseling. 
The observation that the story  of  the  de~~th  of  RC~II~US  was  taken  from 
the poem of Nnwius, war not repeated by Nicbnhr in 1829, wllicll may perIl,~p\ 
ji~stify  thc inference that he ]lad the11 abantloned  this conjecture; hut it rnust at 
the  same time  be  remarked, that in 1829  he  treated  th~s  whole  subject much 
more b~ieflj. 
tllere had been only two  pitched battles,  the one at Adis and 
the  one in which Metcllus  had defeated  tllc  Carthaginiaas; 
but the latter were,  nevertheless,  confined to the western cor- 
ller of Sic,ily.  The siege of Lilybaeum began in the year 502, 
:Llld the 1,ilybacan war  lasted  fill1 nine ycars:  in the tenth, 
pczce  was  concluded.  The  siege  was  undcrtakcn  by  the 
Iiomaiis under unhvourablc circumstances : tlic Carthaginians 
were in reality masters of the sea, but they limited their naval 
forces as  much as possible  on  account  of  their  cnorlnous  ex- 
11cnsc.  The  Ronlans,  encouraged  by their late success, had 
again built a fleet,  though  likewise  of  a  liinitcd  number  of 
ships; but it was sufficient, if not to render thc coinnlunication 
between Carthage and Lilybaeu~n  impossible,  yet to make it 
clifficult.  Lilybaeum was  the only l'unic  town in Sicily,  and 
had bccn built by the inhabitants of  &lotye after  the clcstruc- 
tion of' the latter town by the elclcr  Dionysius!  Its name is 
Punic, and shows the  unimaginative  character of  the Cartha- 
ginians, for  according to Bochart it signifies nothing but LC 
Lubi,  that  is,  a place  opposite  to  Libya.  The colony was 
undoubtedly a mixed one, like Carthagc in Spain,  consisting 
of Punians ancl Libyans,  and had now become  a place of con- 
sidcrablc importance.  l'anormus,  on the other hand, had an 
elltirely Greek population consisting of Greelis and Hellenised 
Siculians and Sicanians,  although it had for a long timc been 
under  the dominion  of  the Cartliaginians,  and in fact,  the 
inhabitants of  Sicily were  all  Greeks,  even  those  who  had 
aclinowlcdged  the sovereignty of  Carthage.  Lilybaeum  was 
strongly fortified,  and had  an excellent harbour,  which was 
the lnorc safe,  as it was difficult  to sail into it 011  account of 
the sandbanks and lagoons.  The sand, which is driven thither 
from the Syrtcs by south winds,  had accumulated and formed 
lagoons  as  early as  that time;  in the  course  of  ages  it has 
completely filled the harbour, and the present town of Marsala 
has no harbour at all,  but only a lniscrablc  road.6  Drepana 
(the modcrn Trepani)  about fifteen miles from Lilybaeuln has 
preserved its excellent harbour to this day,  although the Em- 
peror  Charles V., fiom  cowardice  and  fear  of  the  Moors, 
cndcavourecl to destroy it.  Sot  fhr from Drepna  was  the town 
of Eryx, with the ~nountain  of  tlle same name.  These were the 
chief places in the srnnll district occupied by the Carthaginians ; 40  SIXGE  AND BLOCKADE  OF LILYBAEUM.  4 1 
and  the war,  which  was  concentrated  there  for  nine  years, 
caused immense misery in that part of the island, for wherever 
armies were encamped, everything was destroyed. 
The Romans began the siege of Lilybaeum in a bold manner.' 
They ellclosed it on thc land side and at the same time cruised 
with their fleet  before  its harbour,  so  that Carthage had no 
cominunication with Lilybacum.  They made an attack upon 
the walls,  and broke  down  a  ort ti on  of  them; but  Himilco 
the commander  of  the Carthaginians  resisted  them with  the 
greatest perseverance.  The troops of  the Carthaginians oftell 
seemed  inclined  to  betray the  place  into  tlie  hands  of  the 
enemy,  for these troops hardly ever  consisted of  Carthaginian 
citizens,  who  served  only  as  officers  and  sonletimes  in the 
cavalry;  the main body consisted of  mercenaries, whence it is 
the more  surprising  to find  that Carthage  had  distinguished 
generals.  It  was always very difficult to inanage those soldiers, 
who came to Carthage from all  parts  of  the world,  especially 
from Greece, Gaul and Spain; and it was hardly possible to rule 
thein by anything else than the prospect of gain.  It was only 
such men as Hamilcar and Hannibal who knew how to attach 
to themselves even these motley masses;  at all other times they 
were  ready  for  money  to embark  in  any treacherous  plot. 
Such a  one was now formed  by some  individuals in concert 
with  the Roman Consuls;  and it  would  probably have  suc- 
ceeded,  had  not  a  Caithful  Achaean  of  the name of  Alexo 
informed Hiinilco of the existence of the plot,  and had he not 
contrived by promises  and sacrificcs to secure  some,  and to 
dismiss  the  others  from  the  service.  Alexo  was  a  man  of 
honour,  although he belonged  to a contemptible class.  The 
Rornans had now for the first time adopted  the Greek method 
of besieging:  in their wars against the Samnites they had only 
used towers,  and simply blockaded the towns of their enemy; 
but  no  regular  sieges  are  mentioned  previously  to the  first 
Punic war.0  Tllc Romans  made  great  progress  indccd,  and 
were  very  successful  wit11  their  fire-engines.  It  seems 
however  to  LC a  inistal<e of  Polybius  to state, that  at the 
commencement  of  tllc  sicge  they  threw  down  six  towers; 
7 Compare vo1.  iii. I). 602. 
"here  is a fragment  of Diodorus in which the Romans are made to reclac<t 
the Carthagiiiians not  to force thcm  to learn  inai-itime  warfare  also,  for they 
said, they had always heen learning new tactics of their enemies, and had always 
5oon conrl~~cred  thoce  of whom they had leanit.-N. 
this circumstance belongs to a later tiine.9  Hannibal,  a bold 
Carthaginian  aclmiral,  kept up tlie  eolnmunication  between 
Cartilage  and  Lilybaeum  by  making  his  way  through  the 
liolnall  fleet.  When Cartl~age  heard that the besieged were 
reduced to extrem;ties,  and that without speedy assistance the 
tow11 ~voulcl  be  lost,  they resolved  to  send  reinforcements  to 
Sicily,  and Hannibal conducted  10,000 men  safely  into  the 
harbour, to the great consternation of the Romans.  The be- 
sieged  immediately  made  a  sally,  which,  however,  proved 
unsuccessful,  notwitlistanding  their  immense exertions.  But 
a fearful west wind soon after accomplished  what Inen had not 
been able to achieve.  The storm blew in the direction of  the 
Roman camp, which was full of fire engines and combustibles, 
and as the besieged threw fire into the camp, all the machines, 
towers, and galleries of the Romans soon became a prey to the 
flames.  The six towers which, according to Polybius, had been 
thrown down at the commencement of the siege, seem to have 
fallen just before this catastrophe.  The Romans now confined 
themselves  to blockading  the fortress,  and as they must have 
been  convinced  that they could thereby effect nothing,  they 
attempted, lilre Cardinal Ricllelieu, to obstruct and destroy the 
entrance of  the harbour; but they succeeded only so  far as to 
render the communication between the fortress and the sea less 
free.  The Ronlan  fleet  was  stationed near  Lilybaeum,  and 
that of the Carthaginians in the port of Drepana. 
In the year 503, the Romans  sent reinforcements  to their 
troops,  as  well  as  to their  fleet, without  the Carthaginians 
being  aware  of  it.  They  were  coinmanded  by  one of  the 
consuls of  this year, P. Claudius, the sonio of  Appius Claudius 
the Blind, who had all the faults of his father without any of his 
great qualities:  he was  a daring and unprincipled  man.  The 
Romans, in consequence  of  the great expense, appear to have 
limited their forces to a single army.  It is uncertain whether 
Claudius  came  to  Sicily  as  consul  prcvionsly to  the sally of 
Rilnilco, or afterwards.  The greater  part of  the Roman fleet 
was drawn on  shore  near  Lilybacum, only a few  ships being 
Volybius, i.  42.  In vol.  iii. p.  603,  Niebuhr  seems to have  adopted  the 
statctcmcnt of  Polybius withont expressing any doul~t  as to its col~ectncss. 
lo In some MSS.  he  is  called  a  grandson,  which  is  contrnry  to  the Fasti 
indeed, hut seems more in accordance with chronology, as there  are 58  years 
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ont at sea  to keep  up  the blockade;  the marines were arlned 
alld  in  the land army.  Meantime, epidcinics had 
broliea  out  Ilere  and there, as  might have been foreseen, the 
slnslll island  of  Sicily being quite exhausted by the protracted 
war; Inany Inen also hacl pcrishe;l  in the battles, so that there 
was a want of  sailors.  To remedy this, new sailors were  en- 
listed  at Rome;  but they were  people  of  the lowest  orders, 
whose property amounted to lcss than 400 ases, and who had 
certainly never bccn out to sea.  In a co~uicil  of war, Claudius 
proposed  to attcrnpt to take  by surprise  the enemy's  flect  at 
Drepana, and the council, according to Polybius, seems to ]lave 
adopted the plan.  Polybius  himself  thinks  that  t11c  scheme 
was fcasible, but this is hardly credible, as it was prevcnted so 
easily.  Aniong  the Carthaginian  gcnerals,  there  were  now 
some  who111  experience  had  raised  far  above  mcdiocrity, 
whcreas, among thc Romans  there was  not  one of any great 
incrit;  and while the Romans were superior  in their soldiers, 
the Carthaginians excelled them in their gencrals.ll  Claudius 
manned  his  gallies in the  stillness  of  the  night, and bcibre 
daybreak sailed into the port of  Drepana, cxpccting to find the 
Cnrthaginians  unprepared.  They  had  not  indeed  expected 
the enemy, but their general had been watchful, and had  ob- 
served from his watch-towers  that some  of  the  Roman  ships 
were already in thc harbour.  The Carthaginian  commander, 
Adhcrbal, saw that by confining himself to the defence of  the 
city, the ships in  the harbour  would  be in  great  danger  of 
being talien ; he therefore quickly manned his ships, and while 
the Roman vessels were running into the extensive harbour at 
the western  entrance, one after  anothcr in a long  linc, he led 
his  ships  into the sea  along  the opposite  coast.  Whcn the 
lZoinans  discovered  what  was  going  on, and that  it was  the 
intention of  the Carthaginians to drive thcm into thc harboul; 
and there to throw them  on the coast, which was occupied by 
Cartllagiaian  troops,  a  signal was  given  and they llastily re- 
treated.  But  while  the  ships  which  were  hastening  to get 
out, prcsscd upon and  injured thosc which wcrc still  running 
through the narrow entrance into the harbour, the Carthaginian 
flect, which was  outside  the harbour, drcw up in battlc array 
and attackccl the Romans.  The consul drew up his ships along 
the coast  in  a  long  line,  with  the prows  towarcls the  land. 
" vol. 111.  p. 607. 
The Cartllagil1ians,  who  had  the open  sea  in their rear, had 
tile slclvsntagc of  being  able  to  manoeuvre  freely.  It seems 
illat  the IZolllans  had  given up using their  boarding-bridgcs, 
for had thcy made use of them, the issue  of  the  engagement 
llligllt  llavc  becn  diffc~ent.l"lle  Ro~nans  were coinpletely 
clcfeated, and  lost  nincty-threc  ships;  inany were  destroyet2, 
;,nd only about thirty escaped  to the road  of  Lil~baeum,  and 
with them thc consul. 
The Carthaginians had  now  decided  advantages  ovcr  the 
1Zomaas.  1'.  Claudins was recallecl to Rome; he was  sevcrely 
rcproachcd  as  being the cause of  the misfort~mc,  because he 
had inipiously despised the predictions and ordcr~d  the augury- 
birds to be thrown into the water, as they would not cat.  He 
was  requested  to appoint  a dictator; for aftcr the curiae had 
lost their privileges,  the right of thc consul to proclaiin  a dic- 
tator had  gradnally  become  a  right  to  appoint  l1im.I3  He 
insultingly appointed M. Claudius Glycia,  thc son of  a freed- 
man.  The Fasti mention only the namc of his father) but not 
that of his grandfather, and hc was consequently yet a libertinus. 
Claudius was tried for high trcason, and appears to have been 
scnt  into  cxilc,  where  he  died  soon  after.  According to 
Polybius, and an expression of Cicero, he was sentenccd to pay 
a  heavy  he;  according  to  others  the comitia  broke  up in 
consequence  of  a thunderstorm,  and the matter was  clroppcd, 
which  seems  to suggest  the influence  of  a  powerful  party. 
Aftcr his death,  his sister,  a vestal virgin,  while  riding  in a 
procession through thc crowds in the Circus, loudly expressed 
llcr  regret  that  her  brother  was  no  longer  alive,  since,  by 
causing the dcfcat of anothcr fleet, he might have setlt a great 
Inany lnorc of  the rabble  out of  the worldls.  She, too,  was 
accuscd and condemned  in a heavy penalty as guilty of high 
trcason against thc pcoplc.  The dictator Glycia was, of coursc 
uompellcd  r ,  by thc senate and pcople  to lay down his dignity. 
llle conduct of  Claudius is in kecping with the many crimes 
colnlnittcd by his race, which Tve  can trace froin the middle of 
the fourtl~  century down to the emperor Tibcrius:  a  criminal 
character was almost hereditary with them. 
Another  disaster  yet awaited  the Romans.  They still re- 
"  Compare vol. iii. p. 605, foll.  I3  Compare vol. i. p.  566, foil. 
"  Si~etonius,  Tihejzvs,  r. 2; I,ivy,  Eptome xix.  (This is anothcr proof that 
the tailors were taken from the caplte censz.--N). 44  DESTRUCTION OF THE ROMAN FLEET.  I-IAMILCAR  BARCAS.  45 
niained undaunted, and sent a convoy of eight hundred ships15 
with  provisions  to  relieve  the  wants  of  the army at Lily- 
baeum.  It  was  no  doubt escorted by a  considerable  fleet, 
under the command of the consul C. Junius; but the men of 
war were unable to protect the transports.  Thc consul  again 
sailed  through  the straits  of  Messana to  Syracuse,  took in a 
cargo there (for it was chiefly at Syracuse that provisions were 
obtained), and sent a part of the convoy under escort to Lily- 
baeu~n,  intending himself to follow afterwards wit11 the remain- 
der.  This was  vcry imprudent;  for  the accompanying  ships 
of  war were  not  sufficient  against  the  powerful  fleet  of  the 
Carthaginians,  which  frightened  thc Roman  detachment  so 
much that  it took  sheltcr  in  the rocky  road-stead  between 
Agrigentum  and Camarina.  The Cartliaginian  admiral Car- 
thalo did not venture to attack tlicin there, but still succeedcd 
in  destroying  many  of  the  transports.  Had  the  Romans 
rcceivcd spcedy support,  the affair  might yet have turned out 
well.  But Junius delayed his departure,  and when hc sailed 
from  Syracuse  and  hcard  that thc  Carthaginians  werc  be- 
tween him  and the other  convoy,  he too sought  shelter  in 
bad road-steads near Camarina.  Thcre now arose one of those 
frightful  storms,  which  in  Italy  are  always  south  winds. 
Carthalo,  adroit and active,  doubled  cape Pachynus  towards 
the north,  where he found protection  against  the wincl.  The 
whole  of  the Roman  fleet,  the ships  of  war  as well  as  the 
transports,  wcrc  thrown  on  the  rocks  and  coast  with  such 
vehemence,  that,, as  Polybius16 says,  not  a plank  mas  saved 
which could be used  again.  Two ships only remained out of 
the whole fleet.  A large number  of  men also perislied;  but 
the consul with the survivors withdrew by land to Lilybaeum, 
where he found an opportunity to do at least something:  lie 
took  Eryx by surprise; the town  itself  was  situated  on  tlic 
declivity of the mountain, and the temple of Vcnus on the top 
of  it formed  the acropolis.  Hc made  himself  master  of  the 
town  by bribcry.  This  was  thc  only  advantage  which  the 
Romans gained in the coursc of that year. 
The Rornans were now unable  to compete with tlie CartllM- 
ginians at sea;  fortune seemed to be against  them, and they 
I5 This fact is worth remembering, as it refutes the false notion, that the com- 
merce of the ancient world was of no great importance; it shews that navigation 
in tho hlcditcrrunein  was carried on npon a very large scale.-N.  l6 i.  54. 
renounced the sea entirely, but still kept up a few ships.  The 
war was  hopeless for  them; and it required  a  Roman  perse- 
verance to preserve them from utter despair. 
Car-llage was now the sole mistrcss of  the sea.  It seems to 
oinians made  beell shortly before this tinie, that tlie Cart,hag 
the  attempt  to  contract  a  loan  of'  more  than two tllousand 
talents with  Ptoleiny Pl~iladelpl~us.  But the king of Egypt 
refused to comply with their request,  as he wished  to remain 
neutral.'7  Carthage hacl to raise extraordinary contributions; 
the continuation  of  the war  drained  her  last  resources,  and 
exhausted her strength as it did that of Rome. 
At this time  the great Harnilcar  Barcas  appeared  on the 
scene of action.  It is not certain whether  he belonged to any 
of  the great f'amilies  at Carthagel"  In my opinion  it  nay 
alnlost  bc said  that he was a  greater man than even  his son 
I-Iannibal.  There  is  no  parallel  case  in history of  a father 
and his son  being so eminently great in their art as Hamilcar 
and I-Iannibal.  To bc a  good  general  is  an  art; it requires 
genius, and the talent for it must be born with a man, just as 
in the case of  a poet or an artist ; tlie  mechanical  part  aloiic 
can be learnt.  Had Hamilcar been  in a position  to influence 
the senate of Carthage at an earlier period, the war would have 
terminated  unfortunately for  Rome.  He began  his operations 
with a boldness which surpasses everything of its kind.  In  the 
neighbourhoodofPalermo there isamountain,  Monte Pellegrino, 
with the convent of Santa Rosalia ; in ancient times it bore the 
name of Hercte (the Elpl~~a,  the name seems to indicate that a 
state prison existed there),  and near it was a small harbour just 
sufficient to form a landing place '9.  Here Hamilcar, who had 
just  returned from  an expedition  against Bruttium, appeared 
unexpectedly with a squadron, took possession of the mountain 
eithcr  by surprise  or  by treachery,  cstablisl~cd  himself,  and 
madc  excursions  in  which he ravaged  the Italian  coast  as 
far  as  Cumae, perhaps  with the intention  of  stirring up the 
Roman allies to revolt.  On this mountain, Hamilcar maintained 
l7  Appian, De  Reb. SicuL, vol. i. p.  92, cd. Schweigh. 
The surnarnc Barcas seems to be of the same meaning as Barak in the Old 
Testament, and we may safely recognize in it the Semetic word b~vuk,  i. c. light- 
ning; the Syriac form is 6c~~rn  ;  it may also  signify  blilszi~~g,  but the othcr inter- 
pretation is more suitable.  The Romans, in like manner, called the Scipios, the 
fulmina be&,  and the Turks called their great sultan, Rayazid, lightning.--N. 
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himself as in a fortress for three years (504-508), during which 
he often suffered from  ext,rcme want  of  provisions,  but  con- 
tinually inaking excursions both by land and sea,  and endea- 
vouring to wear out the Romans.  His appear;lnce there drew 
thc Rolna~is  away from  Lilybaeum.  Slrirn~islles  took  place 
every  day from  mere  cxasperation.  In the third year,  he 
fo'onnd an opportunity of entering into an undcrstandi~ig  with 
the  inhabitants  of  Eryx  and  of  making  himself  master  oP 
the town.  He left  IIercte,  and with  a  detach~nent  of  his 
troops  occupied  Eryx, where  he bloclrnded  the Romans who 
were  still in  possession of  the  acropolis;  hc  was  encampecl 
between the arx ancl the foot of tlzc mountain, where the town 
was situated.  15s object was  to  keep  the Romans  engaged, 
to turn them away from  Lilybneum ancl  Drepana,  and to tirc 
them  out.  This he effected  very completely,  and therefore 
remained four years in his position, during which thc Romans 
were unable to make any progress.  This struggle shows what 
perseverance can do ; even Polybius, himsclf a practised soldicr, 
expresses  the highest  admiration  of  it.  The communication 
with the sea was much more difficult hcrc than even on mount 
Hercte,  and  the  corps  which  he  commanded  consisted  of 
profligate  mercenaries,  hundreds of  whom  would  have been 
ready  for  money to  dclivcr  up their  own  parents  into  the 
hands  of  the cnemy; but he inspired  these  flaithlcss savages 
with such a degree of admiration, that they did not venturc to 
inalrc the nttcmpt.  He carried on the war in the most sirnplc 
manner;  Polybius justly  remarksm, that  it is impossible  to 
relate the history of these years, on account of  thc u~iiforrnit~ 
of  the  occurrences,  and hence  we  know  littlc  about  thcm. 
Rut the  engagements  which  took  place  in this  small  space 
were, nevertheless, often vev  bloody, and although the troops 
of  Hamilcar  wcre  occasionally  beaten,  the  Romans  gained 
nothing  dccisivc,  and  never  madc  any progress  beyond  the 
'  momentary  advantage.  The newly-discovered fragtr.cnts  of 
DiodorusZ1 contain  an  anecdote  about  I-Iaiziilcar  ,v1iich  is 
beautiful,  and shews his  charactcr  in the clearcst light.  In 
the  year  preceding  the  close  of  the  war,  C.  Fundanius, 
an obscure  gcncral,   narcl lied  out  against him; the troops  of 
Hainilcar  were  dcfezated  through  the  fault  of  Vodostc,r,  a 
comniander of  the infantry,  and many werc slain.  Hamilcar 
20 i. 56.  "  Llh. xxiv. 2 and 3, 11.  60, ed. Dinrlorf. 
scllt  to  tlze  Roman  General  and asked for  a  truce,  that  he 
117igllt  be able to bury the deadz2.  Tlie consul sent liiin back 
tile  answer,  that  he ought  rather  to be concerned  about  the 
living,  and capitulate.  Haniilcar  either did not  receive  the 
boclics  at all,  or  only with  this  insulting  reply.  A  short 
time afterwards another engagement took place,  in which  the 
1Zornaizs suffcrcd great losses.  IIeralds were  now sent by thc 
Romzns or tllcir allics to cffect the delivcry of  the dead,  and 
Hamilcar granted their request by saying, that hc would always 
bc willing to allow tlzcm  to take back the dcad after a  battle, 
for  hc made war  against the  living only.  This answer was 
either thc simple expression of his own feclings, or was intended 
to put the Iiornans to  the blush.  This and similar anecdotes 
wcrc  probably  derived  from  I'hilinus,  who  is  said  to  have 
al\vays  rcprescnted  thc  Carthagininns  in a  more  favourablc 
light than the Romans. 
LECTURE LVII. 
TIIE peculiar  nature  of the war in Sicily gradually convinced 
the Romans, that it could not possibly be brought  to a close 
without  extraordinary exertions.  It was  thcrefore  decrecd, 
for the third time, to build a fleet;  but the state was no longer 
able to raise  the necessary sums by a property-tax  (consisting 
of  one or morc per thousand),  which  must have prcssed very 
hard upon the peoplc.  Tlie state may, in the meantime, have 
sold large lsortions of  the ayer.publicus ;  tlze allics, too, had no 
doubt contributccl much to the earlier  fleets.  A special loan 
was therefore  contracted with wealthy individuals for building 
and equipping  a  fleet  of  two hundred  ships  of war,' on con- 
dition that the money should be returned if the undertaking 
turned  out  favourably.  This  condition  implied,  of  course, 
that the advanced  sulns were not to be returned if the undcr- 
''  This pietas  towards  the dead was  generally observed in the wars of the 
ancients, hut more cspccidly 11y thc Grecks; the Romans  werc  not  mucll con- 
cerned ahout the dead.-N. 
Ar~ord1119  to Orosins, Anrelius Victor, ai~d  Entropius,  it consisted  of  300 
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taking failed.2  The loans which the ancient states contracted 
were usually different froin  those  of modern  times;  but those 
which were contracted during the Hannibalian war3 approacl~ed 
nearer to our system.* 
The ships were less awkward than before, for  at Lil~bae~uln 
the Romans  had taken an excellent  galley, which  they now 
used  as  a model for their two hundred qt1inqueremes5.  They 
also provided themselves with better sailors, whom they selected 
from all the maritime towns  of  Italy; and the best [soldiers of 
the legions were  used  as  marines.  Boarding-bridges were no 
longer used, fbr the Romans were now resolved to let the issue 
depend  upon  an  open  sea-fight.  To the Carthaginians this 
news  was  quite unexpected,  for  they had  entirely neglected 
their fleet  from want  of  money;  and as  their patriotism was 
not so strong as that of the Romans, no extraordinary exertions 
could  be  expected.  They  hastily  manned  and repaired  all 
their  old  ships  to convey  provisions  and  reinforcements  to 
Lilybaeum, Drepna, and Eryx, where the want of  both was 
very much felt.  Their fleet, loaded with corn, arrived at the 
Aegatian islands, whence  they intended to  sail  across to the 
coast.  In order that a great number  of tran~ports  niight  not 
be necessary,  the provisions  were  conveyed  in ships of  war. 
Their marines were not  of  the best kind, and the whole expe- 
dition  had been  got up in too  great a  hurry.  The Roman 
fleet  commanded  by the consul  C.  Lutatius Catulus  and the 
praetor  Q. Valerius  Falto, was  cruizing  along the coast,  and 
the Carthaginians intended  to land their  provisions, in order 
to  take  on  board  Hamilcar  and  the  best  of  his  soldiers  as 
marines, and then to venture on an open sea-fight against  the 
Romans.  The latter saw that everytl~ing  would be lost if the 
Carthaginians were allowed to carry out their plan, and deter- 
mined on attacking them before  they had accomplished their 
object."  The Romans had only the advantage of lighter ships 
Polybius, i. 59.  Livy, xxvi. 36; suix. 16. 
'  Down  to the 17th century all loans wcre  repaid  as soon as  it  could  bc 
clone,  in order to avoid  the continued  payment  of  interest.  In many  cases, 
however, it was impossible to follow this system, and in Hollaild, Spai~~,  aud at 
Nurnberg, there st111 cxist boncls which were signcd in the 15th century.-N. 
5  Polybius, i. 59. 
6  C01-n  is a dangerous cargo, and vessels laden wlth it are easily upset, if  it is 
not laden in sacks.  There are many instances  of  ships with  corn  having been 
upset. -  N. 
of better troops; the wind was iivourable to the Cartha- 
ginisns,  while the ltolntlns had to work hard with their oars, 
which was  a great disadvantage in the naval engagements of 
tile ancients, since a vessel  sailing against the wind presented 
a  larger  front  to  the  assailant.  I-ranno,  the  Cartliaginian 
admiral, endeavoured, with  a  favonrable wind  and full  sails,7 
to  cross over  from  the  island  of  I-Iiera  to  Lilybaeum.  He 
thus  fell  on the Romans with double force,  and had decided 
over them,  so that the latter thought it hazardous 
to  accept  the battle.  But they  were  bold  nevertheless:  the 
Carthaginians could hardly move  their  vessels,  and both  the 
cargo of  the ships and the bad condition of the Carthaginian 
soldiers rendered  it easy for the Romans  to gain a  colnplete 
victory.  Seventy Cartliaginian ships were taken, many others 
were sunk, and the rest disper~ed.~ 
Thc Carthaginians, unable to introduce provisions  into  the 
distressed fortresses, or to equip a second fleet, began to nego- 
tiate for peace.  According to the account of Polybius,g which 
seems to be  probable, I-Iamilcar Barca was  chosen  to  conduct 
the  negotiations.  It was  soon  agreed  that  Sicily should  be 
evacnated and surrendered to the Romans, that Carthage should 
pay a contribution of  2200 talents, restore all Roman prisoners 
and deserters, without  ransom,  and pay a ransom for the Car- 
thaginian  prisoners.lO  The Romans had also demanded, that 
Hamilcar  should  lay  down  his  arms  and  return  home as a 
prisoner  of  war;  but he had  rejected this humiliating  condi- 
tion, and declared that  he would  rather  die  sword  in  harld 
than  return  home  in such a state.ll  It was agreed, that  tlle 
peace should not be valid until the  Roman  people  had  given 
their  sanction  to  it.  When its  terms  were  laid  before  the 
people at Rome, the contributions were raised by one thousalid 
talents, and it was  further  demanded  that  the Carthaginians 
should  give up all  the  sinallcr  islands  between  Sicily  and 
Carthage.  This circumstance alone, is sufficiellt to shew that 
the  Liparian  islands  were  still  in  the  possession  of  the 
" Galleys  often  niecl  no sails at all or bi~iall  ones; but when  tho wind was 
fitvourable, largc sails wcre hoisted.--N. 
Polybius, '; 61.  Co~nparc  Diodorus,  Frngm. lib. xxiv.  Eclog.  3,  p. 509 ; 
Oros. iv. 10 ; Eutrop. ii. 16. 
i.  62.  Compare Valerins Max. vi.  6. 2. 
lo Polybius, i. 62,  iii. 27.  Compare  Appian,  De Reb. Sicul.  p.  94,  ed. 
Schweigh. ; Eutrop. ii. 16.  Cornel. Nepos, liamzlc. 1. 
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Carthaginians.  These  terms  were  necessary  to  establish  a 
- 
lasting  peace. 
Thus ended the first Punic war, which had lasted for twenty- 
four years, and which made the Romans masters of Sicily iadeed, 
but had changed that island into a wilderness;  the whole of the 
western part  in particular was laid waste;  and fio~n  that time 
Sicily, in fact, has never recovered, though civilisation existed, 
and the Greek arts continued to be cultivated.  The devastation 
~~  -- 
was completed in the second Punic war.  During the servile war 
the island was a complete wilderness;  and however bad the con- 
dition of  Sicily is  at the present  time-the  modern  Sicilialzs 
are, next to the Portuguese, in the lowest  stage of  civilisation 
among the nations of  Europe-yet  it was  still more  desolate 
and  deserted  in the time of  Verres.  Under the Roman em- 
perors it did not recover; hence, we do not find  in the Itinera- 
ries  that  the high roads passed  through  towns, but through 
large  estates,  for  the towns  had  perished.  Sicily  remained 
thus parcelled out into large  ropert ties  down to the time  of 
Gregory the  Great, when  we  again become  acquainted  with 
its  condition  through  the letters  of  that pope.  The present 
population, notwithstanding its wretched government, is almost 
double what it then was.  In the time of  Verres, the popula- 
tion was less than one million.  It  is as if  the soil  had lost all 
its  life  and fertility;  the small  kingdom  of  Syracuse  alone 
formed an exception, in consequence of the great wisdom with 
which Hiero governed it. 
After this peace, Sicily was  constituted a  Roman province. 
This was  a  new system,  and  Sicily was  the first  country  to 
which it was applied.  A province, in the Roman sense of  the 
word, was a country in which a Roman general (either during 
the time of  his magistratus curulis, or in case of his year of office 
having elapsed, during the time for which  his  imnperium  was 
prolonged)  exercised  over  his  soldiers,  as  well  as  over  the 
inhabitants of  the country, the same power as in times of war, 
by  virtue  of  the lex de imperio.12  It is a wrong  notion, that 
the inhabitants of  a province were not the owners of  the soil: 
that they unquestionably were,  though  not  according  to the 
Roman, but according to the provincial 1aiv.l"he  owners re- 
tained the use of  it on the payment of  a land-tax.  This hap- 
pened also when  a  province  revolted  and was  re-conquered, 
12  Compare vol. ili. p.  620.  l3 vol. iii. p. 618. 
it came to pass that in some provinces almost all  the 
fell into the hands of  the Ro~nan  republic, and in othe~s 
none at all.  This was not understood by later writers,  such as 
T]leophilus, and even Gaius.  Within the boundaries of a plo- 
villce there were civitates liberae,  civitates foederatae,  and sub- 
jects.l"The  allied states were treated  like the Italian  allies; 
some had property, and   aid taxes, sometimes in proportion to 
thcir produce, and  sometimes in fixed  sums  of  money.  The 
property of those who had lost it during the war was, of course, 
disposed of by the ltomans in what manner they pleased.  The 
dorninions of  Hiero, who retained his  title of  king, the state 
of  the Mamcrtines and 'l'auromenium,  Segesta, Centori~a,  and 
other towns  in the interior, remained entirely free.  Thence- 
forward, there  were  usually one praetor, and one quaestor in 
Sicily. 
The first Punic war was injurious to the Romans, becausc it 
in~~overished  the people;  and it therefore had a demoralising 
influence also, for such wounds do not always heal when peace 
is restored.  During such a war, provision  agents, contractors 
and  scoundrels get rich, while  honest  citizens  becolne  poor. 
Hence, this war was one of the first  causes  of  the degeneracy 
of  the Roman people.  Many things  must  have  been  altered 
in the course of' the war, of which we have scarcely any infor- 
mation.  All we know about the changes made in the Roman 
constitution  during  the  last  fifty  years, is  little  more  than 
nothing, and  I  think  myself  very  fortunate  in  having  dis- 
covered some isolated small points.  One  of  them  is,  that  in 
the year 506 a second praetor was appointed to administer the 
law  for the prregrini, as  we  learn  from a  passage  in Lydus, 
"  De Magistratibus." l5  This was  a  great  clzange, for thence- 
forth a peregrinus was a real persona at Rome, whereas for~neri~ 
he  had  been  obliged  to  choose  a patronus, by whom he was 
represented.  We  must recognise in this measure, an important 
diminution of  the spirit  of  faction.  Suetonius relates  that a 
Clauclins, who undoubtedly livcd  about  tlrc  beginning of  the 
first Punic war, resolved to rule Italy through tllc clients, whicll 
is one of  the proofs  that tl~e  clientela was, in some respects, 
a dangerous thing;  and that it was  salutary to break  up that 
connexion.  But the praetor was not confined to administering 
'*  vol. iii.  p. 616. 
IS  i. 38. 45.  Colnpare \ol ill.  p.  613, foll ; Llvy, Ept. bb. rix. 
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means lenient creditors.  The  Carthaginians, moreover,  were 
obliged to pay  their  mercenaries who  came from  Sicily; but 
tlzey  had  110  money,  and  their  state  was  badly  governed. 
Hamilcar,  thc greatest  man  of  his time,  was  opposed  by a 
whole faction; his  friends  also  wcre  called  a faction,  which, 
however, means nothing else but persons from a'll mnlrs, or the 
best part of  tlze nation, who joined  the great man whom the 
majority  endeavoured  to  decry.  Thus the  powerful  assist- 
ance which Providence gave to tlze  Carthaginians, in the per- 
sons of  I-Iamilcar and  I-Iannibal,  led  to  nothing  but misery. 
Had they followcd the advice of Hamilcar, had they not spared 
their wealthy citizens, and had thcy made but one more great 
effort, they might  have paid  off their inerccizaries and formed 
a new army.  Instead of  this, they foolishly tried to negotiate 
with  those  barbarians,  and for  this  purpose  assembled  tlie 
whole army.  Tlze  consequence  was that it broke out in open 
rebellion.  A  fearf~~l  war  arose,  which  for  Africa  became  a 
national war, the Libyans throwing tlzemselves into the arms 
of the troops evcn with enthusiasm,  and tlze  women  offering 
their gold  and jewels  to  defray the expenditure  of  the war. 
The rebcls were also encouragcd and supported by the Italian 
deserters, who feared  lest  they should be delivered  up to the 
Romans.  One of these deserters was Spendius, a Campanian, 
who  had  becn  a  slave  among  tlze  Romans,  and now  made 
himself  very  conspic~ous.~~  Carthage  was  brought  to  the 
brink of  destruction;  and not only Libya, but ancient Phceni- 
cian colonies,  such as  Hippo,  Clupea, and Utica also revolted. 
The cruel manner in which the war was carried on, shews the 
character of those  Ligurian, Iberian, Gallic, and Libyan mer- 
cenaries:  thcy  were  not  rcal  savages,  but  they  acted  like 
savages.22  The Carthagini-~ns  had often  not an inch  of terri- 
tory beyond  their  walls  and  fortifications.  The  war  lasted 
for  three  years  and four  months.23  At length,  under  the 
command  of  the  great  Hamilcar,  and  through  the horrors 
committed by the rebellious  monsters themselves,  the Cartha- 
ginians succeeded in suppressing the insurrection and destroy- 
ing the rebels.  The Carthaginians  had dcclared the revolted 
21  Polybius, i. 69, folI.;  Diodor.  Fragm.  126. xxv.  Excerpt. De Vtrt. et  T7dt. 
p. 567. 
"  Sinmilar illstances occur in the Thirty Years' .war. -N. 
* Polybius, i. 88.  Compare Diodorus, 1. c. and L~vy,  xxi. 2. 
towns in Africa  in a  state of blockade;  and here we find one 
of  the instances in which the Romans shewed themselves just 
towards their own rivals, for they recognised the right of 
blockade,  exchanged  their prisoners  with the Carthaginians, 
forbade all colnmerce with the rebels,  and protected  the pro- 
visions  which  wcre  conveyed  to  Cartl~age.~~  The  Italian 
merchants  did not  always  observe  the conlmands  of  Rome, 
but sailed  mlhither they were drawn by  the prospect  of gain. 
Hence the  Carthaginians  had  the right  to seize  all  vessels 
bound for a harbour  of the rebels,  to confiscate their cargoes, 
and  to  keep  the  crews  as  prisoncrs.  The  Romans  even 
allowcd  the Carthaginians  to levy troops in Italy, and made 
an exchange  of  the prisoncrs  who were  still in their hands 
from the late war.  In the same  spirit  they refused  the offer 
of the Uticans, who proposed to surrender their town into the 
hands of  the Roizzans.  These acts of justicc make it thc more 
suri?ribing, that shortly afterwards the Romans committed such 
glaring injustice towards Carthage. 
During this war in Africa, the nzcrcenaries in Sardinia, the 
maritime  towns  of  which  were  entirely  Punic  down  to the 
time of  CiccroZ5,  had liliewise revolted, and had massacred the 
Carthaginian  colonists in the island.  Polybius2Qhinks  that, 
at first,  tlzey  murdered  only the Carthaginian  officcrs.  The 
native Sards rose against the nzercenaries, expelled  them from 
the island, but at the satnc time refused obedience to Cartlzagc. 
Aftcr the conclusion  of the war  against the rebels  in Africa, 
when  the Carthaginians made  preparations  to reconqucr Sar- 
dinia, the Romans protected  the Sards and took possession of 
the island,  threatening the Carthaginians with  a fresh, war, if 
they would not give up tlzcir claims  to  Sardinia and Corsica, 
as those islands had placed themselves under tlze  protection  of 
Rome.  The Carthaginians wcrc too much exlzaustcd to make 
any resistance;  and Harnilcar,  who,  like all intelligent  men, 
gave up what could not be retained, without indulging in sen- 
timental melancholy, adviscd his countrymen to yield till better 
time.  should comc.  Tlze  Carthaginians determined,  for  the 
present,  not  to  wage  war,  but  swore  that they would  take 
vengeance, and accordingly concluded a peace, by whiclz  they 
'' Poljl)ius, i. 83.  Hcrc mc see  the first  traces  of  mnritimc law and of  the 
claims of neutrality, which have caused so many disputes in modern history.-N. 
"  See vol. i.  p.  170.  "  Poljbius, i.  79 and 88. 56  ILLYRIAN  WAR.  EMBASSIES TO  GREECE.  5 7 
gave up Corsica  and  Sardinia, and paid an additional  contri- 
bution of  1200 talents.  This is one of the most detestable acts 
of injustice in the history of R0me.~7 
Subsequently to the Peloponnesian war nn  empire had arisen 
in Illyricum, where formerly there had been only independent 
tribes.  After  the time  of  Philip  of  Macedonia  especially,  a 
greater state had been created out of  smaller ones, the origin 
of  which  cannot  be  traced  with  accuracy; nor  is it certain 
whether it was  founded  by Bardylis,  who is known  to have 
formed  a  kingdom  in  those  districts  during  the  reign  of 
Pl~ilip.~~  Kot cven  the capital  of  this  Illyrian state can  be 
distinctly ascertained;  all we can say is, that it must have been 
situated  somewhere  in the neighbourhood  of  Ragusa.  The 
worst Illyrian piratcs must have been those who inhabited the 
northern part of Dalmatia.  The maritime power  of the Rho- 
dians was still of considerable  importance;  but about the year 
520 the Illyrians, like the modern Albanese, became formidable 
in those seas and ravaged the defencelcss coasts in a  dreadful 
manner,  especially the unfortunate  C~clades;  they carried  off 
all grown up persons, and destroyed  all cornmcrce.  Perhaps 
none but the Macedonians  and  Rhodians were  able to resist 
them, though they may not have disliked to  see other nations 
annoyed  by  piracy,  as  is  sometimes  the  case  with  modern 
maritime powers.  But the  Illyrians, unfortunately for them- 
selves,  also  ventured  to  disturb  thc  coinmerce  of  the allies 
of  the  Romans,  and  thcir  boldness  increased,  when  in the 
reign  of  their king, Agron,  their  prizes  became  greater and 
greater,  and when  they found  themselves  very successful on 
the  coasts  of  Epirus  and  Acarnania.  Ambassadors  were 
sent  by  the  Romans  to  demand  reparation;  but  Teuta,  the 
queen  of  the  Illyrians-for  Agron  had  died  in  the  mean- 
time, and his son  Pinnes was undcr  the guardianship  of  his 
mother  Teuta-answered,  that piracy  was  the national  cus- 
tom  of  her  subjects,  who  took  what  they  could  find; that 
she herself  and her state had  not wronged the Romans, and 
that she could  not forbid  her  subjects that which  was their 
right and their privilege.  One  of  the ambassadors,  probably 
a  son  of  the  great  Tiberius  Coruncanius,  having  replied 
27  Polybius, i. 88; Zonarns, viii. 18. 
28  Diodoms,  xvi. 4;  Cicero, De  Of. ii. 11;  Photius, Biblioth. p. 530,  ed. 
Bekker; J,ibanius,  Orat. xxviii. p.  633. 
it  was  the  custom  of  the  Romans  to  abolish  bad 
customs, Teuta, enraged at such boldness, despatched assassins 
wllo  murdered  the  ambassador~.~g  Previously  to  this time 
the Rolnans  had  never  entertained  the thought  of  crossing 
over to tile  eastern  coast  of  the Adriatic;  but they now sent 
an army and  a fleet,  which  landed  on the Dalmatian  coast. 
The  Illyrians  who  were  now  beginning  to  extend  their 
clominion,  were just  besieging  Corcyra,  which,  before  the 
Peloponllesian war had been  a paradisc,  with a fleet of  some 
hundreds  of  galleys.  The  island,  wliich  is  now  allnost  a 
wilderness,  was  obliged  to surrender before  the  Romans  ar- 
rived.  They landed at Dyrrhachiurn and delivered this town 
as well as Apollonia and Epidamnus.  The neighbouring tribes 
also  surrendered,  and  the  governor  of  Corcyra,  Demetrius 
Pharius, a traitor,  who  was   roba ably  bribed, gave the island 
up to the Romans.  Issa  also was  delivered, and  the Romans 
advanced through Upper Albania, along the Dalmatian  coast. 
They met with no great resistance, all the towns  surrendering 
except  one  fortified  place,  so  that the queen was  obliged  to 
make peace.  The  Illyrians  rcnounced  the  sovcrcignty  of  a 
part of the Dalmatian islands and of Upper Albania, pledging 
themselves  not  to sail  further  south  than  the Drin, a  river 
issuing  from the Lake of  Scutari,  with  more  than  two  un- 
armed vessels.  The Romans  thus became the real benefactors 
of  the  What became of the people between Epirus 
and Scutari, cannot be stated with certainty ;  but they probably 
remained, like Apollonia ancl  Epidamnus, in a certain state of 
depenrlencc on Rome, though neither a garrison nor a praetor 
was  kept there:  they probably  paid  only  a moderate tribute. 
Being  the benefactors  of  the  Greeks, and drawn to them  by 
the irresistible charm which many nations felt when praised by 
the Greeks, the Romans sent an embassy to Greece to announce 
the terms of  the peace with the Illyrians.  The Aetolians and 
Achaians  were  then  allied  against  Demetrius of  Macedonia, 
a  circumstance  which  gave  to the unhappy  country a short 
breathing  time;  and the  Romans  for  political  reasons  sent 
this  embassy  to  both  confederacies.  Another  embassy  to 
Athens had no  othcr  object  than to obtain the praise  of  the 
Greeks;  it was an act of homage paid to the spiritual power of 
that city, for the poor  Athenians were  in a  state of extreme 
"  Polybius, ii. 8; Appian, De  Xeb. Illyr. 7.  30  Polybius, ii.  12. 5 8  CONDITION  OF GREECE.  THE CISALPINE GAULS. 
weakness;  but the  relnelllbrance of their forefathers was  still 
alivc and gave a value to the honours  conferred by  at hen^.^' 
AS  Corcyra,  Apollonia, and. Epidamnus were  Corinthian c010- 
nies,  we  see  at once  why  a  separate  ernbassy was  sent  to 
Corinth, although it belongcd  to  the Achaean league.  The 
Corinthians rewarded  the IZomans  by bestowing  upon  them 
the right  to take  part  in  the  Istl~mian  games3"  and  the 
Athenians gave tlleln the rights of isopolity and access to the 
Eleusinian mysteries.33 
Even before  this time,  either  during the  Punic  war,  or 
shortly after  it, the Romans  had  interfered in the affairs  of 
Greece.  The Acarnaniitns were  at war  with the Aetolians; 
for the latter, and Alexander of Epirus, had divided Acarnania 
betwccn themselves.  The Acarnanians  rccovcred  thcir indc- 
pendence, dcficnded it against  the  Actolians,  and  applied  to 
Rome  on  thc  ground  that  their  anccstors  had  not  fought 
against Troy, in proof  of  which they appealed to the catalogue 
of ships in the Iliad; and Patron, who  conducted  the ships of 
Aeneas,  they  said,  had  becn  an Acarnanian.  The Ronlans 
also adduced  thcse  circumstances as the reasons for protecting 
them; but their embassy  was  treated  by the Actolians  with 
insult and contempt, and produced no effect 3S  Justin relates 
this froin Trogus Pornpcius, with a ccrtain feeling of  pleasure, 
for Trogus was not a native Roman, but belonged to a Ligurian 
or  Gallic  NOW,  howcver,  in the  ycar u. c. 524, the 
Romans were  more  successful, and obtaincd  the before mcn- 
tioned distinctions. 
3'  The following  affecting occurrcncc is related by Suidas.-When  Antigonus 
Gonatas had  conquered Athens, which  had bravely resisted  during thc long 
war, and had been compelled  to surrcndcr by famine, the aged poct Philemon 
was  still living in Piraens, whither he had perhaps removed after the fall of thc 
city.  Althongh extremely old, he was still very vigorous, and not  forsaken by 
his mnse.  EIis  1:ist  comedy was finished, except  the  final scene; and  he was 
lying on his couch half  drcnmiug, when on a sudden he saw nine virgins before 
him in the room, and on the poi~lt  of  walking  out.  When he asked them who 
they were, and why they were going away, they answercd that he nndouhtcdly 
knew them.  They were the Mnscs, and  turning round, they left  him.  Phile- 
mon then rose, finirlied his  comedy, and  died.  Grcek literature pcrlshed with 
the loss of  Piraeus:  the  spirit literally witlidrew from GLLLC.  -N. 
3Volybius,  ii. 12.  33  Zonaras, viii. 9.  34  Justin, xxvi~i.  1 and 2. 
3F  According  to Justin,  xliii.  in Jin., Trogns Pompeius  was  a  Vocontian, 
from the south-east of  Gaul.  Comp. Niebuhr, Vortri~ge  uBer alte  Gesch. i.  p. 9. 
LECTURE  LVIII. 
oence,  As the contemplatioll of nature shews an inherent intellid 
may also  be conceived as coherent with nature, so does 
history on  a  hundred  occasions shew an intelligence  distinct 
from  nature,  which  conducts  and  determines  those  things 
seem to us to be accidental.  Tt  is not true that the study 
of  history  the belief  in a divine providence:  on the 
contrary, history is of  all  kinds of  kno~vlcd~e  the one which 
most decidedly leads to that belief.  Circnmstances, which are 
called accidental, conlbine in such a wonderful way wit11 others 
to produce ccrtain results, that men evidently cannot do what 
they please.1  For example, the Gauls alone would  have been 
sufficient to crush  the Romans;  and had  they invaded  Italy 
during the first  Punic  war,  the  Romans  would  have  bcen 
utterly  unable  to make  their  efforts  against  Sicily.  Again, 
had Alexander, the son of  Pyrrhus, tried  to avcnge  the mis- 
fortunes of  his father  in Italy,-had  he formed Italian con- 
nexions  at the time when Regulus was dcfeatcd, the Romans 
would  not  have been able to offer any resistance.  But Alex- 
ander's eyes were  directed  toward  petty conquests;  the Gauls 
were quiet, and the Carthaginians had no good generals, except 
at the close of  the war: in short, it was  providential  that all 
things  combined  to  make  the  Romans  victorious.  Thep 
themselves  seem to  have been prepared for  some attack from 
the cast; for evcr since the time of Pyrrhus they kept a strong 
garrison at Tarenturn, to prevent  any undertakings from that 
quarter. 
During  this  period  the Roinans  extended  thcir  relations 
with foreign  powers  far and wide.  Previously  to the Punic 
war,  they  had  formed  friendly  connexions  with  Ptolelny 
Mliladelpl~us~,  and  they now  did  the  same  with  Seleucus 
Callinicus of Syria. 
Aftcr the Gauls had lost the Romagna,  they had fallen into 
a kind of  torpor.  During  the last  fifty years  they had been 
perfectly quiet in their Cisalpine districts,  either because there 
were  no immigrations into  their  territory,  or  because  thcy 
tllemselves were  satisfied in the belief  that the Romans  hsd 
Herodotus often says,  ;?TEE  ybp ahbv &?roh[orr8ai; and we may eq~idly  often 
say, 3ss  yap akbv ohfcu0ar.--N.  ~ol.  iii. p. 548. 60  DIVISION  OF  GALLIC  TERRITORY.  IRRUPTION  OF  THE GAULS.  6 1 
forgotten  them.  After  the extermination  of  the  Scnones,  - 
their beautiful country, Romagna and Urbino, had passed into 
the  hands  of  the  Romans  as  a  ~ilderness.~  This  country 
afforded  room  for  a great many Roman  settlers according to 
the right conferred by the agrarian law.  After the first Punic 
war, about the year 522, the tribune C. Flaminius, by a decrce 
of the people, caused this ager Gallicus et Picenus to bc di~ided.~ 
The ager of the Senones comprised a part of Romagna, Urbino, 
and of the tcrritory of Ancona, where the colony of Ariminum 
had  already been  established.  Polybius  most  strangely calls 
this bill  of  Flaminius an attempt  at revolution,  a  proof that  - 
even an intelligent man may err in matters of detail, especially 
when  he follows others  without reflecting  for  himself.  Fla-  - 
minius carried  this decree in spite of  the vehement opposition 
of the senate (for we can now no longer speak  of  patricians), 
and as none  of  the othcr  tribunes  opposcd  him,  the rulers 
induccd his  aged  father to ascend  the  rostra  and lcad his son 
away.5  This distribution of Gallic territory and thc settlement 
of  a great number of  Romans  on the fronticrs,  we arc told, 
disturbed thc Boians who inhabited the country about Modena, 
Psrma,  and Bologna,  as  GLir as  thc  Romagna.  It may  bc 
asked whether it was  prudcnt at that time to establish  strong 
scttlements  in those  districts, as  the Romans  dreadcd  a war 
with  the neighbouring Gauls.  To this we must answer, that 
the war could not be avoidcd; thc Gauls could not continue to 
dwell quietly in Lombardy,  and it was a matter of  little con- 
sequence  whether  the war  broke  out a  little  sooner  or  later. 
It is certain that the new scttlernents made the Gauls uneasy; 
fifty  years  before,  they had  been  almost  extirpated,  but the 
population  was  now  nearly  restored.  They ieared  lest  the 
powerful Romans who had lost tlieir large estates in Romagna, 
YO].  iii.  p. 428 foll. 
4  Ciccro, Brutus, c.  14, Academ. ii.  5.;  Polybius, ii. 21. 
This opposition by his ow11 father shews the gleat change which had taken 
place.  The fathcr was, like his son,  a plebcian at the time;  but this need not 
surprisc us,  sincc, according to the Licinian Law, the  plebeians  had  the jus 
~ccu~andorum  agrorum,  as well as the patricians,  and both classes had enriched 
themselves  by it.  This law of  C.  Flaminius is  the  first  instance  of  a  mere 
plcbiscitnm, without tho consent of the senate, becoming binding as a lex, in ac- 
cordance w~th  the Hortcusian law; and the expression of  Polybius dpxl17bs rijs 
dnl ~b  xsipov G~au~popijs  rijs 'Pwpa[wv  ?TOAI~€[(I.S,  must  probably  be  understood 
with reference  to this  fa~t.  -N.  Coinpare  vol. iii.  p.  418, full;  C~ccro,  Ue 
Inventtone, ii.  17. 
should seek  new ones in their territory; but the Romans did 
,lot  yet think of  a war with them.  Their eyes were directed 
towards Spain, and they had no hopes of being able to expel 
the Gauls from  Lonibardy.  It is  said  that at this  tinie  the 
Romans were  carrying on war with the Ligurians; we should 
however be greatly mistaken,  if we were to imagine that they 
had already  into Liguria Proper, or the tcrritor~  of 
Genoa; tl~e  Ligurians  here meant  are  those who  had spread 
in the Apennines as  far  as Gasentino  and  Arezzo,  after  the 
power of the Etruscans  and of  the Gauls  on the lake Vadimo 
had been broken.  The war against these  Ligurians was dilE- 
cult,  for  they defended  every separate  hill,  and every little 
tribe resisted until it was almost annihilated. 
The Gauls in Northern Italy were the Boians and Insubrians; 
the former lived south of the Po in Romagna, the latter in the 
neighbourhood of  Milan,  and in the plain  of  Bergamo  and 
Brescia.  These  two  towns  themselves,  however,  were  not 
Gallic, but probably belonged to the Ractian or Etruscan race. 
The  Cenomani  dwelt  between  the  Insubrians  and Veneti, 
bctween Milan  and Mantua,  and had placed themselves under 
the protection of  the Romans.  Ever sincc their first  conflict 
with the Romans,  the Gauls had  been  longing  for  an oppor- 
tunity  to take  vengeance  upon  them;  and now,  when  the 
Romans  settled  on  their  frontiers,  they  began  negotiations 
with  the Transalpine Gauls,  among  whom great movements 
were going  on at this time.  Several  years,  however,  passed 
away without anything further being done.  The negotiations 
with the Transalpine Gauls caused great apprehensions among 
the Romans,  and at length, eight years  after  the Flaminian 
law,  an innumerable  host  of  Gauls  invaded  Italy,  and the 
war  broke  out  in  the  year  52'7.6  The swarms which now 
descended  into  Italy from  the north,  were  like those  of  the 
Cimbrians in after times.  Among these hordes of  barbarians 
wc also find Tauriscans, who otherwise occur only in Carinthia; 
whether at that time they occupied a part of  Helvetia, is un- 
certain.  This war is memorable on account of thc extraordinary 
preparations of the Romans, who made a general levy through- 
out Italy.  The Italian  allies obeyed this time also,  and cvcn 
more  readily than ever; for  they anticipated with  horror  an 
invasion like the one which  had taken  place  about 150 years 
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before.  The Roinans sent one army by the ordinary road to 
Ariminum,  under  the  consul  L.  Aemilius,  and  stationed 
another  in Etruria,  under the coininand  of  a praetor.  The 
cons~~l,  C. Atilius,  was  still in  Sardinia  with  his  army  and 
fleet, as  the  Sards refused  obedience to Rome.  A  corps  of 
reserve was  stationed in thc neiglibourliood  of Rome.  All the 
Italian allies capable of bearing arms wcre kcpt ready to march. 
A  list  of  them  is given  by Polybius7,  but it sl~ews  that he 
himself  was not  quite clear  about  the matter.  The numbers 
are unfortunatcly not exact, and Schweighacuser's  computation 
is quite wrong, for he speaks of  the legions as if they had not 
been contained in the census.  But this is the only instance in 
which I can  say that Polybius uscd  materials  without  being 
perfectly  clear  about  them.  I  believe  that  Fabius  spoke 
thoughtlessly,  when he said  that the Roman forces consisted 
of about 800,000 foot and 80,000 horse, numbers of which we 
can make no use and from which we can draw no conclusions; 
but least  of  all  can we,  as was  done  in the dispute  between 
Hume and Wallace, deduce from them any inference as to the 
amount of  the population of  Italy; for  although I-Iume is the 
more sensible of the two,  still he treats tlie matter too lightly. 
The list  in Polybius is perhaps  not  complete; but I cannot 
think that he could have made a mistake  in his  calculations 
without being aware of it, for  he is always  very exact in his 
numbers.  I have said this much  upon the point,  because the 
census  of  that time  is  so  often  referred  to.  If we  had  the 
original lists wc might see where the fault lies:  but as things 
are, we can only say that there is something wrong. 
The Romans looked forward to the brcaking out of this war 
with  far  greater  apprehensions  than they  afterwards  did  to 
that of Hannibal:  such is human foresight !  The Apennines 
north of Tuseaizy were then quite impassable,  and there were 
only two roads by which Italy could be invaded, the one lcading 
by Faesulae, and the other through the territory of  Lucca, in 
the neighbourhoocl  of  Pisa,  whcre the whole valley was then 
one extensive marsh.  The Gauls must have taken one of these 
roads,  and probably  the latter.  EIannibal's  march  through 
those marshes has become celebrated, but history is silent about 
the passage of the Gauls through the same district.  The Gauls, 
unconcerned  about the Consul near Ariminum, thus marched 
'  ii.  24. 
illto  Etrurin,  an army of  50,000 men,  and the swarm 
advsllced irresistibly as far as Clusium, a distance of only three 
days9  joorlley  fioln  Rome.8  The Rolnan  army was  probably 
statiolled  in the  neigllbourhood  of  Florence,  to prevent  the 
Gauls from ~n~r~hing  towards Rorne;  and thus tve can under- 
stand  how  it did  not  hear  of  the  arrival  of  the G~L~s  at 
Clusium till late.  Tlie  Romans now broke up, if  not to cut 
the enemy off from the road to Rome, at least to pursue them. 
When the Gauls perceived  that an army was closely following 
their traccs,  tlicy turned back.  They marched from Clusium 
tlirough  the territory of  Siena towards  the sea, and we there 
find  them  in the neighbourhood  of  Piombino,  on  the coast 
opposite  to  Elba.  Polybius says that the Romans  mct  the 
Gauls near a place callcd Faesula (QalaoXa). The commentators 
on that passage are wrong.  Fiesole cannot possibly have been 
the place;  for how could  the Gauls  have  afterwards marched 
tlicnce  along the sea  coast?g  It must have been a place  be- 
tween the sea and Chiusi, perhaps on the frontier of  the Papal 
dominions  near  Aqua  Yend~ntc.'~  The Gauls  had left their 
cavalry behind and lay in ambush at some distance; the infantry 
was to cntice the Romans aftcr it, to retreat slowly,  and thus 
to draw them  to the spot  ~vl~crc  the  Gauls  wished  to  mcet 
them.  Tlic Romans,  imagining that  the encniy were taking 
to flight,  and that the cavalry was only protecting their rear, 
followed, and fell in with tlicir whole army in fill1 battle array. 
The Romans suffercd a great defeat,  and a part of them with- 
drew to a hill in the Apennines,  on which they were besieged 
by  the  Gauls.  The  consul,  L.  Aemilius,  who  had  bcen 
stationcd  ncar  Ariminum,  fortunately  hasten~d  across  the 
Apennines to their assistance; but as he arrived after the defeat, 
he found the Roman army blockaded by the Gauls.  However 
he rescucd thein from their precarious position,  and the Gauls 
marched  away  along  the sea  coast;  for  as  they had  already 
collectcd an ilnmcnse booty,  and did not wish to begin a new 
contest with an aymen impediturn, they resolvccl first to sccure 
their  plunder  in a  safe  place,  and then to return for battle. 
Such  a  resolution  can  be  taken  only  by barbarians.  They 
marched  slowly  along  tlie  sea  coast,  ravaging  evcrything.'l 
Polybius, ii. 25.  Folybius, ii.  26. 
'O Montepulciano, in thc lect~ves  of 1626. 
"  Many persons have beau inclined to believe, that the ancients, whose intel- 
lectual powers were surely not inferior to ours, carried on their wars at random. 64  ROUT OF  THE GAULS.  FLANIINIUS AND CLAUDIUS BIA4RCELLUS.  6  5 
The Consular army followcd them, but had not the courage to 
attack them;  and they would have returned home through the 
territory  of  Pisa  witliout  interruption had  not  the  army  of 
C. Atilius fertunately just  returned from  Sardinia and landed 
near Pisa, whither it had been driven by contrary winds,  and 
where  the Gauls  arrived at that very time.  C. Atilius,  had 
intended to join  the other armies,  but when  he heard of the 
invasion of the Gauls,  he left  his baggage  at Pisa,  and began 
to march towards  Rome along the coast;  of  the defeat of  the 
Romans he knew nothing.  Near  a place  called Telamon his 
light troops  fell  in with  the Gauls;  some of  them who were 
taken  prisoners,  revealed  their whole  situation, and told the 
consul that the main army of  the Gauls was approaching, fol- 
lowed by the consul Aemilius.  The latter, in the meantime, 
had heard of the movements of Atilius, but did not suspect that 
he was so near.  As the battle of Tclamon took place in the  neigh- 
bourhood of Populonia,  this is anothcr proof that @aloohacannot 
possibly be Faesulae  near Florence.  The Gauls were now in 
a  fearful  situation:  they first  abandoned their  baggage,  and 
then tried to occupy a hill near  the road-side,  whither Atilius 
had sent his cavalry,  and where the battle  commenced.  The 
Gauls placed one front  against Atilius and the other  against 
Aemilius.  Atilius fell,  and his head was carried  to the chief 
of the Gauls; but his troops avenged his death, and the cavalry 
took possession of the hill.  The troops facing Aemilius fought 
naked like true savages; the other Gauls were likewise without 
breastplates,  but had  small sllields  and large  Celtic  cloaks.'2 
The Gaesatae mentioncd among the Gauls were not mercenaries, 
as  Polybius interprets  their  name13,  but  men  armed  with 
javelins.14  All the Gaesatae faced Aemilius,  and were met by 
the light troops  who  were  also  armed with  missiles.  They 
took to flight after a fierce  struggle.  The other Gauls  united 
on both sides in enormous masses,  but the day resulted in the 
death  of  40,000  and  the capture  of  10,000  Gauls,  so  that 
scarcely any escaped.  The danger was thus averted by a most 
fortunate circumstance; but the war was not concluded till the 
fourth year. 
Here we havc an instance of such a warfare; but the Gauls were barbarians,  and 
the Romans never acted in such a way.-N. 
12 Polybius, ii. 27-31.  l3 ii. 22. 
l4 From  yaesum  (a  javelin)  which  word  is used  by Virgil  in his beautiful 
description  of  the  Gauls, in  contradi4tinction  from  those armed with swords. 
The Gaesatae were illlohroges, for they came from the Rhone.-N. 
Ill  the  year  of  tlle  war  thc  Romans  crossed  the 
Apellllines,  and the Boians submitted to them.  During the 
Inst two years,  529 and 530, the war was carried  on  in the 
coulltry of  the Insubriaas,  that  is,  in the tcrritor~  of  Milan. 
The Insubrians, who wcre supported by the Trnnsalpine Gauls, 
defendcd  thcinsclves  very  bravely,  which,  considering  the 
open nature of their country, reflects much honour upon them. 
The Ronlans wcre obliged to retreat towards the confluence of 
the Aclda and the Po.  A portion of  thc Cisalpine Gauls,  tlle 
Cenomanians, bctween the river Adda and the lake of  Garda, 
the Venetians, whose cap; tal was Pataviuln, and the Euganeans, 
were  allied with the lZomans  and rerriained  faithful to their 
interest.  The Venetians, who excelled even tlle Cenomanians 
idfidelity to  the Romans,  were  a civilised people  occupying 
the country between  the rivers Adige and Plavis;  they were 
perfectly foreign to the Tuscans, and probably belonged to the 
Liburno-Pelasgian race. l5  The Insubrians aftcrwards sued for 
peace, but in vain;  thc Romans did not trust them, and wished 
to annihilate them.  In the year 529,  C. Flaininius gained a 
great victory over  thcln to the north  of  the Po.  It is unjust 
towards hinl to asscrt that he conducted the war badly,  and I 
shall say  more  about  him hereafter,  for  it is the duty of  an 
historian  to  rcscuc  from  the contempt  of  posterity those  to 
whose  names  blame is attached undeservedly.  The war  was 
decided in the fourth  year  by the great general M. Claudius 
Marcellus,  who slcw Viridomarus,  the lcader of  the Gauls.16 
'"ompare  vol. i. p.  166, foll. 
l6 The Capitoline Fasti state, that Marcellus triumphcd, de  Gallis Insubrzbus 
et Germanis.  The corner of the stonc which contains the syllable er,  mas bro- 
ken off  at one timo;  but ~vl~cthcr,  when the stone was restored,  the syllablc er 
was pllt in at raiidom,  or whetl~cr  it was so on the original stonc, I can neither 
assert nor deny.  1  havc oftcn seen the  stone; but  although a  friend of  mine 
wished  me particularly  to  ascertain  the truth,  I was  nevcr  able  to convince 
myself whethcr the corner containing thc syllable is part of the original stonc or 
not.  It is evidcnt that the  name cannot have hccn Cenomanis, since they were 
allied with the Romans,  and the g is  quite distinct.  Gouonzani does 11ot occsur 
among the Romans.  If thc author of  these Fasti actually wrote Germunis, the 
illscription would  be  the  most  ancient  document  in whicll  the rlalrlc of  our 
nation  is  mentioncd.  Thc thing i3  not  at all impcrssible.  At the time of J. 
Caesar, it is true,  the Gcrmans  did not live further south than the river Maine 
or the Ncckar;  in earlicr times  they extended rnuch  farther south,  bat  were 
drivcn back hy the  Gauls.  The Gcrmans  in  the Walli5,  of  whom  Livy (xxi. 
38,  comp. vol. ii. p. 525) speaks, mere the remnants of an e:~rlier Gcrn~an  popu- 
lation which had been expelled by the G~~~~~.-N. 
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The victory was  gained at Clastidium, in the district between 
Alessandria and Piacenza.  The Insubrians,  who were allnost 
annihilated,  recognised the supremacy  of  the Rolnans,  who 
now became masters of Milan and the whole plain of Lombard;~. 
Here they founded the two colonies of  Placentia and Creinona 
on  the banks of  the Po; and I am  inclined  to  believe that 
Modens,  though it is not mentioned till a later ~eriod,  having 
been lost for a time in a fresh insurrection of  the Boians, was 
liltewise fortified by the Romans  immediately after  this war, 
in order to secure the possession  of  their new  acquisitions.17 
The frontier was  pushed  forward as  far  as the Ticinus.  The 
Ligurian tribes in Piedmont were,  in point of  law,  still inde- 
pendent, though not in point of fact. 
In the first  Illyrian war,  the Romans owed their rapid suc- 
cess  to a  Greelr,  Demetrius Pharius,  who being  governor  of 
Corcyra had  probably been bribed  to surrender  the island to 
them, and had through their influence been appointed guardian 
of  the young  king of  the  Illyrians.  His character was quite 
in accordance with the despicable age of  Greece,  and treach- 
erous  towards  every  one.  He now  conspired  against  the 
Romans,  and during the Gallic war,  induced  the Illyrians to 
revolt,  which  proves  that  those  people  paid  tribute  to  the 
Romans.  He moreover  indulged  in  piracy,  with  a fleet of 
fifty lembi,  against  the Cyclades.  The Romans sent over  a 
consular  army under  L. Aemilius  Paulus.  The hopes  of  the 
rebels were speedily destroyed, and their chief place, Dimalusf8, 
was  taken.  The  residencc  of  Demetrius  was  in his  native 
island Pharus, which the Romans took by a stratagem; but he 
himself  escaped to Macedonill, where the last Philip had just 
ascended  the throne,  and Demetrius became  his  evil genius. 
The second Illyrian war was thus quickly brought  to a close. 
The Romans at this time extended their dominion in other parts 
also.  We are not informed when  the Veneti lost their inde- 
pendence, but in the great Gallic war they were allies of Rome. 
The Istrians wero subdued even before the time of  the Hanni- 
balian war, so that even the Veneti must have been conquered 
at  an  earlier  period,  and  probably at  the  time  I am  now 
speaking of. 
11 This may be inferred from Polybius, iii. 40, and Livy, xxi. 25. 
l8 This namc bhews  that  the modern Albanesc language  is  like  ancient 
nlyrian;  for dimal in Nhnncse signifies "  a double hill."-N. 
while these  things were  taking place,  events were ril;en- 
illg  ill  secret,  the  greatness  and  fearfulness  of  which  the 
Romans  were  unable  to  conceive.  During  the  interval 
that had  elapsed  since  the first Punic war,  Hamilcar  Bama 
had  displayed  the  qualities  which  commonly  distinguish  a 
great  man.  The  differences of  character  are  never  sccn 
more  distinctly  than  in times when  men  are surrounded  by 
difficulties and misfortunes.  There  are some who,  when dis- 
appointed  by the fiilure of  an undertaking  from which they 
great  things,  make  up their minds  at once to exert 
themselves no longer against what they call fate,  as if thereby 
illcy could avengc thenlselvcs upon fate; others grow dcspond- 
ing and hopeless; but a third class of men will rouse themselves 
just at such moments, and say to themselves, '' The more diffi- 
cult  it is to attain my ends, the more honourable it will  be;" 
and this is a maxim which every one should impress upon him- 
self as a law.  Some of  those who are guided  by it prosecute 
their plans with obstinacy, and so perish;  others, who are more 
practical men,  if  they  do  not  succeed in one way,  will  try 
another.  Therc are, it is true, persons who succced in nothing; 
but the old proverb audaces fortuna  adjuvat holds good neverthe- 
Icss.  Of this Hamilcar is an example.  Carthage had for centu- 
lies been wasting her best energies in Sicily. I believe that there 
were fellows at Carthage, such as Hanno  l9, who partly from envy 
of  Hamilcar,  and  partly from their  own  stupidity,  would  or 
could not see that, after the loss  of  Sicily and Sardinia, there 
were yet other quarters from which the republic might derive 
great benefits.  When, after the American war, it was thougllt 
that  the ignominious peace  of  Paris  had  put  an end  to  the 
grcatncss of  England, Pitt undertook with clouble courage the 
restoration  of  his  country,  and  displayed  his  cxtraordinary 
powcrs.  It  was  in the same  spirit that  Hainilcar  acted:  he 
turned his eyes to Spain.  The Phcenicians had formed settle- 
ments  in that country at  an early period.  Gades is  said  to 
have been older than Carthage, and the former place was cer- 
taillly very  important as an  entrcpdt  for the  commerce with 
the CassiteridesZ0. With the exception  of  Gadcs, there were 
'' The early p&  of  the  secoud Punic war in Livy is  disfigured by Harlno's 
spcec11es.-N. 
20  Tin was of  the highest value to the ancients, for tho puq,ose  of  srneltir~g 
col'lje*,  of which th-yllad great quuautit~es;  thc use of calami~lc  in tnuaking 1)rass 
is a mnch later inrention.-N. 
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probably no settlements, either Phanician or Carthaginian, on 
the western  coast  of  Spain; but  there  were  several  on  the 
southern  coast,  in Granada,  Malaga,  Abdera; and there had 
arisen  the  Bastulians,  a  ,nixed  people,  called  ML~O+O~VLKCT. 
Into the interior the  Carthaginians  had  not yet ~enetrated, 
although  thcy  seem  to  have  had  connections  with  it; and 
IIamilcar  now  showed  his  great  tact  and  sagacity;  for  he 
formed  the plan  of  making  Spain a ~rovince,  which should 
compensate  for  the loss  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia.  The latter 
island  was then  and is  still very unhealthy,  and its interior 
was almost inaccessibie.  Sicily had an effeminate and untvar- 
like population,  and  rich  as  it was,  it  lnight  indeed have 
increased the maritime power  of  Carthage, but it would  not 
have given her any additional military strength.  The weak- 
ness of Carthage consisted in hcr having no armies; and it was 
a  grand conception  of  Hamilcar's,  to transform  Spain into a 
Carthaginian  country  from  which national  armies might bc 
obtained.  His object therefore was, on the one hand, to sub- 
due the Spaniards, and on the other to win their  sy~npathy, 
and to change them into a  Punic nation under the dominion 
of Carthage.21  The conduct of the Romans towards their sub- 
jects was haughty, and always made them feel that they werc 
dcspised.  The highly refincd  Grcelcs,  who were  tllemselve's 
must  wont  to look  down with contempt upon all foreigner,, 
have felt that haughtincss very keenly.  The Spaniards  and 
Celts wcre  of  course  still less respected.  Common soldiers in 
the Roman armies not unfrequently, especially in the times of 
the emperors, married native women of the countries in which 
they  were  stationed.  Such marriages  were  regarded as con- 
cubinage,  and  from  them  there  sprang a  class  of  men  who 
werc  very  dangerous  to  the  Romans.  The  Carthaginians 
acted more  wisely,  by  making  no  restrictions  in regard  to 
such marriages.  Hannibal himself married a Spanish woman 
of  Castuloz2, and  the practice must have  been  very common 
among the Carthaginians.  This was an excellent way to gain 
the good  will  of  the natives.  The whole  of  the southern 
coast of Spain had resources of  no ordinary kind: it furnished 
all the productions of  Sicily and Sardinia, and in addition to 
them it had very rich  silver mines, the working  of which has 
21  Polybius, ii. 1  ;  Diodorus, Fragm. lib. xxv. eclog. 2, p. 510. 
lz Livy, xulv. 41.  Coinpare I)io(lorns, Fraym. 11h. xxv. eclog. 2, p.  510, foll. 
been  revived  in our own days.  Hamilcar  was  the first who 
introduced  there a  regular  and systematic  mode  of  mining, 
and this led him, or his son-in-law, to build the town of New 
(Cartl~a~cna).  While the Carthaginians thus gained 
tile  synlp,ztliy  of  the nation,  they acquired  a  population  of 
millions  which  relieved  them  from  the necessity  of  hiring 
faithless mercenaries, as  they had  been  obliged  to  do in the 
first Punic war:  they were enabled  to raise  armies  in Spain, 
just  as if it had  becn in their own country.  The Romans no 
doubt  observed  these  proceedings  with  feelings  of jealousy, 
but could  not  prevcnt  them, as long as the Cisalpine  Gauls 
on  tl~~cir  frontiers,  ready  to avcnge the defeats  of  thc 
Senoncs and Boians. 
All Spaill was inhabited by a multitude of small tlibes which 
were  without  any connexion  among  themselves,  whereas  in 
Gaul, some tribe or  anotlicr, the Aedui or Arverni, had the 
supremacy.  Tlie  Spaniards  wcre  people  of  very  different 
kinds.  Whether  the  Turditani  and  the northern  Cantabri 
belonged  to different  races,  as the ancients  say,  or  whcther 
all the Iberians belonged  to one race, as the great  Huinboldt 
maintains, cannot be dccidcd.  I must abstain from expressing 
an opinion, because I do not know the language; but I tllinlr 
that notwithstanding  the  great  authority  of  Humboldt,  the 
statements  of  thc ancients  ought  not to be  ncglectcd.  Tlzis 
much is  certain, that tl~e  people  south of  Sierra Morcna, tlle 
inhabitants of  Bactica,  had  a  character  quite  different from 
that of the northern tribes:  thcy had a high dcgree of civili- 
sation,  a  literature,  written  laws  and  books;  alld  there  are 
illscriptions  and coins,  on which we  still  possess  solne  rcm- 
nants of their very peculiar  alphabet, which  was  not dcrivecl 
from  that of  the Phcenicians.  But these peoplc werc just as 
warlilre  as those in tlle  north, though they wcre less  able to 
attack an enemy than to dcfend themselves.  It was  only  at 
bcginiling that they succeeded in drivillg the Celts across 
the  Pyrenees  as  far  as  Aquitania; for  afterwards  we  always 
find  them  confined  to  their  own  bounclarics,  within  wl1ich 
they defended themselves with desperate courage, so tllat tlle 
saying of an Arab general about them is quite true:  'L Behind 
walls they were more than men, but in the field more cowardly 
than women."  The latcst wars,  too, have  this.  The 
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behaved bravely when they were commanded by able generals, 
such as Hannibal and Sertorius;  so also in the 15th and 16th 
centuries.  Otherwise they confined their efforts to desperately 
defending themselves, and that even behind bad fortifications. 
They sometimes put  to  death  their wives  and  children, and 
fought as long as  a  drop of  blood  was left  in their bodies, 
rather than surrender. 
Hamilcar had come to Spain as soon as he had subdued the 
rebellious mercenaries.  There he remained  eight years, which 
time he cmployed with incomparable wisdom,  in establishing 
the Cnrthaginian  empire.  When he died,  he left  the com- 
mand to Hasdrubal, his son-in-law.  Here we see a character- 
istic  difference  between  the Romans and Carthaginians:  the 
general  of  the  latter  not  only  holds  his  office  for  life,  but 
leaves it to his son-in-law, like an inheritance.  It is true that 
this required great influence at Carthagc, and is what  Livy 
calls Barcina factio. 
LECTURE  LIX. 
LI~  opens his narrative of  the second  Punic war  with  the 
remark  which  others  had  made  before  him, that it was  the 
greatest and most memorable that had ever been carried on by 
the greatest  states, and at the periods of  their greatest fresh- 
ness and vigour:  he could  say so with justice;  but  after the 
lapse of  more than 2000  years we cannot  think the same, for 
in the wars of the French revolution far greater energies were 
called  into  action ; even  the seven-years' war, especially the 
campaign of  1757, has a greater accumulation  of  events, and 
as for the greatness of  the generals  engaged  in it, it  is by no 
means inferior to the second Punic war.  In  the first Punic war, 
there  appears only one great general; in the sccond we have, 
besides Hannibal, Scipio, Fabius, Marcellus, and many second- 
rate ones.  We  may, however,  truly say, that in all ancient his- 
tory there is no war which equals that against Hannibal in the 
greatness of the events.  We  may also on the whole assert, that 
there never  was  a  gcncral  superior  to  Hannibal, and in an- 
tiquity there is not one whom we could even place by his side; 
before  him  all  the other  Carthaginian  generals  shrink  into 
insignificance.  Against him there stood Scipio, who, although 
he perhaps did not quite equal Hannibal, yet must be considered 
as a general  of  the  first  order:  Fabius  and  Marcellus,  who 
might have acquired great fame in other wars, are eclipsed  by 
him.  1 do not  hesitate  to adopt  the opinion  of  Hannibal 
himself, when he places himself  above Scipi0.l 
The second  Punic war  was  described  separately by severaI 
writers.  The first, but more especially the second war against 
Carthage,  was  the real  subject  of  the annals of  Fabius  and 
Cincius.  The latter prefixed to his history of it a brief sketch 
of  the  early  history  of  Rome,  and  described  the war  vcry 
minutely, as  far  as  he himself  had witnessed  it.  I have no 
hesitation in saying, that the account which Appian  of 
this war  is  mainly based upon that of  Fabius.  Dionysius of 
Halieamassus failed  him  at the beginning of  the first Punic 
war.  I can prove satisfactorily, that some characteristic points 
in the narrative of Appian ancl Zonaras are derived from Fahius, 
for Dion Cassius also knew that he could  not  have  a  better 
guidc than Fabius.  The Hannibalian war was  also described 
separately by two Greelis, Chaereas and Sosilus, both of whom 
are  spokcn  of  by Polybius with contempt2; he regards them 
as  untrustworthy,  although  Sosilus,  if  we may trust the ac- 
count3, had lived in the camp of Hannibal.  When Livy wrote 
the history of  this war, he did not think of using the memoirs 
written  by Hannibal,  or  the  Greek  letter  which  Scipio had 
addressed  to  Philip  of  Macedonia.  Polybius4 made use of a 
document  of  Hannibal,  engraved  on  a  brass  tablet  in  the 
temple  of  Juno Lacinia?  in which the numbers were stated 
with particular  accuracy.  As far as we possess  his  worli, we 
clnnot wish for anything further or better: his  third book  is 
a  master-piece, which  satisfies the milici  of  the reader  in all 
respects.  Unfortunately we possess  his  account  only for  the 
first Years of  the war.  He undoubtedly  had  before  him  the 
excellent  work  of  L. Cincius, who  described  the war  as  an 
eye-witness.  In  the Latin language there was only one separate 
history of  the second Punic war, by L. Coelius Antipater, who, 
Livy, XXX.  30.  iii. 20. 
CorncI. Nepor, Hannib. 13, where also one Silenus is mentionctl,  who had 
lived in the canql of  IIannihal, and written a history of  tllc war. 
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to  judge  from  his  name, must  have bcen  a  Greek, and was 
either a freedman, or enfranchised  and adopted into the gens 
Coelia.  He wrote in the seventh  century with  declamatory 
pretensions, and many points in Livy's account are, I believe, 
derived from him, especially those  parts in which he falls into 
the lomantic;  for it had been the object of Anti~ater  to wlite 
an  elegant  history,  and  Cicero  was  probably  not  wrong in 
speaking of hiin with contempt.  The work of Dr. Ulr. Beckcr, 
of  Ratzeburg"  on this war is good, although it is not founded 
on matured studies.  It contains some strange prejudices, and 
neglects  many points which one wo~~ld  like  to  see explained. 
It is a valuable work neverthclcss, which should not be over- 
loolied;  and the name of  its author will not be forgotten.  111 
the narrative of  Livy, we can distinguish the different soulccs 
from which he derived his information.  The account  of  the 
first period of  the war, and especially  the  rhetorical  descrip- 
tion of the siege of  Sagnntum, are unquestionably derived from 
Coelius Antipater; and if his history of  the remaining period 
of the war were not based  on better  authorities, the whole  of 
his  third  decad would  be worth nothing.  But in some parts 
Livy follows  Polybius  very carefully; in  other  parts  of  this 
decad, as for instance at the end  of  a  year, when  he givcs  a 
brief summary of  the eventr which occurred  during the year, 
he followed  the pontifical  annals, or some annalist.  He evi- 
dently wrote this decad with grcat pleasure, and some portions 
of it are among the most beautiful  things that have ever been 
writtcn.  The points in which he is dcficient arc, a knowledge 
of  facts, experience, an intimate acquaintance with  the affairs 
of real life-he  does not step beyond tlic walls of the school- 
and a control over his subject.  He worked  with  grcat  ease, 
and repeatcd what others had said  before him without  toiling 
and moiling.  Wherever he differs from Polybius, hc deserves 
no credit  at all; and  however  beautifully his  history of  this 
war is written, still it is evident that he could not form a vivid 
conception  of  anything.  His  description  of  the  battle  of 
The book here alluded  to bears the t~tle  Vorarbezten zu ezner  Geschzcltte 
des zwezten Pzinzschen  Krzeges,  Altona, 1822.  A supplementary work  by  the 
same author, IS ent~tled  "Ueber Lzvzus xxx. 25  und 29.  oder Entwzckeluny  der 
Begebenhezten,  welche  zwzscheu  Hunnzbals  Ruchkehr  nuch  Afrzca  und  der 
Schlacht 6ez Zumu  Zzegen." 
Cnnnae, for  instance,  is  untrue and impossible, whereas  that 
of  Polybius is so cxcellent, that  it enables  the reader  to  see 
the locality and to draw a map of it; and the better the locality 
is known, the clearer his  description  becomes.  The work  of 
General  Vaudoncourt,  "  Canlpagnes  d'Anniba1,"  which  was 
published a few years ago at Milan, and which was  raised so 
much  because  the  author  is  so  able  a  man, is a thoroughly 
wrctched production;  the maps  are good for not,hi~lg,  and the 
plans arc quite arbitrary.  The author was unable  to read  his 
authorities critically, knew no Greek, and has  @en  no  new 
information.  There  is  only one  point  in ancient tactics on 
which I have  learned  anything  from  him.  He is especially 
mistaken  respecting the order of  battle of  the Carthaginians, 
which  he considers to have been that  of  the phalanx;  this it 
was not;  thcir troops weie just  as  movcable  as  those  of  the 
Romans, and the sword  alone decided with them; thcy prob- 
ably had no lanccs at all, but grcat quantitics of javelins. 
If I were to  rclatc  the history of  this war according to my 
own inclination, the time which is set  apart for these lccturcs 
would be much too short.  I must therefore confine myself  to 
brief  sketches and outlincs; but abridged narrativcs require a 
perfect consistency in all their parts, a thing which  a  person 
can attain only by writing them down with great care.  Lord 
Chesterfield  very  appropriatcly  said  on  a  similar  occasion, 
"  I bcg  your  pardon  for  my prolixity,  but I have no time." 
All abridgments rcquire time  The greater part of my labours 
consists  in condensing  what I have written;  but in these lec- 
tures I cdnnot  give  such  an  abridgment with  the necessary 
consistescy;  and if the limits of an abridgment arc overstepped 
herc and there, in a subject which has  bcen  dear  to my heart 
for tlic last forty years, I trust no one will find fault with me. 
When Hasdrubal had had the administration of  Spain  for 
nearly nine years,  he was  assassinated  by an  Iberian,  whose 
chief he had ordered to be put to death.  This pcrsonal  attach- 
ment to their chiefs was a peculiar feature among the Iberians; 
no one allowed his master to be killed unavenged, and, if  pos- 
sible, no one survived him.  EIannibal,  the  son  of  Hamilcar 
Barca, was living in the camp of  I-Iasdrubal to finish his mili- 
tary education, and became the favourite of the army.  Nothing 
in history is so well  known as  the vow of  Hannibal, which I 
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mentioned it in aftertimes7 :  and what reason have we for doubt- 
ing  it? The fact that the circumstances  under which it  was made 
me stated differently, is no ground for disbelieving it: accord- 
ing to some, it was the condition on which Hamilcar took his 
son to Spain:  according to others, it was made at the moment 
he took leave of  his father.  I also believe that when Hamilcar 
not  more  than  went  to  Spain in 516 or 517, Hannibal  wa~ 
nine years old, and consequently must  have been born in 507 
or 508, previously to the time when Hamilcar went  to Sicily, 
so that he began his expedition  to Italy in his twenty-seventh 
ycar.  Against such an age nothing can be said:  it is just the 
age at which a gcneral may best display all his great qualities. 
Frederick the Great was not more than twenty-eight ycars old 
when he undertook the conquest of Silesia; and Napolcon was 
twenty-seven or twenty-cight years old, when he made his first 
Italian  campaign.  Remarks  like  these  may  be  laughed  at 
when  they are  mistaken  for  proofs; but I know what  proofs 
are, and what I mean to say here is simply this:  that at such an 
age  he  could act  the  great  part  which  history  ascribes  to 
him.  His  whole conduct in this war  is that of  a vcry young 
man; and at the time of his death he was not much more than 
fifty years old.  He had  two  brothers, Hasdrubal  and  Mago. 
Whether Hasdrubal was older than Hannibal is unknown, but 
Mago was very young whcn Hannibal went to Italy. 
Opinions  as  to  the personal  character  of  Hannibal  were 
naturally  divided  among  the  ancients:  in  Latin  authors  bc 
appears  cvcrywl~ere  as  a  formidable  being.  The  descrip- 
tion  in  Livy  of his  character  as  a  gcneral  is in parts  very 
beautiful ;  but  when  Livy  adds that his  virtues wcrc  coun- 
terbalanccd  by  as  inany vices, he contradicts Polybiuso, who 
expressly denies the charge of cruelty, and asserts that, where- 
ever  any  cruel  or  faithless action  is mentioned,  it must  be 
attributed to Hannibal's subordinate ofEccrs  in the Carthagi- 
nian  army;  and  especially to  anothcr  Hannibal,  surnamed 
Monomachusg,  whosc  name  gave  rise  to false  reports  about 
the great  Hannibal.  The name  Hannibal  was  as  common 
at Carthage  as many of  our  Christian  names are among us. 
There  are  statements  respecting  his  cruelty,  especially  in 
7  Polybius, iii.  11; Corn. Nepos, Hannzb, 2.  Compare Val. Maximus, ix. 3. 
Ext. 3; Appian, De  Bey. Hzspun. 9. p. 110. 
ix. 22.  Polybius, ix. 24. 
Appim, who derived them from Fabius,  but  Polybius knows 
nothing of  them.  I do not  mean  to  say that he committed 
no  act  of  cruelty; but  what  he did was  no  more  than the 
common practice among thc Rolnalls themselves, with whom, 
as  the ancients in general, the destruction  of  the enemy 
was the principal objcct of  war.  Sometimes cruelty is one of 
the necessities of war.1°  In modern times warfare has assumed 
a more humane  character; and  really destructive wars,  such 
as we find in the history of  Spain, are among the exceptions. 
Of  Hannibal's  alleged perfidia plus quam  Punical1  not a single 
instance is  known,  and  Polybius  absolutely denies it.  We 
may  confidently asscrt, that in  capitulations he  always  kept 
his  engagements; for if he had  not,  the charge  would  have 
been brought against him, and no one would  have  made  any 
capitulation  with him.  The  Romans are terrible liars  when 
they blame an enemy:  stories like those of  the murder of  the 
senate of  Nuceria, and  the massacre of  that of  Acerrad"  are 
not established by  any good authority.  His greatness, how- 
ever, was not less  striking in peace than in war; and in this 
respcct the differcnce between him and Scipio is very remark- 
able.  In times of  peace Scipio was a useless citizen; nay, the 
dangcrous cxamplc which he set in defying his lawful accuscrsl3 
may have led the Romans to despise the laws of their country; 
and who knows whether  his  cxample was  not  actually a slow 
poison!  I like  Scipio for  many reasons,  and he  was  really 
great in not  making  a selfish use  of  the popular  enthusiasm 
for him; but there is,  on  the whole,  somethina  P  exceedingly 
haughty in his character: he was  conscious of  his own great- 
ness.  He shewed  his  haughty  pride  from  the  moment  he 
bcgan to take part in public affairs, until he became a candi- 
date for  the consulship;  afterwards he set himself  altogether 
above the laws of  his country.  This feature in his character 
is visible throughout his life:  he wanted to be  superior to the 
laws, and submission to their sovereign power was quite foreign 
to him.  We do not  hear that he was the author of  any insti- 
tution or law to benefit his  country, although he might have 
bestowcd great blessings upon it by his influence;  and Rome 
'O  Thus it wa.;  a case  of  necessity, when  in the  crusades Bohemund, for the 
purpose of keeping off  the Turks, ordered the corpses to hc roasted and qhown 
to the ambassadors.-N.  Comp. Wilkcn,  Geschzchte d. Kreuzzuge, i. p. 187. 
" r~ivy,  xxi. 4.  l2  Zonaras, ix. 2 (from Dion. Cassius);  Appian, Pun.  63. 
l3 Livy, xxxviii. 55, foll. ; A. Gellius, iv. 18, foll.;  Val. Maximus, iii. 7.  1. Q.  FABIUS  MAXIMUS.  7 7 
was  surely in need  of blessings.  This neglect a'fter the Punic 
wars WAS  one of the main causes of the decline of  the Rolnan 
constitution and morals.  Hannibal, on the other hand, shewed 
his  genius  in  everything;  and,  in times  of  pcace,  after  the 
second Punic war, hc was  the benefktor  and reformer of his 
country by wise  laws  and institutions.  He and  Scipio were 
both  men  of  highly  cultivated  minds,  and were  intilnately 
acquainted  with  Greek  literature.  Halmiballs  colnpallions 
were  Greeks  with  whom  he conversed  in his  leisurc  hours, 
and although they were not mcn  of  thc first  order,  still  the 
fact shews that his amusements were  of  an intellectual kincl.14 
Among many othcr advantages in his  relations with  otlicrs, 
he possessed  irresistiblc pcrsonal  attractions, which  he sceins 
to have  inherited  from  his  father, who subdued savages,  and 
then managed and guided them without any difficulty.  For 
a  pcriod  of  sixteen years he commanded  an army, in which, 
likc that of  Gustavus Adolphus, therc was at last not one of 
the old  soldiers  left,  but which consisted  only of a  crowd  of 
reckless adventurers.  He  was placed in difficult circumstances; 
but although individual Gauls and Celts, or some of tlie frivo- 
lous and unprincipled Nuinidians were now and then faithless, 
or deserted and betrayed him, yet not one ever raiscd his hand 
against  him.15  I3e was  obliged to sacrifice his soldiers to his 
objccts;  he could not spare the Italicans, and made enormous 
demands upon  them:  but none  of then1  ever  attempted  any 
thing  against  him.  He was like  a  bcing  of  a  higher  ordcr, 
who governed  all mcn,  and dazzled  them  by his  lustre.  A 
man who settled thc administration of Spain, crossed the Alps, 
shook thc power of the Romans, and reduced them to extreme 
weakncss-snch  a man I call the greatest among his contem- 
poraries;  yca,  I may call  him thc greatest of  all ages.  EIow 
small,  in comparison with his, are tlie achievements of  Alex- 
ander the Great, who had no difficulties to overcome !  Scipio 
came  forward  against  Hannibal  undcr  the  most  favourable 
circumstances, and he could not but conquer, unless EIannibal 
had been  a  bcing  of  supernatural powers.  EIannibal's perse- 
verance  and faithfulness towards  his  country cannot be  suffi- 
ciently praised; his transactions mitli othcr states had only one 
l4  Cicero (De Orat. ii. 18) in relating the anecdote of  the  rhctorici.ln mho 
preached to Hannibal  about the virtue? of a  general,  bays  that EIann11)d did 
not speal~  Greek veiy well (non  optzme Gruece). -N.  '5 Pulybius, xxiv. 9. 
object-to  scrve  his  own  country.  Wherever  he  was  he 
commalzdcd;  l1c  did not  seek protection even when he was in 
exile,  and  lze  bowed  bcforc  ao one;  he never violated truth, 
nor  did  any thing which was  opposed  to the dignity  of  his 
This  man  I  honour,  esteem,  and  love,  almost 
although I do not wish to deny, that things 
are related  of hiin which  fill our eyes with tears.  But when 
he  was  at  Capua,  and  allowed  Decius  nlagius  to  depart 
uninjured,  he did not follow thc dictates of policy,  but those 
of his own generous heart.  Few Romans could boast of such 
magnanimity; and  at that time  Scipio was, pcrhnps, the only 
one ainong them who was capable of it. 
Tlzc  third hero  of  this war  is  Q. Fabius Maximus,  a  man 
who has bcen  very much  ovcrratcd.  Great  circumspection 
and  self-control  are  indeed  qualities  which  we  cannot  help 
recognising  in him; and he was  a very good gencral, but not 
a  better  onc  than  many  others.  EIc  had  already  acquired 
reputation  in the preceding and more  obscure wars,  but thc 
surname Maxiinus was an inheritancc from his  grand or great 
grandfather,  Q.  Fabius Iiullianus,  who  lived at the time  of 
tlie  Samnitc  wars,  and  received  that  surname  for  having 
separated the four city tribes from  the rustic ones.  He acted 
in thc way  that he thought useful,  and  did  not  hesitate  to 
do  that which  brought  upon  him the charge  of  cowardice. 
Ennius says  of  him: unus  homo  nobis  cunctando restituit rem. 
As a general he was calm,  cautious,  and circumspect, but the 
only important feat  of his is the recovery  of  Tarciztum;  and 
what was  that, after all?  The fact  of  his holding  out after 
thc battle of  Trasimcnus was no more than the republic had a 
riglit to expcct of him.  I a111  inclined to compare him with 
ficlcl-marshal Daun, and am convinced that Daun, as a general, 
was  at least not  inferior  to him.  I am  very apt to transfer 
my affection  for  great  ancestors  to  their  dcsccndants:  but 
however much I should  like  to speak  of Q. Fabius Maximus 
with  affection, I cannot.  His opposition  to  Scipio is  not a 
rhetorical exaggeration, but an historical  fact.  The speeches 
which  Livy  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Hanno  are  rlzetorical 
flourishes taken  from  Coelius Antipater, but the character of 
those of Fabius is historical: it is evident that he was envious, 
and that he could  not  bear  the star which was  rising  above 
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threshold of old age, he looks upon the rising generation with 
uneasiness,  and does  not  rather rejoice  in beholdillg it; and 
yet this is vcry common  old men.  Fabius would rather 
have  seen  Hannibal  unconquered,  than  see  his  own  fame 
obscured  by  Scipio.  Hence  he  would  not  endeavour  to 
destroy Hannibal, but only to wear hinl out. 
Claudius Marcellus,  an able  and entcrprising  general, was 
quite the opposite  of  Fabius by his  great boldness;  he was 
distinguished as a general and a brave warrior. 
These are the men who acted the most prominent part in 
the second Punic war, which,  like the first, must  be  divided 
into several periods.  The first  comprises  all  that took place 
in Spain, including the conquest  of  Saguntum, etc., until the 
year 534, when Hannibal began his march  towards  the Alps. 
All the events of this period, however, must be rcgarded merely 
as preliminary to the  itself.  The second period comprises 
the next threc years  and a  part  of  the fourth, from  534 to 
537,  during  which  Hannibal made  his  irresistible  progress, 
crossed the Alps and overran Italy.  During the third period 
from 537 to the taking  of  Capua  in 541,  his  star began to 
sink: the Romans recovered their ground, and their hopes of 
success  received  new strength,  for  it was  now  evident  that 
Hannibal  had  irreparably  lost  the  object  of  the war.  The 
fourth period extends from  541 to 545; EIannibal  now began 
to set his hopes on Spain and on the reinforcements which he 
expected from his brother Hasdrubal.  He maintained himself 
in  Apulia,  Lucania,  and Bruttium,  and  the  Carthaginians 
raised fresh armies in Spain, until the defeat of  Hasdrubal on 
the Mctaurus.  The fifth  period  extends  from  545 to 550, 
when  Hannibal,  at the command of  thc Cnrthaginian senate, 
left  Italy.  The sixth  and last  extends  from  his  arrival in 
Africa down  to the end of  the war,  and may be  termed the 
rican war.  Af ' 
Several  other wars run parallel to,  or are interwoven with 
that against  Hannibal; thus we have to notice,  from  535 to 
547, the wars of  the nomans in Spain,  which were carried on 
with various  success until  the taking of  New Carthagc; from 
535 to 540 the Sicilian war and the insurrection of  Sardinia, 
form an episode, and were brought to a concIusion by the sub- 
jugation  of  Sardinia and the conquest of  Syracuse; and lastly, 
from  540 to 547,  the llacedonian war.  Those  who  wish  to 
form an accuratc idea of  the second  Punic war, must keep all 
tllese  great masses  separate from one another,  whereby  they 
will get rid of much that is perplexing in the detail. 
LECTURE LX. 
WHILE  Hamilcar was  establishing a Carthaginian  empire in 
Spain, the  Romans  acted  the part  of  mere  spectators.  On 
his arrival in that country,  the Carthaginians ~ossessed  only 
the coasts of Granada and Murcia; but under his administration, 
Andalusia and the grcater part of Valcncia seems to have becn 
added to their dominions.  The empire of  Carthage  did not 
yet extend beyond  the  Sierra Morena,  but connexions with 
the natives had already been  formcd,  and it may have been 
under  Hasdrubal  that  greater  progrcss  was  made  in  that 
quarter.  When we rcad that Hannibal was master of all Spain1, 
it  is  a  mistake  of  the  writcr, for  the  Carthaginians  never 
advanced  farther  than  a  little  north  of  New  Castile  and 
Estrcrnadura.  Old Castilc and Leon never belonged to them. 
The northernmost  point to which we can,  in Polybius,  trace 
the conquests  of  Hannibal,  is  Salamanca2; and even  if we 
could consider  this  acquisition as a lasting one,  still the Car- 
thaginian empire did not extend over one half of the peninsula. 
The tribes  of  the interior and the Celtiberians  seem  not  to 
have recognised the supremacy of Carthage, and were only her 
allies,  retaining their own peculiar form  of  government,  and 
merely furnishing  mercenaries  for  the Carthaginian  armies ; 
which they  did the more  willingly,  as  they were  of  a  vcry 
warlike disposition.  Polybins3 justly remarks, that the Romans 
were  silent  at  the  progrcss  which  the Carthagillisms  were 
making in Spain, because  they were afraid to  renew  the war 
against them, while  they  were  threatened themselves in Italy 
by the Gauls.  Had Hamilcar been alive, he would,  perhaps, 
have taken part in that war.  Hasdrubal was thus  enabled to 
train and prepare the new nation, during the great war of  the 
Romans  with  the Cisalpine  Gauls.  We  are surprised  at an 
account, which mc~ntions  that during this time  a Carthaginian 
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fleet  appeared  off the coast of  Etr~ria.~  If that statement  is 
true, it was certainly not a step talien by the government, but 
probably  by Hasdrubal  on  his  own  responsibility.  During 
thc  Cisalpine  war  the Romalls  had,  strangely  enougll, con- 
cluded a  trcaty,  not  with  the  government of  Carthage, but 
merely with Hasdrubal,  the governor of  Spain.'  This seems 
to shew, that Cartilage was in a state of analclz~. The treaty, 
however, had reference  to Spain  only,  whcre the river Iberus 
was  fixcd  uljon,  as  the bounddry  between  the two empires. 
It is  owing to  the loss  of  thc  second decad of  Livy, that we 
do not know at what  time the Romans had gained possession 
of that part of  Spain; for,  at the beginning  of  the  second 
Punic war,  we  find  them  in possession  of  Tarraco, and  the 
inhabitants of  the coast of Catalonia were under their protec- 
tion.  Their fricndship  and alliance  with lCiassilia  were  very 
old.  Livy aclds,  that it  was  stipulatcd  in  the  trcaty  that 
Saguntum should  be frcc,  between the dominions of the two 
powers;  and if  this had really  been the case, the hostilities of 
the Carthaginians against that town would certai~lly  have been 
a  violation  of  the treaty.  But  Polybius  knows  nothing of 
such a clause;  ancl  if he, who had autl~entic  documents before 
him, had  found  anything about  it, he would  assuredly have 
stated that Hannibal had  committed  a  breach  of  the  treaty. 
However  excellent  Polybius  generally  is,  yet he sometimes 
crrs in details:  he had first published his work down to the war 
with Perseus;  the second edition contained the history down to 
the t~liing  of Corinth, and it  can be clearly shown, that the first 
books were not revised in thc second edition.  It  is evident that 
at the time he was  quite unacquainted with the geography  of 
Spain,  and  hc,  like  Livy,  appears  to  have  imagined  that 
Saguntum was situatcd east  of  the lbcms.  The Romans,  no 
doubt, did not wish to give up the Saguntines who were their 
friends,  but it had not been  stipulated that  an  attack  upon 
Saguntum  should  be  regarded  as  a  breach  of  the  peace. 
Hannibal carried on the war  in  Spain only as  a  prepration ; 
for his  real object was  the war in Italy which he endeavoured 
to kindle.  The Carthaginians  stood  to him in the samc rela- 
tion  as  the Romans  did  to Czsar:  he  was  stationed,  with 
an  army dcvoted  to him,  in  a  country  which  he himself 
had  subducd, and over which  consequently the senate had no 
Zonalas, nu.  19.  Llr  y, xxi. 2; Polyblos, il. 31. 22, 111.27.29. 
control.  Carthage,  accorcling  to  the  naturaI  career  of  its 
collstitution,  was  already in a state of decay, authority having 
passed from the senatc into the hands of the popular assembly; 
and altllougl~  the people  may  have adored  Hannibal, yet the 
senate  calznot  have  been  favourably  disposed  to  him; aor, 
the Romans were generally hated, is it likely that the 
majority of  the Carthaginians  expccted that  their  condition 
would be improved  by  a  war with Rome,  or could  see how 
Rome  was to be  attacked.  The  nobles,  moreover,  dreaded 
Hannibal at the head of a victofious army. 
Livy places the sicgc of Saguntum in the year 534, although 
he could not but have seen that this was  an iml~ossibility,  and 
that it must have taken place the year before, 536."olybius 
blamcs  Hanilibal for  cndcavouring  to kindle the war  by a11 
kinds of intrigues, and he has, on this  account, bcen charged 
with  being  too  partial  to  the  Romans; but  neither  he nor 
Hannibal  is  deserving  of  censure.  Polybius  thinks  that 
Hannibal ought at once  to have demanded the restoration  of 
Sardinia; but this  Hannibal could not  do.  Had  he been  a 
king,  he might perhaps have  done it, but as  it was,  he was 
obliged  gradually  to  draw  the  Carthaginians into  the  war, 
whether they would or not.  He accordingly interfered in the 
hostilities betwecn  thc Saguntines and  Turdetanians, or,  as I 
should like to read, the Edetanians,  for it is hardly to be con- 
ceived  how  the  Turdetanians,  at so  great a  distance,  could 
have  had  any coinplaints  against the Saguntines.  The Hde- 
tanians, on thc other hand,  were  the inhabitants of  Valcncia, 
and must at that time  have  been  under tlle  protection of  the 
Cnrthaginians.7  Saguntum was probably not a pllrcly  Iberian 
town;  it is  said that colonists from Ardca had settled there, in 
which case it must have been  a  Tynhenian town; and this is 
not  improbable,  although  afterwards  the  Iberia11 population 
pcrllups  predominated.  The  statcrncnt  tLvt  the  Saguntincs 
wele Ll  colony of Zacynthus,  scclns  to 11ave adsen solely fiulll 
tllc  nalnc.  some  years  l,efi,~c, disturbances  llad  arisen  at 
Sab"~"tu111;  for Seveo~l  of  ~~OSC  Spnlish &tics were ropu~lies, 
and their  inh  Jitants  must  not  be  looked upon as  barkarialls 
like tl'cCclts.  Tire Romans on that occasion had interfered as 
mediators,  and tho victorious party had talcon crllcl  vengeance 
See Slgonins on Livy, xx1.  6. 
A~l'larl,  Be  Rebur Hi~pnn  lo, calls the~n  Tiuhcletan.1. 
VOI.  11.  G 8  2  SIEGE  OF  SAGUNTUl\I. 
upon  the conql~ercd. Hannibd availed  himself  of  this cir- 
cumstance and  stirred  up  the latter,  and at the same time he 
colnplained at Cartliage  that the Saguutines in their reliance 
upon  Rome, had  committed  acts of  violence  against Cartha- 
ginian  subjects.  This was  certainly  a  bad  intrigue,  but he 
could not act otherwise, as hc wished to bring about a war.  The 
Romans had an  extraordinary dread of  a  war with Cartilage, 
for  the manner  in which  that  city  had recovered must have 
made a deep impression upon them.  They did not know how 
to conduct the war; they  could  transfer  it to Africa only by 
means  of  a  iicet,  which  would  have cost  an enormous  sum, 
and with which was associated the recollection of so many clis- 
asters.  Against  Spain too the war would have had to be car- 
ried on by sea, and there they had scarcely any basis  for their 
operations,  having  only  some  insignificant  allies  in  Spain, 
whereas Carthage had at her disposal all her subject-population, 
and had all her troops ready  at hand, while Rome could  only 
fight with her own  forces  which she would have had to trans- 
port  at an immense  cost.  For these reasons, the Romans  al- 
lowed  Rannibal  to extend his  dominion  without  venturing 
upon anything; nay, whcll he was besicging Saguntum, thcy 
only negotiated,  and  tool;  no measure  to scnd relief,  so that 
Hannibal carried  on the siege for  eight months, while  they 
were engaged in the Illyrian war.  This siege has gained  an 
imperishable celebrity in history  from the heroic resistance  of 
the Saguntines.  But the minute description of  it  in Livy is a 
romancc,  undoubtedly  derived  from the account  of  Coelius 
Antipater.  According  to him  the town,  like  several others 
in  Spain,  was  destroycd  by its own  inhabitants  in  despair. 
The description of  Polybius is much morc authentic; he only 
knows that the town, situatcd one mile from the sea, on one of' 
the  last  hills  which  there  risc  and  separate  Aragon  from 
Castile was  taken, not  destroycd;  that Hannibal made  extra- 
ordinary  booty,  gained  courage and strength for further un- 
dcrtakings8 and was enabled to send rich presents to Carthage. 
This completely refutes  the  tale  of Livy, which, in fact,  be- 
trays its character by its minuteness.  Hannibal then took  up 
his winter quartcrs at New  Carthagc,  and completed the pre- 
parations  for  his  great  expedition.  The  Romans  had  sent 
ambassadors  to him  to  call  him  to  account  for  his  conduct 
l'olybi~~s,  iii. 17. 
Saguntnm;  but he refcrrcd them to Carthage,  where 
tiley  colnplained and dcinailded the surrcndcr of Hannibal and 
tile  Carthaginial~ commissioners  (D~VE~~OL)  ~vho  were  with 
hiln,  circulnstance which throws some light upon the other- 
wise obscure institutions  of  Carthagc.  The ambassadors were 
received  in  the  senate in a  manncr  which  might have been 
foreseen, after so  long an irritation  and  SO  ardent a  desire  to 
take vengeance for the injustice which  Rome had inflicted  on 
Carthagc in regard to Sardinia.  Tlle Carthaginiails instead  of 
complying  with  the  demand,  endeavoured  to  show  that 
Hannibal had not acted wrcngly,  and that Carthage could not 
be restrained  by  Rome  in extending its  dominion  in Spain. 
Polybius justly  remarks  that  they disputed  about  secondary 
matters without entering into the real q~~estion  at issue.  One 
of the Roman  ambassadors  having  made  a fold  of  his toga, 
requested the Carthaginians to choose eithcr war or peace.  The 
Carthaginians replied that they would follow the choice of  the 
Romans;  and when  the latter declared  for  war,  their  words 
were received by the Carthaginians with loud acclamations. 
It  might now have been expected that the Romans would have 
made serious preparations, but this was not the case;  they had at 
the time only a small  fleet, which afterwards, too, was always 
very limited.  EIannibal ttsscmbled his troops in the neighbour- 
hood  of  Carthagena, and  shewed  great foresight  in drawing 
Libyans to Spain, and sending the most distinguishecl Spaniards 
to Libya, where  thcy were to serve as  garrisons;  but, at the 
same time, he retained  great numbers of  Spaniards, to accom- 
pal~y  hirn on his expedition.  Thc army with which he crossed 
the Iberus, is said to have consisted of 90,000 foot, and 12,000 
horse.9  This event  must  11;lve  happened  in thc early part of 
Jfay.  P. Cornclius Scipio,  and Tiberius Seinpronius Longus had 
been consuls since the 15th of  March.  The tribes cast of  the 
l3h-o were under the protection of  Rome, but ruitho~rt  being in 
tllc condition of subjects, and were hostile to the Carthaginians: 
 red a  gallant resistance, but  Hnnnibal advanced very 
r:~~idly,  and conquered the fortified places with tEle  sacrifice of 
lives.  He crossed thc Pyrences  in  the  ileighbourhocd 
of Figuera  and  Rofas,  in the  direction  of  Boussillon, where 
"olybius,  iii. 35 ; Idivy,  xxi.  13.  Polybius  has  talicn  his  numbers  from 
the table  of IIannibal, and  no  douht  intended  to give  them  correctly;  but I 
S"sPect  that  this  is sornc  mistake  in the writing, and  tl~at  we ought  to retld 
7'~,000,  instcar1 of  90,000.  -N. 
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tl~c  mountains slope down towards the coast of  the hlediterra- 
ncan, and arc of  110  considerable height.  Hc had  previously 
scnt envoys to the Gallic tribes, to ask for a free passage throrigh 
their country.  These envoys now returned wit11 presents, and 
the assurance  that IIanl~ibal  would  meet wit11 no resistance in 
Gaul as far as the Rllonc.  A part of his forces was left behind 
in Catalonia, and when he had crossed the Pyrenees, a danger- 
ous  mutiny broke  out  a~nong  his  soldiers.  Three  thousal~d 
Carpetanians  returned hoine,  and  that others  might  not  be 
cncouragcd  to follow their example, Hannibal was wisc enough 
to  send  back  all those in whom he discovered any unwilling- 
ncss to follow him, since he was convinced that a chcerful and 
small army is better than a  numerous  and  discontented  011~. 
Aftcr having allowed  his  soldiers some rest in tllc ncighbour- 
hood of  I'erpignan,  he continued  his march with 50,000 foot, 
and 9,000 llLrse. 
When thc Romans discovered that it was  his  ~lan  to cross 
tllc Alps, tl~cy  sent the consul, P. Cornelius Scipio, the father of 
tlic great Scipio, with im  army of two legions and 10,000 allies 
to Spain, and a fleet was equipped to sail to Afiica, under the 
command  of  the other consul, Tibcrius Sempronius, who was 
already dreaming  of  besieging  Carthage; but even before  he 
arrivcd, things had happened which quite altered  the state of 
affairs.  Carthaee at this time had no fleet of  any importance,  " 
which was the first great fault in the managclnent of affairs 011 
the part of  the Cartliaginians; whoreas  all  that Ilannibal did 
was wise and well  calculated.  But in the senate of  Carthagc 
there were men of  a different stamp; and it is not improbable 
that a propcrty-tax was found necessary  to cover the expcnses 
of the war, and that in paying it the wealthy sl~cwed  a niggardly 
spirit;  otherwise  the mean  pnrsimony  of  Carthage  is  quite 
unaccountable.  The  plan  of  the Romans was, in certain re- 
spccts, not ill-calculated,  but it  proves  that  they  underrated 
their enemy and his strength.  Had P. Cornelius Scipio arrived 
in  Spain  with  his  fleet  before  Hannibal  passed  the  Ebro, 
I-Iannibal  might  possibly have becn  stopped  in his progress; 
although I am almost  convinced  that Hannibal would  have 
thrown  him  back  upon  the sea, and that thus his expedition 
would have bccn facilitated.  But the Roman fleet did not sail 
until  Hannibal  was  master  of  Catalonia;  and  it cannot  be 
denied that at the beginning  of  this, as  of  every othcr  great 
War, tile Romans were  slow  aid awkward, SO  that  Hanllibal 
was beforelland  with them in everything.  It is true that they 
just  before  made  great  exertions  against  the  Cisalpine 
~~~l~,  but  the exception of  this, they had  been engaged 
ollly  ill petty warf~~rc  sincc  thc  coiiclusion  of  the first  Punic 
war, and they had no standing armies.  Their troops were a sort of 
nlilitin, witho~it  any regular training ; whereas the Carthaginian 
army under  IIannibal  consisted  of  veterans.  Moreovcr, the 
Bomans did not think it necessary to placc  the bcst  of  their 
gci~erals  at the hcad  of  their  armies, but  made  their  choice 
with their usual views;  and the consuls of  this year were clull 
and slow  like  their  soldiers.  In the  year  bcforc  they  had 
commenced establishiiig thc colonies of Pl~ccatia  and Cremona; 
they now hastily scnt  out  thc  colonists, and the fortifications 
wcrc completed  before  the opening of  the  campaign, so  that 
ncithcr IIannibal nor the Gauls were  able to takc those placcs. 
Polybius  censures  the  authors  of  his  time,  for  spcaking  of 
Hannibal's enterprise as of a thing which had nevcr  happened 
before, and as if  he had intended to do something unheard of, 
and which was impossible without  thc  intcrfercnce  of  higher 
powers.  IIannibal certainly did not undertalce  the expcdition 
without  some  precedent.  The  story  that  a  spirit  shewed 
Hannibal thc way, is  changcd by Livy into  a  drcam, which 
is exquisitely beautiful;  but the writcrs of that timc had rclatcd 
this as a real occurrence. 
Hannibal  continued  his  march  with  the utmost  rapidity, 
and, according  to  the  calculation  of  Polybiuslo, lcd  his Car- 
thagirlians  a  distance  of  9,000  stadia.  This is indced rather 
exaggcmtcd ; but  still  the  distance  between  Cartl~agcna  and 
thc river Po is immense, and what difficulties had  hc to ovcr- 
come !  When Hannibal arrived  in Cisalpine Gaul, cnvoys of 
the  Gauls  implored  his  assistance  against  the  Romans ; but 
until then he had  had to makc his way through a country all 
p~oplcd  by independent  and  hostile  tribes, to whom an army 
like  his  must  have  appcarcd  a  cursc.  In such a host it was 
impossible to 1)rcvcnt acts of violencc, especially if we considcr 
thewants with which they had to strnggle, and which impeded 
their progress  evcrywherc.  He pnss~d  through thc magnifi- 
cent  country of  Lower Languedoc  to Pont St. Esprit  on  the 
Rllonc,  in  order  to  reach  the  Alps.  The  inhabitants  of 
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Languedoc  could  not  resist  the torrent that poured  in upon 
them, and they sent their women and children into the Cevenlles 
mountains for shelter ;  but the Gauls in Dauphin6 and Provence 
had the rapid river before them, and could defc'cnd themselves. 
They perhaps heard at the same time that a Roman ariny mzs 
in Catalonia, or perhaps  even on the Gallic coast; and altliough 
the hostile feeling which existed  between  the  Gauls  and  the 
Romans was  very strong, and the inhabitants of  Languedoc 
had rejected with scorn  the request  of  the Romans, still  they 
now loolred upon thein as auxiliaries against the starvillg host 
of  invaders, who in their rapid course were obliged to take a11 
they could.  IIannibal had immense difficulties in effecting a pas- 
sage across the Rhone: as it would have been difficult to makc 
a bridge of  boats, he purchased  of  the people  on the banks of 
the river as many ships as  he could, and ordered canoes to be 
made of  trees;  he then  sent  during the night  a  part  of  his 
army up the river, where they passed over on rafts, that  they 
might get to the rear of  the Gauls.  The plan succeeded, and 
it is inconceivable  how the Gauls  did not observe it in time. 
When the detachment had got  across, Hannibal threw all his 
forces into the ships and passcd the river, while the Gauls were 
attacked in their rear.  Thc elephants wcre  transported  with 
great difficulty.  This success, in a place where nature herself 
secmed  to have  drawn the boundary line, made  the  deepest 
impression  upon  the  barbarians.  Had Hannibal arrived one 
week  later,  Scipio  would  havc  prevcnted  his  crossing  the 
river. 
Scipio, on his voyage to Spain, had landed near Marseilles, 
and when hc heard that  Hannibal whom  he imagined to be 
still on the Ebro,  had already arrived on the Rhone, he must 
have  felt the  danger  of  opposing  an  army  so  much  more 
numerous than his  own.  In conjunction with the Gads of 
the eastern  bank,  he might  have prevented  the enemy from 
crossing  the  river;  but it  was  too  late,  and Hannibal  was 
already on the left bank before  the arrival of  a detachment of 
Roman cavalry which Scipio had sent up the river from Mar- 
seilles.  Both parties wcre astonished to meet  each  other, for 
Scipio who had scarcely heard that I-Iannibal  had crossed the 
Pyrenees, could not expect to find hiin on the eastern bank of 
the Rhone.  A trifling  engagement  took place  in  the 
Romans  were  victorious,  but  Hannibal,  unconcerned  about 
Scipio, now marched hrthcr up the Rlione, and Scipio returned 
to his  &ips.  At this point  begin  the  most  contradictory 
accounts  of  Hannibal's  march.  Had he taken  the road  de- 
scribed by Livy,  through tlic  valley  of  the  1)uralzce  up to 
Briali~on,  over  mount  Gentrvre, so  as  to descend  by Susa in 
neighbourhood  of  Turin,  he  could  not  have  given  the 
Rolnans a  gi.cater  advantage,  for Scipio might have  attacked 
his rear, and the Gauls might havc stopped  hiin  on  the other 
side  from  penetrating  into  their  mountains  by  abattiscs, 
ambuscades and the lilie. 
It is  one  of  the most  disputed  points  of  ancient  history, 
in what part  Rannibal  crosscd  the  Alps,  and the  ancients 
tllemselvcs differ widely in their accounts.  Livyls desciiption 
is  and  Polybius  does not enter into any disquisition 
concerning  the  localities,  because  they  wcre  known  in  his 
time,  and no  one had  any doubt  about  them.  The ancient 
writers are divided in their opinions:  soine maintained that he 
passed over tlzc Little, and others that he passed over the Great 
St. Bernard;  soine  evcii  thought it probable  that he crossed 
the Simplon:  across inount Cenis there was no road.  Modern 
xvritersll are likcwise divided; but, after the masterly researches 
of  General Melville,  which have been published by De Luclc, 
and are bascd  upon  an accurate knowledge  of  the localities, 
there can  no longer  be any doubt as to the road which Han- 
nibal toolr;  and if any one who has a practical mind comparcs 
with these  researches  the account which  Polybius gives,  he 
must see that no other road  than that over the Littlc St. Ber- 
nard is possible.  It is strange that even ingenious and learned 
men, as Letronnc, have, in this instance, remained unconvinccd 
by  the  most  palpable  evidence.  hiclville  has  conclusively 
proved  that Hannibal marched  across  the Littlc St. Bernard, 
and that he reached the highest points about the beginning of 
October.  The mountain  is not a glacicr covered with etelnal 
irc; it is only a littlc higher  than the Brcnner; not far fiorn 
its top a little corn is grown,  and during the summer montlls 
it is a  green Alp,  serving  as pasture;  whereas  the Great St. 
Bernard is  covered with eternal  snow.  On  his  arrival there, 
llannibal found  fresh  snow and a frcquentcd  road.  But the 
"  A complete list of tho modern worl<s on this sul~ject  will be found in Ukcrt's 
Geoyruphze der  Grlerhen und Romer, ii.  2, p. 565, fol!. 
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following circumstance  is more decisive still:  on  one occasion 
Hannibal had  a  severe  contest  wit11  the Alpine  tribes;  and 
Polybius, evidently with  the intention of  marking Hannibal's 
road,  says that he halted  near  a zuhite  rock.13  Now there is 
only one gypseous cliff in those Alps,  and that is in the valley 
of the Tarantaise, near the Little St. Bernarcl, along which the 
ancient  road runs; it is  discernible  cvcn at the present day, 
and is known to the inhabitants of tlic country by the name of 
la  roche  blnnche.  De  Luc  observes  that  any  one  who  has 
travelled that road,  cannot help recollecting  that rock.  This 
circumstance  alonc would  suffice to remove  all  doubts;  but 
the hypothesis  tliat  this was  the road  is  perfectly consistent 
also with thc number of  days which Hannibal spent upon his 
march;  which number differs so widely from that required for 
the road over Susa, that the latter ~lacc  cannot come into con- 
sideration at all.  Polybius applies the name of Alps to the whole 
range of  mountains  from  Szvoy to Aosta;  thcy form  scvcral 
chains running one behind the other, and must be crossed. 
Hannibal was obliged to march farther up the Rhone.  Had 
Scipio ventured  to  follow  his  enemy,  Hannibal  would  ccr- 
tainly have  defeated  him,  and  Scipio would have  been  lost 
among the Gallic tribes, which woulcl have risen against him. 
Gcneral Mclville truly remarks, that Hannibal inarcheci up tlle 
Rhone as far as Vicnne, the ancient capital of the Allobrogians, 
a fact which is not mentioned by Livy.  Here Hannibal found 
the people  engagcd  in a  civil war,  and took up thc cause of 
one  of  the pretenders.  After  having  established him  on the 
throne, he rcceived  supplies  for  his army and continued his 
march.  The Allobrogians were  at that timc in posscssion  of 
the country betwcen the Rlione, Saonc, Ishe, the wcstern dis- 
tricts of Savoy, and some other neighbouring territories.  At 
Vicnne, Hannibal left the Rhone.  Melville saw hcre a Roman 
road leading to Yennc, which was used throughout the middlc 
ages,  and down to the beginning  of  the seventeenth century. 
From Vienne Hannibal went to Chambdry, and into thc valley 
of the Tarantaise, and followed the course of  thc Ishre up to its 
source.  Gcneral Melville  has shewn that the march through 
this narrow valley must have bccn  a very troublesome one,  as 
it was  easy for the inhabitants to defend  themselves  in their 
mountains.  It is a gross mistake,  when some writers describe 
l3 iii. 53. 
llannibal as  over iinn~ensc  fields of ice;  for about the 
Taralltaise there are luxu~iant  plalltatiolls of  nut trees,  and in 
tile vdley itself a considerable quantity of corn is grown.  The 
arrival  of  Hannibal  and his  alniy was  a  fearful  calamity for 
the inliabitaiits of this valley, for the host consumed everythi1lg 
that these poor people possessed.  The less Hannibal was able 
to  thcir hunger with the supplies lie carried with him, 
the greatcr was the devastation caused by his army, for in such 
soldiers  destroy  everything.  EIowcver  great, 
tllcrefore,  his exertions were  to pacify the mountaineers,  yet 
they manifested a desperate exnspcration  against him, and the 
losses  of  thc Carthaginians  in these  contcsts  were  immense. 
They did not  indeed vcnture upon  open resistance,  but they 
made use ofa stratagem, which is quite characteristic of  those 
small  Alpine  tribes:  they brought  him  provisions  and even 
hostages, and then fell upon the Carthaginians while marching 
through the passes.  Hannibal, howevcr, not trusting them- 
he was in hct never  dcccived  by any one-contrived  to send 
his  baggage  ahead,  followed  cautiously,  protected  his  rear 
very strongly, and thus succcecled in repelling the mountaineers. 
Mclville has shown that the scquel of  the march, though very 
dificult,  was by no means over fields of ice and snow, but that 
the road passed through a thickly peopled and beautiful country. 
The road passes between  the mountains,  through richly culti- 
vated valleys, forests of nut-trees and cornfields; but as the road 
ascends highcr,  it becomes extremcly narrow and difficult, and 
is generally fit  only for  mules,  so  tliat  at best two can pass 
each other, on the edge of precipices through which the moun- 
tain torrcnts roll down.  It  is only in thc present ccntury that 
a carriage road has been madc.  Hannibal spent fiftcen days on 
his  march  through these  mountains,  but during the greater 
part of  that timc  hc was  traversing  splendid  valleys  full  of 
cultivation and wealth,  whose  inhabitants must  be conccivcd 
to  have bccn  not more  barbarous  than  the Tyrolcsc  of  the 
fifteenth century.ls  About the end of  September,  Hannibal 
reached the Little St. Bernard.  Snow had  already begun  to 
fall in those regions, and frosts and the othcr miseries of wintcr 
wcrc now added to the suffe'elings with which he had hithelto 
l4 Camp. L.  Arctino's  description of  the roads and the inhabitants of Tyrol in 
the fifteenth century, in his journey  to Constance, which quite  reminds  one of 
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been struggling.  The main difficulty consisted in transporting 
the provisions necessary to  feed  from 30,000 to 40,000 men, 
8000  horses,  and  certainly  not  less  than  4000  mules  and 
sumpter horses which carried the bread;  for when snow fell, it 
was ill~~ossibl~  to obtain green fodder for the cattle.  A large 
quantity of  his baggage had been taken by the mountaineers. 
Up to the time when  he reached  the top  of  the  Little  St. 
Bernard, Hannibal had not suffered much from cold, his main 
difficulties  being want of  provisions  and the hostility of  the 
mountain tribes; but when  lie  arrived  at thc  summit,  there 
were heavy falls of  snow which  rendercd tlzc  roads quitc im- 
passable.  Imagine the distress of Africans ! As  tlie snow covered 
many of  the crevices in the rocks,  the horses slipped  and fell 
into the abysses;  fodder was wanting,  and many  of  the ele- 
phants  perished  with  cold.  His army suffered not less from 
hunger  than the  French  did  on  their  retreat  from  Russia: 
thousands perished in a few days, but yet Hannibal must havc 
been glad that he had arrived at the summit of  the mountain. 
Those among  his  soldiers who wcre  rathcr  discontented,  a,nd 
had been  lingcring behind,  now  rejoined  him.  The account 
of Livy,  that Hannibal broke the rocks by mcans of  vinegar, 
is one of  those tales which wc grieve to sec  related  scriously 
by  an intelligent  man.  It was  undoubtcdly  derived  from 
Coelius  Antipatcr,  and is nothing  but a  misrepresentation  of 
an actual fact which has  been  explained  by General Mclvillc. 
The descent  was  particularly difficult;  the roads  in the Alps 
run  along  rivers,  by  which  thcy  were  originally  formed. 
Thcse  rivers  often  pass  from one mountain to another,  and 
then roads  run along  above the rivcrs.  Such a road  is often 
buried under avalanches, or cut off by a sinking of the ground. 
Hannibal found such a  spot on his  march  from  the Little St. 
Ecrnard to the valley of  Aosta15, where  the road  had  fallen 
down the year before, and had not yct bcen restored, as  Poly- 
bius very plainly relates.  He was obliged to encamp therc for 
three days,  though suffering severely from  hunger,  cold,  and 
snow,  and to open  a  new  road.  General  Mclville  has  ad- 
mirably  illustrated  this  part  of  the  march  from  Polybius. 
Livy16  says,  that the mountain  formed a  precipice  one thou- 
sand feet high, and that Hannibal made a new road down that 
precipice ! This is nonsense, as every one must see.  According 
15 Polybius, iii. 54, foll.  IG xxi. 36, foll. 
to the account of Pol~bius,  on the other hand, the avalanche 
extended  to 1$ stadia,  that  is, about one  thousand  feet  decp 
into  the  torrent  Dora,  at  the  beginning  of  the valley  of 
~~~ta.  In this statellielit there is not one feature which is not 
perfectly  correct,  and  fonndcd  upon  accurate  observation. 
Hannibal endeavoured  to strike  into a  new road,  for  he had 
probably  bcen  informcd  that  Alpine  hunters  had  gone  by 
several  other roads; but in this he failed,  and for  three  days 
and  three nights he was  obliged  to encamp  in the snow,  in 
order  to make a  new road of  wood  in those  parts where  the 
old one had broken down,  and that sufficiently broad to carry 
his sumptcr horses.  This was the point at which his army was 
really in immense distress, and where he sustained great losscs, 
especially of  animals.  After these  difficulties were  overcome, 
the army gradually came down into the valley of Aosta, which 
was a cultivated and tolerably civilised country, inhabited by the 
Salassians.  The statement that from the top of  the mountain 
Hannibd showed  to his soldiers  the fcrtile  plains  of Italy, is 
likewise an impossibility, and merely a rhetorical invention; for 
from  the top of  the  Little  St. Bernard  nothing  is  seen  but 
mountains.  On his arrival in the valley of Aosta, Hannibal had 
lost a large numbcr of elephants, and his army was reduced to 
20,000 foot (12,000 Africans and 8000 Spaniards)  and 6000 
horse17, for the most part Numidians.  It is astonishing that so 
large a  number  of  horses were preserved;  but it shews what 
hardships the southern horses are able to endure, and the great 
c'arc which the Numidians must have talken of them. 
LECTURE  LXI. 
THE whole mode  of  conducting  the war  on the part of  the 
Romans is a remarkable instance of thc same want of design, 
and of  the same slackness, with which  wars were  carried  on 
in the time  of  the French Revolution,  whereby  the French 
were enabled to gain many a victory.  Without knowing  any 
particulars,  and  by mere  tradition, we  may  form  the  most 
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vivid image of tlle inanner in which tlie Rolnans viewed their 
impending  danger.  \T'llen  they  heard  that  Hannibal  had 
passed  through the country of  the Allobrogians towards thc 
Alps, thcy u~ldoubtedly  thought hiln a fool, whose arllly must 
perish by the elements.  It  is, indeed, only by supposing  that 
this conviction was general among them, that we can account 
for thcir inactivity and drowsiness.  The col~sul  Scipio,  who 
was stationed at Marseilles, and had advanced into the interior 
as  fidr  as  Avignon,  ought  to have been  in Lombardy beforc 
I-Iannibal arrived at the top of the mountains1;  but he did not 
reach  the Po until  IIannibal had  dcsceizdcd  from  the  Alps, 
and, to the amazement  of  the Romans, had defied and ovcr- 
come  all  the immense  difficultics  which  nature  had  placcd 
in  his  way.  We may  wcll  imagine  what  reports  were 
spread about thc losscs  sustained  by the Carthnginian army, 
if  we  relnembcr  the logic of  tllc  sensclesss among thc allics 
in  the  war  against  the  French  Revolution.  What  the 
Romans believed  and said  to one another was  sometlling to 
this effect:  that it was madness  in Hannibal to have lcd his 
army to such a inonstrous undertaking;  that he and his host 
would be destroyed by discase,  and by want  of all the ncccs- 
saries  of  life;  and that not  one indiviclual  would  survive to 
return  home  across  the  Alps.  It has  often  caused  me  tlic 
cleepest  grief  to hear  such reasoning,  whcn  people  consoled 
thcmselves  in this childish  manncr,  and neglected  the most 
necessary precautions.  Had Hannibal becn an ordinary gene- 
ral, he would  indeed  have been in a precarious position;  but 
with an undaunted spirit he advanced  with his army, which 
aftcr its severc  sufferings must indeed have bcen in a friglltful 
condition,  and  may not have  appeared  much  bcttcr  than  a 
host of gypsies.  Scipio had  only two legions,  a  corrcsponcl- 
ing numbcr  of  allies,  and a  snzall number  of  cavalry.  The 
Romans were in many respects  slaves to custom, which they 
oftcn did not know how to abandon whcn  a  danger presented 
itself unexpectcdly.  Thus such nn  army had from early times 
bcen  deemed  sufficient,  and  for  this  rcason  they  did  not 
send a largcr one.  One part of the Gauls was in full insurrec- 
tion; in the preccding  summer the Boians had  defeated  one 
We  saw the same slowness in thc year 1800, whcn  the Austrians  had it in 
thcir  power  eithcr to prevent  tlie  passage  over  the Great  St. Bern~rd,  or to 
render it fruitless. -- N. 
Roman legion,  and blockaded  the rest  in Afodena,  for  they 
extended  from  Parma  and  Piacenza  as  far  as  the  frontiers 
of  Rolnagna.  They treacherously  captured  three Rolnans  of 
rallk,  who  had  been  seat  as  triumvirs  to superintend  the 
establishment  of the colony at Placentia, hoping that tllcreby 
they might  recover their own hostages.  They sent ainbassa- 
dors to Hannibal when he was  yet on the Bhone,  to invite 
lliln $0 colne to Italy.  The Gauls north of the Po, the Insu- 
brians,  were anxious to get an  opportunity to rise against the 
IZomans,  but  they did  not  venture to move  until  Bannilual 
arrived, for tlle Romans kept them in submission.  Hannibal 
turned  against  the Tauriscans,  and made  himself  master  of 
Turin.  While he was  there engaged,  Scipio had  arrived  at 
Genoa, and astonished at what he heard, had crossed the river 
Po,  and encamped  on  tlie  Ticinus, probably  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood  of  Pavia.  Hannibal  now  turncd  against  him; 
they met for the first  time on the Ticinus, and to  the great 
astonishment  of  the  liomans,  Hanilibal  still  had  a  large 
army.  An engagement with  the Roman  cavalry took  place, 
in which the Romans were beaten by the Spanish and Numidian 
horsemen.  In  this  sliirmish,  the  consul  Scipio  received  a 
dangerous  wound,  and  it  was  only  with  great  dificulty 
that  he was  rcscued  from  the  tumult,  according  to  soine 
writers  by  his  own son2, afterwards the  great  P. Cornelius 
Scipio Africanus. 
The issue of this engagement, which would have created but 
littlc sensation in other wars,  at once  convinced  the Iionlans 
of  the delusion  under  which  they  had  been  labouring,  and 
that they must keep 011  tllc defensive.  Scipio retreated across 
the Po, gave up its northern banli, and pullccl  clown too e:~rl~ 
tlie bridge of rafts which  1le h:~d  constructed.  A portion of 
the soltliers, intended  to protect  the bridge on tlle  left Lanli, 
thus fell  into the hands of  tllc Carthaginians.  Hannibal  Ilad 
dlficulties  in crossing the Po, and had to collect  boats from 
the  rleighbouring  rivers.  In the  meanwhile  the  Insubrians 
declared for him. 
The  oma ails now fixccl their hopcs  on the support of  Tib. 
Sempronius, who had made  a  dcscent upon  Malta,  had tnlccn 
some places  on the African coast,  and was now on his return 
to .bill  Scil1io.  IJcrc  we  meet  with  a  fine cxa~llple  of  the 
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discipline of the Romans:  they knew that nothing was so fati- 
guing to the soldiers as to march along tlle road in columns, 
and accordingly avoided it as  ~nuch  as  they could; but now 
they did  solnething which  seems  possible  ollly  in the very 
highest degree of enthusiasn~:  thc ariny was not kept together 
to  march  to  its  place  of  destination,  but every  soldier  was 
obliged to take an oath, that on a certain day he would appear 
at the  appointed  place;  a  violation  of  tlie  oath was  to  be 
severely  punished.  Sempronius  had  his  troops at Puteoli3, 
and tllcre disbanded them, with the command to join him again 
at Ariminuin.  Thence they marched towards the Trebia, and 
joined  Scipio.  It is inconceivable how the two consuls could 
join  each  other;  Sempronius  must  have  marched  through 
Liguria by way of Genoa.4  Both consuls now undertook the 
command alternately.  I believe that there is something incor- 
rect in our description of  the occurrences which now ensued. 
General Vaudoncourt has endeavoured to clear up the matter; 
but his idea of  the battle on the Trebia is Llse in the highest 
degree.  We inust suppose that Hannibal was on the eastern 
bank of the Trebia:  the Romans cross the river to offer battle, 
consequently  Hannibal,  who  was on the right  bank  of  this 
river,  must  have  crossed tlle  Po somewhat  below  Placentia.5 
In order to render  a battle in which you are sure of  victory 
quite  decisive,  you  must  elude  the enemy,  and cut off  his 
retreat:  such was  the constant method  of  Haniiibal, and has 
at all times been the method of every courageous general who 
was  conscious  of  the strength of  his  army  as  well  as of  his 
own  superiority,  and was  colifident  of  victory.Ve must 
therefore  suppose that the Rornans had crossed the Po in the 
ncighbourhood of Piacenza, and Hannibal, as all circurnstailces 
shew,  and as I have alreacly  observed,  sornc distance  below 
Piacenza.7  It is  said,  for  instance,  that the Romans trans- 
3  So it is in thc MS. notes;  but Niebuhr probably madc amistalrc, for accord- 
ing to Poly bius Lilybaeum is monnt. 
4  In 1828 Nicbnhr  quite  positively  expressed  this  opinion, "  Sempronius 
came from Africa to Gcnoa,"  on which  account he omitted tlie mention of  the 
soldiers' oath to reassemble at Rimini. 
5  See Livy, xxi. 47, foll.;  Polybins, iii. 58, foll. 
6  Whcn in the year  1800 Napoleon  crossecl the  Po,  between  Pwia and 
Piacenza, he defeated Mclns,  the old  and awkward Austrian field-marshal,  by 
the same tactics, i. e. by placing himself between Mclas and his basis to fight the 
battle of Marengo, whereby Mclas was compelled to sign the con~cntion.-N. 
7  One  of  my friends,  Major-General  von  Schutz,  of  Magdebulg, who  is  a 
ferrcd tlleir carnp from the left bank of the Trebia towards the 
foot of the Apennincs, where they werc better protected against 
tile  of the Carthaginians by scveral low hills rising out 
of the plain.8  This and several other things are intelligible only 
if Tve  upp pose that Hannibal crossed the Po solnewhere between 
piaCenza and Parina.  The Romans had  gained  their  object 
joined  the arnly  of  Tib.  Seinpronius,  but  were  cut  off 
from nome and pressed towards Piedmont.  When Providence 
has  once  decided  upon  the dcstruction  of  an  army,  all  the 
most unfortnnate circulnstances will conspire for  that purpose. 
At  that moment  the wound of  Scipio was  no trifling  matter. 
It  healed  very  slowly, and was  so  severe that he could  not 
appear  at the head  of  his army; and who  among his  legates 
could have undertCikeil  the command?  Two months and a half 
had elapsed from I-Iztilnibal's passage over the Little St. Bernard 
to his  arrival on the Trebia, and he hat1 employed his  time in 
establishing :~iinsclf  in the country, and  in restoring his mcn 
and liorscs.  The 6000 horsemen  whom I mentioned  before, 
n~ay  have  included  those  who  had  been  newly  mounted. 
Hannibal distressed  the Romaris  very  much, by taking  their 
stores of provisions.  The consul Sempronius, now united with 
Scipio, thought  it a  disgrace  to the Roinan  name to remain 
idle, and insisted upon offering battle, saying that a blow lllust 
be strucl:,  as  soon as  possible,  to prevent the enemy from  ap- 
pearing  formiclable;  but Scipio  refused  to give his  col~seat, 
partly  on  account  of  the  state  of  his  health,  and  pzrtly 
because he had already had some experience of  the character 
of  his  enemy.  Hannibal,  on the other hand, being perfectly 
sure of  victory, was grcatly inclined to  begin an cn@gement 
with thc Romans; for as long as the two arinies werc encamped 
opposite each other, he could not take up  his winter quarters, 
which was an essential point, as he wanted  rest ibr his troops, 
and was also anxious to get rid of the llomans in those districts, 
that the Gauls might be  enabled  to  declare  their  sentiments. 
He was encamped sorne  iniles south  of  l'iaccnza,  on the right 
bank of the Trebia,  and the Roinans  oppo3ite to him  011  the 
left  bank.  He irritated  the enemy  by  little  skirmishes, in 
highly disting~lishecl  tactician, has perfectly convinced  himself and me too, that 
Iiannibal cannot havc follow-ed thc traces of  the Romans.--N. 
P~lybius,  iii. 58; Livy, xxi. 48. 96  BATTLE  ON  THE  TBEBIA. 
which he allowed  theln  some  apparellt  advantages over  him. 
The Trebia  has become meinorable  in modern  history  for  a 
battle  which  Macdonald  lost  on its banks  in  the year  1799 
against Suwnrrolu:  it does him great honour  that 11~  cfkcted 
his retreat to Genoa, whcrc lie joined t-he rcst of the army.  I 
never saw the  river  myself,  but I have gathered information 
concoming its localities; and it is remarkable that to this day 
they perfcctly  agrec with thc description given by Polybius. 
Thc Trebia io a very  broad  torrent  which  comes  down from 
the Apnnines in inany branches, and in such a  manner  that 
it flows between  its  two  banks  in the form  of  several small 
streams.  The ground consists  of gravcl and is covcrcd  with 
shrubs.  In winter, whcn the snow mclts on the mountains, or 
aftcr a heavy rain, the river  is very broad  and ovcrflows the 
ncighbouring  country;  but  at  other  times  one  can  walk 
through  it.  Hmliibnl  placed  some  detachments  in  ambush 
among the shrubs, which tlicn,  as  now, covered thc banks  of 
the river  to a  considerable  extcnt.  He  had  for  some  days 
been trying the Romans, and  Sempronius  began  to  imagine 
that Hannibal was timid and would not vcnture upon an open 
contcst.  But the simple truth was that hc wanted to induce 
the  Romans  to  cross  the  river; he  would  not  attack  the 
Romans  on  the  left  bank,  because  he  would  not  lead  his 
army, at a  cold  scason,  through  an icy river.  The Romans 
fell into the snare.  Pedestrian travellers in Italy are accustolncd 
to walk through the Trebia  in summer, but at that time thc 
cold was very sevcre.  EIannibal  had  large fires  in his camp, 
for brandy was  then  not known except  in  EgyptQ;  he gave 
his  soldiers warm and plentiful food, and made them rub their 
bodies with oil at thc iires, so that they became quite brisk and 
w3rm.1°  During the day there was  a  plentiful sprinkling  of 
snow, and tllc cold in that part of Lombardy, especially in the 
neiahbourhood of Verona, is in truth not  less  sevcre than an 
D 
ordmary  winter  in Germany.  Notwithstnndin~  b all this,  the 
Eomans wcrc imprudclit  enou~rh  a '.  during the iilght,  to wade 
through  the rivcr ; which had  risen so  inuch that tllcy  were 
up  to  their  chins in water; in addition  to  this,  the  wind 
blew  the  snow  into  their  faccs,  so  that  they  were  almost 
frozen when they arrived on  the right  bank.  Hannibal now 
I 
"11  the  paintingq  on  the  walls  of  Thehes, the  ~vhole  process  of  distlllmg 
ifi represented. -N.  lo   pol^ hius, ili.  i2 ; Ln j,  xxi  55. 
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advanced to  meet them,  and the Romans, although  in reality 
they  were  already  defeated  by  the elements,  yet  fought as 
brave  soldiers; they formed  indeed  an  army  of  30,000 men 
agaillst 20,000 enemies,  but the Carthaginian cavalry quickly 
drove back the Romans, whose infantry was  in fact worn  out: 
they did all  they  could,  but  they were  a  militia  against  an 
army of veterans, and were  opposed by the elements.  When 
all had got through thc river, the Cartliaginians, who had been 
lying in ambush, rushed forth and attacked their flanks.  The 
loss of the Romans was  very great: many were thrown back 
into the river and perished ; the left wing, about 10,000 men, 
escaped  to  Placentia.  The  weather  afterwards  became  so 
fearful, that the Carthaginians did not pursue the Romans any 
farther, although their usual maxim was to follow up a victory 
to thc utmost.  All the Romans who survived the day,  threw 
themselvcs  into Placentia, where  they  had  their  stores,  and 
there they remained for  some  time.  The consul was  at first 
base  enough  to  deceive  the  senate  at Eome  by  false  des- 
patches,  and to conceal  the cxtent of  his loss; but  the truth 
soon bccame lmown.  Hannibal's army spread over both banks 
of the Po, whcre he now took  up his  winter quarters in order 
to give his  soldiers rest, and lived in plenty upon the stores of 
the Romans.  The Insubrians now openly espoused  the cause 
of  Hannibal.  He did  not  attack  Placentia,  because  it was 
of  no  importance to him:  and  he  always  knew  what  was 
neccssary.  The  Roman  army in Placentia thus escaped, and 
a portion  of it marched down the Po to Cremona, whence the 
wholc afterwards went  to  Ariiniilum, where  the new coasul, 
C. Flaininius, had arrived with reinforcements. 
According to  Livyl1, Hannibal,  that same winter, made  an 
attcinpt  to  march across  the Apennines  into  Etruria;  this is 
indeed  possible, though  hardly probable, and  Polybius knows 
nothing  of  it.  That pcriod  was  one  of  those which  afford 
abundant materials  for  rhetorical  exaggeration.  It may  be, 
however, that Hannibal made some excursion to reconnoitre the 
or perhaps cvcn some greater cxpedltion;  but the dc- 
scription  which Livy gives of this reputed march from Modena 
Luc~a,  of  the localities and the storm, is a masterly produc- 
tion.  I have  myself witnessed a storm in those Apennincs  in 
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must render it utterly impossible to ascend the mountains.  But 
to the inhabitants of  the adjacent  country  such  a  storln  is 
nothing  uncomlnon:  they  speak  of  it as  an  ordinary occur- 
rcnce.  In the plain its  effects are not so strongly felt, but on 
the mountains it is really frightful. 
Caius Flaminius had  now obtained the unlucky honour  of 
the consulship.  His  name  has come  down to us  in an unfa- 
vourable  light; but  so  far  as  we  can  judge  of  his  actions, 
unjustly so.  In his tribuneship he had carried the assignment 
of the ager Gollicus Pieenus, for which the noble Xoman families 
nevcr forgave him.  He afterwards, as  consul, made  himself 
still more obnoxious  by supporting a tribunician law which was 
very  offensive  to the  Roman nobles.  This transaction  is  a 
curious example of  the hypocrisy of those aristocrats who always 
talked of  the good old times, and spoke of  all trade and indus- 
try with contempt;  although they endeavoured to gain by the 
same means for themselves all the advantages they could.  Such 
men are not capable of  a gcnerous  action  under any circum- 
stances, or of sacrificing  their own personal interests in any way. 
The tribunician  law which  C. Flaminius supported forbade all 
senators to  have,  either  directly or  indirectly,  any sea-going 
ships of  a greater burden than 300 amphorz, and those which 
they were allowed to have, were only to be used in conveying 
corn from their estates to  Rome.12  This law  prevented  the 
nobility from  acquiring  wealth  by commerce  and  trade,  and 
confined  them  to  agricultural  pursuits  on  their  own  estatcs. 
The greediness of  the Roman  aristocracy was  extremely hurt 
at the blow thus  inflicted upon them; but the principle of  the 
law  was  perfectly consistent,  and it was  only right  that the 
senators should not interfere with the pursuits of the equites or 
wealthy merchants, who  now formed the  second class  in  Ro- 
man  society, and  to whom  banking, commerce, and  industry 
should have been left undisturbed.13  But the lavr., nevertheless, 
produced among the aristocrats so  much excitement against C. 
Flaminius, that  they spoke  of  him only as  a mutineer.  He 
may have  been  a sanguine  and  inconsiderate man; but I am 
convinced that he was actuated by anything but revolutionary 
ideas.  If a man is once doomed to be decried, he is generally 
l2 Livy, xxi. 63. 
13 Such a law would have been quite in the spirit  of  the Venetian aristocracy 
at its best period.-N. 
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to feel his doom in all possible ways.  Thus, in regard to 
his march to Ariminuin, he mas charged with rashness because 
he had  gone thither without waiting for  the Latin holidays- 
a charge  which  is  quite ludicrous.  Surely Hannibal would 
not  have waitcd  till  the holidays were  over;  he had, on  the 
contrary, set out so early, that Flaminius was in reality already 
too late. 
The  prospects  of  the  Romans  were  very  gloomy, for the 
enemy was now in Italy with his superior forces; they formed 
new  legions,  and  here  they  were  labouring  under  a  disad- 
vantage, for  their  veterans  were  lost, and  their  tactics were 
the worst of all when the soldiers were untrained (this was the 
cause  of  the defeat  at  Cannae) ; whereas,  with  well-drilIcd 
soldiers they were the best.  They ought, under these circurn- 
stances, to have formed only phalanxes, so as to fight in masses. 
HannibaI  had  before  him  three  roads, two  leading  through 
Tuscany, and  one along the Adriatic to Rimini, in the ncigh- 
bourhood  of  which  Sempronius  was  encarnpcd,  with  the 
reinforcements which the new consul had brought to him.  It 
is an unaccountable fact, that the  Romans  do  not  appear  to 
have expected  the  enemy in Etruria; no army seems to have 
been there, for Hannibal penetrated  into  the country through 
the marshes without meeting with any resistance.  One of the 
two  roads into  Etruria  led  across  the Apennines,  by  Prato 
towards Florence, and the other  from Bologna  by Pietramala 
and Barberino, where  the Apennines are broadest and wildest. 
The latter must then have been impassable and overgrown with 
woorls, perhaps  in  order  to prevent the inroads of  the Gauls. 
Hannibal might have forced his way througlr, though perlla11s 
with solne danger; but, for his purpose, it ran too close by the 
Apcnnincs14, and  if  he  had  been  betrayed  there,  Flaminius 
might easily ha~7e  fallen upon his flank from Rimini.  Hannibal 
tllercforc took the other road.  It  is surprising  that this road 
has ever been a subjcct of  dispute.  Strabo, who very seldom 
makes a mistake, had a wrong  idea of  the matter, in spealcing 
of  the marshes in the neighbourllood of Parma.15  In Italy, or 
at least in T~scmy,  no one has any doubt as to which road is to 
bc understood.  The  road  ran  by Lucca  and  Pisa, and  is ;it 
"  This seems to be an error, though all the MS. notcs have "ApenninesV; it 
is  diflicult to say with certainty what sshould he substitutctl, perhaps "Rimini." 
l5  strabo, v. p. 217  C'ulnp,tle I'ul~l,il~c,  ill.  78, and Livy, xxll. 2. 
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present very agreeable; but formerly the Arno penetrated into 
the country as far as Sendil6, and formed a shallow bay which, 
at a very remote period, had gradually been filled up, like the 
Pomptine  marshes,  though it  is  not  SO  ullllealthy.  On its 
northern bank, not  far  from its mouth, there is still a number 
of  lakes, some  of  which  are  quite close to one another;  and 
there are traces everywhere that the marshes have been drained 
by canals.  This is the case as far as Pim, which itself is situated 
somewhat higher, the ground on which it stands  being a contin- 
uation of the fiuitful fields of Lucca.  Hannibal marched through 
this country, which  in the spring is covered with water, and 
forms a lake; he had learned that it was not a morass, but that 
the water was fordablc.  The Romans, however, thought them- 
selves  quite  safe  in  that quarter.  Hannibal  first, probably, 
went to Modena, to deceive  the Romans, and then  turned  to 
the right; he shewed his enemies that he could  get  through, 
although he had to struggle with unspeakable  difficulties.  In 
war he never asked whether what he thought necessary could 
be  done with or without loss, and acting in  this spirit, he set 
out on his march towards Etruria.  The  difficulties  which he 
it said  to have  encountered  may  be  exaggerated;  but  the 
description which we havc of  his march seems, on the whole, 
to convey a correct idea of  it.  He  lost a great number of men 
and horscs, and had only one elephant  left.  During his pas- 
sage over the Alps he had  been  attacked  by a  disease  of  the 
eyes, and now on his passage through the marshes, he lost the 
use of one eye completely.  After a march  of  three  days  and 
a half, he arrived in the neighbourhood of  Faesulac, and then 
turned towards the valley of the Upper Arno, behind Florence, 
wherc the countrywas even then drained,  but is now wonderfully 
improved.  His army had been  considerably increased  by the 
Gauls, and he now allowed the men time to recover from their 
fatiguesJ7  A report of his march  had  reached C. Flaminius, 
'6  This name, too, is probably incorrect;  the MS. notes havc either this name, 
or some one which has a similar sound. 
l7  The following account  belongs  to the Lectures of  1826-7,  but I do not 
think it right to suppress it :- 
"Whether  Hannibal now marched  along the Arno into the upper valley of 
the river, or turned towards  the territory of  Siena, cannot be  ascertained.  I 
believe he did the latter, although Livy speaks of  his ravaging the valley of the 
upper  Arno  (which  is  perhaps  an invention of  Coelius  Antipater), in which 
case Flaminius could not have made his unfortunate march.  HannibaYs ol~ject 
who was  encamped  at Arezzo,  and who, thinking  that Han- 
nibal would throw himself upon Ariminum, intended to hasten 
through Romagna to the assistance of  the Romans there.  But 
when  Hannibal  suddenly appeared  in the heart  of  Etruria, 
Flaminius broke up his camp without delay, in order  to gain 
possession of the road to Rome before Hannibal's arrival.  The 
latter  proccedcd  on  the road  of  Chiusi towards  Rome, and 
ravaged the country which he traversed.  Flaminius followed 
him with the greatest speed.  One of the hypocritical  charges 
brought against Flaminius was, that he paid little attention to 
the auguries, and that he did not defer his march because the 
standard-bearer -  probably  from  fear -  could  not  draw  the 
standard out of  the ground.18  We can scarcely form  an iden 
of the influence exerted by such  absurdities; but they prove 
what Polyhius says, that during this war the Romans were very 
much given to superstition. 
I-Iannibal advanced on the road  to Rome froin the valley of 
the uppcr Arno, below Cortona, and had the lake of Trasi~nenus 
on his left.  Flaminius followed  him in haste and amazement, 
must have been, not to devmtate some di5tricts of  Etrnria, but to gdn  the road 
to Rome bcforc Flaminius;  and so he did.  Hence,I believe, that on issuing from 
the marshcs hc turned towards Chiusi into the hills.  Flaminius heard of  this 
march, and endcavoured by quirk movements to reach  the road to Rome.  If 
my opinion be corrcct, thc account  of  Polybius  is  crroneouq, for  accorcling to 
him and Livy, 13ani1ibsl  passcd by Cortona, and threw hirnsclf bctwcen the hills 
and lake Trasimcnus,  whithcr  Flaminius followcd  him.  Hannibd, thcy say, 
thcn halted, took possession of the heights, and lay in ambush against Flaminius. 
According  to my opinion, both  gcllcrals, though from different sides, marched 
round the lake; for otherwisc Flaminius could not possihly have dlowed himself 
to be taken l)y wrp~i.;c.  Had Hannihal como by this road, lie would  have bcen 
only a few hours'  distancc from Arczzo, and Flaminius inust havc bccn informed 
of his march long before;  but  if  Hnnnibal passed through thc territory of  Siena, 
by San Gcmignano and Collc, everything  is  clear; we then  comprehend I~ow 
Flaminius, who broke  up to follow him, was unahlc to overtakc him;  and how 
Rannihal came to the south side of  lake Trasimenns, while Flaminius imagined 
that he had already advanced much farthcr on the road towards Rome, and that 
hc was only intending to cut him off.  In  this manncr, moreovcr, it might hap- 
pen that IIannibd, encamping on  the south sidc  of  the lakc, placcd  his  light 
troops on the hills around the lake, bctwcen which and the mountains the road 
ran.  That Flarninius did not perceive this, could  be true only on  thc supposi- 
tion of  his not knowing that Hannibal had marched that road." 
Although  the gencral  presumption  is,  that  when  Nieblthr's  latcr opinions 
differ from the earlier oncs, 11c had changed his vicws, and that accordingly the 
lattcr  only  sho~ld  be  given,  st~ll,  the prcsent  case seemed to be different, and 
for this reason  thc minute  discussion  about  Hannibal's  route has been given 
here as a ~~ote.  l8 LIT, xxii. 3. 102  BATTLE  OF LAKE  TRASIMENUS.  CONVULSJONS  OF NATURE. 
for  Hannibal  had  gained  a few days' marches upon hila,  and 
might have advanced still further: but he knew the advantages 
of his ground and wished to gain a decisive battle.  When the 
Romans came  to  the pass on the south side  of  the lake, they 
found  it  closed, for  Hnnnibal had  in  the meantime marched 
round the lake, and  Flaminius, in the belief that he was  still 
continuing his  road  towards  Rome, descended from the hills 
which stretch along the lake:  in some places they are not more 
than a stone's  throw from its borders.  Hannibal ascended the 
hills from  behind in colurnns, took  his station upon them, and 
placed  his  light  armed troops where  the  space  between  the 
hills and  the lake was  narrowest, and  formed a very long de- 
file.  Here we see again the finger of  Providence;  for the day 
was foggy, and  the Romans, without  being  able to see either 
the  lake  or  the hills, broke  up very early, before  sunrise, to 
continue their  march, in very thick  columns which were una- 
ble to manoeuvre.  When they arrived  in  the narrow defile, 
they fell in with the light armed troops of  Hannibal, and ima- 
gining that the  Carthaginians were  returning  to  meet  them, 
they thought it necessary to hasten onward without delay, and 
repeatedly assailed the enemy, but without success.  HannibaI 
drew his columns to the right and outflanked the Romans; and 
while  they  attempted  to  force  their  way  through the light 
armed troops,  Hannibal  attacked them from  behind  and from 
the hills.  Thus the Romans were driven into the lake, and not 
more than 6000 forced their way through the enemy, and thus 
escapedlY; the greater part perished in the lake, and C. Flaminius 
was  among the  slain.  In Dutens' Manuel du  Voyageur,  and 
other books, two spots, La Ossaia and the Ponte di Sanguinetto, 
are pointed  out  as the places whcrc the battle was fought, and 
they are  generally cited  as instances  of  the  manner in which 
local  traditions are  preservcd.  But the  Sanguinetto  cannot 
possibly have been  the actual scene  of  the battle, which may, 
however, have been fought in the vicinity;  and as for La Ossaia, 
I have  discovered that in  the  sixteenth century it was  called 
(haria  (a bear's  den), and that the nobles of  Perugia used  to 
keep bears (orsi) on that spot, from which it derived the name 
Orsaria, which was subsequently corrupted into Ossaia. 
l9 This battle  strongly reseml~les  the unfortunate day of  Auerstadt, for there, 
too, chargcs were continualty attempted, and one detachment was destroyed after 
mother.-N. 
LECTURE  LXII. 
SHAKESPEARE  has  connected awful  phenomena of 
nature with occurrences in the moral  world,  as  Thuc~dides 
connects the physical  phenomena  of  the  Peloponnesian war 
the moral  condition of  the people.  During  the second 
Punic  war,  the earth was  in like manner  shaken by  extra- 
ordinary convulsions and fermentations which were going on 
in its bowels, and Pliny '  says, that in the year of  the battle of 
Trasimenus fifty-seven earthquakes were reported  at Rome, a 
greater number than had ever been observed  before within SO 
short a  period.  Whether the earth shook  in  fifty-seven dif- 
ferent  places,  or  at  different  times  of  the  year,  cannot  be 
decided,  on  account  of  the vague  manner  in which  Pliny 
speaks of  the fact.  Many places were changed  into heaps of 
ruins, as Cannae in Apulia; and others  lost their walls.  We 
cannot, however, believe the statement of  Livy, that the earth 
shook under  the feet of  the combatants, without  their being 
aware of it, although the motion was so violent that the walls 
of  many Italian towns fell down."  It may be  that the thick 
fogs, which covered  the scene on  the morning  of  the battle, 
had  some connexion  with  these  internal convulsions of  the 
earth,  although  in  spring  such  fogs  are  not  unfrequent  in 
those districts.  I myself  saw one, in the month of  June, in 
the valley of  the Tiber, not far from  lake Trasimenus, which 
reminded  me very  forcibly of  the description  given  of  the 
morning of  that memorable battle.  Flaminius  had fallen in 
an  honourable  struggle; but  although  his guilt  is  infinitely 
smaller  than  that  which  is  laid  to  his  charge,  yet  in  my 
opinion he cannot be entirely acquitted  of  negligence in the 
battle;  but in grcat events intended  to change the fate of  the 
world we often see a prevailing fatality which blinds even the 
most prudent. 
After the battle of  Trasimenus, Hannibal, as  he had  done 
after that on the Trebia, exchanged  the Libyan armour of  his 
soldiers for that  of  the Romans?, which  shews how wcll he 
knew how to train  his  army.  In  order  to use  the Roman 
'  Hist. Nut. ii. 86.  Pliny, 1.  c; Livy, xxii. 5; Zonars, viii. 25. 
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arinour with success, it was indispensable to adopt their whole 
method of  training  and exercising the troops, and this could 
not be learned  as  quickly as the manoeuvres of  the phalanx. 
The introduction of  the pilum, the use of  which conld not be 
easily learned, alone proves  that even  in the midst of  war, he 
kept  his troops  ready for any improvement.  The Spaniards 
were allowed  to retain  their  own  armour.  Ever  since  the 
battle on  the Trebia  he had made a  distinction between the 
prisoners:  he treated the Italicans with kindness;  he took care 
of the wounded,  often gave them presents, and restored them 
to  freedom, probably  on  condition  that  they  should  never 
again  take up arms against him.  He now adopted  the  same 
line of  conduct towards the  far  greater number  of  prisoners 
who were taken in the battle  of  Trasimenus, and proclaimed 
himself  to the inhabitants  of  Italy as  their  deliverer  from 
the  Romans.  When  he  crossed  the  Alps,  it was  not  his 
intention  to fall  upon  Rome like a  torrent, and to scale its 
walls;  he was  not  capable  of  such  a  false  calculation;  he 
must,  like  P~rrhus,  have  entertained  the idea  of  forming  a 
close alliance with the Italicans, and of  thus crumbling Rome 
to dust  by a  series of  wars.  Pyrrhus had had  the power to 
crush  Rome,  but Hannibal was  obliged  to create for  himself 
a power in Italy, before he could hope successfully to contend 
with Rome. 
When he broke up from lake Trasimeiius, which must have 
been  immediately after the battle, he encountered in Umbria, 
a  detachment  of  fo~n  thousand  Romans chiefly cavalry, who 
had been sent from Rimini by the consul Scrvilius, to reinforce 
the army of C. Flaminius; they vere surrounded by Hannibal, 
and almost  all of  them were cut to pieces.  This at  least  is 
stated, with the grcntest  probability,  by Polybius;  but  Livy 
says, that Centcnius, by the command  of the Senate, formed 
an army after the defeat  of  Trasimenus  had  become  known. 
This is not likely, as  the news of  the defeat could  not  then 
have reached Rome. 
Hannibal did not march towards Rome, but to Spoleto, which 
belonged to the third line of  Roman  colonies, in the hope of 
making an impresion upon the town, the  conquest of  which 
would necessarily afford him great advantages.  But the town 
held out, and remained  faithful to the Romans.4  One feeling 
'  Livy, xxii. 9. 
whichHannibsLl,  in common with niany great generals of modern 
times, such as Frederic the Great, entertained, was an aversion to 
sieges.  He himself never besieged a place, and long sieges were 
always conducted by his generals.  When, therefore, he found 
that his attempt upon Spoleto did not succeed, he  broke up, and 
continued his inarcli into Picenum.  The gates of all the towns 
werc closed  against him, except where they had  been  thrown 
down by eartluquakes.  Now, every one will ask, Why did he not 
march directly towards Rome?  Why did he not avail himself 
of  tile  general  consternation which prevailed there ?-for  the 
Romans were alarmed in the highest  degrce,  and the city and 
its immediate vicinity  were  no longer  their recraiting places; 
their forces could be  strengthened only by drawing rcinforce- 
ments from distant parts of  Italy;-or  why  did not Hannibal 
attempt  to blockade  Romc,  if  he despaired  of  taking  it by 
assault?  To these  questions  we  may  give  the  following 
answer:  in those times Romc was  an extremely strong fortress, 
protected by steep rocks, walls, banks, and moats.  The Capi- 
toline  rock was hewn quite steep; one side of the Quirinal, as 
far as the Porta Collina, was a  rugged rock,  and protected  by 
a strong  wall;  further on was the wall of  Servius Tullius,  an 
Italian mile in length.  Where the city was not protected  by 
anything but  a  wall,  as  between  the Aventinc and Caelius, 
there it was  backed,  at least  partly, by marshes;  in short,  a 
great army would have been  required to undertake the block- 
ade.  Hannibal would further have rcquired very largc engines, 
of  which  he  had  none.  He might  have  burnt  down  the 
suburbs, and thus have produced great terror  and alarm; but 
that was  not  what  he wished,  and he had, besides,  sevcral 
reasons for not undertaking  anything of  the sort.  His army 
was suffcring from diseases, principally of  a cutaneous nature, 
and requircd rest for  the recovery  of  its  health.  The horscs 
too had suffered much, and he was obliged to find quarters for 
The connexions  which  he hoped  to form with  the 
Italicans by his generous  conduct towards  them, had  not  yet 
been effect~d.~  Another reason must assuredly have been, the 
unhealthy  state of  the  atmosphere  in the neighbourhood  of 
Romc, during the summer months.  The battle of  Trasimenus 
may have taken place about the end of May, or the beginning 
of  June: there is  a  passage from  which its exact date can  be 
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inferred,  but  I  do  not  recollect  it at present.7  His army, 
therefore, would have been  consumed by diseases, even if the 
hcaltli  of  the soldiers  had  not  already  becn  impaired.  He 
accordingly  took  up his  summer-q~~arters-which are as nc- 
cessary in Italy as winter-quarters are in other countries,-in 
Picenurn  and  the  Marca  Ancona,  a  fruitful  and  healtl~y 
country, with a moderate temperature.  Providellce here again 
evidently  interfered  on his  behalf;  the earthquakes,  which 
announced awful events to the world, had paved his way,  and 
been his battering-rams, for the walls of several fortified towns 
wcre  thrown down, and he was  enabled  to gain  an cntrance 
into many  places  without resistance  and provide himself with 
the stores he  found  in  them.8  While  his  soldiers  thus re- 
covered  from their sufferings,  the  Romans  exerted  all  their 
powers.  Q.  Fabius 14laximus was made dictator, and received 
the command  of  the army which  he formed  by  collecting 
those who had survived the day of  Trasimenus, and by  fresh 
levies, for the flowcr of the Roman troops had been destroyed.9 
The Romans began even to enlist  prisoners  as  soldiers, when 
they were willing to serve.  With such troops  he was  to  op- 
pose  I-Iannibal,  whose  strength  necessarily  increased  with 
every fresh success, whereas the Romans were suffering under 
the feeling that they were the conquered, and could  not ven- 
ture  upon  a  battle;  but  Hannibal too,  like  all  great eom- 
manders, did not like to fight a  battle unless it was  necessary. 
Fabius saw that hc must train his troops, and that the fidelity 
of his allies was a great piece of good fortune.  Of this circum- 
stance he was obliged to avail himself.  He further hoped that 
the consequences of the fact that Hannibal's army was  such  a 
motley host,  would  soon  become  manifest;  but this was  not 
the case.  Thc army, it is truc, was  composed of a variety  of 
nations; the Gauls  especially  were  very  numerous,  but they 
were  so  enraged  against  the Romans, that  Hannibal  could 
firmly rely upon them.  The nucleus of his troops consisted of 
Africans,  and  a  smaller  number  of  Spaniards,  who  were 
probably thc best of  all.  Lastly,  he had  many  slingers; his 
infantry did not amount to more than 40,000 mcn altogether, 
(It was ix.  cal. Jul; see Ovid, Fast. vi. 765, foll.)  The atmosphere in and 
ahout  Romc is pestiferous  even before  the end of  June;  and  in ancient times 
it was no less so than at present.-N. 
Livy, xxii. 18, who gi1e.j orlc instance of  it. 
@  Livy, xxii. 11 ; Polybius, iii. 88. 
and with tllis army he was in a  country where as yet no town 
had, of its own accord,  opened  to him  its  gates;  the country 
tllrough  *llich  he had  marched last was particularly attached 
to tile Romans:  in Apulia the feeling was probably different. 
In the meantime Hannibal left his quarters, at the begillning 
of  autumn,  when  the  season  becarne  more  favourable.  He 
marched through Abruzao,  the country of the Pelignians and 
Marrucinians,  along  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic;  but he  was 
opposed by Fabius, who endeavoured, and partly succccded, in 
cutting off his supplies;  but EIannibal in these difficulties  de- 
ceived him, broke up without being  observed,  and  suddenly 
appeared  in  Campania,  wishing  to rcacll  Casinum  and the 
Via  Latina,  and by  confining  the communication  between 
Rome and Campania to the  Via Appia, to ascertain whether 
such a position would encourage  the  Italians to venture upon 
something  decisive.  He  soon  found  himself  involved  in 
difficulties  on  account  of  his  having  no  maps,  though  it 
is  wonderful  how  well,  in  general,  the  ancients  attained 
their  objects  without  them.  He knew  that  Casinum  lay 
on the road, and he commanded one of his guidcs to lead the 
troops thither.  Now whether it was  that he made  a mistake 
in speaking,  or  that the guide  misundcrstood  or wished  to 
betray him, we know not, but the guide led his troops through 
upper Samnium and down thc  Vulturnus, to Casi1inum.l"  Han- 
nibal did not discover the mistake till it was too late, for Fabius 
was  beforehand,  and had turned from  the  Via  Latina  into 
Samnium, and fortified himself  there.  When, therefore, Han- 
nibal saw that his plan was tliwartcd by this unlucky accident, 
he ravaged the Falernian district and the beautiful country of 
Campania, where many of  the Roman nobles had their estates, 
and where he made immense booty.  He then intended to re- 
turn through  Samnium into Apulia, in order  to take up his 
winter-quarters in those mild districts, and at the same time to 
have,  by his  presence,  the southern  Italians  more under his 
direct influence.  He  had already conceived the idea of forming 
an alliance with Tarcntum and other towns, and even with the 
king of  Macedonia.  Fabius, however, cut off his retreat ncar 
mount Callicula, by closing the road of Caudium while another 
detachment sccurcd the passes of Casinum on the road to Rome. 
Hannibal, however, did not  lose his presence of mind;  he was 
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encamped  at the foot  of  the hills  occupied  by Fabius,  and 
availed himself  of  a celebrated  stratagem.  The story related 
by Livy about the fils tening bundles of brushwood to the horns 
of a great number of oxen, and kindling the wood in the dark- 
ness  of  night, ctc., represents  the  Roinans  in a  foolish light. 
The truth is stated by Polybius.ll  Kothillg was more common 
among the  ancients than the march  by night with lanterns; 
and when the Roman out-posts saw the lights between  them- 
selves and the unoccupied district,  they thought that the Car- 
thaginians  were  forcing  their  way,  and  quickly  advanced 
towards  the  scene  of  the supposed  danger to shut  the road 
against the enemy.  In the meantime  Hannibal quickly took 
the ~osition  which  had  been  occupied  by  the Romans;  the 
whole  army thus cscaped without  loss, and the Roinan camp 
was destroyed by fire.  Hannibal continued his march through 
Samnium, until he reached the frontiers between Apulia  and 
the Fretanians, where he pitched his camp.  Here Fabius again 
met his enemy, but without suffering any defeat:  in petty skir- 
mishes the Romans even  gained some  advantages.  But these 
little victories led thc Romans to forget their real position, and 
to believe that their former defeats were to be attributed merely 
to chance, and that Fabius, with more courage, might wipe off 
the disgrace  from the Roman name.  Fabius was  obliged  to 
return to Rome, and left  the whole command  of  the army to 
his nlagister  equitum, M. Minucius  Rufus.  It is well known 
that the senate gave to Minucius the power of  pro-dictator, so 
that both had equal  powers12; and afterwards when Fabius re- 
turned, the troops were  divided  between  him  and Minucius. 
Whcn  Hannibal was  informed  of  this measure  he provoked 
Minucius, lay in ambush, and gained such a victory ovcr him, 
that he would have been completely lost, had not Fabius and a 
faithful corps  of  Samnites  comc to his  assistance.  Minucius 
now resigned  his power, and Fabius terminated the campaign 
in as favourable a manner as the circumstances would allow. 
During the ensuing winter, Hannibal was, properly spcaIzing, 
in distressed  circumstances : the harvest appears to have  been 
safely carried  into fortified towns before his  anival; for provi- 
sions were scarce, and he had great difficulty in supporting his 
I' Polybius, iii. 93 ;  Livy, xxii. 16 ; Zonaras, viii. 26. 
l2 Liv,  xxii.  26 ; Polybius, iii. 103;  Dion  Cassius, Fragm. 48;  Plutarch, 
Fubius, c.  7; Zonaras, viii.  2fi. 
army; but what inore than anything else rendered his situation 
precarious, was the fact that not one of the Italian nations had 
yet joilled  hi111  against the IZomans. 
TIle  of  the year 536 were L. Aemilius Paullus  and 
C. Terentius Varro.  This is the first  and pcrhaps  the only 
time in Roman  history that we read  of  events such as we  are 
quite familiar with in the history of Athens at the time of Cleon 
and Ryperbolus, when tradespeople rose to the highest offices of 
tile republic.  The account that Varro's father was  a  butcher, 
is 80  strongly opposed  to  everything that had gone before  or 
followed afterwards, that it is hardly credible.  But if it was so, 
the idea oftlie charactcr of a plebeian must have been completely 
altered;  and such trades must have been carried on not only by 
strangers,  aliens,  and freedmen,  but by native  citizens.  In 
former times, it would have been impossible for any person  to 
obtain the consulship in such a case.  Whether a  man posses- 
sed a  hide  of  land, of two or  four jugcrs, nay, whether  they 
were his own property, or whethcr he merely tilled them as a 
labourer, was  a matter  of  indifference  to the Romans; but it 
was husbandry, which in their opinion made a man honourable. 
Varro is said to have risen, like Cleon at Athens, by demagogic 
artifices13; but whether the account of Livy is correct or exag- 
gerated, or whether it  is a  mere tale, cannot be ascertained. 
If, howcver, we look at the events themselves,  we cannot help 
doubting  the justice  of  the sentence of  condemnation  which 
our historians pronounce upon  him.  Had he been really and 
solely  the cause of  the defeat of  Cannae,  how did  it happcn 
that, after  the battle, the senate went out  to  meet  him, and 
offcr thanks to him for not  having despairedla;  and that from 
that moment, down to the end of  the second  Punic war,  he 
alone had an  army with  cxtraordinary powers?  It was  only 
ominis causa, that he was not re-electcd to the consulship.  If he 
had actually been a contemptible man, as Livy says, such dis- 
tinctions would  be incomprehensible.  My belief  is,  that he 
was  one of  those  unfortunate  persons  who, like Cn. Flavius, 
were decried  by the pride  of  the nobles.  In their  political 
opinions thc two consuls  were diametrically  opposed  to cach 
other.  Aemilius  Paullus was  not  mercly  a  patrician, mhich 
would  have  made  little  difference,  but  he  was  literally  a 
l3 Livy, xx~i.  25, foll.  Polybius knows nothing of ~t. 
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p~ad6ypo~,  on  account  of  an unjust  charge which  had  been 
brought  against  hiin  before the beginning of  the Punic war, 
when  he  had  with  difficulty  escaped  condemnation.  The 
learned  M.  Terentius  Varro,  who  scarcely  150  years  later, 
belongcd  to the aristocratic party, was  no doubt a descendant 
of  the consul:  so much and so quickly do circumstances alter ! 
Each consul usually  commanded  an army of  two  legions, 
each containing 4200 men, and 200 horsemen, with the cor- 
responding number of  allics, that is, 5000 foot, and 600 horse. 
When this  force  was  united  it  consisted  of  four  legions, 
and a  corresponding  number  of  allies,  i.e.  16,800  Romans, 
20,000 allies, and 3,200 horse.  The Romans had now excrted 
themselves  to the utmost  to raise  their  troops  to  an  equal 
number with  those  of  thc Cartliaginians.  Their forces  con- 
sisted  of  no less  than eight legions, all more than complete, 
each consisting of 5000 foot and 300 horse.  Tliere were con- 
sequently 40,000 Romans,  independently  of  their allies, who 
served as infantry1"  2400 Roman horsemen, and 6000 of thcir 
allics.  This  army  was  commanded  by the consuls  of  the 
ycar, and those of  the preceding year, under the title of  pro- 
consuls.  All met  in Apulia.  Q. Fabius urgently  requested 
the commanders to adopt  his plan, and this also was the wish 
of the consul L. Aemilius Paullus :  but at Rome people thought 
differently.  Hannibal  had  no longer any elephants,  but  he 
had  a considerable number of  Gallic horsemen;  the Spanish 
cavalry,  however,  was  the  best.  The  Numidians,  like  the 
Cossacks, were not made for a charge, but were most excellent 
for reconnoitering, foraging, and harassing the enemy:  against 
the infantry or heavy cavalry they were useless. 
The dcscription of  the battle of  Cannae in Appian is taken 
from  Fabius  Pictor, and occurs  also in Zonaras.  According 
to it, Terentius Varro was not by far as guilty as he is described 
in Livy and Pol~bius. When thc consuls set out from Roinc, 
the whole  people,  it is  said,  murmurecl  at the slackness  of 
Fabius, and demanded  a  battle,  because  the protracted  war 
was  oppressive.  This account  has  intcrlial  probability,  and 
also explains why Paullus yielded  against his own conviction. 
The two consuls united in Apulia, and by thcir s~~,~ri~rity  in 
numbers, somewhat alarmed Hannibal, who established himself 
at Cannae.  The town had been destroyed  by an 
I5 Po1jb1115, iii.  107 ;  Livy, xxii. 36. 
but tile arx which  he took  by treachery, was  still  standing, 
~t is  a  mere chance that  we know  the date of  the battle of 
Cannae, and we are astonished  to find that  it was  at so late a 
season of the year:  Gelliuslhays that it took  place  on  the 
of  August.  If the statement is correct, we  may ask, 
how was it that so long a time was  allowed to pass away in 
inactivity?  But  according  to  Polybius'  account, the season 
does not seem to have been  so far advanced;  this, however, is 
an obscure point.  At any rate, the harvest, which takes   lace 
in those districts about the end of  May, must have been over. 
The two armies were encamped for  a  considerable time oppo- 
site each other on the banks of  the Aufidus, in the real  lain 
of Apulia, the soil of which consists of  linze, as in Champagne, 
and  thercfore contains few  springs,  so  that watcr  had  to be 
fetched from the Aufidus.  Hannibal is said  to have been  so 
pressed for provisions, that if the battle had  been delayed, he 
would  have  been  obliged  to  break  up.  He  enticed  the 
Romans  to a  battle,  and  in  a  skirmish  during  a  foraging 
excursion,  they  gained  a  victory,  Hannibal  not  supporting 
his  troops,  and pretending  to be  timid.  The Roman  forces 
were yet divided  into two camps, each occupying one bank of 
the river;  their head  quarters were  at Canusium,  and thcir 
stores  at  Cannae.  The  latter place,  which was  only  a  few 
miles distant from the  Roman camp, was  taken  by Hannibal 
before  their  own  eyes,  because  they  were  not  yet  strong 
enough to prevent it.l7  Even afterwards, Paullus was too timid 
to engage in a decisive battle.  It may be, however, that all 
the troops  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  that  for  this  reason 
Aemilius  Paullus would  not yet venture to attempt anything. 
But  what  ought  to  have  been  done?  The  wisest  plan, 
I  believe,  would  have  been  to  refuse  a  battle  as  long  as 
I-fannibal did not compel them to it; for the longer the hopes 
which Hannibal entertained in regard to the Italicans continued 
to be disappointed, the better it was for the Romans.  But it 
might, on the other hand, be said  also, that  a longcr  delay 
might have encouraged  the allies of the Romans to do what 
they  wished,  but did  not  yet venture  to do.  Everything 
depended upon one decisive moment;  and if  the Samnitcs or 
Capua  had  descrted  the Romans,  their  situation would  have 
been fearful.  AemiIius Paullus knew that if he conquered in 
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the battle, the  advantages would  be  immense;  but  he also 
knew that if he lost the battle,all would  be lost.  One camp of 
the Romans crossed the river Aufidus, and joined the other. 
The traveller Swinburne was the first who gave a satisfactory 
and clear description of the scene of  tlie battle of  Canna% and 
with his description, the battle can be easily understood.  The 
Aufidus near Cannae forms a  great reach, and on this the two 
armies  draw up, the Romans  standing  on  the chord  of  the 
arc which is formed  by the river,  Hannibal likewise crossed 
the river, and drew up his army in battle array in tlie face of 
the enemy, in such a manner that  his two flanks were leaning 
against the curve of the river.18  His position was such, that the 
Romans had the land in their rear, andcould deriveno  advantage 
from their superiority in numbers.  His own position was very 
dangerous; but he knew that he would be lost, if he did not win 
the battle.  The Romans placed their cavalry on the two wings : 
Hannibal  did  the same,  but in  such  a way, that one  wing 
was occupied by his light, and the other by his heavy cavalry. 
The Romans had  80,000 foot, and  from 6000 to 8000 horse, 
there being among the latter  about 2500 Romans.  The Car- 
thaginians had 40,000 foot, and about 8000 horse, for the most 
part Numidians, who were excellent for foraging, reconnoiter- 
ing, and harassing the cnemy, but could  not  stand a shock in 
battle, nor be used at  all against heavy cavalry, but at best only 
against light infantry.  The Romans left  10,000  men  behind 
in their  camp,  and  advanced  against  the  enemy with  only 
'70,000, from  which,  however,  must  be  deducted  the large 
n~unber  of those who always remain behind, cither from illness 
or other causes.  The Roman cavalry stood on the right wing, 
and that of the allies on the left.  Hannibal had no elephants; 
he placed his best cavalry on the left wing, to face that of  the 
Romans, and tlze Numidians  and  Lybians  on the right wing, 
while to the right wing he added Celts and Spaniards.  Some 
a.  Passage of  the Romans.  6. Passage of  tllc Carthaginians. 
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Libyans an~l  Celts also were placed  in the centre.  The space 
was too small for the whole of the Roman army, and they were 
accordingly drawn up unusnally deep, several  maniples  being 
placed  behind  onc  another.  The battle  was  opened  by  an 
attack of  the left  wing of  the Carthaginians upon tlie Roman 
llorse,  which, though fighting bravely, was soon thrown back, 
as, in fact, the wliole battle lastccl only a short time:  it began 
two  hours  after  sun-rise, and was  finished two hours  before 
sun-set.  The Numidians were  at tlie  same time engaged on 
the right  winc against  the  cavalry of  the allies.  I-Iannibal  P 
now dividcd  111s  line in the middle, ordering part  to advance 
with  tlieir  right  shoulders, and the other  wit11  their left, so 
that they formed  a wedge  against  the Roman  centre.  This 
was  an application  of  what  is  called  the oblique  battle line, 
which became so fatal in the Seven Years' war near Collin;  in 
this manmuvre, one of  the extreme points of  the line remains 
immovable while the other advances.  Hannibal made the ex- 
periment  with  two  lines.  The Romans advanced, the battle 
was very bloody, the Cwthaginian  troops could not penetrate, 
and retreated through the two wings.  As the Romans followed 
them, the two wings made half a turn, and attacked thc flanks 
of  the Romans.  At the  same  time, the  cavalry  of  the  left 
wing of the Carthaginians went round the Romans and, joined 
with  tlie  Numidians, routed  the  cavalry of  the  Iioman  left 
wing, so that now they could freely attack the Roman inhntry 
in its rear.  Aemilius Paullus was  mortally wounded;  in  the 
immense confusion there was no possibility of giving or obeying 
orders;  and two hours before  sunset, the wliole of  the Roman 
army was destroyed.  The  losses are stated difl'ercntly : Polybius, 
contrary to his usual practice, gives the largest numbcrs, stating 
that  out  of  80,000, 50,000 were  killed, so  that  only 30,000 
survived;  but the statement  of  Livy appears to be more cor- 
rect.lg  The  survivors  consisted  not  only  of  those  who had 
remained behind in  the fortified camp, but at least 8000 escaped 
from the field of  battle, so  that the  Romans  must  have  lost 
about 40,000 men.  I must here notice a curious circumstance, 
which is  mentioned  by Appian  and Zonaras20, and  was  pru- 
bably derived from Fabius -  in that part of Apulia, it is said, a 
Li\y, xxii. 49.  Compare Polybius, iii. 117; Appian, De Bello Annibal. 25; 
Plutarch, Fabius, 16. 
20  Appia1l, De Bell0 Annzbal. $0,  foll.;  Zonaras, ix.  1 foli. Comp. Livy, xxii. 46. 
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sea-breeze rises every day at noon.  This is probable enougll. 
The entire district is of a calcareous nature, and in summer the 
whole of  Apulia  is  covered with clouds of  dust.  But in this 
case it is added, that on the day before  the  battle, Hannibal 
had ordered the fields to be ploughed, and that he took such a 
position  that the wind, blowing  towards the Romans, carried 
the clouds of  dust into their faces, so that they were unable to 
fight.  I readily bclieve tl~it  Hannibal lnay have availed him- 
self of  the wind; but the rest sounds rather marvellous, and is 
perhaps nothing  morc than  one  of  those fictions by which  a 
conquered party endeavours to covcr its ow11  disgrace.  Anothcr 
story  relates,  that  Hannibal  allowed  a  number  of  Spaniards 
with  concealed  daggers to go to the Romans, as if  they were 
deserters; they were placed by the Romans in the rear of  the 
army, and afterwards  fell  upon thcnl.  This wretched  talc  is 
quite childish. 
On the day after the battle, the  surviving Romans of  both 
camps  capitulated, but Varro, with a small  detachment  of  70 
men, threw himself  into  Canusium, where  all  those who had 
eseapcd reassembled, and with thcm he went to Venusia.  The 
camp  surrendered, on  condition  tliat  Hannibal  should  enter 
into negotiations  with  Rome  concerning  the ransom  of  the 
prisoners, as had been  done in  the first  P~~nic  war, when the 
captives were always exchanged, and the party which had the 
greater  number  rcceived  a  sum of  money as a conipcnsation. 
Hannibal, who, as I have  already remarked, had  an aversion 
to  sieges, was  unconcerned  about  the Romans at Canusium, 
and inarched towards Capua, with which town he had already 
commenced negotiations.  This must  have  been  sooner  after 
the battle  than  Livy  represents  it:  Hannibal  cannot  have 
defcrrcd it, for there  is  yet  an immense number of events, all 
of  which  belong  to this year. 
It is a very well  known story related  by Cato'l,  that imme- 
diately  after  the  battle, Maharba122, the  commander  of  the 
Carthaginian horse, requested  Hannibal to send him to Rome, 
where, in five days, he promised  to celebrate  his victory by a 
banquet  on  the  Capitol.  Hannibal  answered  with  a  smile, 
that it  was a fine idea, but impracticable;  whereupon Maliarbal 
replied, "  Thou knowcst, indeed, how  to gain  a  victory, but 
21  Gellius, Noct. Att. x. 24.  Compare Livy, xxii. 51 ;  Plutarch, Fab. 17. 
22  I belieye we must pronounce MaharbBl, and not MahLrba1.-N. 
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not  how  to make  use  of  it."  We  cannot, indeed, say how 
great tile consternation and paralysis mould have been at Rome, 
if tllc  Carthaginian  cavalry had  made  its  appearance  on the 
Via Lath,  before the mournful  tidinw  of  the destruction of  9  tile noinan army had  reached  the  capital;  but no part of  the 
army could  have reached Rome in so short a time, except the 
cavalry, and even this not without thc greatest  dificulty, and 
without  changing  the  horses  on  its  road;  for  the distance 
between the field of  battle and the city of  Rome  was  at least 
two hundred miles, even if we suppose the road to have formed 
a straight line.  The only thing, howcver, which the Romans 
would  have  had  to  do  against  cavalry, in ordcr  to  be safe, 
would  have been simply to shut their gatcs.  It is not impos- 
sible tliat Maharbal inay have fancied Bome to be in a state of 
consternation, similar to that after the battle on the Allia;  but, 
although there were in the city only recruits and soldicrs dcs- 
tined  for  the navy, yet I can  never believe that the Romans 
would  have been so desponding  as not to defend their walls; 
and though the defcnce would  perhaps have  been unavailing, 
it might  at least  have  coinpclled  Hannibal to  lay encamped 
before  Rome  in the  middle  of  August, which  is  the most 
unfavourable season.  He might  have ravaged the neighbour- 
hood of the city, but this would  have been useless;  and if  he 
had  returned with  his  cavalry  without  having  effected  any- 
thing, it would  have made thc worst possible impression upon 
the It  a  1'  icans. 
LECTURE  LXIII. 
LIVY~  and Polybius give lists  of  the Italian nations  which 
deserted Rome after the battle of Cannae; and the fact is repre- 
sented as if it had happened immediately after the battle.  But 
this cannot have becn  the case:  several  of  thcln  contiilued to 
he faithful to Rome for a considerable time aftcrwarcls;  and we 
see that the belief  in the unshaken onlnipotcncc of  Rome was 
still very strong among them.  Those which at once deserted 
Rome  after  its great  defeat,  were a  portion  of  the Apulians, 
' "ii.  61, nith the note gf  GIaieanu:. 
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Samnites,  and Lucanians;  thcir exalnple  was afterwards fol- 
lowed by the Bruttians,  and at a  much  later  time  by  the 
Sallentines.  None  of the Greeks  yet  joined  Hannihal.  It 
was especially the fortresses of Cales, Fregcllae, Interamnium, 
Casinum,  Beneventnm,  Luceria, Venusia,  Brundusium,  Paes- 
tum,  and  Aesernia,  that  exerted  their  influence upon  the 
people  far around them,  so as  to ~aral~sc  them and prevellt 
their joining the Carthaginians. 
Even before  the battlc of  Cannae,  RannibaI had  entered 
into negotiations with Capua,-next  to Rome the most  flou- 
rishing city of Italy, but, in regard to moral power and political 
importance,  quite the reverse of Rome.  How soon he arrived 
at Capua, cannot be said,  the ancients usually giving no dates 
in  such  things; but  it is  certain  that he became  master  of 
Capua in the year of  the battle of  Cannae much  earlier  than 
would appear from Livy's narrative.  Campania was proverbial 
for its wealth,  but its inhabitants were  luxurious  and egemi- 
nate in the highest degree:  Capua stood to Rome  in the very 
favourable relation of isopolity ; and its great families thought 
themselves  quite equal to those of  Rome,  and were connected 
with them,  even with the Claudii,  by intermarriages.-hey 
entertained the hope that the fall  of Rome would  transfer the 
supreme power  to Capua; but this was manifestly absurd; for 
why should the nations of Italy have cast off the yoke of Rome 
to become  subjects of  Capua?  Hannibal, however, supported 
their dreams,  though without making  any promises  to them. 
When, therefore, he appeared  in Campania,  every thing was 
prepared.  The Romans had small garrisons in all other places, 
but at Capua thcre was none,  and the only thing which  made 
the inhabitants of  Capua  hesitate  was the circumstance,  that 
300 of  the noblest Campanians,  who  formed the cavalry be- 
longing to thc Campanian legion,  were still  engaged  in the 
service of Rome, and had been sent to Sicily, where they were 
kept, so to speak,  as hostages to insure the loyalty  of  Capua. 
Livy's account of  the manner  in which  Hannibal established 
himself in the city, of the repast and of the attempt to murder 
him, is exquisitely beautiful, but is no doubt a romance.  The 
story of  Decius Magius,  the only man  at Capua who rccom- 
mended the people to remain faithful to Rome3  seems to have 
some  real  foundation,  however  much it may be  embellished; 
Compare vol. iii. p.  109, foll. and p. 291.  Livy, xxiii. 7. 
and it  may be  doubted  whether  Hannibal  exilcd  him  as  a 
friend of  the Romans.  The apostasy  of  Capua was  the most 
glaring  ingratitude,  and it is only natural that the Romans 
could not forgive it; for no kind of ingratitude is so mortifying 
as the assumptions  of  unworthy men,  when they become  re- 
fractory,  and wish  to occupy places which  are  filled by others 
worthier  than  themselves.  The  Cainpanians  had  derived 
from  their connection with Rome,  and now they 
were not merely ungrateful,  but  displayed  a useless barbarity 
by putting the Romans to  death  in hot bath  rooms.  Capua 
a very favourable treaty with  Hannibal,  in which 
no mention  is  made of any kind of  Cartliaginian supremacy; 
Hannibal on the contrary recognised  thcir  independence,  did 
not claim  the right of  levying contributions  among them,  or 
of  making  them  serve  in his  armies,  and allowed  them  to 
select 300 from among the noblest of  his Roman captives as a 
compensation  for  thc 300 Campanian  horsemen  in Sicily; in 
short  everything  was  avoided  which  had  made  the  treaty 
with  Pyrrhus disagreeable  to the Tarentines.  He also  pro- 
mised  them,  in the name  of Carthage,  that they should  not 
be  forgotten  in  any future  peace.  It is  not  known  what 
became of those 300 noble Romans,  whether the Campanians 
put them  to death, or exchanged  them for their own nobles; 
but I believe that they were exchanged, for at that time Rome 
was not so haughty as she had used to be. 
The acquisition  of  Capua  was  a  great gain  to Hannibal. 
It  may be taken for granted, that on his march into Campania 
the Hirpinians,  Frentanians  and  Caudines  had  declarcd  for 
him.  Accrrac, which also enjoyed the right of  isopolity with 
Rome, was taken after a long siege. 
The taking of  Capua  forms  the conclusion  of  the  second 
period  of  the war.  Hannibal  had  now  reached  the  highcst 
point of his glory.  Whcther it be true, that his winter quar- 
tcrs in the luxurious city of Capua destroyed thc character and 
discipline of  his army,  or whether  this  statement be a mere 
rhetorical  declamation,  is  a ~oint  concerning which I think 
it preferable to bc silent.  This much however is certain, that 
when, after  extraordinary  exertions, mcn  betake  themselves 
to  rest,  they  lose  their  disposition  for  great  and  energetic 
activity,  and sometimes  never  acquire it again.  This  is  a 
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been  so  to  Hannibal  and his  army.  Bnt  there  is another 
circuinstance  which  is usually  overlooked,  namely,  that  he 
could not recruit  his army either from Africa, or from Spain 
or Gaul.  Every battle cost him a number of men; his being 
in the heart of  a foreign  country rendered a constant succes- 
sion  of  little  skirmishes  unavoidable; many  also  must  have 
perished by diseases, and tlze greatest loss is always that which 
is  sustained  in  a  foreign  land.  When Hannibal descended 
from the Alps, he had only 20,000 foot and GOO0  horse;  since 
then he had fought three great battles, and had not receivcd a 
single nzan  to reinibrce his  army.  He had no choice but to 
recruit his forces by Italicans.  We  know that he drew soldiers 
from  Bruttium,  and  we  may  suppose  that he strengthened 
himself  by levies  in other  parts  also.  IIe was  in the same 
situation as Napoleon in Russia  after the battle of Borodino, 
when  the  offered  peace  was  not  accepted.  He had  indeed 
been joined by a part of soutbern Italy, but all the Latin colo- 
Ore  not  nies throughout that country remained  faithful, and w.. 
to be conquered.  He was master  of  a  country  containing  a 
number of hostile fortresses:  if he wished to advance throuoh 
P  Campania, he had to conquer  or break through a whole series 
of fortified  colonies,  and to conquer  the Latin and Hernican 
towns in the neighbourhood of  Rome.  The people favouring 
Hannibal  could  do  nothing but blockade  these  towns,  and 
could  furnish  him  with  no  reinforcements.  He  calculated 
upon assistance from Carthage and Spain.  The year after the 
battlc  of Cannae, or even  later, he received from the former 
reinforcements and elephants;  the exact numbers are not men- 
tioned, but they must  have been  considerable, as is stated by 
Zonaras (from Dion Cassius).*  At the end of  the war, only a 
few of  the veterans who had crossed the Alps survived.  All 
this is sufficient  to account for  the fact, that the character of 
his soldiers  was afterwards inferior  to that of  the army with 
which he hacl begun the war.5  Whatever injurious influence, 
Livy, xxiii. 13, rclatcs (probably after Coelius Antipater) that the senate of 
Carthage decreed in the very year of the battle of Cannae, to send reinforcements 
to Hannibd; and lie adds, that the dccree was carried into etlbct with that slow- 
ncss which is common in prosperous circumstances, as if  the Carthaginians had 
loolied  upon  Hannihal's  whole  enterprise as scnselcss.  These considcrrttions 
might, indeed, have delayed the arrival of the reinforcements till the year after; 
bnt elephants are mentioiled in the camp of Hannibal even  before  he took up 
his winter quarters.-N.  Livy, xxiii. 18. 
The Prussian army of 1762 was infinitely inferior to  that of 1757; and those 
therefore,  the stay at Capua  may  have had  on  the army of 
Hannibal,  the  above-mentioned  circuinstances  alone  would 
satisfi'Lctorily account for its state of  dissolution.  If financial 
exllaustion  had had  that  decided  influence  in ancient  as  in 
modern times, the Romans would  have been colnpletel~  pzra- 
lysed, but they made a11  possible efforts, and thus it happened, 
tllat tllrough  the battle of Cannae they lost only those districts 
Tyl~ich  surrendered to tlze enemy, while in regard to the others 
they were in no danger.  The Marsians, &larruc,ilzians,  Sabines, 
Unzbrians,  Etruscans, Piccntians, and othcrs remained faithful 
to them. 
I-Iannibal's  object in Campania was to obtain possession of a 
seaport, to enable  him  to  communicate  with  Carthage;  but 
tlze attempts against Cumae, Naples, and Nola were unsuccess- 
ful, and, near the last  of  these places,  the Carthaginians were 
repulsed with  sonze  loss  by Marcellus.  Livy6  does  not  seem 
to think that this loss was  very considerable, and it may cer- 
tainly have been sorncwhat exaggerated by other writers, as it 
was the first  advantage which thc Romans g~ined  after many 
defeats.  It was, however, at any rate of great importance  to 
them that Hannibal did not  succeed  in his attempts to obtain 
possession of Cumae and Naples;  for if he had been successful, 
he would  have  had  a  place  of  arms  and of  communication 
with Carthage, from which he might have derived incalculable 
advantages.  But he was  now  in the strangest  position:  he 
had, in reality,  not  a  single sea-port town; and although he 
was the general of' a maritime state, yet he was  in the niidst 
of  a  foreign  country,  and shut out from  the sea.  Marcellus 
S~OWC~  great skill as a general, and revived the confidence  of 
the Romans.  Thc Bruttians, after revolting from  Rome, suc- 
ceeded  in gaining possession  of  Locri,  the first  Greek town 
that declared for Hannibal.  Croton was  taken  by force,  and 
this brought about the complete ruin  of  that once  populous 
and flourishing city;  only the central part of it was inhabited, 
as is the case  at present with Leyden, and still more so with 
Pisa, so that the deserted walls co~~ld  be easily stormed.  Any 
attempt  to  defend  the town  was  impossible,  for the number 
who have secn the French armics must ovn, that  the one of  1807 was incorn- 
paral~ly  better than that of  1812, during the campaign to Russh--N. 
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of  its inhabitants had  been  greatly  reduced  by the repeated 
devastations of Dionysius,  Agathocles, and the Romans under 
Rufinus in the war apinst Pyrrhus. 
I shall relate very briefly the history of the period from the 
taking of  Capua in 537, down to its recovery in the year 541. 
The  Romans  now  made  almost  incredible exertions.  Their 
legions were thenceforth  constantly increased.  Allies are no 
longer mentioned;  the best  among them had  deserted Rome, 
but it is highly  probable  that in this year  they were  incor- 
porated with the legions for the whole duration of  the war, in 
order that they might not stand isolated.  This is, however, a 
mere conjecture of mine, which I do not mean to give as an 
historical  fact; it may be  merely a plausible  error,  but until 
evidence  to the contrary  is  produced, I must  take  it to be 
correct.  Instead  of  confining themselves, after such losses, to 
operations on a smaller scale, the Romans conceived  the great 
idea of multiplying everything.  They were obliged to create 
a new army, and with it to meet the Carthaginians, who were 
accustomed to victory.  They refused  to ransom  those  who 
had been taken prisoners at Cannaer; but whether this measure 
was wise and just, and whether the prisoners were worth being 
ransomed, are points about which a  great many things might 
be said.  The awful consequence, however, was, that Hannibal 
sold them all as slaves,  and that they were scattered over the 
whole world.  Many must  have  rnade  away with themselves. 
The actions of those who act  as members  of a great body of 
men, must not be judged with the same severity  as those  of 
single and independent persons,  for the former are obliged to 
give up their own individuality.  I have known persons who, 
at a  moment  of  consternation  and bewilderment,  acted in a 
similar  manner,  although  they  were  perfectly  incapable  of 
doing the same thing either before  or after such an occasion. 
We have,  moreover,  to consider  whether  Hannibal  did  not 
perhaps demand ready money, which the Romans were not in 
a  condition to pay.  But even those who survived the day of 
Cannae, without having been  taken prisoners, were treatcd as 
cowards,  with  unfair  bitterness  and  contempt8; just  as  the 
unfortunate Admiral Byng was  shot by the English, in ordcr 
to  establish  a  maxim.  All the young  men  were  enlisted, 
and as a  sufficient number  of  young  freemen  could   lot  be 
7  Livy, xxii. 59, foll.;  Polybius, vi. 58.  Livy, xxiii. 31, xxv. 6. 
found, (many undoubtedly endeavoured  to avoid entering the 
service  out  of  despondency),  all  those  who were  unable  to 
pay  a  delictu?n, as  well  as  all  addicti,  were  set  free  under 
the  guarantee  of  the  state ; 8000  slaves  were  bought  on 
credit of  their masters, and formed into two regimentsg; nay, 
even  were  enlisted  with  their  arms,  for  arms 
too were  wantin@.  The Marsians,  hlarrucinians, Vestinians, 
Frentanians,  ~ezgnians,  and  Picentians, were  the only tribes 
among  tile  warlilce  people  of  Italy  that  still  sided  with 
Rome.  Its greatest  strength  consisted  in the  lnany  Latin 
colonies  extending  from  Bruttium  to  the  Po.  Such  were 
the  resources  of  Rome,  and  in  spite  of  Livy's  description, 
it is perfectly  clear  that  the  distress  must  have been  very 
great.  He  describes  the  wealthy  private  individuals  who 
advanced  money  to the  state as  excellent patriots,  although 
it is known on good authority that they exacted the most dis- 
graceful usury: the contractors  got the  transports  with  pro- 
visions for  Spain  insured  against  the dangers of the sea, and 
then contrived to get the ships  loaded  with  the worst goods 
and wreclced.  We can  hardly  form an idea  of  the distressed 
state of  Rome:  corn had risen to ten times the ordinary price, 
and the city  was  in a  state  of  positive  famine20  Lucania 
(with  the  exception  of  Petelia,  which  the  Carthaginians 
destroyed  as  a  punishment  for  its  fidelity),  Bruttium,  the 
greater part  of  Samnium,  and many of  the  Greek towns of 
Italy, threw themselves into the arms  of  Hanniballl;  a,nd it is 
surprising that, under these  circumstances, he not  only gained 
no lasting advantages,  but that, from  this time forward, the 
Romans  continually  acquired  new  strength.  Thcir  troops 
became  gradually  trained,  as  Hannibal  did  not  fight  any 
great battles, and left them time  to drill  them.  Thc Romans 
thus created an army which  was  certainly better than the one 
they  had  had  before the  battle  of Cannae. 
As early  as  the year  539,  the Romans  gained  a  decided 
ascendancy in Campania.  Hannibal was opposed by Q. Fabius 
aIaxinlus  and Marcellus;  and  he is  reported  to have said at 
the time, that he respected  Fabius as his tutor, but Marcellus 
as his rival;  that  Fabius  prevented  his  committing  any mis- 
take, and that Marcellus gave him exercise for the development 
Livy, xxiv. I I.  '0 Polybius, ix. 44. 
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of  his  own  powers?2  This is  not a  mere  rhetorical  phrase. 
The  Campanians  were  cowards;  they  took  the  field  0111~ 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Cumae,  but  werc  defeated,  and 
allowed  themselves  to  be  shut  up  like  sheep  in  a  fold. 
Hanilibal  inadc  several attempts to relieve them;  one Cartha- 
ginian army, under  the command  of  Hanno, advanced as far 
as  Bcneventum,  but was  beaten  there  by  Tib. Sempronius 
Gracchus  and  his  slaves  (volones),  whose  bravery  was  after- 
wards  rewarded  with  In tlle  following year,  the 
Romans recovered Arpi, and in this manner they gained  back 
many small places one after another.  These petty undertalrings 
accompanied sometimes by successful, sometiincs by unsucceiisful 
engagements, fill up this period down to 540, when Tarcntum 
surrendered  to  Hannibal.  The  revolt  of  lfctapontum and 
Thurii  from  Rome,  is quite  justifiable  on  moral  grounds. 
These towns had given hostages to the Romans; the hostages 
made their escape, but having bcen re-taken,  the Romans  put 
them  to  death  indiscriminately.  As in this inanncr  many a 
one had  lost  a  son  or  a brother, and the most distinguished 
families wcre  injurcd, those towns, naturally seeking revenge, 
surrendered  to Hannibal.  But  the citadel  of  Tarentum re- 
mained in  the hands  of  the Eomans, and thither the garrison 
of Metapontum repaired.  I do not understand why Hannibal, 
who  had  in  the  meanwhile  rcccived  reinforcements  from 
Carthagc, did not exert all his powers  to rclieve Capua, which 
was  blockaded  by the  Romalzs  with  double  entrcnchments. 
It  is true thc communication with the city was extremely difi- 
cult, but Ilannibal ought to have  stormed the entrenchments; 
this  neglect  is  almost  unaccountable to  me.  It is  possible, 
howcvcr, that the negotiations with Philip of Macedonia, which 
belong to this time, may  have  kept him in the east of  Italy. 
He lingered  in  Apulia  and  Lucania,  made  sonic  petty  con- 
quests, and endeavoured  to  keep in good humour  the  allies 
whom he had gained, for the Lixcanians and the tribes in their 
neighbourhood were of  a  fickle disposition.  The Romans,  in 
the meantime,  wcrc  maliing  scrious preparations  to conquer 
Capua.  Elanno  was  still  opcrating  in that distiict, but the 
Eomans  had  already  been  established  near  Suessula  for  the 
last two years, ravaging the whole country, so that famine had 
becn  raging  at Capua  for  some  time.  At last, however, in 
la Plutarch, Marcellus, C.  9.  l3 Livy, xxiv. 14. foll. 
541, at tile most urgent rcqucst of the Campanians,  Hannibal 
made an  attempt,  the real  ~llcaning  of  which  history  is at a 
loss how to explain.  There  are  many  contradictions in the 
accounts  of this undertaking; if  we  follow  the most  unpre- 
tending account, I-Imnibal attacked tlle Romans without being 
able to break tl~rough  their lines, only a few Numidiails having 
forced  their  way  and  opened  the cominunication  with  the 
town.  But  this  could  not  be  kept  up,  and  Hannibnl 
tllerefore  determined  to nlake  a  diversion.  Thcre  are  two 
accounts  as  to  the  road  which  Hannibal  took;  that  of 
Coelius  is  the most  improbable.  For it is  a disputed  point 
whether  he  marched  through  the  country  of  the  Pelig- 
llians and appeared  at the Colline  gate from  the north,  and 
whetllcr  on  his  retreat  he  began  his  return  at  the  Porta 
Capena, or the reversc.  The former statement is most entitled 
to belief;  the other implies too round-about a way.  Hannibal 
scellls to have takcn the Romans so much by surprise with this 
$an,  that there was hardly  time  for  half  of  thc troops  from 
Capua to reach Rome bcfore him  by the Via Appia, as he was 
a few days' march  ahcad  of  them ; for  he marched along  the 
arc or which the Appian  road  forms the chord, that  is  across 
the  Vulturnus,  and through  the territory  of  Cales  towards 
Fregellae, which was  very strongly  fortified.  The people  of 
Fregellae  had,  with  great  circumspection,  broken  down  the 
bridges over the Liris,  and  Hannibal was  obliged to halt  till 
tlzcy were restored, during which timc he ravaged their country. 
IIe then advanced  by the Latin  road  and  Tusculum towards 
Rome;  but  found  no  favourable  reception  anywhere.  The 
consul  Fulvius,  howcvcr,  who  had  marchcd  along  the  Via 
Appia, had  arrived  at the Porta Capena  bcfore him.  Whell 
13annibal was  alrcady on the Esquiliac,  Fulvius arrived there 
at the right momcnt, through the town,across the Carinae,  and 
by a sudden attack prevented I-Iannibal from taking the  by 
surprise. He  had probably calculstcd that both arinics would be 
recalled from  Capua, which  would  have  enabled  h'  im to re- 
lieve that city, and  to introduce provisions, or to lead away its 
Population. But  it  seems that the general,  to whom hehad leftthe 
command to effect this, was not fit for the task.  FIannibal was 
encamped  near  the Porta Collins,  on  a  projection of  Monte 
Pincio,  opposite  the low grounds of  the gardens of  Sallust, 
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again begins to be poetical.  Hannibal  marched  out twice to 
offer battle to the Romans.  They advanced towards  him, but 
each  time  a thunder storm  began at the same moment, and 
when the armies withdrew,  the sky became  bright  again;  so 
that Hannibal was convinced  by these portenta, that he could 
not effect  anything  apinst Rome.  Other stories sound  very 
beautifully,  but  are liliewise  Fables.  It is  said,  for example, 
that  the Romans  sent  reinforcements to their army in Spain 
about the time that  Hannibal was  at the gates  of  Rome,  and 
that the field on which the enemy was  encamped  was sold  at 
as high a pricc as if it  had been a time of  the most  profound 
peace.  It cannot  have  been the rcal  object  of  Hannibal to 
fight a battle in that position; for he had in his  rear absolutely 
nothing to back  him.  When he had  been  encamped  before 
Rome for eight days, and the Roman allies far and wide did not 
stir, he broke up, and returned by Antrodoco  and  Sulmo into 
Samnium and Apulia,  through the midst of  hostile  countries, 
where all towns were  closed against him; he went like a lion 
pursued by hunters, but passed  through unhurt.  The object 
of  his undertaking  was thwarted.  He who  had  great objccts 
and great means was in  the sad  predicament  of  wanting  the 
something  which  could  accomplish  these  objccts and render 
his means available, however trifling this something may  have 
been.  If his  Italian  allies,  the  Samnites,  Lucanians,  and 
Bruttians, had, in thc meanwhile,  compelled the other consul 
to raise the sicge of  Capua,  Hannibal  would  have  gained  his 
end; but he was always obliged to do every thing himself. 
Hicro died  at the  age  of  ninety, either in the year  of  the 
battle  of Cannac, or the year  after, and was succecdcd  by his 
grandson, Hieronymus.  We  find almost  invariably in  Grcek 
dynasties, that the successors of great men do not seein to know 
what use to make of  the power bequeathcd to them, except so 
Gar  as  their  own  enjoyment is  concerned.  EIieronymus was 
the son  of  Gclo, the son  of  Hiero; had  Gclo  been  alive, he 
would  have followed  quite  a diferent  line  of  policyll,  for  he 
cnjoycd the same reputation  for  mildness as his father.  Gclo 
had two or three  daughters, and a son, Hieronyl~us. Hiero's 
authority was  rooted as firmly as  if  his  dynasty had  been  on 
the throne for  centuries;  but Hieronymus, in the belief that, 
after  the battle  of  Cannae, Rome would  not  raise  her  head 
l4  Polybius, vii. 8. 
vain,  thought  that he might treat the Romans with disdain,  a, 
although he ha,d no wish to throw himself into the arms of the 
Carthaginians.  He was a  contemptible  youllg man, without 
ability or  and fancied that, in the confusion of  the 
war, he  might make llilnself  sole master  of  Sicily.15  He in- 
tellcled to give  up the alliance with Rome, and to negotiate 
lvitll tile  Carthaginians.  It is  natural that the Syracu- 
sans did not like the Romans to be their real masters;  but they 
could  not  avoid  recognising either the  Carthaginians  or  the 
Romans, and the  latter had, on  the whole, treated them well. 
But it  was a pneral  fatality which induced all nations to revolt 
from Rome.  EIannibal had behaved towards Sicily in the same 
manner  as  after  thc  battle  of  lake  Trasimenus  towards  the 
Italicans.  Syracusan prisoners had been dismissed by him with 
presents; and after the battle of Cannac he sent ambassadors to 
Syracusc to draw the king  into an alliance.  Among these 
ambassadors were Hippocrates and  Epicydes, the grandsons of 
an exiled Syracusan who had settled at Csrthage, a proof  that 
such aliens  at Carthage did not cease to be  Greeks, although 
they sometimes had Carthaginian names, as we see from monu- 
ments.  These ambassadors found Hieronymus willing to listen 
to them:  their first proposal was to divide Sicily bctwecn Car- 
thage  and  Syracuse, with the Himera  for  their  boundary, as 
in thc time of Timoleon;  Hicronymus, however, was not satis- 
ficd with this,  but  demanded  the sovereignty of  all  Sicily as 
the  reward  for  his  alliance.  Hannibal,  who kept  his  own 
objects in view in such cases, made the concession without any 
scruple, on condition that Rieronymus should at once renounce 
11is alliance with Rome, for he hoped to subduc him aftcrwards. 
This  EIicronytnus  did;  but  he took  no further  stcps.  The 
Syracusans, who in I-Iiero's rcign had never thought of a revo- 
lution, wcre exasperated by his grandson's ridiculous imitation 
of Eastern kings, and by the crimes of himsclf and his associates; 
a party accordingly was formed to restore the republic, and it 
was joined  by all  those who were in favour of  Rome, and by 
all sensible men who considered  the rule of  the Carthaginians 
to be more detrimental than that of the Romans.  The conspi- 
racy was  discovered, and one  of  the accomplices was  put to 
death; those,  however, who  had  been  found  out, would  not 
betray their othrr associates.  Hieronymus was thus unwarned 
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when a numerous conspiracy carried out its design, and he was 
murdered  on  the roacl from Syracuse to Leontini, one of  the 
most important places of his little kingdom.l"fter  his death 
a republic was proclaimed, and a number of strategi were to be 
appointed, probably one for each pllyle ; the povxc),  was allowed 
to continue, as even  under the Bings it had taken  part in the 
administration  of  the state, which was  in fact  the case in all 
republics  governed  by tyrants.  The question  now was who 
were to be  appointed  strategi: the king's  own brothers-in-law 
wcre elected among them, so  that the revolution cannot have 
been very radical.  It was not yet decided, whether the alliance 
with Cartllagc should be kept up.  The Roman praetor, Appius 
Chudius, was ncgociating with that object, and thc citizens of 
Syracuse  hesitated very niuch  about breaking it; but the two 
ambassadors  of  Hannibal  contrived to  be  electcd among  the 
stratcgi,  and exerted  all their influence to disturb the nego- 
ciatioiis.  The whole account of these transactions is extremely 
complicated; but Livy took it from Polybius, and it is therefore 
authentic.  There had repeatedly been a prospect of peace being 
concluded, but at last the Carthaginian  party brought  about 
a  revolution through the mercenaries, by which the govern- 
ment was  placed  in the hands of  Hippocrates and Epicydes, 
and all the meinbcrs  of  Hiero's family were butchered at the 
very altars of the gods.  After these scenes of horror, Syracuse 
was  in a  state of  anarchy:  the name of  the republic existed 
indeed, but those two men ruled by mcans of  the mercenaries, 
and the unhappy Syracusans were  only thcir  tools.  But on 
thc other hand,  the unpardonable cruclty of  the Romaiis  also 
exas~eratcd  the minds of all:  the coinrnonalty of Enna, which 
had bcen convened  under  a false prctencc, was  massacred  on 
account of an apparcnt attempt at insurrection, so that far and 
widc all towns revolted to the Carthaginians, who now sent  a 
considerablc fleet  under the command  of  Himilco,  to  Sicily. 
This measure was perhaps prudent, and in accordance with the 
wish of  Hannibal himself, the object  being to mailltaill  tlleir 
possession of tlle island, and to diviclc the Solces of tllc Romarls. 
This fleet kept  open for  a time  the communication  betwccn 
Carthagc and Syracuse, but the commanders proved themselves 
to be most nnfit for their task. 
M. ibIarcellus, who had  acquired  fame by his  fight  against 
l6 Liry, xsiv. i;  Polybjus, vii. 6. 
Viridomarus  and at Nola, ncw obtained the command  of  an 
army  in  Sicily,  and  ellclosed  Syracuse.  The tow11  could 
easily be enclosed on tlie land side, but the sea remained almost 
almays open.  This war lasted for two years (538-540);  it is 
described as a blockade of Syracuse, but was probably conducted 
by tile  Romans in such a  manner, that they inade war  upon 
the  neiglibouring  country  from  two  very strongly fortified 
camps.  EIimilco had madc liiniself master of Agrigcntum, and 
thencc of a great number  of  Sicilian places,  SO that the whole 
semi-circlc round Agrigentunl belonged to the Cartllaginians; 
it was  only the western towns  of  Lilybaeurn  and  Panormus, 
and tlie  northern ones, Messaila and Cataiia, that continued to 
rcinain faithful to the Romans.  The Cartliaginian army en- 
deavourcd  to relieve  Syracuse, and  encamped  in the neigh- 
bourhood;  but the  unhealthy atmosphere wliich has prevailed 
there evcr since its foundation, and has at different tinies saved 
the  city, destroyed  the whole  army, the commander  himself 
and EIippocrates who had  gone out to  him  being among the 
dead.  Marcellus made various  attempts against Syracuse : he 
attacked Achradina from the sea;  but here all his endeavours 
werc dcfcnted by thc mechanical talent of Archimedcs.  It  is 
well  known that tllcrc  are many accounts about this subject, 
but that wliich is best established merely says, that Archimedes 
thwarted all attcmpts  of  the Romans to undermine  the walls, 
and destroyed thcir vinene and the besieging  engines on board 
their ships  by mcans  of  his  supcrior skill  in  mechanics.  It 
seerns lcss  probablc that  he should have set fire to the Roman 
flcct  by  lncans  of  burning  glasses:  the silence  of  Livy and 
col~scqucntly  that of Polybius, also are against the story.  Mar- 
cellus would  ncvcr  have conquercd the city, had he not acci- 
dentally pcrceivcd  that a portion  of  the wall near the sea was 
ill fortified;  and  had  he not at the same  time lenrncd from 
dcscrters that the citizens werc  celebrating a  festival  without 
apprehending any danger.  Of this day he availed himself:  he 
scaled  the weak part  of  the wall, and thus the Rolnans  took 
two quarters of  the city, Tycha  and Neapolis,  and soon after 
E~i~olae  also, that is the part built on thc heights:  the greater 
Part, llowever, viz., the old town  (NGaop) and Acllradina, the 
most Prosperous quarter, werc still unconquered;  for Tyclia and 
Neapolis were only suburbs and not even connected.  Negotia- 
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inclined to surrender, and Marcellus desired notliing so  much; 
but the Roman deserters, in their fury and despair, were deter- 
mined to defend themselves  to tlie last, and they succeeded  in 
misleading  the mercenaries, and in inspiring them with  their 
own  madness.  A massacre  thus  co~nmenced,  in which  the 
most  distinguished citizens were  murdered, and those  barba- 
rians usurped the reigns  of  government.  The  condition  of 
Syracuse was  now as horrible as that of  Jerusalem during its 
siege, according to the description of Josephus.  If the liomans 
could  ever  have publicly deviated from  their ~rinciples,  and 
granted a free departure to the deserters, Syracuse would have 
remained  undestroyed;  but although  they did not ostensibly 
abandon their principles, they did it in another way, for in this 
war they had recourse  to bribery and seduction of evcry kind, 
things which  they had formerly disdained.  Marcellus  bribed 
Mericus, a Spanish commander of  mercenaries, to surrender to 
him a part  of Achradina; and this piece of treachery was con- 
trived with such diabolical skill, that it completely succeeded : 
the garrison of  Nasos was enticed  to come out, under the pre- 
tence  of  defending itself, and Nasos as well as Achraclina  was 
taken.  Syracuse was then tlie most splendid of all the Greek 
cities, for Athens had long  since lost its splendour.  Timaeus, 
who had  lived  in  the latter  city, and must have had a vivid 
recollection of it, acknowledged that Syracuse was the first and 
greatest of all. 
The humanity and gentleness of  Marcellus after the taking 
of Syracuse are  generally spoken  of  as something quite extra- 
ordinary17, but from the Excerpta ITepi  Tvop6v, published by 
A. Mail8, we see this humanity in a diff'crent light.  The town 
was not set on fire, but thoroughly plunderccl, and those of its 
inhabitants who were not sold as slaves were driven out of the 
town into  the open  fields, where they tore up the grass from 
the earth to satisfy their hunger, or died of starvation, so that 
the free S~racusans  had to envy the lot of slaves, and many of 
them  pretended  to  be  slaves, merely to obtain the means  of 
satisfying their  hunger.  Everything in the city became  the 
booty of the soldiers or of  Rome; and Marcellus was  the first 
who  carried  Greek works of art in large  quantities  to Iiome. 
'7  Livy, xxv. 40. 
18  Diodorus,  Excerpta  Vaticana, p.  68 ed.  L.  Dindorf;  compare Excerpt. 
vules. p. 569. 
~i~~'~  remark that this sad gain was no blessing to him is true, 
for in IJivyls own time, the teinple of Virtus and Honor, which 
had beell  adorned with  the spoils,  was  plundered  by others. 
After the taking  of  Syracuse, the war in  Sicily continued for 
tmo years longer, and ended with the taliing  of  Agrigentum, 
was treated still more crueily, a11 free persons beinm  a.  sold 
as  slaves.  Agrigentum  thus experienced  three destructions, 
first under Dionysius, 140 years earlier in the first Punic war, 
and fifty years later a third time.  Next to Syracuse it was the 
most splendid city in Sicily, but at last became the insignificant 
place  which  it still is.  In 549, M. Valerius  Laevinus, a  liu- 
mane Roman again formed a community thcie.  This victory 
over the Carthaginian army was likewise gained by treachery, 
Mutines,  a  Nuiliidian  captain, deserting with his troops,  and 
being liberally rewarded by the Romans for it, as 8Icricus had 
been before.  In the sixth year after the revolt of Ilicronyn~us, 
all Sicily thus came again under tbe dominion of Rome. 
LECTURE LXIV. 
THE talcing  of Syracuse and the treatment which its inhabit- 
ants experienced, shew how little the wars of  the ancients can 
be compared with those of modern times, and how grateful we 
may be that the principles of  war arc so  much altered for the 
better.'  Another example of the same cruelty was exhibited at 
the talting of Capua, which occurred in the sane  year as that of 
Syracuse, A.U. 541.  Ciccro2 sccnis to tl~ilik  it a wise clcinency 
that thc lloinans did not destroy Capua, but they raged against its 
inhabitants  with  all  imaginsblc  fury.  The distress  in  that 
city had  reached its highest  point,  and it was  ready to capi- 
tulate;  but the Romans demanded its surrender at discretion. 
The heads of' the party hostile to the liornans, Vibius Virrius 
and twenty-seven other sciiaturs then resolved to die; and the 
cvcnt indeed shewed that they were wise in so doing;  for the 
Romans acted  with  the most  heartless  cruelty.  The whole 
senate of  Capua was  led  in chains  to Teanum,  and the pro- 
'  Thc last really  horrible war in n~odorn  timcq,  was the destruction of the 
Palatinate under Lo~uii  XIV.-N.  Ue Leg. Agr. i.  6. 
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consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus would  not  even leave  the decision 
of  thcir  fate  to  the  Roman  senate.  The proconsul  Appius 
Claudius,  to whom alone with Flaccns  the city had been sur- 
rendered, \vished to save as many as ~ossible,  and had requested 
the senate to institute a causae cognitio;  but Flaccus, who ~us- 
pected  this went to Teanum, and ordered all the senators of 
Capua to be put to death, without opening the letters  he had 
received from the senate.  Jubellius Taurea, the bravest of the 
Campanians, whose heroism was acl~nowledgcd  even by the RO- 
mans, killed his wife and children, but hiinseIf awaited his fate at 
the hands of the Romans.  When the gates werc opened, the in- 
habitants suffered everything that can be inflicted by an army 
of enraged soldiers, who were, in truth, no better than demons. 
The town was not destroyed,  but all Cstinpanian citizens wcre 
compelled to quit it.  Most of them went to Etruria;  many also 
were put to death as  guilty,  and  even  though guiltless  were 
deprived of  their property.  Only  freedmen  and slaves  were 
allowed  to remain and inhabit the  place.3  The  town  thus 
received  quite  a different population;  and its whole  territory 
with the houses it contained was confiscated by the Romans." 
The town afterwards gradually filled  again with a new popu- 
lation of Roman citizens and others;  and a Roman prefect was 
sent thither to administer  justice.  Atella  and Acerme,  the 
perioeci of Capua,  experienced the same fate; and from one of 
these  Calnpanian  towns  the whole  population  emigrated  to 
Hannibal. 
The period from 541 to 545 is enlivened by battles in which 
Hannibal on the whole always gained advantages.  Ever since 
the tenth  year of  the war,  he had been  in possession  of  thc 
greater part of Apulia, Samnium, Lucania, and of the whole of 
Bruttiurn;  and  during  the  loth,  11th and  12th years,  the 
latter country was the seat of the war.  Hannibal defeated the 
proconsul  Cn. Fulvius near Herdonia,%nd  from an ambuscade 
he fell upon  the consnls  M. Marcellus  and T. Quinctius Cris- 
pinus.  Marcellus was  slain,  and Crispinus died afterwards in 
consequence  of  his  wound^.^  Hannibal  gained  possession  of 
the towns of Arpi and Salapia, but both were re-conquered  by 
the Romans:  he took Tarcntum  after  a  long  siege  of  three 
years,  the issue of  which was,  for  a time, very doubtful, and 
Livy, xmi.  16.  '  Livy, xxviii. 46.  5 Livy, xx~ii.  1. 
Livy, xxvii.  27; Polybius x.  32. 
during  he displayed  the whole  greatness  of  his mind. 
~11  tile Greek towns in southern  Italy had now joined him; 
but  Tarentum  wlzich  had been  treacherously  surrendered to 
hiln  was  'afterwards  delivered  up to  the  Romans  by  the 
treacllerous governor of  the Bruttian garrison,  whoin  he had 
entrusted with  the command  of  it.  The city was  treated  as 
if it had  been taken by the sword,  and all its treasures wcre 
carried to Rome.  Thenceforth Tareatum was a deserted place, 
until C. Gracchus scnt a cololly to it. 
Let us now turn our attention to Spain.  At the beginning 
of  the war  the Roinans  may have thought  that  the Carthagi- 
nians,  after  the brilliant  successes  of  Hannibal,  would  send 
army upon army from  Spain  to reinforce  hila; and although 
the Romans tl~cmselves  werc in the most difficult circumstances, 
they scnt out an army under the brothers Publius and Cneius 
Scipior,  not  to protect their  own sinall  possessions in Spain, 
but  to  prevent  the  Cartl~aginians  froin  sending new  armies 
into Italy.  They arrived in Spain in the year 535, thc second 
of  the war,  established  themselves  in the neighbourhood  of 
Taragona and thence harassed  the Carthaginians.  After the 
battle of Cannae the Carthaginians wished Hasdrubal to march 
into Italy, but he was prevented by the Scipios.  The Spaniards 
were a strange people:  they always hated thcir rulers, whether 
they were  Carthaginians or Romans;  and they now began to 
side wit11  the Romans, seeing that they werc used only as tools 
by the Carthaginians  to  furnish  numerous  armies  and  tllc 
expenses of  the war,  although at first their  government  had 
bcen truly popular.  The manner in which the war was carried 
on  cannot  be  distinctIy  sccn  in  the  narri~tive  of  Livy.  It 
seems  surprising,  but  cannot  be  doubted,  that  the  Roinalzs 
advanced  into  Andalusia  as  far  as  Cordova  (for  Illiturgis  is 
probably the place of thisname near Cordova, not the  other).  How 
they could venture to penetrate so far, is quite unaccountable, 
This war in Spain  deserves  the less  to be minutely described, 
as, owinv to the great distance of  the scene of war, all accounts  .9 
of it dlffell-d according to Livy, who is here our only guide, 
most widely one from  another, and werc  very far from  bc.ing 
trust~ortlly.~  We  cannot  even  say with certaiiltv how lone- 
J  0  '  Tho name  of  the  duo fulmina  belli  scems to ha~e  been transferred  from 
IIaniilcar Barcrcn  to the Scipios.--~. 
Livy,  zTr. 39,  xxlri. 49.  Compare *uxvii. 7.  (Even the death of Marcellus 
is lelate(1 in three rliffe:ent n-a]-s. -N.)  -See  I,ivy, nl ii. 27. 
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the two Scipios (the duo fulmina  belli, in Lucretius and others) 
carried on  this war.  Livy mentions the eight11  year.  If he 
begins his calculation wit11 the arrival of  the Scipios in Spain, 
this does  not  agree with  the year  in adlich he relates their 
death.  But I agn  very much  inclined  to bclicve  that tll~y 
died in 542, for otherwise  there would be a gap, and Hasdru- 
bal's  expedition from Spain would fall too early. 
The Carthaginians had increased their troops, and formed  a 
considerable  army, which  Hasdrubal  was  to lead into Italy; 
they had  divided  it into three  parts, which,  by skilful  ma- 
nceuvres, separated the two armies  of  the Scipios, and gained 
two  victories  over  them.  In the first,  Publius fell  by the 
faithlessness of the Celtiberians, who served in the Roman army, 
and who allowed themselves to be bribed by the Carthaginians.g 
Thirty days afterwards, Cneius also fell.  The Romans lost by 
these defeats all their possessions west of the Iberus;  bnt, if we 
trust to the account given by Livy, who did not himself really 
believe  it,  the progress  of  the enemy  was  checked  by the 
eques, L. Marcius, who is said to have assembled the surviving 
Romans, and to  have  completely defeated the Carthaginians. 
The senator,  Acilius,  who  described  this victory  in  Greek, 
had said  that  on that occasion the Carthaginians lost 30,000 
men and their whole camp.  Livy himself, however, seems to 
agree rather with Piso, in believing that Marcius only collected 
the surviving  Romans,  and repelled  the attacks of  the Car- 
thaginians upon  the  camp.  The advantage, however, which 
Hasdrubal derived  from his victory, was that it afforded him 
the means  for  his  expedition  into  Italy.  Whether Spain in 
his absence would remain faithful to the Carthaginians or not, 
was  to him  a matter  of  indifference, for  he thought  that  it 
would be easy to re-conquer it after having  gained  possession 
of  Italy.  The Eomans, on the other hand, were  determined 
not to give up Spain.  Their army, with the exception of  the 
remnant at Taraco, was destroyed;  reinforcements were therc- 
fore  sent  under  C.  Claudius  Nero, but  could  cffect nothing, 
Polybius, X. 6; Livy, xxv. 35; Appian, Hispan. 14-16.  Thcse Celtibcrians 
had many of  the peculiarities which  distinguish the barbarous nations  of  early 
times.  Thc same  features are found  among the Vandals and the Goths, who 
were anything  but  faithful.  Faithfulness is not a characteristic of barbarians; 
and thc more civilised men are, the more faithful do they become.  The ancient 
Germans were as faithless as the modern Albanese, who  will  do  anything  for 
money,  Such also was the character of  the Celtiberians, notwithstan(ling their 
great heroism in otl~er  respects. --N.  - 
except  that they maintained a somewhat more extensive dis- 
trict east of tl1c  Iberus, and detained Hasdrubal.  Accordingly, 
as both collsu~~  were engagcd in Italy, it was resolved to send 
a  pro-collsular  army  to  Spain.  The comitia  centuriata  were 
held as for tllc election of consuls.  NO  one, however, presented 
himself to undertake the command until Publius Scipio, the son 
of  Publius  Scipio  who had fallen in Spain, came forward and 
offered to go.  He is said to have warded off a fatal stroke aimed 
at his father in  the battle on the Ticinus ; but if we consider tllat 
hc was not more than twenty-four years old when he went to 
Spainlo, it seems  impossible  that  he  should  havc done what 
is ascribed to hiin as  early as the battle on the Ticinus.  After 
the battle  of  Cannac, he is  said  to have compelled thc noble 
young Romans who, in their despair, wanted  to  quit the city 
and cinigrate to Illacedonia, to swear upon his sword not to go 
away.  As there was no other choicc, he obtained the votes of 
thc pcople, although many objected because he was too young, 
and, in their superstition, considered  it an evil  omen  that  he 
was yct  in mourning for his father.  Scipio was  called  by his 
contemporaries  the  Grcat,  a designation  which  has  unjustly 
fallcn into disuse, for no man in Rolnan history can be preferred 
to him.  His pcrsonal  character was  cmincntly grcat; hc was 
not only a grcat general, but a man of  high education;  and he 
understood  thc  Greelr  language  so  well  that  he wrote  his 
mcmoirs in it.  There  is one point  in his character which has 
led  many to  the belicf  that  he was an impostor:  he was ac- 
customed  to go early in  the morning  into  the sanctuary of 
Jupiter  on the  Capitol, and to rcmain  there alone  for  some 
time, pretending that  hc  had  intcrvicws wit11 the gods.  His 
Pretension to prophetic powers, which, in solnc instances, seemed 
to bc justified by what actually tool< place, gaincd him the con- 
fidcncc of  all.  Sometimes he would say that he had heard a 
voice  promising  him  victory;  sometimes  he rclatcd  to  his 
soldiers, that within thrce days hc would take the enemyYs  camp 
with  its stores; and the event verified his prodiction,  Similar 
things  are  related  of  Mohammed and  Cro~nwcll;  and  solno 
Pc*"ns  believe  that these men were  the .  lnflucnce of a 
sul'ernatural  inspiration,  whilc  others  regard  them  as  mere 
but I think that wc are justified in  that 
'O  Livy,  xxvi.  18;  Alppian, De  Reb.  Hisp.  18.  Eut Polylius,  x.  6.  says 
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there was a mixture of both: the truth is known to God alone. 
Scipio  was very popular, and was  supplied with all that was 
necessary for his great undertaking. 
The  first  period  of  his  stay in Spain,  passed  away  amid 
preparations  at Tarragons,  and probably  lasted  longer than 
is  stated  by  Livy.  The year in which  New  Cartliage  was 
taken is uncertain, as Livyll himself  confesses;  but I believe 
that it was the year 546, for otherwise it would be hadly  con- 
ceivable how the Romans could have taken the town, consider- 
ing that  their possessions  were confined  to the small coast  of 
Valencia, and that there were  threc  Carthaginian  armies  in 
Spain.  Thc cvcnt, however, shews that it was possible.  The 
historians probably thought that it was inglorious for Scipio to 
remain inactive so  long.  Hasdrubal  had  gained the Ccltibc- 
rians as free allics, and among them he levied an army for his 
expedition to Italy.  Besides Hasdrubal, there were in Spain, 
Hasdrubal the son  of  Gisgo, and  Mago the brotllcr  of  Han- 
nibal.  Scipio lcd  his army to Carthago Nova before the Car- 
thaginians  suspectcd it.  Respecting the detail of  the events 
of  this campaign and its duration, it is impossible to arrive  at 
any certain  results.  Carthago Nova was a small  town,  as, in 
fact, most towns in southern France, Italy, and even in Spain, 
were smaller in ancient times than they are now; it was almost 
exclusively a military place;  but during its  short  existence, it 
had become of  great iinportancc, and had  a  numerous Punic 
population.l2  It contained arsenals and ship-wharves, and was 
strongly fortitied with  high walls.  To take such  a place was 
almost  an impossibility, and became  possible  only because it 
had  not  been  expected, the Carthaginians taking no pains to 
relieve  the town.  It was situated on a peninsula, and  Scipio 
must  have  had information  about  its  weak  points.  He first 
made a ~owerful  attack upon  its walls  from the land side, but 
was  repelled  with  great  loss.  On  the northern  side  of  the 
~cninsula  there was a  marshy  district  which, when  the tidc 
came  in, was always  under water, but  did  not bclong  to thc 
harbour.13  The existence of  that district was not unknown to 
Scipio, and after having sent some men with fishing-boats  to 
reconnoitrc, and having heard that it was possible  to ford  the 
xxvii. 7.  12  1'  my, xxvi. 42, fall.;  Polybius, x  11, fall. 
l3 Thc tide does not rise as high here a8 in tho ocean, but  it is nevertheless of 
considel  J~le  importance. -  N. 
district, he rellewed  his  attack from the land side;  and while 
the inhsbit,zllt~ were defending  themselves here, a detachment 
of  the Rolllans  entered the town from the marsh, not far from 
tile low  wall, wllich  was  scaled  with  ladders, and they took 
possession  of  one  of  the  gates ; the town was  thus taken by 
storm.  This was an irreparable loss to the Cartllaginians.  It 
seems  that  Hasdrubal  must  at that  time  have been  in  the 
neigl;llbourhood of the Pyrenees;  but his whole care and atten- 
tioll were directed to his Italian  expedition,  and he ilnagincd 
that the town could defend itself. 
The numbcr of  his forces is not known, for Pol~bius  is here 
wanting14; he did  not  take a  large army  from  Spain,  but 
with an adroitness equal to that of  his father and his  brother, 
he formed connexions of  friendship with the Gauls, by whom 
he incrcascd it.  Livy expressly says that, since the passage of 
IIannibal across the Alps, many Carthaginian messengers had 
followed  the same road  in going to EIannibal  in Apulia, and 
that in this manner they had  become  bettcr acquainted with 
the Gallic  tribes.15  By  an intercourse of twelve years  those 
tribes  had  become convinced  that the passage  through their 
country was only a necessary means for an ulterior object, and 
that it was their interest to grant it on favourable conditions. 
Hasdrubal avoided the fault of  his brother in breaking up too 
late.  In the autumn his preparations were completed; and now 
11e  made a great round-about march.  From a careful cxamin- 
ation of  the statements we  have, it is clear that after a  short 
engagement with Scipio, he marched from the country of  the 
Celtiberians  not  through  Catalonia,  but through Biscay,  by 
way of  the modern  Bayonne  along the northern  side of  the 
Pyrcnecs,  in  order  to  deccive  the Romans,  and  not  to be 
detaincd by thcm.  He  took up his winter quarters in tlic south 
of  Gaul, perhaps in the ncighbourhood  of  the modern  Rous- 
sillon, whence he could  continuc his march in the beginning 
of  spring-  From IAivy's  account we see, that, at this time, the 
Arvernians  had  the  supremacy in Gaul, and that, owing  to 
their  intercession,  I-Iasdrubal  met  with no  resistance  to  his 
progress.  It is  said that he marched  in two months as far as 
his brother had in fivc.16  This, however, must be understood 
of the distance betwecn  the Pyrenees-for  thcre hc had  bcen 
l4  According to Appian  his forces consisted  of  48,000 foot, 8,000 horse, and 
15 elephants.  Livp, xxvii. 39. 
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in winter q~~artcrs-and the Italian foot  of  the Alps, whereas 
his brother had set out from Carthago Nova. 
The Roinans  on  hearing  of  Hasdrubal's  movements  were 
greatly  terrified,  and  madc  cnormous  exertions.  Hannibal 
was,  no doubt,  informed of  cver~thing,  but  did  not  expcct 
his brothcr so early, since I-Iasdrubal had set out on his rnarch 
vcry much sooner than Hannibal had anticipated.  Hannibal, 
in thc course of  years, had   roba ably rcceived  more reinforce- 
mcnts  than  are mentioned  by  Livy;  but his  veterans  had 
ncarly all disappearcd, and  he had only Italicans over whom, 
however, he had perfect control; he was therefore now obliged 
to carry on  the war according  to the ltoman  system.  His 
prcsent object was  by perpetual  marchcs  and countcr-marches 
in Apulia, Lucania  and Bruttium, to draw the Romans from 
one point to another, as if he had been  playing  at chess with 
them : and  in this he perfectly  succeeded.  Had Hasdrubal 
been  like his  brother, he would havc madc no delay; but he 
hoped to be able to gain possession of  Placcntia, which would 
servc him as a safe place of  arms.  It is almost  inconceivable 
how this town, surrounded  as it  was  by Gallic tribes, could 
maintain itself.  In his unsuccessful sicgc of it, IIasdrubal lost a 
great deaI of  time,  and it was  particularly  unfortunate,  that 
thc letters which he sent to his  brothcr fell into the hands of 
the Romans, who were thus  made acquainted with his wholc 
plan.  The Romans kept Hannibal surrounded by three armies, 
none of  which, however, had the courage to offer him  battle; 
their main force was  sent against the Gauls.  Hasdrubal  did 
not intend  to march through Etruria, but along the Adriatic 
towards thc frontiers of  Apulia  where  his  brother was  sta- 
tioned ;  he was opposed by thc commander-in-chicf C. Claudius 
Nero.  M.  Livius Salinator had  been  sent to Rimini with the 
Volones and two legions of  allies, in all  six legions;  but he 
rctreatcd  before  Hasdrubal as far as  Sena Gallica, and would 
have retrcated  as  fi~r  as  the  Aternus  in  Piccnum,  had  not 
Claudius,  venturing  on  an undertaking which  is  one  of  the 
boldcst and most romantic in history, hastened to his colleague 
whom  he met  near  Sena.  Hannibal was certainly not unin- 
formed of  his brother's approach, as is incontrovertibly shown 
by his  march to  Larinum;  but  he was not  in a  position  to 
storm the Roman camp.  Hence Claudius could march to his 
colleague with the flower of  his  troops.  Hasdrubal who had 
been  ready to attack Livius, perceived  by caref~~lly  observing 
the advancing Romans, tl~at  the condition of their horses, arms 
and  clothes, betrayed  a  long  march, that they were different 
frolll  the troops of  Liviua, ancl  that accordingly thc latter had 
received  During  the  night,  Hasdrubal's 
%ttcntion was  excited  by  hearin@  b thc military  music  play 
twice,  md  he  concluded  from  this  circumstance  that  thcre 
must be two consuls, although the Romans had cndeavourcd to 
acccivc  hiIn, and had not extended their camp.  He therefore 
wisiled to rnalie a round-about march :  hithcrto he had cvidently 
followed thc straight road along the Adriatic;  lie had crossed 
the  Metaurus,  and  now  wanted  to recross  it.  and  proceed 
towards its source, to march along the Apennines, and thus to 
evade the Romans, or  to occupy  a dcfensive  position  behind 
the river  Mctaurus;  but  his  guidcs  ran  away,  and  hc was 
unable to iind  thc fords  by which he had  crossed  the rivcr. 
It  is  probable  that  there  had  bccn  hcavy  rains,  since 
otherwise the Metaurus might have been forded  in any place 
without difficulty; for, in ordinary circumstances, the water at 
most reaches up to a man's breast.  While he  was thus marching 
along the banks, and was worn out by fatigue, he was attacked 
by the Romans.  The battle was conducted in a manner worthy 
of  the son of  I-Iamilcar, and of  the brother of  Hannibal;  the 
Iberians  and  Libyans  fought  like  lions:  but  Romc's  star 
demanded  reparation  for  Cannae.  Hasdrubal  fell,  and  the 
greatest  part of  his  army was  cut to pieces,  not  the whole 
army as  Livy  says.  Thosc who escaped,  owed  their  safety 
only to the fact that the Romans were too fatigued to continue 
the pursuit.  According to the account of  Appian (from Poly- 
bius  or  Fabins), a part  of  the Celtiberians  fought  their way 
through to  I-lannibal, ~vlvllich is  vcry credible,  as  it does  not 
contributc  to thc glory of  the Romans,  and is  therefore  not 
likely to have becn  invented  by them.  Thc surviving  Gauls 
returned to their own country.  This undertaking thus turned 
out a complete failure.  The Roman  army quickly  returned, 
and FIannibal had not, in the mean  timc, ventured to under- 
take  mytlling.  Claudius  ordered  the  ]lead  of  the Barcine 
hero to be shown to the outposts of  Hannibal,  and thus the 
first  news  of the defeat was  conveyed  to him.  This  event 
closes thc third period of  the war?7 
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LECTURE LXV. 
AFTER  Hasdrubal had led his forces into Italy, the Carthagi- 
nians  had  still two armies in Spain, one mzder the command 
of  I-Iasdrubal the son  of  Gisgo,  and the other under the com- 
mand of Mago;  but they were driven back as far as the shorcs 
of the Atlantic.  Scipio,  in that and the followiiig year, con- 
tinued tlic war against them; and it soon became evident that 
Hnsdrubal,  the  Bnrcine,  had  been  the  soul  of  all  tlie 
undertakings of  tlze  Carthaginians; for  after a  succession  of 
battles,  Hasdrubal  the son  of  Gisgo  left  Spain  and went to 
Africa.  At Gades, a citypretendiiig to be equal to Carthage, 
tlzough it was subject to her, a treacherous plot was formed  to 
dcliver  up Mago  to the Romans;  but it was  discovercd  and 
frustrated: the magistrates were enticed to come out, and were 
put to death.1  But Mago now received  orders  to withdraw, 
and he accordingly  embarked,  and led tho rcmaindcr  of  his 
forces  to thc Balearian  islands,  which  seem to have  refuscd 
obedience.  He soon afterwards went to  Liguria, endeavour- 
ing to establish  a power there, with which he might  support 
Hannibal, and attack tlie Romans in Etruria;  for this country, 
which had becn  faithful to Boine until then, began  to shcw 
somewhat  of  a  refractory  spirit,  which  alarmed  the Romans 
with fear of a rebellion.  When the nations of Spain perceived 
that they wcre given up by the Carthagiiiians,  and that  they 
were making their last efforts only to extort from  them  the 
means  for  carrying on the war in other quarters, they refused 
obedience, and endeavoured to expel the Carthaginians.  The 
town  of  Gades,  which  was  all  the  more  exasperated  on 
account  of  the  severity  show11  towards  it,  abandoned  the 
cause  of Carthage for ever.  A treaty was concludcd with the 
Romans, which in some accounts is ascribed to an earlier  date 
than the narrative of Livy allotvs us to supposc.  But it is not 
improbable, that  thc  tradition  of  an  earlier  treaty with  the 
Romans may be a politic  forgcry of the Gaditans themselves, 
by  which  thcy  ascribed  to  themselves  the mclit  of  having 
shewn a friendly disposition towards the Romans, even imme- 
diately  after  the arrival  of  Scipio.  The Carthaginians  were 
now completely  driven out of  Spain. 
Livy, xxviii. 37. 
scipio  plnaincd  ill  that  country  during  the  years  545 
alld 546.  But tlle  Romans could  not look upoil their posses- 
sion of  Spaill  as secure; for they offered to the nations which 
llad  calcul,zt~cl  upon  freedom  nothing  but  their  own  domi- 
nion, which Tvas  perhaps  even  more  oppressive  than  that  of 
the  Cnrthnginians, since  the  latter  employed  mercenaries, 
whereas tile  Romans  only  by way  of  exception  took  small 
Celtiberian bands into their service.  The Romans, moreover, 
toolC vengeance  on  some  towns  which  had  violated  their 
alliance  with  Rome,  or  had  treated  them  cruelly.  At  this 
time there occurred soine horrible events, the conscquences  of 
the &naticism of bravery, which at times became a real madness. 
One of these occurrences is the defcnce of Illiturgis and Astapa, 
froin  the latter of  which  towns all  men  capable  of  bearing 
arms made  a  sally,  and fought to the last, while  those  who 
remained  behind  murdered tlze women  and children, and set 
fire to the town, in which they destroycd themselves. 
While Scipio was engaged in regulating the  which 
as yet was confined to Catalonia, Valcncia,  and Andalusia, an 
insurrection  broke  out  among  the  Spaniards."ew  of  the 
Spanish states were republics.  Most of them were governed by 
princes:  two of them, Mandonius  and Indibilis, after  a  long 
conricction with the Romans,  had imbibed  a fearful hatred of 
thein.  Here, too, we see the national character  of  the  Spa- 
niards, such as it has shown itself at all times, liable to sudden 
rage  against  foreigners,  whom  at all  times  they wanted  to 
makc  use  of  only as instruments.  These events are rcmarlc- 
able also in other respects, being the first traces of a sentiment 
which  shows its full developmcnt at a much  later period-I 
mean the tcndcncy of the Italian allies to place themselvcs on 
an equality with the Romans.  The accounts of these  occur- 
rences in our historians are not complete, and evidently do not 
explain the main  point.  Scipio was  severely ill, and it was 
reported that he was  dead.  An army of 8000 men  was  sta- 
tioned  at Sucre, consisting of  Italian  allies,  and not, as Livy 
says,  of  R~mans. These allies  resolved  to make  tliemselves 
masters  of  Spain, and to establish an independent state.  The 
first  Pretext  of  the rebellion  was  the  arrears  of  their  pay, 
which,  although it was derived from their own funds, was yet 
Livy, sxviii 2 1, full.;  Polybius, xi. 25, foll. ;  Applan, De  Reb. Hkpan. 35, 
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want to put an end to the war, in order to be able to multiply 
the nuillber  of  thcir  consuls,  is accordillg  to all appearance, 
nothing but one  of  those  foolish  opinions, by ~vhich  the ma- 
jority  of people are so easily misled.  I have myself heard per- 
sons  expxess  similar  opinions.  When  Louis  XVI. was  exe- 
cuted, I heard very intelligent  men  say, that the elnigrallts 
had prevailed upon the Convention to pronounce the sentence, 
in order to call forth the general indignation of Europe against 
the republic.  Absurd as this  opinion was, we cannot wonder 
that  a siniilar one became current among the Romans.  Scipio 
was  the idol of the peoplc, but was  opposed  by the nobles  of 
both orders,  whose  rallying point  was  old Fabius.7  It was  a 
party like that which, according to Livy, existed  at Carthage 
against  Hannibal;  but  we  must  not  be  unfair  towards  it. 
Fabius was then, probably, about eighty years old, and was at 
the head of the aristocracy for several reasons; perhaps because 
like every  old man who sees his glory fading, he was inclined 
to look upon rising young men with unfavourable eyes.  Scipio, 
himself, also may  have  appeared  to  the Romans as an incon- 
ceivable character, just  because  he was an extraordinary man; 
and many may have feared  lest  his  success rnight  make hirn 
rash and hazardous like Regulus, while others thought that he 
might be led to overturn the constitution.  We may easily see 
that  this suspicion  was  quite  unfounded,  so  far  as  Scipio's 
personal  character  was  concerned;  but  there  is  a  passing 
remarkR that it was intended to make him  consul and censor 
for life.  If this had  been  done,  he would  have  been  king, 
although it could  not  have been  done  peaceably  under  the 
circumstances ofthe time; but it shews that that mistrust was not 
without foundation.  Hence the senate which had to detcrmine 
the amount of troops and supplies, formed a decidcd opposition : 
Scipio  endeavoured  to  obtain  Africa  for  his  province;  but 
they gtlvc him  Sicily  without  any  other  troops  than  those 
stationed in  the island.  They  thus refused  him  the means 
of  trmsfcrring the  war  to Africa; but  the more  the  senate 
opposccl  him,  tlie  ]nore  vehemently  did public  opinion,  not 
only in Rome but in all Italy, cxpress itself in favour of Scipio. 
He was told that, with the forces in Sicily, he might go over 
to  Africa,  if  he  thought  it  useful  to  the  republic.Q  But 
7  Livy, xxviii. 40, foll. 
"i~y,  xxxviii. 56; Valer. Max. iv. 1. $ 6; hut according  to both passages it 
was intended to make him consul and dcctatol  fur Ife.  9 Livy, XXTIII. 45. 
notllil,g  at all  be  done  on  such a  condition; and he 
demanded permission to increase his forccs at least by enlisting 
who wo~~ld  be no burden  to the senate.  When 
praise the pcrscverance  of  tlie  Roman senate during 
illis war, its conduct towards Scipio,  which llobody can think 
very  ought not to be kept out of sight.  The senate 
in this instance behaved in the same manner towards Scipio, as 
the scllate of Carthage acted towards Hannibal.  We  can well 
understand,  that  the irritation produced  by the nobles must 
have been  the  more  provoking,  in proportion  to the cnthu- 
siasm which the other party shewed for Scipio.  These disputes 
brought Rome ncarly to the point of  losing all the advantages 
which it had gained. 
We now see  Scipio's  personal  influence.  Italy was  visited 
by famine  and  epidemic  diseases;  and  Rome  herself  was  so 
much worn out, that the voluntary excrtions which were made 
on  hcr  behalf  must  excite  our  admiration.  The towns  of 
Etruria and Umbria made  extraordinary efforts;  although, in 
point of duty, they were bound to little or nothing at all; they 
had suffered less than Rome,  which was quite exhausted,  and 
the Romans had strictly kept to the letter of their treaties with 
those countries.  They now exerted themselves, as if they had 
had  to  carry  on  a  war  for  their  own  safety.  A  part of 
the  Umbrians  built  a  fleet;  Arretium gave  Scipio arms for 
30,000 men,  and also money and provisions;  great numbers 
of  men  who  had  already  served  their  time,  as  well  as  of 
young  men,  came  from  the  Sabines,  Marsians,  Picentians, 
and other tribes, and offered to scrve as volunteers in the army 
of Scipio.  Thus a  great  arlny and a fleet were soon  ready to 
follow him to Sicily,  contrary to the expectations  and wishes 
of the senate.  EIe went to Sicily, and thence made an expe- 
dition against Locri,  which town he took from I-Iannibal.  On 
the whole,  however,  the year  passed  away without  any im- 
portant  event, either  because  the  Roman  general  forgot his 
duties under the beautiful  Grecian  sky of  Sicily,  and in his 
intercourse  with the enlightened  Greeks  at Syracuse, or  be- 
cause  he was  occupicd  with  preparations.  It is not  quite 
what kept him  SO long in Sicily.  The expectations en- 
tertained of him were disappointed in the highest degree; it had 
been believed that he would cross over to Africa as soon as he 
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lived  quite  like a  Greek  at  Syracuse.  Commissioners  were 
therefore sent  over  to inquire into the state of  affairs, and to 
depose  him  if  the  charges  should  be well  founded; but  he 
made such ail iinprcssion upon the coinmissiollcrs that in their 
report they stated, that he was by no means wasting his time, 
but was engaged in completing his preparatioas. 
Hannibal had foreseen the issue of the war irn~nediatel~  after 
the  battle of Sena ;  but lie did not lose his courage, thinking it  his 
duty to make the Roinal~s  insecure in tlieir own coulltry as lollg 
as possible.  Gut he could not defend the extensive territory of 
southern  Italy,  and accorclingly evacuated  Apulia,  Mcssapia, 
the country of the Hirpinians, and the greater part of Lucania, 
so that he was confined  to its south-eastern part,  and to Brut- 
tium.  There he  remained  during  three  campaigns  with  a 
perseverance which Livy himself  could not help admiring: in 
that confinement  he resembled  a  lion  surrounded by hounds, 
and whoever  attacked him  there  paid  dearly for it.  Hc was 
obliged to recruit and provide  for his army,  and at the same 
time  to  detain the Romans  so  as  to prcvent  thcm  going  to 
Africa,  while he himself  lived  among  nations  whom  he rc- 
duced to despair by the most  enormous  demands  upon them. 
Yet he succeeded in all this without  exciting even a thought 
of  insurrection or  violence  against him, notwithstanding  his 
inability to pay or  fecd his  army,  which  was  suffering from 
famine and diseases.  Croton was his head  quarters and place 
of  arms.  In this way the war was continued,  until the Car- 
thaginians rccalled him  to Africa.  The Roinaiis wcrc conti- 
nually limiting  his  territory more and more,  by taking  onc 
place after another. 
In thc year after his consulsliip,  548, his inlpcriun~  having 
been  prolonged,  Scipio, as proconsul, hacl assembled a consider- 
able fleet, and sailcd to Africa in 400 transports, escorted by 40 
quinqucremes.  Had the Carthaginians had their ships of war 
together, they  ought  to  have  frustrated  Scipio's  expedition; 
but this does  not seem to have bcen  the case,  for  otherwise 
their inactivity would be  unaccountable.  Thc ancients tliem- 
selves did not know how many troops  Scipio took with him: 
but we may suppose that he had about 16,000 foot and scvcral 
thousand horse.  The timid party at Rome trembled,  as they 
imagined that the last  rcsources of  the state were now going 
to be lost.  In three days Scipio reached Africa, and landed in 
the neighbourll~~d  of Utica,  at a head-land near the mouth of 
t,lle  river Bagradas,  like  nearly  all the rivers flowing 
illto  tile  Mediterranean,  has  pushed  its  mouth  forward,  the 
anciellt  one having been  blocked  UP  by sand.  Sliaw, in his 
'6  Travels," has describccl tlic point very accurately;  it bore the 
of  Castra Corllelia10 as long as the Roman empire existed, 
and  may  be  recognised  to  this day.  It was  a  barren head- 
land, a sloping beach of gravel on to which the ships had to be 
drawn.  Igere Scipio encamped and fortified  himself,  making 
excursions in the nciglib~urhood.~' Syphax had, in the mcan- 
wllilc, becll  entirely pined ovcr by the Cartliaginians, having 
iilarricd Sopllonis (in Hebrew, Zephanja), or accorcliilg to Livy 
Sophoiiisbc, tllc daughter of  EEasdrubal,  Gisgo's son.  Scipio 
was 1nct by  three armies,  one Carthaginian ulider I-Iasdrubnl, 
and two Nuinidinn ones under the command of Syphax and Mu- 
sinissa.  Masinissa, altl~ough  a  bsrbprian, has a  great fanlc ill 
history;  hc was hcrcditary king or the Massyliaiis, a people on 
the fiontiers  of moclcrn Tunis,  at the foot  of  the mountains; 
he stood to Carthagc in the relation of a vassal, and had scrved 
her  in  Spain,  where  he  had  forined  connections  with  the 
Romans,  to whonz  lie  was  very  favourably  known,  as  con- 
nected with Scipio by tics of hospitality, as wc see from Cicero's 
Somnium Sc&ionis, where he appears as a venerable  old man. 
At Carthagc he had received an education  superior  to that of 
other barbarians1" and in his later ycars, he must evidently have 
bcen conversant with the Greek or Latin language.  His lii;:  was 
marked by grcat changes  of  ibrtune.13  Thc African  princes 
were thoroughly faithless ;  and his fidelity towards tlic nomans, 
which was  much praised,  arose  solely from thc circumstance, 
that  it was  his  ol~jcct  to  cnricli  himself  at t21c  cml?cnse  of 
Cartl~a~c,  and that he was supported in this by thc ltolxans. 
According  to the acco~~nts  of  the Romalls he was faithlessly 
treated  by the  Carthaginians;  but however  this inay be,  this 
lnuch is certain, that while  he scrved under the Carthaginians 
in Sp~~in,  he had always  kept UII  secrct negotiations witll tile 
Ron1alls.  His son, who stoocl in different relations to Itolne, 
collducted himself', during the third  Punic war, in a manner 
which  was injurious to the Romans,  The rol-nance that nfasi- 
nit.sa was in love with Sophonis, and that she was nevertheless 
'"wsnr,  De  Bell. Cis~l.  ii.  24;  Oroduz, iv. 22.  Livy, xxix. 28. 
l2 A~JIJ~J~,  De  lleb. PUIZ.  10.  Li~y,  xxix. 29, foll. 
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given in marriagc to Syphax, was  roba ably invented to excuse 
his faitlllessness to Carthage.  It seems that when he was  in 
Spain  he received  money from thc Romans,  for  he returned 
to Africa and revolted from Carthage.  At the time of Scipio's 
arrival in Africa, we find him again as the ally of the Cartha- 
ginians, and operating, together with  Hasdmbal, apirlst the 
liomans.  Scipio,  however,  renewed  his  former  connexiolls 
with him, and BIasinissa promised to desert the Carthaginians, 
but that, before taking that step openly, he would procure thc 
Romans soinc  material  advantages.  This fraudulent conduct 
sllcws that, in a moral point  of  view, 3lasinissa was no bettcr 
than a common barbarian:  he was a basc traitor, who deserves 
the hatred of every honcst man.  Nis wliole life was an unin- 
terrupted  series  of  treacheries  against  Cartilage.  It was  he 
who now led out the Carthaginians to an expedition which he 
had planned with  Scipio?~cipio  lay in ambush, fell  upon 
the Carthaginians, and Massinissa went over  to the Romans.15 
This was  a  serious  loss for  Carthage, for  a great number  of 
Carthaginian  citizens were  slain.  The Carthaginian  general, 
who was taken prisoncr, was exchanged for Masinissa's mother. 
Syphax, in the meantime, presumed to come forward as media- 
tor betwcen  the Carthaginians and Eomans, which  of course 
led to nothing, as he proposecl that every thing sllould remain 
in statu quo,  and that Scipio and Hannibal were to withdraw 
from  Italy and  Africa.  But the attclnpt  was  nevertl~cless 
useful  to Scipio, who thereby obtained time to establish him- 
self in Africa. 
After  this  Scipio  blockaded  Utica,  but  without  success. 
Syphsx and Hasdr~~bal  took thc field  against him:  it is un- 
known whether their camps werc open or fortified, though the 
former is more probable.  They consisted  of  straw-huts and 
tents built  of  branches,  which in the climate of Africa  must 
havc become as dry as touchwood.16  Scipio sndclcnly attacked 
them by night, and showed the wretchedness of  their military 
discipline.  He succeeded in penetrating into the camps, which 
fvcre  set  on  fire; and the conflagration  produccd  such  con- 
fusion, that the fugitives allowed themselves to be slanghtered 
like sheep.  The two armies dispersed, and Syphax now aban- 
doning the Carthaginians,  withdrew to his  own  dominions: 
14  Appian, De  Reb. Pun. 13  and 14.  l5  Liuy, six.  34. 
l%i\  y, xxx. 3; Poljbins, xiv. 4, 
sucll  is the general  custom in the east, where all desert hiin 
wllo  is deserted by fort~~nc.  Bfasinissa now came forth with 
clili121s to the tllroae of  Syp1lax,  and many Afrlcans declared 
tllcIllsclves  in his  favour.  Blasinissa  even  made  a  campaign 
against lliln, and Laelius completed the undertal~ing  : Syphax 
lvas  defecated  and taken  prisoner.  Jfasinissa  followed  up his 
victory, and took posscssion of the capital of Cirta, afterwards 
alld still called Constantina.  Every one knows the tragic fate 
of Sophonis17: Masinissa fonnd her at Cirta, and im~llediately 
inarricd her, without asking the consent of the Romaas.  But 
Scipio demanded that she, as a Carthaginian and an encmy of 
the Romans,  slzould be givcn up; but Masinissa, to save her 
froin  such a  f'dte,  sent her  poison,  and she nladc away with 
hersclf.  A part of the dominions of  Syphax was given to his 
son1*; hc hiinsclf was  sent to Italy and adorned the triumph 
of Scipio; he died at an advanced age at Alba, in the country 
of the Marsians.19 
Carthagc was in the grcatcst  difficulties.  The people were 
convinced that their forces wcre insufficient:  they were indeed 
successful in an attempt upon thc Roman ships; but that was 
their only successful undertaking during the three years of the 
war in Africa.  I-Iannibal and Hanno received orders to come 
to Africa.  The report  of this was no doubt agreeable to the 
Romans;  but as it was uncertain whether it would be possible 
to transport  the armies,  the Carthaginians at the same time 
commenced negotiations for peace with Scipio.  Here we see 
what injury the annual change of the magistrates might have 
clone to thc Roman republic.  Scipio, who hacl now been pro- 
consul for  thrcc years,  may have thought, and  with justicc, 
that  if  hc should  be  obliged  to resign  his  com~nancl  to thc 
consul of  the year following, Ti. Claudius Ncro,  llis  successor 
would rcap tllc fruits of his labours-that  this did not actually 
happen  is surprising enough-and  he therefore endeavoured 
to accelerate the  end of  the war.  The conditions  he 
1"'"1?05ed  to  the  Carthaginians  wcre  hard  iildecd,  but  yet 
tolerable  in comparison with  what were  inlposcd afterwards, 
-Iilr tile issue of  the war with I-Iannibal was still very uncertain. 
" I~ivy,  xuu. 12 ad  15; Appian,  De Reb. Pun.  27, foll.;  Dlodor. Frccgnl. 
111).  xuvii. 
IS  Aplmn, 1. c. 33; Lily, xxx. 44. 
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He recognised  the independence of  Carthage, but demanded 
that the Carthaginians should  confine  themselves within  the 
Punic canal",  surrender all their  ships with  the exception  of 
thirty, probably  triremes, give up Spain,  as  they had befolc 
@ven  up Sicily and  Sardinia, and deliver  up all Roman ~ri- 
soners  and  deserters.  Respecting the sums of  money which 
were demanded of  the Carthaginians to defray the expenses of 
the war, the accounts, as Livy saysz1, differed greatly: the fact, 
that  late Greclr authors give us exactnumbers-appian  mentions 
1500 talents-proves  nothing, for they are talccn from the dif- 
ferent  statements,  between  which  Livy does  not  venture  to 
decidc.  A great  quantity of  corn  also  is  mentioned.  The 
iuling party at Carthage were determined to conclude peace on 
these terms; but the restless and mutinous population opposcd 
the pcace  unconditionally  and furiously,  tl~ough  they them- 
selves were unwilling to shed their blood.  They were in des- 
pair,  declaring it a  disgrace that after so  long and glorious a 
struggle they should admit themselves conquered, especially as 
Hannibal, the idol of  the people, was still in Italy.  The go- 
vernment,  however,  succeeded  in getting a  truce concluded, 
during which ambassadors were sent with full powers to Rome, 
to obtain  thc sanction  of  the senate and pcople  to the peace. 
There  the  peace  was  accepted  on  condition  that  Hannibal 
should quit Italy.  Whcn  the  ambassadors returned, and the 
Carthaginians at the same  time heard  that Hannibal was  re- 
turning with forces  sufficicnt  again  to take  the ficld  against 
Scipio, those people who had done least before, were now vexcd 
that steps had been talccn to conclude a peace.  Such people 
generally appear  in history in a  false light:  in this instance 
they were contemptible, if compared with the noble  spirit of 
Hannibal.  He recommended the peace, but the riotous  and 
turbulent popular party at Carthage raved and stormed against 
it, trusting that the gods would come to their assistance.  These 
were thc  sentiments  of the majority.  The peace  had becn 
agreed to on both sides, but it had not yet been confirmed by 
oath.  In the  mcanwhilc  there arrived a  large convoy with 
provisions  for  Scipio,  but while  trying  to land its cargo, it 
was  scattered  by  a  storm,  and as  Carthage  had long  been 
suffering  from  famine,  the restless  party  insisted  on taking 
20  Appian,  Ue Reb. Pun. 32.  This  canal is  anfortullately unknown.-N. 
2'  xxx.  16. 
possession of  it by  force.  They  embarked  in a tumultuous 
manner, and captured the Roman ships which had cast anchor 
ill full  on the truce. When Scipio sent ambassadors  to 
lclnonstrate against such proceedings, they were insulted,  and 
the  Carthaginian  magistrates  had  grcat  difficulty  in getting 
them on board their ships in safety.  But even here they wcre 
uursucd and attacked, and some of thcm lost their lives.  This 
was a violation of  thc law of  nations similar to thc murder  ot 
the French  ambassadors  at Rastadt in 1799, when  many Per- 
sons believed that the government  had given secret  orders to 
murder them.  But this was a mere  colljecturc and can never 
be proved.  All llopcs of peace had now vdnislled, and the car- 
thaginian ambassadors rcccived ordcrs to quit Rome. 
~~g~,  after  leaving  Spain, had landed at Gcnoa, which  he 
tool<,  2nd had tried to change Liguria into a Carthaginian pro- 
vincc,  just as the Romans in  Spain had  extended their sway 
from a  singlc  place.  Gut his  progress in tllc Apennines  and 
Alps among the many small but obstinate nativc tribes was in- 
significant.  He received, indeed, re-inforccmcnts  and money, 
but his resources at Grst were vcry small, though he continued 
to  obligc the Romans to make  cfforts against  him.  On one 
occasion llc dcfeatcd them in the country of  the Insubrians, so 
that if  hc had  not  becn  re-called,  hc would  certainly have 
placed them in grcat difficulties.  Hc now embarked, but died 
of  thc wounds  which  he had  receivcd  in that  engagement. 
EI'~nniba1,  who llacl bcen  strictly ordcrcd to rcturn, had in the 
mcantiinc sarcly landed at Adrumctum, and had brought with 
him from  Bruttiurn all who  could be  induced  to follow him: 
hc lcft thc country almost  uninhabited.  All thc Italican and 
Roman  deserters who wcre willing  to  scrvc  under  him wcre 
cnlistcd as soldicrs-and  they were men whom he could trust, 
for a peace with the Romans would havc bccn death to them, 
--and.  it is not  improbable  that they had some  influence  in 
the breaking-off  of  the negotiations with the Romans.  It is 
inconceivable why the  Romans  did not  exert all their powers 
to destroy his fleet.  His army consisted of about 40,000 men. 
SciPio was really inclined to make peace; for against  Carthage 
itself the hmans could undertake  nothing, and Scipio had as 
Yet conquered none of the other fortified towns, though he had 
made hi1nsclf master  of  several  open  places,  but the  Cartha- 
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LECTURE LXVI. 
THE  war was brought to a close in Afiica, according to Cato 
in the year  550, according to Varro 553.  Whcn  IIannibal 
saw the true state of  affairs,  he endeavoured  to continue the 
negotiations  for  peace;  for  hc  foresaw  the  impossibility  of 
carrying on  the war successfully; and he was convinced  that, 
if the last battle should  be  lost, the Carthaginians would  Le 
obliged to accept a peace which would render it impossible for 
them ever to recover.  Peace, thereforc, appeared desirable to 
him as well as to Scipio, who had every reason for fearing lest 
his adversaries  at Rome sliould take the coinmand from him, 
and appoint a  successor.  The terms which Hannibal offered, 
were  not  satisfactory  to  the  Romans,  as  he demanded  for 
Carthagc the sovereignty of  Africa, and merely ccdcd  to thc 
Romans all thc countries conquered  by them; but declincd to 
yield  any thing else.  Scipio  demanded  nothiiig  more than 
thc conditions agreed to bcfore, and a trifling indemnification 
for  the  injury  done  to the convoy.  But  tlzc  ncgotiations 
wcre broken off through the folly of  the people of  Carthage ; 
for  as  thcir  invincible  general  was within  thcir  walls,  they 
believed, what  he himself  neithcr could nor did believe, that 
everything  was  gained;  and  they  wouId  hear  no  more  of 
peace. 
These events  led  to the dccisivc  battle  of  Zama  in 550. 
IIere too,  Hannibal,  as  is attestcd  by  Polybius,  sl~owcd  the 
qualities  of  a  grcat gencml:  he drew up his  army in tlirec 
divisions ; thc forcmost  consisted  of  a  mixturc  of  foreign 
mercenarics  from  thc  most  heterogeneous  nations ; bchind 
thcse wcrc clrawn  up thc Carthaginian  citizens, who took up 
arms only in cascs of  extrcinc necessity, but were forced to be 
brave  by tlicir  actual circumstnnccs;  bchind  these  were the 
Italicans whom  he had  brought with  him, and who formed a 
considerable corps of  rcservc.  Eighty elephants were stationed 
bcfore the front line, and the cavalry on the wings.  This was 
the only battle in which hc made use of the elephants; but they 
had  ccnscd  to  bc  formidable  to  the Romans.  The lattcr 
wcre  drawn  up in  their usual  order,  hastati,  principcs  and 
triarii; but Scipio, illstead of forming his cohorts into maniplcs, 
arranged  tllelll  in  lchclons  or  col~imns, side  by  side1;  iu 
tile large intervals left between the col~~lniis,  as well as in front 
of  the lints, hc placed thc light-armcd troops, that they might 
the elcl$lants with thcir missiles, if they should approach, 
and with tlleir javelilIs, if  they should penetrate into the ope11 
spaces.  TIlc Roman and Numiclian  horsc were placed on the 
wings.  TIlc issue of  the engagement S~OWS  that illis caydry, 
was now, at lcnst in quality, superior to that of the Catliaginialls, 
as the latter was soon  routcd.  The plan as to the elephants 
was partially successful; as most of  them, when frightened by 
thc light troops  of  the  Romans,  escaped  through  the opcn 
spaccs,  though some threw themselves  sideways  upon  those 
who  attac1;cd  thcln  with  thcir  javelins.  Thc contest  thcn 
bcgan bctwecn thc hastati and the Carthaginian mcrcenarics, 
who,  after  a  bravc  fight,  retired  upon  the  Carthaginian 
phalanx stn.ncling in their rear, but were driven back by them 
agrainst tllc  Romans,  so that they wcre cut to pieces bctmccn 
the two.  The hastati,  howevcr, were  thrown  back  by the 
Carthaginians;  Scipio  allowed  them to rctrcat,  and dircctcd 
the principcs and triarii to movc obliquely towards thc wings, 
60 as to attack thc flanlrs of  thc Cartha~iniaiis. This pIan was 
pcrfectly successful :  the ltalicans alonc fought with thc couragc 
of  despair,  but thc wholc  of  the Carthaginian  cavalry was 
rontcd, and the Bomans threw thcmsclves upon the rear of tllc 
Cartliaginians; wlicrc~~on  the flight  bccamc so general, that 
thc army was allnost complctely annihilated.  Hannibal hinisclf 
escaped with a small numbcr to Adrumctum. 
Aftcr this battle was lost, the only  thought which occupied 
the  minds  of  the Carthaginians was  to  rnalrc  peace.  Tllc 
great  IInnnibal  himself;  chicfly  conducted  the negotiations. 
It was, however, a  picce  of  great  good  luck for the Cartha- 
ginians, that scipio himself, for reasons which I have already 
lnentioncd,  was  desirous  to bring  the war  to a close.  Thc 
tcrlns,  howcvcr,  which  he  now  offcrcd,  were  much  harder 
than  those  which  had  proposcd  bcfore.  \Vhilc  the first 
treaty allowed them to have thirty triremes, their number  was 
now reduced  to ten; they wcre to keep no elephants for  pur- 
POSCS  of war, and those which they had wcrc to bc surrcndercd; 
10,000 Eubocan talents were to be paid  by instalments in the 
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course of  fifty  years,  that  is  200  every  year;  150 hostages 
wcrc to be given and to be chosen  by the Romans themselves 
(this was  a  hard case, considering  how  badly  hostages  were 
treated by the ancients), and all prisoners and deserters were 
to  be  delivered  up  to  the  Romans.  Carthnge,  however, 
rctained her independence;  the towns and countries which  she 
had possessed  in Africa before the war were to remain subjcct 
to her, but it was vexatiously demanded that Carthage should 
~rove  what slic had possessed.  Among the deserters werc the 
unhappy Italicans, especially Bruttians, who had fought in the 
army of  Hannibal.  Whethcr all were put to death, or sold as 
slaves, is unknown, for Livy passes over this part of the treaty, 
wllich is mciitioncd  by Appian"  and must consequently have 
been spokcn of  by Polybius.  The Cartllaginians were furthcr 
obliged to recognise Masinissa as king of  Numidia, within the 
limits iixed by the Romans, and to conclude a passive offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Romans,  who  thus  shooli 
off  all  obligations  on  their  own  part.  The Carthaginians 
pledged themselves to undertake no war in Africa, without thc 
sanction  of  the Romans,  out of  Africa no war at all,  nor  to 
enlist  mercenaries in any part of  Europc,  and to provide the 
lZoman army then in Africa with all that was necessary for thc 
space of  six months.  Some  of  thc foolish people at Carthage 
spoke  against these  tcrms;  and  it was  on this  occasion that 
Hannibal  seized one Gisgo,  and dragged  him down from the 
elevated place where he stood, midst thc cries of the multitude 
that  their rights as  citizens werc  violated.  Hannibal  savcd 
himsclf  only by declaring that,  having  left  Carthage  at the 
age of nine ycars, and having spent thirty-six years abroad 11c 
was not acquaintcd with its  manners and  custom^.^  He then 
urged the absolute necessity of concluding peace,  of which, in 
fact,  every  sensiblc  man  must  have  been  convinced.  The 
intelligent among  the Carthagininns  saw that the peace was 
unavoiclable,  and that matters would nevcr have come to this 
had they supported Hannibal at the right time. 
After the pcacc was concluded and sanctioned at Rome, the 
Roman army returned to Italy.  All the armed ships  of  the 
Carthaginians  werc taken  down into the sea  and set  on  firc. 
Thus ended  the sccond  Punic war which had  lasted  sixtecn 
De  Rebus Pun. 54.  compare Livy, sxx. 37; Polybius, xv.  18. 
Livy, xxx. 37; Polybiu~.  xv.  19. 
vears; the rivalry  of  Carthage was  gone,  and  Rome  made 
J 
ilnmcnse booty. 
It was undoubtedly the first object of attention to the Romans 
to heal the wounds which had been inflicted upon the Italicans. 
Alnny of the inhabitants of southcrn Italy were punished; their 
lands werc confiscated,  and no  small aumbcr of colonies were 
foundcil in those districts,  perhaps ratlicr  with thc intention 
of providing for impoverished Romans, than to secure the pos- 
session of  the country.  The vetcrans who had served in the 
army of  Scipio,  received settlel~lents  in Apulia and Lucania4: 
this is the first instance of  provision  being made for veterans; 
if we had the sccond decad of  Livy, we should perhaps know 
earlier  instances,  but they  would  certainly  be  only  isolatcd 
011es. 
Much  might  bc  said  respecting  thc consequences  of  this 
war,  although  little  is  mentioned  in  our  historitins.  The 
priccs of everything had riscn to an unnatural height, and the 
middle classcs  must havc been  exhausted  by thc constant and 
heavy  contributions  which  thcy  had  been  obliged  to  pay. 
And the rcsult  of  this must  have been,  that the se~aratiorl 
between  thc rich and the poor bccamc  more marlicd than it 
had ever bccn beforc.  Wot long aftcrwards, indecd,  thcre appears 
a state of things completely at variance with the spirit of  the 
earlier Romans. 
Scipio was thc first Roman who received the honourable title 
of the Great, as Sigonius has shewn"  in the Fasti this is ovcr- 
loolicd,  but  PolylsiusG  cxpressly calls  him 6 pQyap.  It is  an 
intcrcsting fact,  that towards the cad of  the war  the Romans 
raised a public loan which was  to be paid back  by thrcc in- 
stalments;7  but thc difficulties  during  the  Maccdonian  war 
were so great, that thc last payment could not bc made in any 
othcr way than by grants of  land.  Livy has vcry much ncg- 
lected  the internal condition  of  Rome,  but we cannot entcr 
upon it here.  Conccming the statc of intcllect and literature 
I shall speak hereafter,  when  I havc reachcd  the end of  the 
war with Antiochus. 
Ilnmediatcly after the battle of Cannae, Philip 111. of Mace- 
donia had sent ambassadors to Hannibal,  and had concluded a 
Llvy, xxxi. 4, whose words, however, arc: Decreverunt Patrcs, nt M. Junius, 
praetor urbis,  si ei ndcretur, decemviros agro  S,,mnct~  Appulopue,  quod  eius 
p~~blicum  populi Rornani esset, meticndo dividcndocyue crenrct. 
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treaty  with  him,  the document  contailling  which  fell,  by 
chance,  into the hands of  the RolnansR; there  was,  indeed, 
no  reason  for  keeping  it  secret,  as  it  could  not  have  re- 
mained concealed,  at least not for any lcngth of  time.  This 
treaty,  as preserved  in  Polybius, is  certainly genuine; for  it 
is  written  in a quite peculiar  form,  which  is  not Greek,  but 
is undoubtedly  an exainple  of  the style in which the Cartha- 
ginians drc-cv up such documcats.  Neither  of  the coiztracting 
parties  had undertaken any important obligntions towards  the 
othcr.  As regards the advantages granted to Pllilip, Hannibal 
promised  him that, in  case  of  his being victorious, he would 
compel  the Eomans  to  give up their possessions east of  the 
Adriatic:  that is, Corcyra,  Apollonia,  Epidamnus, the colony 
of Pharos, the Atintunians, a ~cople  of Epirus, the Parthinians, 
an  Illyrian  tribc,  and  the Illyrian  town  of  Dimalns;  all  of 
which  were  to be  given  to Philip, who conceded  that Italy 
should  be  under  the  suprcmacy  of  Carthagc.  Had  Philip 
then bcen  what  he was at a  maturer age, the alliance might 
have become dangerous  to  the Romans.  But the latter dis- 
played  all  the heroism  and pcrscvcrancc which distinguished 
them during this whole period, ancl  sent out a fleet under thc 
cominand of the praetor  M. Valerius Laevinus, to protect Illy- 
riuin and to create in  Greece  a  party  against  Philip.9  The 
war began in the ycar 537 or 538-as  Laevinus was  not con- 
sul, the cxact ycar cannot be  ascertained,-and cnded in 545. 
On thc part of the  Itomans it was badly conductcd, but no less 
so on that of Philip, although he had  to makc but sinall excr- 
tions against a few places to expel thc Romans, and he might 
easily have made himself master of  all  the districts inentiolled 
in the treaty;  in  short,  he conductccl  tllc war  in a  manner 
which might malre us inclined to consider  his powcr very dif- 
ferent from what it afterwards actually proved to be.  Had he 
given  to  IIannibal  only  10,000  Iilaceclonian auxiliaries,  hc 
might havc inflicted a sevcre blow upon Roune; but he was too 
vain. 
At the time wben tb  war broke  out, Philip was 
not more  than twenty  or twenty-one years  old.  When  his 
fat:nther  Demctrius IT.  dicd,  he  was  left  a  chili:  uncler 
guardianship of  an uncle, or rather an cldcr cousin, Antigonus 
Epitropus,  who  had  the  nickname  of  Doson.  This  nlan 
"i~  y, xxiii. 33, feu. ; I'olybius,  vii. 9.  Lipy, xxiv. 40; Justin, xxix.  4. 
sllewed  a conscientiousll~ss  which, considering the character of 
those tilneP, excites  our  astonishinent,-for  he was faithful, 
and as  anxious  about the educatioll of  his  ward as  about his 
rigllts;  as Philip at first  appears not  only as a young man 
of  grpmt ncco~nplisi~ments,  but  of  an amiable  disposition,  we 
lnust  infer  that his  guardian  bestowed  equal  care  upon  the 
forlnntion of  his  character,  as  upon  the  dcvclopmcnt  of  his 
But  tllere  was  something  vicious  in  the  nature  of 
Pllilip, which led Ilim soon to rid himself of the wiltchful  eye 
of Antigollus and to spend his time, like  an eastern youth,  in 
vo~ul~tuousncss.  Yet he possessed high abilities; he had decided 
talents as a, military  commander, great courane  .D '.  and the power 
of using  and increasing  the resources  of his kingdom, which 
became  inore  particularly  manifest  after his  peace  with tllc 
Romans.  After having lost a part of his don~inions,  he availed 
hilnsclf  so  prudently  of  his  circumstanccs, as  to make  the 
Romans  themselves  contribute to  increase his power.  Hence, 
he left to his son thc liingdom in a more prosperous condition 
than  it  was  in  when  he succeeded  to  the throne;  for  the 
Maccclonian  cmpirc had  fallen  into  decay  under  Antigonus 
Gonatas.  The Actolians had  risen,  and  the  Achaeans had 
emancipated tl~cmselves.  Under his successor,  Demetrius,  the 
cmpirc had been still inore  reduced; and from this state it did 
not rccovcr till the last years of the guardianship of Antigonus 
Doson, whose  efforts  were  aided  by the  high treason  of  old 
Aratus, who, disgracing  his  glorious  life,  had  sacrificed the 
frccdom of  his country, and, from personal and national vanity, 
hacl  given  up Corinth  rather than  establish  the  freedom  of 
Greece by a union among the I'eloponnesians, which would have 
sccurcd to Clcomcnes the influcnce ancl  power he dcservcd, and 
without which the Lacedacmonians could not join the Achaean 
Icague.  I11  the beginning of his reign, Philip, in conjunction 
wit11  the Achaeans, carried on a war against the Aetolians, in 
which the latter lost a considerable  part of  their importance: 
some of their fortified places in Thessaly fell into the hands of the 
Cncmy, and the respect  which they had until then enjoyed  in 
~r~ecc  began to sink.  They were obligcd to conclude a disad- 
vantageous peace; but retained their independence.  At  the time 
when Philip entered into the alliance with Hannibal, Greece was 
in the enjoyment of lxace.  Tl~essal~,  with the exception of the 
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Corinth, Heraea, and Bliphera, were in favour of  Macedonia, 
and had Macedonian garrisons.  The Achaeans, nominally free 
and allied with AIacedonia, wcre in reality in a state of depen- 
dence upon their allies.  The same was  the  case  with the 
Boeotians  and  Acarnanians.  The  Aetolians, on  the  other 
hand, were free, and had still a large territory, which comprised, 
besides  Actolia Proper, the country of  the Ozoliaiz  Locrians, 
of the Dolopes, and the greater part of Phthiotis.  Lacedaemon 
mas then harassed by one revolution  after another: it was go- 
verncd by a nominal  king, probably a  soil of Eudamidas, but 
soon afterwards  Machanidas usurped the govcrnrnent.  Philip 
was  allied with  the Eleans,  Mcsscnians,  and  Lacedaemonians. 
Rhodes, with  its great  maritime  powcr,  was  connected with 
Macedonia by treaties  and  ties  of  fricndship.  Thc kings of 
Syria at this time govcrned  western Asia,  but Caria,  Samos, 
the  Rellcspont, Chersonesus, the towns  on the southern coast 
of Thracc and the Bosporus, belonged to Egypt ;  Chios, I,esbos, 
and Byzantium forined  a  free confederacy of  cities.  Rhodcs 
was free, powcrful  at sea, and on friendly terms  with  Rome, 
although no actual connection  existed between them.  A war 
had  been  carried  on  between  Syria  and Egypt,  which  was 
terminated  by a  peace,  in which  Egypt  retained  Coelesyria, 
but lost the northern fortresses of  Phoenicia.  Now, while  all 
the countries east of  the Adriatic were thus restored to peace, 
the attcntion of  the Greeks was directed towards the Romans. 
Athens, in its state of impotence, was connected with them by 
friendship, but kept aloof from all political activity. 
It might have bccn thought that Philip, at the head of such 
an extensive empire, and with such warlike nations at his com- 
mand, would have been able to gain important advantages over 
the Romans, but he made no efforts:  in the beginning of  thc 
war  there wcre  only littlc  skirmishes.  Philip, however, con- 
qucrcd  Atintania  and  the  Ardyaeans  who  wcre  under  the 
~rotection  of Rome, and occupied the northern part of Illyricum. 
About the  fonrth year  of  the war the Itolnans  concluded  an 
alliance with  the AetoliansQ, and  unfortunately  for  unhappy 
Greece,  they now  became  more  enterprizing  in those  parts. 
They sent, it is  truc, only one  legion, consisting in reality of 
the epibatae of  thcir ships; but they had a fleet in the Grccian 
scas, which was  a rnatter  of  considerable importance, because 
Livy, xxvi. 24;  comparc 26, and Polybius, xi. 6; xxiii. 8. 
the 1facedonians had scarcely any fleet at all.  Through  the 
~~t~li~~~,  tile  Rolllans  becaine  acquaillted  and were  enticed 
into friendly relations with Attalus I. of  Pergramus, who from 
his slnall  domilzions had  conquered  Lydia, and rdcd over a 
ratller  extensive and rich  principality.  The  Ronlan  fleets, 
under  Laevinus and his  successor P. Sulpicius Galba, ware  a 
true curse to unfortunate Greece.  In the treaty with the Ae- 
tolians, it was  stipulated that  all places  (Livy says only those 
between Actolia and Corcyra), which should be conquered  by 
their  united  forces, should be treated in  such a manner,  that 
the towns and the soil should belong to the Btolians, but the 
inhabitants and  all  thcir  ~lzoveable  property to the Romans, 
who might sell thcnz or carry them away, just as thcy ~leased. 
In discussing the qucstion whether  Polybius, in his judgment 
of the Aetoliai~s~~,  is  just or  not, we  ought to remember  this 
ignolninious clause, for it shows incontrovertibly what they were. 
After  the  Lainian war, it is  truc,  thcy deserved  praise,  but 
afterwards they proved that they werc barbarians in their man- 
ners, as well  as  in their ways of  thinking, although they may 
have  partially  spolrcn  tlic  Greek  language.  The  deplorable 
consequence  of  their trcaty with  the Romans was, that when 
the Roman fleet appcarcd on the coast  of  Greece, and  Dyme, 
Orcus, and Acgina werc taken, the Roinans sold  a11  the inha- 
bitants  3s  slaves.  The Actolians,  however,  wcre  unable  to 
maintain  possession  of  Dyme and  Oreus, and it was  only in 
Acgina  that they held  outll: they sold this  important  island 
with its harbour  to Attalus  for thirty talents.l$  Such1 sharne- 
ful co~iduct  roused thc indignation  of  the Greeks agaillst  the 
Aetolians and Romans, and increased the popularity of Philip. 
As the lloinans  lcit the Actolians without support, Philip and 
the Greeks penetrated into thc heart 01  their country, and took 
vengeancc for the ravages  they had  madc  on  the  sea  coast. 
Thus the Actolians,  abandoned by the Rornans,  concludcd  a 
very disadvantageous peace, the terms of which are not known13, 
and Philip madc considerable conpests. 
Two or three years afterwards, -the  chronology in Livy is 
here very uncertain,--perhaps in the year 548, the Romans 
through Tib. Scmpronius, concluded a peace with Philip, 
lo  In  such passayes a3  ii. 3, full. 45, 49; iv. 3, 67; ix.38, and many others 
" Polybius, xi. 6,  x\ill. 8.  1J  Livy, xxvii. 29, foll. 
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tllc tcrms of which again conceal grcat disaclvantages.16 The fact 
was, that the Romans, in order to obtain peace, gave up Atin- 
tanin, which belonged to them, and allowed Philip to establish 
himself in Epirus.  Atintailin  was,  in itself,  an insignificant 
district, but very important on account of the pass of  Argyro- 
castro, by which Philip obtained a free communication between 
the country  subject to Rome and Epirus, which  was  then a 
republic.  The Ardyacans were likewisc left to Philip; but the 
llomans concludcd this peace, in the hope that, before long, an 
opportunity  would  offer  for  rccovcring  what was  now  lost. 
This is one of the few instances in which the Romans gave up 
a part of thcir possessions; and it ought to have been rcinern- 
bcred, by those who reproached Jovian when, in ordcr to save 
his army, he ceded to thc Persians  a tract of country:  people 
then cried out, as if such a thing had ncver before occurrccl in 
the history of Eome, though Aurelian  had given up Dacia to 
the Goths, and IIadrisn had sacrificecl the eastern conquests  of 
Trajan,-not  to mention the pcacc with the Volscians in the 
earliest timcs. 
LECTUIZE  LXVII. 
AFTER  having concludcd  peace  with  Rome,  Philip entered 
into alliance with Antiochus the Great of Syria, against Ptolclny 
Epiphancs, who  had  succeeded  his  father  (the  contemptible 
Ptolcmy I'hilopator)  when a child five years  old.  From the 
tiillc 01  Philadclpl~us  and Euergctes, the  Egyptian  kings had 
been in posscssion of extcnsivc territories and fortified placcs on 
tlic coasts of Syria and Asia Minor, as far as the coast of Thrace; 
Lycia, at least, was under their dominion.  As undcr Ptolclny 
Pliilopator the kingdom had fallcn into complete dccay, and as 
liis young successor was growing up uncler an unworthy guar- 
dian, Antiochus anci Philip availed themselves of thcsc favour- 
ablc circumstances to dcprive the young king of his possessions 
in Caria, and on the coasts of  Asia  and Thracc.  Evcr since 
thc formation of the Alexandrine kingdom, EUpt had been in 
fricncll~  relations  with  Rhodcs,  and it was  for  the 
" Lit y  ~11d  A~J~)I"II,  11.  cc;  Juailn, air  4. 
interest  of tile Rhodinlls to entertain such relatiolls ; hence they 
defellded Epiplllialles.  ~ut  their power was not sufficient against 
l\ilacedollia and Syria, especially as the wretched govenlmellt of 
Egypt  did  notlling, but  left  the whole b~uilcll  oftllc War  to 
their allies, tile  Rliodians,  Byzantiun~,  Chios,  and Attalus of 
Perganlus.  Philip and Antiochus, therefore, gained their end; 
Philip conquered for himself the wholc coast of Thrace;  perin- 
thus, Ephesus, and Lycia, came undcr tllc power of  Syria, and 
the Egyptians lost a11  thcir possessions in those parts, although 
tllc allies of the Egyptians had been  solncwhat successful in a 
naval engagement near  Chios.  Philip  had now  reached the 
highest pitch of his greatness; and even the Cretans, with whom 
the  Macedoninns  had  nevcr  before  had  ally  influcncc,  now 
called upon him to mcdiate in their bchalf. 
The distress inflicted upon  Athens, afforded  the Rolnans  a 
welcome pretext for renewing  the war with Philip.  Athcns 
was at that time utterly decayed, desolate, and impoverishcd; 
but it  had, neverthcless, hitherto enjoyed a kind of iizdcpendencc : 
iL  had been, for upwards of twenty-five years, in friendly rcla- 
tions with Rome, having concluded an alliance with it after the 
first Illyrian war, and honoured it with the right of  isopo1ity.l 
The liomans may have received this isopolity with a smile; but 
the  city  still continued to  enjoy, from tllcrecollectioi~  ofcarly times, 
such a rcnown, that this present, at least on their part, was by 
no mcans ridiculous.  Pausanias relatcs that, among the ceno- 
taphs of those who had Gallen  in battle, there wcre  also somc 
for those who had fallen in three triremes in distant countries, 
asallics of the Eoinans;  but he docs not state the time.  It is 
not  lilicly  that this was  a  fiction  of  the Athenians; and the 
period to which those cenotaphs referrcd is probably the sccond 
lllyrian war, the Athenians being cunning cnough to see that, 
by  sending  a  fcw  ships, thcy  might  win  tlic fiavour of the 
~omans. During  the  first  Maccdonian war, tllcy  wisely  re- 
mained  neutral.  In tlie  last  years  of  the Hannibalian  war, 
hostilities broke out between them and Philip.  The murder of 
two young Acarnanians, who had entered the temple of Demeter 
at Elcusis during  celebration of the mysteries, inducccl  the 
harnaniarls to call Philip to their assistance, in taking revcngc 
on the Athenians.  Philip, who had long been  to get 
posscssion  of  Athcni, was  delighted  at thc opportunity,  and 
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mvaged Attica up to the vcry  walls  of  the city most  cruelly : 
a11  the temples in the territory of Athens were demolished, and 
even the sepulchral lnonulnents were destroyed.  The complaints 
of the Athenians were carried to Rhodes, to Attalus, and in gene- 
ral to all the allies  of  the suddenly broken-down kingdom  of 
Alexandria,  which, under  Euergetcs, had enjoyed  such a de- 
gree of prosperity;  but their hopes were chiefly based upon the 
Roma~s. At Rome,  long  discussions  took  place  as to what 
sl~o~ild  be doae.Vlle  senate and the ruling party, whose  de- 
sires and ideas of Roinc's powcr  already knew no bounds, did 
not hesitate for a moment to declare  war against Philip, wish- 
ing, at the same time, to indemnify themselvcs for  what had 
bcen  sacrificed in the  late peace  with him;  but the pcople, 
who  were  utterly  exhausted,  wished  for  rcst,  and  when  the 
proposal was first brought before them, it was rejected. 
It  is one of  the greatest errors to believe that a constitutioll 
remains  the  same  as  long  as  its  form continue  unaltcrcd. 
When changes have taken place in the distribution of property, 
in the social condition, in the sentiments and the mode of life 
of a nation, the nature of its constitution may become quite the 
rcvcrse of what it originally was, cven though not an iota may 
have bcen  altered in its form.  It may at one time be dcmo- 
cratical,  and  at  another  it  may,  with  the  same  forms,  be 
aristocratical.  We moderns  pay too  littlc  attention  to such 
internal changes, although they arc among those points which 
we must  cndcavour to ascertain,  and without which  history 
cannot be understood.  The constitution of the Roman republic 
was  at that  time  quite  different  from  what  it  had  bccn, 
although no  formal  change had  bcen  made  in it.  That re- 
marltable  and strange ascendancy of  thc oligarchy  of  wealth 
already cxisted,  and the multitude which has no judgment  and 
no will, decrced what in reality it did not wish.  This statc of 
the constitution  is manifest  during the seventh century on a 
hundred  occasions;  and in these  transactions  about  the war 
with  Pl~ilip,  we sce  one  of  its  carliest  and most  ren~arhal,lc 
symptoms.  It was  a  great lnisfortunc  that, after thc sccollcl 
Punic war, there was not some great man of sufficient influellcc 
to examine the constitution, and to regulate its spirit  in ac- 
cordance with the actual state of  things; for if, after immcnse 
exertions, the issue of a long disease is lcft to chance,  without 
Llrj, ~xxi.  51, fo11. 
the applicatioll of remedies, a great state lnust necessarily conie 
to ruin. 
The Romans now with much zeal sent ambassadors to Philip 
to delnand  reparation  for the Athenians,  and to request that 
he would  an end  to  all  hostilities  against  Rome's  allies, 
to wllom  Ptolelny also belonged.  Philip saw clearly that this 
was  only  a  pretext  to  bring  about  a  war,  and  must  have 
regretted  that he had  not better  availed  himself  of 
the  HIlnnibalian  war.  The second  war  against  Philip  was 
decreed  in 552.  The consul,  P. Sulpicius  Galba,  who  had 
carried  on  the war  in those  parts before,  and had  been  the 
scourge of Aegina, Oreus,  and Dyme,  was entrustcd with the 
comrnancl.  Philip remained on the defensive, especially at first. 
The war must have been declared at  avery late scasonof theyear, 
for it did not actually commence till after the end of the consul- 
ship of  Sul~icius. Livy3 erroneously places the beginning of 
it in the year of  the consulship of  Sulpicius Galba, according 
to which  date,  no  place  would be  lcft  for  the consulship of 
P. Villius Tappulus.  Villius  appeared  on the scene of  action 
only for a very short time towards the end of his consulship. 
The  Actolians  were  then vcry  much  reduced,  but  inde- 
pendent  and  hostile  to  Macedonia:  they  possessed Aetolin, 
a  part  of  Acarnania,  the  country  of  the  Aenianes,  the 
Ozolian  Locrians,  the greater part of  Phthiotis, the country 
of the Dolo~ians,  a part of southern Thessaly, and Thermopylae ; 
they were connected with Lacedaemon and a number of distant 
places  in Elis and Messenia;  but they  had been  sinlring  for 
the  last  thirty  years.  In Peloponnesus,  the  Achaeans had 
Achaia, Sicyon, I'hlius,  Argolis, and Arcadia,  but in point of 
fact they wcrc quite dependent on the hlaecdonians, and under 
their protection against Actolia and Laccdaernoa.  The Lacc- 
daemonians were much  confined within their ancient country 
and had lost thcir  old  constitution:  they had no ephors  and 
probably no senate,  being governed by the tyrant Nabis, one 
of the greatest monsters in history.  The Melsenians were sepa- 
rated  the Aetolians and Achaeans, and hoslile to the latter ; 
Elems were independent and allied with the Actolialls ; 
BocOtians, enjoying only a nominal independence, lverc under 
supremacy of  Macedonia;  Corinth,  Euboea,  Phocia,  and 
LOcris -iswere nonlinslly allies of ilacedonia, but in reality had 
Xal. 33, foll. 
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to obey it.  Thessaly  was considered  as  a  state united  with 
Macedonia.  Thc family of  the Aeacitlae in Epir~~s  had bccn 
extirpated; and the remnants of  the people hemmed in by the 
Actolians formed a republic,  sometimes under Actolian, some- 
times  under  Macedonian  influence.  On  the  main-land  of 
Grcecc,  Athens survived as a mere name standing apart from 
all  associations,  and was the object  of  Plrilip's  hatred.  The 
Acarnanians were not among the real  subjects of  Macedonia, 
but were united with it only by their comnon hostility to the 
Aetolians.  The Cyclades had formerly been  under the domi- 
nion of Egypt, but their condition was now undefined.  Cretc 
was  independent,  but  torn  to  pieces  by intcrl~al  factions, 
between whom thc Cretans invited  Philip to mediate.  Chios 
and Mitylcne were free,  and Rhodes great and powerful.  By- 
zantium  too  was free,  and  allied  with  Chios and Mitylcne: 
they had takcn as littlc part as  possible in tlzc  disputes of  tho 
other states, but were now (especially Chios) drawn into them 
and were allicd with Attdus.  As far as intcllcct is conccrncd, 
the  Greeks  wcre  in  a  state  of  coinplcte  decay;  at  Atllcl~s, 
~chools  indced still existed, but poetry was extinct, and even 
the art of oratory,  the last flower of  the Hellenic mind  had 
disappeared  from  Greece  and  establishcd  itself  among  the 
Asiatic  nations,  which  had bccome  Helleniscd  without  pas- 
scssing the great  qualities of  thc Greek nation.  Most towns 
wcre only shadows of what they had bcen,  and there wcre fcw 
which had not been  destroyed  scveral times.  Corinth was one 
of  the fortunate  cxceptions, and hence had become  the most 
flourishing  of  all  Greek  cities.  The  Achacans,  evcr  since 
Aratus had delivered up his l~eople  to Maccdonia in his oppo- 
sition  to the Lacedaemonians,  stood  in a rclation  of  pcrfect 
clientship to the former.  During this connection, which had 
existed for nearly twenty years,  they had had many causes for 
exasperation,  but they werc  on  unfriendly terms  with thcir 
ncighbours,  and the most  that their  patriots  clesircd was to 
change their dcpcndence on Macedonia  into an attachmcnt to 
it, but none thought of independence.  Many, moreover, were 
agitated by feelings of  indignation  against  the Romans,  who 
had cruelly ravaged many of their towns.  The Actolians felt 
inclined to undertake the war,  but could not  make  up  their 
minds.  A misunderstanding had arisen between them and the 
Romans,  they reproaching the Romans for having held out to 
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thcln  unfounded  hopes,  and the Rolnans complaining of  not 
having been supported by tlicln in the Illyrian war. 
During the first campaign of  Sulpicius, in the year 553, thc 
Romans gaincd little or nothing:  the undertaking hiled alto- 
gether, for they had,  as it wcre,  taken the bull by the horns, 
attacking hllaccdonia from lllyricum.  Philip remained  on the 
dcfcnsive.  Illyricuin, as far as Scutari,  is a country similar to 
Fraizconia:  it has many hills of a modcrate  height, but inany 
parts arc almost pcrfect plains.  On the esstcrn frontier,  how- 
ever,  lofty  mo~~ntains,  which  branch  out  froin  Scardus  or 
Scodrus,  rise  up and occupy thc western  part of  Macedonia, 
and rangc southwards as far as Pindus  and Parnassus.  These 
mountains, high,  broad, cold, and barren, arc at the prcsent time 
scarcely inhabited  at all,  and even the valleys  between  thein 
are almost uninhabitable.4  Sulpicius attacked the Alacedonians 
in thcse mountains.  There the Romans found all circumstailccs 
unfavourable;  alinost the whole popnlation consisting of Macc- 
donians was hostile, csccpt thc Orcstians in Epirus;  and thcy 
cvcrywlzere suffered  from want of provisions.  IIowevcr much 
historians  may have disguised the fact,  or bcen ignorant of it, 
he was  completely thwartcd in his  undertaking.  He thcrc- 
fore  retreated,  and spent tlzc  winter  in the fcrtile country of 
Lower  Illyricum,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Apollonia  and 
Epidamnus. 
T. Quinctius  Flamininus,  who  undertook  thc command as 
consul in 554, was wiscr:  he immediatcly conveycd  rcinforcc- 
lncnts across  the Adriatic,  and  altered thc mode  of  action. 
Tlle  A"rcedonians  this  tinze  also  had  fortified  the passes  in 
thc  nzountains  on  thcir  frontier,  and remained  on  the  clc- 
fcnsivc;  thcir  main  camp  was  ncar  Argyrocastro,  wlzcrc 
the river  Aiius  flows5 through a narrow  dciilc between  two 
limestone  mountains,  onc  of  which  stretches  towards  l'in- 
~1~s  and the  other  towards  Acroccraunus6:  both  MTcre  wild 
and ilnpassable-  Herc thc king of  l\laccdonia was cncamy,ctl. 
'  rl'llo~cmoi~ntains,  tllc highlands of  Macedonia, Tvero  tlla urigi~ld  seats of the 
cs,~i.li(xit  Mnccdollians, w11o had Sormcrly bee11 gu~ren~cd  I?y fe~~d;~l  prirlrcs of tlleir 
own, ilcpcndcnt on I'llilil); b11t  they mere now cornplctcly 11nitcd with iilaccdonia. 
'  Thus we must read in Plutarch's life of  I~laminirlus,  instcacl of Aps:l+-N. 
I~ivy,  axii.  5.  Colnpare Polybius, ii.  5;  Plutarch,  Flamin.  3.  This  is 
still, and over will be, the true road frorn nlylic~lm  into  the  interior of  Epims, 
the ancient .fauces Antigoneae.  Part of  the  road rLlns  along the hank of  the 
river, and is cut out of tho  lock.-^. 
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Meanwhile the Aetolians, with whom the Ronlans had renewed 
their alliance, threatened  the frontiers  of  Thessaly7,  though 
without  undertaking  anything  of  importance.  It was  of 
great consequence  to the Macedoniuns  to prevent  their actu- 
ally  attacking  Thessaly,  and  uniting  their  forces  with  the 
Romans.  Philip succeeded  in  effecting  this  by the  energy 
wit11  which  he  maintained  his  ground near  Antigoncia. 
Villius too had, as proconsul, pitched his camp in that quarter; 
but I'lamininus,  who found him  there,  was  convinced  of  the 
uselessness of  an  attack upon  the front  of  the n'lacedonians. 
Thc Romans, probably, hoped that the Aetolians would compel 
the Macedonian  army to change its ~osition,  for otherwise  we 
cannot understand their encamping in  those districts. 
Flamininus, who now undertook the command, was a distin- 
guished man, ancl was elected consul, even before his 30th year, 
through the confidence of  the people in his personal character. 
He  is a proof of  horn false are the notions of those who imagille 
that the Romans did not try to malrc themselves familiar with 
Greek literature till a later period, for Flamininus is expressly 
praised for his Greek culture.  His conduct towards Greece can- 
not,  it is true, be justified  in all respects; but he was irritated, 
his  noble endeavours  to win the approval of the Greeks being 
thwarted, by the ingratitude of the  partially degenerate nation. 
Had the Greeks been able to accommodate themselves to thcir 
actual circumstances, they would have escaped much that was 
distressing to them.  Flamininus was  convinced of  the neces- 
sity of  trying  to drive the Macedonians  from  their  position, 
and he gained his  object through the faithlessness  which,  in 
those  times,  was the prevailing  charactcristic  of  thc  Greeks: 
he entered into negotiations with an Epirot chief of  the namc 
of Charopus,  whom he bribed  with moncy and promises;  hc 
sent to the consul a man by whosc  guidance he might evadc 
the mountain pass.*  A  detachment  of  4000 Romans was  ac- 
cordingly sent to follow the guide along unknown paths.  The 
Romans not  trusting their guide, kcpt him in chains, but  no 
treacherous attcmpt was inade;  and having made a long circuit, 
they reached, on the third  day,  thc hcights in thc rear of  the 
Liivy, xxxii. 13. 
Livy, xxxii. 11 ; Appian, De  ReB. Muced. 4.  Most passes can  bc  evaded; 
and on this account they ha170  lost  their  importance in civilised  countrics.  If 
the pass of Antlodoco near Naples could not be  evaded,  it would be impossible 
to attack Naples.-N. 
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Macedonians.  This  was the day fixed  upon  for  the attack, 
and at sun-rise, when the  signal was  given, the 
consul  attacked the front lines of the enemy, but was beginning 
to sustnill great  loss, when on  a  sudden the Jfacedonians dis- 
covered tllat  the Romans  were  on the heights  in their  rcar, 
and  that  in a  few  miilutcs  their  rctreat  might  be  cut 08. 
$'lamininus  now attacked the enemy with double vigour, while 
tllc other Romans fcll upon the rear  of  the Macedonians,  who 
were Seized with a  and flcd;  SO that the Romans at once 
became masters of  Epirus, and the gates werc thrown open to 
them everywhcrc.  Philip retreated across Mount Pindus into 
Thessaly.  Flamininus  did not pursue him, but first wishcd to 
avail  himsclf  of  his  position  for  tlic  purpose  of  driving the 
Macedonians out of Greece;  an expedition into Thessaly, how- 
ever, was not followed by any great results.  At Ambracia  he 
joined the Aetolians, and then  tool;  up his winter quarters in 
Phocis, whcrc 11c  laid siege to the fortrcss of Elatea. 
A fleet of King Attalus and the Rhodians,  united with that 
of  the  Romans,  was  stationed  during this  campaign  in the 
Aegean.  It entered upon  several unclcrtakings,  which how- 
ever  lcd  to  nothing  but the  devastation  of  Greecc.  Thus 
Chalcis, once a flourishing town, was plundered and laid waste. 
Corintlz and  JPcgara  had  bcfore been given  up to the Mnce- 
clonians, and Philip had unceremoniously retaincd Orchomenos, 
although it should have been rcstorcd to the Achaeans; but at 
the commcncelnent of  the sccond  war with  Romc he gzve it 
back to them.  Had Philip  at this juncture givcn up  Corinth 
also  to  the Achaeans, thcy would  probably never llavc  bccn 
induccd to abandon his cause;  for thcy entcrtaincd an implaca- 
ble hatrcd of  the  Aetolians,  and it mas  only this hatrcd that 
led thern to the otherwise  disgraceful  amity with  Macedoni.~. 
7 3  I  hey were, however indignant at the llomans also, on account of 
the ravages they had made in Grccce during the first Macedoniall 
war.  But now vhen Philip was unable to defend himself, and 
all the collntry as far  ILS Thern~op~lae  was in the hands of tile 
Romans, the afaccdonian party among the Achaeans, which was 
Still very great, could not vcnture to come forward; and  discus- 
sion took place % to the necessity  of  entering into an alliance 
with  the  Romans.  At th~  congress  of  Sicyon,  ~vhich  was 
attended by the ambassadors of Rome, their strategus, Aristae- 
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way to rcasonable considerations, sct forth Philip's  acts of  in- 
justice, and carried  a  decree, though not witho~~t  great oppo- 
sition, by which the alliance with l'hilip  was  given up, and a 
treaty was concluded with  the Rornans.  The Achaeans were 
promiscd that the places takcn from them by Philip should  bc 
restored, and that Nabis and the Aetolians should abstain from 
hostilities against them.  It was  no  longer possible  to guide 
the nation by enthusiastic  eloqucnce and lofty feelings, as  had 
been done by Dcmosthenes;  what  was  now required was  pru- 
dence.  The Achaeans  were not a warlike people, even at the 
time whcn Philopoemen did his utmost to inspire thcm  with a 
warlikc spirit.  The war with Macedonia  was  troublesome  to 
them; for  although the Macedonian  garrison at Corinth  was 
very small, yet it niight by sallies do great injury to the neigh- 
bouring placcs in Peloponncsus;  nay, the general, Philocles, to 
whom Philip had given the command of  Corinth, made him- 
self master  even  of  Argos, the greatest  among the Achaean 
cities. 
The Boeotians were in thc meantime takcn by surprise and 
coinpelled to join the Romans.  They were wavering; for after 
having borne the Macedonian yoke for 140 ycars, thcy thought 
it impossible that that power  should now be broken.  It  was 
almost cntirely  by cunning  that  Flamininus succeeded in in- 
ducing them to enter into the alliance with Romc,  for  in the 
year 555 (his  impcrium having been prolonged to him as pro- 
consul) he appeared before thc gates of Thcbcs, and demanded 
to be  admitted, in order to negotiate  with thcm within  the 
walls of the city.  He was accompanied by his  troops,  and as 
hc was entering  with them, the Boeotians decreed the alliance 
with Romc, which untlcr thcse circumstances was a mcre farms 
One  hundred  and twcnty-five  ycars had  elapscd  since the 
death of  Alexander the Grcat.  Thc proud wavcs had subsided, 
and all things had assumed  a different aspect:  the Greeks no 
longer  considered themselves as a  nation dcstined  to  govern, 
but saw in the Macedonians  their natural protectors  'against 
the Gauls,  Scordiscans,  Thracians, and Dardanians, to resist 
whom they felt that thcir own strength was insufficient.  They 
had become accustomcd to look up to the court of Macedonia, 
and had derived no small benefit from the gold which flowed 
from  that quarter:  in short, it had become a natural feeling 
Livy, =iii.  1 and 2. 
witll  the Greeks  to resign the supremacy to the Macedonians, 
who Ivere  no longer looked upon as barbarians:  the court and 
the  educated  classes in Macedonia spoke Greelr  as  their 
motller  tongue ; and  at  Pella,  Grcek  was  unquestionably 
spolien  just  as  lnuclz  as  the Macedonian  idiom, so  that, in 
reality,  the diffcrcnce  between  Macedonians  and Greeks had 
beconle effaced. 
Before the cominenccmellt of  the new campaign, and whcn 
the Achaeans had alrcady  declared  against  Pllilip, the latter 
triccl to negotiate, but rcfuscd to evacuate the whole of Greece, 
as was  demanded by the Romans,  and rcsolved  again  to try 
his fortune in war.  I&  had bccome  far  more  skilful  in the 
coursc  of  his  government; the negotiations were broken  off, 
and in the ycar U.C. 555, the hostile armies advanccd towards 
each  other.  Thcssaly  was now the natural scene of the war. 
Ylzilip  had exerted  all his strength, and if it is  truc that he 
madc  a  gencral  levy,  the small  numbcr  of  troops  brought 
together provcs  that Macedonia  must have been  in a fearful 
state of desolation, in conscqucnce  of the ravages made there 
by the Gauls;  but thc statcmcnts on this point do not secm to 
bc quite correct, for even with a moderate population, it would 
have bccn easy to raise an army of  100,000 men.  Flamininus 
scems to have had fcw or no other allies bcsides the Actolians, 
who,  if our accounts may be rclied on, amounted to not more 
than a few thousand foot, and from 400 to 500 horsc.10  The 
whole army of Flainininus is said to have consistcd  of  26,000 
nlca,  and a  small  numbcr  of  cavalry.  The campaign  was 
opcncd  at an early scason of the year:  and as thc harvcst in 
Thcssaly talrcs place  about the middle of  June, the battle  of 
Cyllosccphalac  must  have  bccn  fought in thc course  of  that 
month, for the corn was ripe, but not yet cutll, so that in thcir 
foraging  excursions  the  soldicrs  had  only to reap  it.  The 
Jbnlans  and Macedonians  approached  each  other  at  a  spot 
whcrc only a linc of  small hills (Cynosccphalae)  separated the 
two  armies.  This was  at  the  boundary  of  the  Thcssalian 
plain,  where  tllc  hills  of  Phthiotis  gradually  descend  into 
Thessaly  Proper.  IIcre the vanguards of  the hostile  armies 
met  un~xpcctcdly,  each  believing  thc  other  far  away,  and 
both wishillf; to take up thcir quarters where they might find 
'O  Livy, xxxiii. 3; Polybius, xviii.4; Plutarch, FZarnin.  7. 
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provisions  and the corn  ripe.  Both were on their march  to 
Scotussa.  It had been mining the day before, and in the morn- 
ing there was such  a thick fog, that the hills on thc right and 
left  of  which the armies were marching wcre hardly visible. 
The  Macedonians  wanted  to  ascend  a  height,  which  the 
Romans happened  to have occupicd.  Philip had  no inclina- 
tion to fight, and the Roman commander too would have pre- 
ferred  another locality,  this being too open,  but thc force  of 
circumstances rcndered the battle ncccssary.  Three days had 
passed  away before  the battle  began,  and the Romans were 
already  on the heights  when  the Macedonians  arrived,  but 
being only few in number, they were repulsed until reinforcc- 
ments came up.  This happened on the left wing of the Mace- 
donian  army.  The two  generals  had  perceived  how near 
their armies were  to  each  other,  and cluickly  sent reinforce- 
ments.  The Romans being supported by  the Aetolians,  had 
the  advantage  on  the  hills,  which  led  the Macedonians  to 
make the engagement a general one; but the Romans who were 
opposed  by  the whole  of  the left  wing  of  the Macedonians, 
were driven  from  the hcights;  and this  success had such an 
effect  upon  the  Macedonims, that the king was  obliged  to 
give battle,  for  fear  of  discouraging his  soldiers.  He there- 
fore arranged  them in the most  appropriate manner, but was 
obliged  to take possession  of the hill, which was ill suited to 
the Macedonian  masses,  whereas  the elastic  arrangements of 
the Romans enabled them to avail themselves of  such a posi- 
tion with  advantane.  The  description  of  the  battle  in the  9 
fragments of  Polybius is masterly.l"he  left wing had made 
a  considerable  advance,  and  prcsscd  the  Romans  down  the 
other side  of  the hill.  The right wing of  the Macedonians 
rushed with great vchemcnce  up the hill, to which  the left 
wing of  the Romans had in the mcantime advanced, so  that 
this  part of  the  Macedonian  army was  soon  routed.  This 
victory was owing to the Aetolian cavalry, and it also pursued 
the fugitives;  but on the  left  of  thc  Romans,  which  faced 
thc dense masses of the Macedonian phalanx,  the victory was 
undecided.  For a time they could not resist those masses of 
at first nine, and afterwards sixteen men in depth, where the 
hindmost lines were protected, and pressed  forward with thcir 
Macedonian lances (a6p~aaa~).  The Romans, however, made 
I2  xviii. 5, foll. 
half a move to the right, and drove the Macedonians  on the 
other  side  up  the  hills,  whence  they  had  come.  111  this 
position, in  tile phalanx  could  not  move,  the victory 
was  decided.  The Rolnans no doubt owed it cllicfly  to the 
cavalry  of the Aetolians;  for  it was they that broke through 
tile plldanx.  According to Polybius and Livy, at least  8000 
Macedonians  were  shin, and 5000 taken  prisoners?"'hilip 
his life wit11  difficulty; the Macedonians gave the signal 
for  a  by  raising  their sarissae;  but the Romans 
not understanding this symbolic action rushed upon them, SO 
that most  of  them  were  cut to pieces,  and the others  taken 
Philip fled  to Larissa, and thence to Tcmpe.  He 
had led his whole army into the field, and had committed the 
great mistake  of not  lcaving  any troops in reserve;  he there- 
fore  immediately began  to negotiate  with  the Romans; and 
aftcr a  fcw fruitless attempts  a  truce was  concluded,  during 
which he was to send ambassadors  to Rome, to providc for the 
Roman army, and to pay down a contribution  towards defray- 
ing thc expcnses of the war. 
The Romans were the more inclined to make peace, as they 
were no longer on good terms with the Aetolians;  the feeling 
of  estrangement  may  perhaps have  existed evcn  before  this 
campaign; but, after the battle of Cynosccphalae, the Aetolians 
plundered the Macedonian camp, and this gave rise to disputes, 
and to most vehement ill-temper  on the part of thc Aetolians. The 
Romans had taken part in the battle with far greater numbers 
than  the Aetolians,  but thc Actolian  cavalry  had  certainly 
decided  the victory; and at the beginning  they had kept up 
the fight  on  the  hill, so  that thc Romans  were  enabletl  to 
retreat  in good  order.  These  points wcre evitlcnt,  and thus 
the Actolians, evcn if they had  not been  a vain people, had 
just  reason  for  ascribing  the victory  to themselves;  but this 
they did  in a  manner  which  greatly offended  the  sensitive 
Flamininus.  Hence immediately  after  the  battle  he  endea- 
voured  to curtail  thcir  advantages.  The Aetolians, in their 
collccit,  placed  themselves  on  a footing  of  equality with  the 
Romans, and felt hurt when the latter claimed higher authority 
for themselves than the Aetolians thought fit to  The 
AetolianS behaved  in such a  deplorably  mean  spirit towards 
Rome, that nothing short of the foolish and conceited charactcr 
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of  a  southern  nation  can account  for  it.  Wherever  such  a 
state  of  feeling  exists, the fruits of  it are the greatest ingra- 
titude  and  hostile  malice  towards  allies.14  The Aetolians 
wanted  to turn  the happy  issue  of  the war  to  their  own 
advantage  and  aggrandisement,  but  of  this  the  Romans 
would  not hear; for their policy was to restorc thc Grecl~s  in 
such a  manner  that the separate  nations  might  balallcc  one 
another, without any one of them being prcdonzinant ;  nor was 
it their wish  to destroy  Macedonia.  The Aetolians,  on  tllc 
othcr  hand,  insisted  upon  the  Maccdonian  dynasty  being 
cxpcllcd, in order that tl~cy  tl~cmsclves  might  be ablc to takc 
tllc  government  into  their  hands.  Throughout  Grccce,  the 
Actolians wcre celebrated  in songs as thc conquerors, and the 
Romans with their consul werc spokcn off  only as auxiliaries. 
It  was,  without  doubt,  immcdiatcl~  after these  cvcnts,  that 
Alcaeus,  the Messcnian,  wrote  his  beautiful  cpigram  on the 
victory of  Cynoscephalac,  in which  he speaks with contempt 
of  thirty  thousand  Maccdolzians,  who  wcre  slain  by  thc 
Aetolians and  Latins.15  For this insolence,  Grccce had to pay 
dearly.  Any otllcr  gcncrd, who was  not  actuated  by that 
lovc  of  the Grcclis  which  Flamininus cl~crisl~cd,  would havc 
rcgardcd  such conduct  vcry differcntly.  Flaminiilus indccd, 
was too scnsitivc, and he ought to have dcspiscd  such things, 
considering that he had thc glorious mission to dclivcr Grecce; 
but thc Romans wcrc by no means juet towards tllc Actolians, 
and according to previous  agreements, thc latter had a right 
to claim back  all  the placcs  which  Philip  had  taken  from 
thcm.  The Romans  now  dccidcd  against  thcm;  and  while 
they retained for  themselves somc of  thosc placcs or annexed 
thcm  to other  statcs,  tlzcy  allowcd  others  to rcinain  inde- 
pendcizt.  All this was  not donc without provocation; bnt it 
complctcly  infuriated  thc  Actolians.  Peace  was  concluclcd 
with Macedonia  in the year 556,  on conditions which wcre 
very  humiliating  to  Philip; for he was obliged  to give  up 
all his  possessions  out  of  Macedonia,-this  kingdom,  how- 
ever, was  far  more  cxtcnsivc than  thc ancicl~t  kingdom  of 
The Spaniards, down to this day, have no feeling of  gratitude towards the 
English who were  their deliverers; they boast of  the battle of  Salamanca, as if 
they had conquered  thc French, although it was the English who gaincd  it for 
thcm, and they thcmselves lost only one man.-N. 
Is  It is preservcd in Plutarch,  Flumzn. 9. 
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lfacedonia,  for  it  extended as fsr  as  tllc  river  Nestus,  and 
conlpriscd a pnrt of  Thmce, and many Illyrial~  and Dardanian 
tribes;-he  had  to give up all the towns  in Greece, and the 
coasts of  Thrnce and Asia Minor (the latter countries ought to 
have been  restored  to  Ptolcmy, but thcy obtained  a  no~ninal 
independcncc);  to  surrcndcr  all  his  ships  of  war,  with the 
exception of  iive and his  royal  g~llcy;  to lreep no morc than 
5000 soldiers  as  a  standing  army;  to  pay  1000 talents,  by 
instalments, in ten years;  and to give hostagcs to the Romans,  - 
and among them his own son Dcmctrins.16 
After  various  expectations,  hopes,  and  resolutions,  the 
Rolnnns made a  noblc use of  this peace.  It would  be unfair 
to inquire into their motives;-it  may be that tllcy wished  to 
deprive  Antiochus of  every  advantage-but  whatever  their 
policy  may have bccn,  Quinctius  Flamininus, at least, seems 
to have  acted  from  very pure  motives.  All  T1lessaly,  the 
countries  south  of  Thermopylae,  and  the  threc  fortrcsscs, 
Acrocorintl~us,  Chalcis, and llemetrias wcre occupied  by the 
Bomans.  The  qucstion  now  was  what  should  be  done? 
Thcrc werc not wanting  men who wcre unwilling  to sacrifice 
a momcntary matcrial  advantage for the salre of  a  noble  and 
gencrous reputation, and who insistcd upon liceping posscssion 
of  thosc  threc fortresses,  and some  others,  in order  to licep 
Greece  in a  state of  submission.  Flamininus opposed thcm, 
and carried  his plan, so that Corinth, whosc citadel rcrnaincd 
for the prcscnt occupicd by the Romans, was  restored  to the 
Achacans at oncc.  This was the more noble, as not only the 
Actolians, but even  thc Achacans, with Philopocmen at their 
head, considercd thcmselves quite equal to the Romans, so that 
Flainininus  had  to excrcise  grcat  self-control  to succeed  in 
carrying out his noblc dcsign.  It was fortunate for thc Grcclis, 
that in mind  and education  he was  a Grcck, a  fact which is 
also attestcd by thc inscriptions  on  thc presents  hc dcdicatcd 
in thc temples. 
Tllc dccrec of  thc  senate was to bc proclaimed on the day 
of  the  Isthmian  games; and the Greeks,  according  to  their 
different dispositions, cntcrtaincd  different  expectations.  An 
cnorlnous multitude of pcopk assembled at Corinth, and Flarni- 
ninus ordered the decree of  thc scnate, by which fi-ccdom was 
granted to all the Greeks, to bc proclaimed in thc thcatrc.  This 
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noble moment of enthusiasm afforded Greece a happy period of 
fifty years.  Fifty years is a short tinzc in the history of theworld 
though  too  long for a nian to  descend  into the grave with- 
out having experienced misfortune.  But the sad  experiences 
of a11  earlier period have often  been  rewarded  by an  old  age 
full of joy. 
The Aetolians alone did not rejoice, nor did  Nabis of Lace- 
dsemon.  The alliance wit11  him is  a foul spot on  the honour 
of Rome:  he had stipulated to retain for hiinself Argos, which 
he had caused Philip to sell to hiin; but Flamininus afterwards 
gladly seized the opportunity to annul tlic  alliance, and make 
war upon him.  Livy is very minute in this part, having Poly- 
bius  for  his  guide,  to whom  these  events must have bcen of 
particular  interest.  The tyrant  was  not, indeed, wanting  in 
skill during the war; but he would  have been subdued, and 
Sparta  taken, had  not  Flamininus, probably in obedience to 
his instructions, followed the  unhappy policy  which  led him 
not to wish to deliver Greece  from  this  source  of  anxiety, in 
order that the Achaeans might be obliged to exert thcmselvcs, 
and to require the aid of Rome.  A great part of Laconica, the 
district of the modern Maina, was separatcd from the dominion 
of the tyrant, and constituted as an independent state, inhabited 
by the ancient periocci ;  the Achaeans received Argos, and Nabis 
was obliged to pay a war-contribution of  100 talents  at once, 
and 400 more within the space of eight years, and to give his son 
as a hostage.  This state of things did  not  last  long.  In the 
absence  of  Flamininus,  the Achaeans availed themselves  of a 
tumult in which Nabis  was  slain, for  the purpose  of  uniting 
Sparta with the rest  of  Peloponnesus, which  was  disagrceablc 
to the Romans, but could not then be altered. 
The Romans  pledged thcmsclves to evacuate  the two for- 
tresses  of  Chalcis  and  Demetrias,  as soon as the affairs with 
Antioclzus should  be  settled.  They constituted  Thesssly, to- 
wether  with  Phthiotis,  as  an independent republic;  and the  b 
Orcstians,  who formed a  part of  Macedonia  Proper, but had 
revolted, received a rcpublicsn constitution, though it seems to 
have been unitcd with Thessaly, as I conclude  from the list of 
Thessalian generals.  Euboea, Locris, Acarnnnia, Eoeotia, Pho- 
cis,  Ambracia, Elis, Mcsscnia, Laccdaemon,  and Athens, were 
proclaiined  free statcs; the  rest  of  Peloponnesus  and Mcgara 
became Achaean.  But, although the Romans thus proclaimed 
thelnselves the deliverers of Greece, yet they gave the towns of 
Oreus alld  Eretria to Euinenes, the son  of Attalns-he  seciiis 
to have  Xretria afterwards,-and  left him in possession of 
Aegina.'7  The Atlzeiiians received the islands of  Paros, Scy- 
ros, Delos, and Imbros.  Dowiz to the time of  Sulla, the Rolizans 
always shewed a particular favour  and respect for the Athen- 
ians, and  never  have  the Muses been more kind towards  any 
nation than towards the Athenians. 
LECTURE  LXVIII. 
IF, in relating  the history  of  Rome,  we  were  to follow  the 
standard of the ancients, we could have little hope of attaining 
our end within the time allowed for these lectures; for all that 
I have hitherto related is contained in about thirty-three books 
of  Livy, which constitute only a small part of his whole work. 
But the constitution of Rome, which is to us the most import- 
ant part of  her history, has been growing, and fully developing 
itsclf before ow  eyes;  and the wars, which have any moral  or 
artistic interest, are over.  Henceforth, we have only masses to 
consider.  I shall relate, at full length, the history  of  the de- 
struction of Carthage, and of the Cimbrian war ;  but why should 
I enter into the detail, for instance, of the battle  of  Magnesia, 
in which rude  and ~ndisci~lincd  masses  of  barbarians  fought 
against the Romans?  Livy9s  history, .froin the time which we 
have now reaclzcd, down to where  it broke  off, formed  more 
than three-fourths of  the whole  work, though it  comprised  a 
period of not morc than about 215 years.  We may follow just 
the opposite course, and condense our narrative as we proceed 
further. 
During the Hannibalian war, the Insubrians had  remained 
quiet, and, with the exception of  the first years, had taken no 
part  in  it, partly because  they  were  not  provoked  by the 
Romans, and partly because the scene of  tlie war was generally 
too far awsLy  from  them, and they kept  up little  intercourse 
with I-Iannibal;  hut they now rosc, and  thc Romans  had  to 
l7  LIYY,  xxxiiii. 30 aud 34. 1'74  THE  BOPANS.  ANTIOCIIUS  THE  GREAT.  175 
dread  thein  the  more,  because an  enterprising  Cartl~a~inian 
general, of  the namc of  Hamilcar, ~vho  had  remained  behind 
from the army of  Mago, disci~lincd  the  Ligurian  and  Gallic 
armies, in ordcr that he might thus be enablcd  to inflict soine 
scvere wound upon  tllc  Romans.  The Insubrians were very 
different from tile Boians;  the former  subnlittcd  after  a  fcw 
campaigns ; but the Boians  hcld  out with great bravery  for 
morc  than ninc ycars, in the course of  which the fortresses of 
Placcntia and Cremona were entirely dc~troyed,  for they knew 
that it  was the intention of tlic Romans to ani~ihilatc  them; and 
thcy accorclingly fougllt with the courage  of despair.  We scc 
from Pliny, that they had vanisllcd from the face of the earth 
at the time when Cato wrote1  The fatc of this people is very 
remarkable:  the  towns  which  they  once  inl~abited  in  Gaul 
proper werc scarccly known in after-times.  On their emigra- 
tion  from  Gaul,  one  branch  had  marched  into  Italy,  and 
another  to the countries on the Danube.  It was probably in 
the Ciinbrian  war,  that  this  latter  branch  was  extirpatcil, 
whci~cc  the namc of the country Deserturn Boiorum"Bohcinia), 
which  was  subscquently  occupied  by  the  Marcomannians. 
According to Cato, the Boians in Italy had  consistcd  of  120 
tribes (tribzcs),  wl~ich,  in his  days, had ceascd  to cxist.  It is 
not more  tllan  seventeen  or  eighteen  years  ago that jurists, 
writing  on  the Lex  de  Gallia  Cisalpina, wondcred  why tllc 
Boians werc not oftencr incntioned in history; but they forgot 
tl~at  the Gauls south of  the Po werc completely extirpated by 
the liomans in the war  which followed the second Punic war. 
The Romans thcn established  colonies  in tllosc  districts, with 
very cxtcnsive territories,  such  as  Bologna,  Modcna,  Parma, 
and Lucca.  Even in the time of  Polybius, thosc districts still 
lzacl  scarccly  any population, and afterwards  bccame  pcoplcd 
only by degrces.  Tllc Julian law unitcd Cispadana politically 
with  Italy.  The Celts  on the northern banks of the Po had 
no connexion with the Romans;? 
At  the close of thc war against Philip, the Actolians shcwcd 
themselves not only ui~~ratcf~~l  towards  the Rolnans, but they 
were most vehemently exasperatccl4' at not having  I'CCC~VC~  thc 
rewards which they expected for their scrviccs; and this fccling 
Pliny, Hist. Pat.  iii. 21.  Pliny, Hist. Nat. iii. 27. 
Res~ccting  the war against the Boians, Iiisuhriaus, etc., sco Livy, xxxii. 30, 
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did  not  by  any means  subside aftcrwards.  They were right 
in some  respects, but wrong  in others:  they madc  too  great 
pre~ensiolls; while the Ron~ans  did  not  act  fairly in refusing 
to surrender  to tile  Actolians  the towlls  of  Phthiotis.  But 
I am convinced, that even if there had been no real ground of 
compla,int, the Aetolialls would have moved heaven and earth, 
in ordcr to drive the Romans out of Grcece.  They accordingly 
now  tunlcd  their  eyes  towards Antiochus,  who  quite unde- 
scrveclly bcars  the surname  of  the  Great.  The dynasty  of 
the Seleuciclae is poorer  in great men than any othcr of  those 
became  established  in  the  various  kingdoms  of  the 
cinpire  of  Alexander.  Seleucus, the first, mas the most clistin- 
guished among them, though even he can  scarccly be called a 
great man; but the majority of  his  successors were unworthy 
and degenerate Orientals, even before thc Ptolemies became so. 
Antiochus is surnamed the Great, mcrely because his reign was 
a happy onc.  In comparison  with  thc  othcr  princcs  of the 
same  nainc  of  his  dynasty,  as  Antiochus  Soter,  and  thc 
contcmptiblc  Theos,  his  grandfather and  grcat  grmdfathcr, 
Antiochus  was  indeed  eminent,  for he rcstorcd the kingdom 
which  had been  left  to  him  by his  brother  Seleucus  in a 
state  of  considerabIe  dissolution,  but  without  doing  any 
rcdly great thing, as he excrted  the con~parativel~  cxtcnsivc 
resources  of  his  cmpirc  against  cowardly  cncmics.  Hc did 
not mcet with any great  digculties;  and  those  he did  mcet 
with,  he did  not  overcome  like  a  grcat  man.  He might 
have callcd himself eZ;-ruX7j~,  for previously  to his war with the 
Romans,  his  monarchy  was  largcr  than  it had  cvcr  bccn 
under the kings of Syria: it  cxtcnded from the lEIellcsl~ont  to the 
frontiers  of  India,  and  comprised  Phrygia,  Cilicia,  Syria, 
l'alcstinc,  Coclcsyria,  Mesopotamia,  Curdistan, Media, Persia, 
and dl  the country as far  as  Sidgistm and Cabul.  He con- 
cludcd trcatics with Indian chiefs, and had immense treasures: 
but with 211  this he had no military powcr,  and his kingdom 
was not superior to that of the former kings of Persia. Asiatic 
effeminacy prcvailcd throughout ; and his  strength ]lad ncvcr 
been tcstcd.  The descendants of the Maccdonians and Greeks, 
in their numerous colonics in Asia, which had been established 
by Alexander and Selcucus, had  bccomc  just as unwarlilcc as, 
at a much later  period, the Pullan or dcsccndants  of  the Cru- 
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and had adopted  all the vices  of  eastcrll nations, without any 
of  their  virtues.  As Antiochus  was  in possession  of  nearly 
the whole  extent of  the Persian empire, he was considered in 
the East as the p&yaS. /3acr~~~riq,  and in Europe as the formid- 
able enemy  of  the Romans;  the Aetolians, therefore,  hoped 
to derive  great  benefits  froin him.  He was  a  haughty and 
presumptuous  man. 
I have  already mentioned  that he entered into an alliance 
with Philip, against the young king of  Egypt.  The Rolnans 
had  then  entered  into  negotiations  with  him,  which,  how- 
ever,  led  to  no  results.  This  was  one  of  the many  steps 
which the Romans took  in venturing  upon  a  thing  witlzout 
dreading  failure.  Antiochus  was  now  in  Asia  Minor,  and 
fancied that he might easily extend his dominion  over a part 
of  Europe.  The  countries  which  Philip  had  talren  from 
Egypt,  and  which,  in  his  peace  with  Rome,  hc had  been 
obliged to give up, were in a defenceless state, and overwhelmed 
by Thracians-just  as the Britolzs were by thc Picts and Scots, 
-and  they therefore called Antiochus to their assistance.  This 
invitation was  flattering  to his  vanity; he accordingly inter- 
fered i11  the disputes in Chersoncsus, and restored Lysimachia 
which had been destroyed by the Thracians.  But the Romans, 
wisely einploying a vague expression, declared, that they would 
not suffer him to overstep the natural boundaries of his empire, 
and  called upon  him to restore  the  Greek  towns  in Asia  to 
freedom,  that they might  enjoy the same  benefit which  had 
been grantcd to the European Greeks.  This was the arrogmt 
demand of a people anxious for war.  Antiochus refused to do 
so, and  the  negotiations were  thus  continued for four years, 
during whiclz he fortified  Lysimachia and Chersoncsus as bul- 
warks in defence of  Asia.  He also equipped a flcet for which 
he ]lad the greatest  resources, having  taken from  the  Egypt- 
ians  the  coast  of  Phoenicia, and also  possessing  Cilicia  and 
Pamphylia.  In Greece  the Aetolians looked up to him, but 
the Rhodians were  decidedly hostile,  being  in  alliance with 
Egypt, and with Rome on a friendly understanding which was 
almost equal to an alliance. 
Antiochus'  residence  mas  not perinanently  at Antiocll;  he 
had then raiscd the splendid city of  Ephesus to the rank of his 
capital.  I-Iannibal  was  at  that  time  with  Antiochus,  who 
had received him with the greatest distinction.  Hannibal had 
spent the first years aftcr the close of  the second Punic war in 
llis  native city, and did not despair of the possibility of its reco- 
verJT. Soon  after the peace, he showed himself as great as he had 
been ill war.  He was appointed sufetes,  a title which we find in 
the book of 'L  Judges," signifying the head of the state in time 
of  peace.  In this  capacity he, by his  ability, restored the au- 
tllority of his ofice, which had ceased to be of great importance, 
the government of Carthage being already greatly paral~sed  by 
the delnocratic element.  l3e attempted to do away with abuses 
of  every  description,  and  to  rcroonn  the  constitution  of  his 
country.5  Hannibal's  reforms in the financial department were 
extraordinary; for  he found a  great  deficit, and ia  order  to 
prevent the  ruling men from  cizriching themselves at the cost 
of the nation, he iiztroduccd a system of economy, and revealed 
the  abuses which  had been  carried  on: in short he bestowed 
new life  and happiness  upon  his  native city.  The party of 
traitors, however, whose  interests he thus  opposecl, and which 
then existed at Cartlzage, as in all  other  contemporary states, 
set all their engines at work  against him, until he found him- 
self conlpelled  to quit his country.  Their ol~ject  was to gain 
power for themselves by sacrificing their country to the Romans, 
whom at  last they endeavoured  to excite  against  him.  Thc 
Ronzans began to silence their own sense of justice, by arguing, 
as  Livy beautifully says, that  they had  made  peace with  the 
Carthaginians, but not with Hannibal.  Rolne had long ceased 
to be a conscientious state; its moral greatness, which in  former 
times had not been a mere fancy, was gone, and just when they 
had it in their power to be just, thcy violated all  laws  of  Lo- 
nour and virtue.  They had repcatcdly coinplaiized of 13annibal, 
and now tllcy scnt  ambassadors to  ciernand  that he sl~ould  be 
surrendered  as  a  conspirator.  This  step, if  we may be]icre 
Liv~,  met wit11 the utmost opposition on  the part of the great 
Sci~io,  who  declared such  cond~~ct  to  be unworthy, nay, dis- 
gr""cful.  Hannibal, being informed of the fate which awaited 
Whcn we  rcad in 1h.y (xxxiii. 46) that EIannibd rcforlncd the ordo  judicum, 
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him, and before the Cartlzaginians had come to any resolution, 
which  perhaps  might have been  extorted from  them by his 
enemies, fled to Antiochm of Syria. 
Wlien  Hannibal  saw  the condition  of  the  Syrian army 
he  was  terrificd;  for  the  great  bulk  of  it  consisted  of 
barbarians.  It  was  only partially adapted to the hlacedonian 
tactics,  and  internally  as  corrupt  and  cowardly  as it  had 
been  under  the Persian  dominion.  There  were  only  some 
portions of  the army from which anything could be expected. 
EIis plan was wortl~y  of  him:  he advised Antiochus  to dircct 
his main attention to the fleet, and by mcans  of  it to  transfer 
the war to Italy, it being  his intention that the picked troops 
and those whom he himself  hopcd to assemble, should embark 
and  land  in the south of  Italy, which  was still  exasperated 
against Ron~c  for the vengeance she had taken.  Tlzc fleet was 
not to touch  Greece, in order to avoid provol~ing  l'hilip,  who 
was rather to be allowed to domineer there, and to increase his 
power  by allying  himself  with  Egypt.  Antiochus was  at 
first  greatly  astonished  at finding  t,hat Haiznibal thought SO 
little  of  the  monarch  of  so  great an empire, as to consider 
it necessary for  him to form  alliances for the purpose  of un- 
dertaking a war against Rome.  Little-minded persons naturally 
rejected  such  a  plan; and it was determined to transfcr  the 
war  into  Greece, where the Aetolians were the  king's  allies, 
and to  try to gain  over  Philip.  The Achaeans  were  firmly 
attached  to  the Romans;  and matters could not be  so casily 
arranged with the king  of  Macedonia;  for on the one  hand, 
Philip could  not forgive Antiochus for  not having  supported 
him in his  last  campaign, and on the  other hand Antiochus 
wished,  in  case  of  his  being  successful,  to  make  himself 
master  of  Greece and Thrace:  ail  alliance  between  the two 
kings would certainly have succeeded in weakening the Romans 
considerably.  But the nonsense which the advisers of Antiochus 
mixed  up with cverything, rendered  this  plan  perfectly  im- 
practicable;  they wanted  not only  to  negotiate  with  Philip, 
but at the same time to frighten him.  Therefore, at the very 
moment when  it was  of  the highest importance  to  gain  the 
good-will  of  Philip, a prctcnder who  gave himself  out to be 
a descendant of Alexander the Great, and had lived among the 
Acarnanians in Epirus, was received at Ephesus  as  the legiti- 
mate ruler of Afacedonia;  it being believed that thereby a revo- 
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lution  migllt  be  brought  about  in  that  country.  This was 
cllildisll.  The opiliion  of  IIannibal, who dissuaded  the king 
from  tile war, was  approved  of  by 0111~  a  few  who  were  not 
blinded by pride and vanity,  as Antiocl~us  himself was.  Han- 
nibal was looked upon as a traitol;  and the wretched king, with 
his wretchecl advisers, went so  far  in their folly as to believe 
that the great Carthaginiaii maintained a secret u~lderstallding- 
with Rome.  I11  this belief they were  strengthened by a piece 
of cunning  on the part of the Romans, whicli could not nlislead 
any but bad persons.  Scipio had been sent to Asia to condnct 
a last negotiation with Antiochus; he  and Hannibal knew each 
other personally, and two great  men  naturally set  aside the 
considcrntion  that  they  had  been  enemies in the field:  they 
were not inere instrumeiits of states, but two great moral powers 
standing f'ace  to  face, which had fought and concluded peace 
with each other, not as individual men.  In  such circumstances, 
truly grcat izlen conccive a mutual love.  In this instance, the 
fornier rivals becamc intimate, and Hannibal offered hospitality 
to Scipio, who declared  that  he would  accept it, if IIannibal 
were not dcpendcnt upon an cnemy of Rome.  This convcrsa- 
tion, in which Scipio may not have been as open as I-Iannibal, 
was  madc  cunning use  of  by Scipio, and may perhaps  have 
contributed to render Hannibal suspected.  IIad Antiochus bccn 
a wise man, he would have had nothing to do with the blind 
fury of  the Aetolians, or he ought at least to have convinced 
himself of  the real  extent  of  their power;  but  hc  imagincd 
that thcy were a great nation. 
After  many and fruitless discussions, Antiochus resolved  to 
follow the prcssing invitations of the Aetolians, but the prepa- 
rations were madc in so clumsy arnanncr, that he  had only 10,000 
men to cmbark.  The Aetolians expccted an innumerable army, 
and had also clescribcd to thc king their own  power  as  mucll 
greater than it really was, so that he was grcatly astollishcd at 
finding illat they had scarcely  4,000 men, and a few llun&ed 
horse.  Antiocllus hdcd  at Dcmetrins inThessalyfi, which, after 
thedcl~arture  of the coman  garrison,had fallell  into  thchallds ofthe 
Actolian9.  made ~~imselfmaster  of Phthiotis,  went to Euboea, 
and took the fortified town of Chnlcis:  it would seem as if fate 
had wished to justify the unwillingness wit11 which the Romans 
elltrusted these places  to the  Greeks,  not  know 
Livy, xxxv. 43. 
N  2 how to conduct themselves.  Thence he entered Boeotia) where 
his arrival was  hailed  wit11 joy7),  Phocis and Thessaly.  The 
last-named country had been constituted, by the Romans, as  a 
republic, but had ncver known how to govern itself; and during 
its long dependence on BIacedonia, it had lost all power of self- 
control.  Magnesia  and  Phthiotis werc separated from it, and 
formed into an independent state.  Antiochus was well received 
on both sides of  Mount  Oeta, and extended his  power  there. 
This was  a critical moment; for had  Philip joined  Antiocl~us 
with energy, the Romans might have been driven  back  as  far 
as Illyricum.  But his attention was turned away by the Romans, 
and he himself saw that the war  had been  cominenccd in SO 
senseless a manner, that not much  success could be expected; 
he had not yet recovered  enough  strength, and foresaw that, 
if the issue should be  unsuccessful, he himself  would  have to 
suffer most.  He might expect, by delaying to join the Syrian, 
to see the Romans crush the Aetolians, who were hostile tohim, 
while  his  own position  did not  become  worse;  and then he 
might wait patiently until the Greeks should begin hostilities 
against the Romans.  Philip, therefore, only took possession of 
Demetrias, one of  the three  strongholds of  Greece, which se- 
cured to him the dominion  over Thessaly.  There inust have 
been a secret treaty with Rome about this place, for thenceforth 
it remained in the hands of the Macedonians, down to the over- 
throw of their kingdom, without  a demand  being  ever  made 
for its evacuation.  Magnesia lilicwise became incorporated with 
Macedonia. 
A  bitter  feeling  between  the Romans  and  Achaeans  had 
manifested itself, even in the war of Nabis : the Achaeans inis- 
trusted the Romans, because they had not yet withdrawn their 
garrisons from Acrocorinthus, Chalcis, and Demetrias.  At  the 
time when Antiochus,  of  whose power the Greeks entertained 
most exaggerated notions, was approaching, the Romans were 
wise enough to withdraw those garrisons.  Other Greek states 
also gradually deserted Rome, and there existed  everywhere  a 
Roman and a Macedonian party.  Flamininus now stained his 
reputation by allowing the faction  clevotcd  to him and to the 
Romans to murder the head of the Macedonian party in Boeo- 
tia,  and by protecting the  murderers against  the justice of the 
law.  The friendship of the Achaeans towards lZorne mas only 
Pvlyhius, XX. 4. 
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of a  nature, inasmuch as it was  repugnant to their 
feelings to innkc common canse with the Aetolians. 
TIle  eyes of both Antiochns and of the Aetolians were now 
opelled  to the delusion under which  they had been  labouring 
in regard  to cacl~  other.  111  these  difficulties,  Hannibal, mllo 
had been  an evil prophet fro111  the beginning, was  looked  to 
for IleIp.  ~t is one of the inost distressing things that can hap- 
pen to a great man, to  be  asked  for  his  advice  in clangerous 
lnomcllts whicll he has forcsceu and foretold, and which would 
have been averted had he been listcned to.  But, as there was 
no other way left, Hannibal's advice, to enter into an alliance 
with Macedonia, was now followed with the most ardent zeal8, 
but quite in vain;  for Philip had already concluded an alliance 
with the Ro~ans. This was an immense advantage to him, 
though hc valued the acquisition more, inasmuch as it afforded 
him the means of  ruining the Actolians with the help  of  the 
Romans.  Antiochus now no longer vcnturcd up011  any great 
undcrtalcing; but, by the advice of his courticrs, hc intended to 
employ thc winter  in making further   reparations  in Asia. 
Meantime, the coiisnl, M.'Acilins  Glabrio, arrived with a fresh 
army, increased by  Macedonians, in Thessaly,  where  he was 
opposed by only 10,000 men of Antiochus, and a few Aetolians. 
Thc latter werc stationed near Hcraclca, while Antiochus occu- 
pied Thermopylac, which was now to be defended by Macedo- 
nixn Asiatics.  That the memorable pass could be evaded, unless 
the road across mount  Oeta  also was occupied, was generally 
known.  TheRomans made a gallant attack.  M. PorciusCato and 
his friend L. Velcrius Flaccus, were con~missioned  to talie pos- 
session of thc two heights commanding the pass.  The latter was 
unsuccessful ; but Cat0 took the heights, ancl, together with the 
fugitive  Aetolians, penctratcd  into  the camp  of  the enemy, 
while M.'Acilius  defeated the Syrians in front:  the whole army 
of Antiochus took to  flight, and thc king himself  cscapcd  to 
Cl'alcis,  where  had passed the preceding  in tile enjoy- 
ment of Asiatic luxuries, and childish festivities.  But he soon 
quittea thir place also, and leaving only a s~nall  &%rrison  behind, 
to -Asia Minor; his fleet also retreated before a Roman 
One  which had recently arrived: in sbort, the king acted as if 
war had been at an cnd.  The great Antiochus no,>- aban- 
dOncdl'imselftosells~alplcasures,  and ordcredun arn~y  to  be raised 
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from bll Asia, which was to be so numerous as to render hope- 
less any resistance on the part of the Romans. 
M.'  Acilius  Glabrio  now  directed  his  arms  against  the 
Aetolians  who  were  left  entirely  to  themselves.  Heraclea 
and  Lamia,  two  towns  on  the  Thcssalian  side  of  Ther- 
mopylz  belonging  to Actolia  Epictetos,  were  besieged,  the 
former by the Romans,  the latter  by  Philip, probably accor- 
ding to the secret article in his treaty with Rome, above alluded 
to.  The sicge  of  EIeraclea,  where  the  main  force  of  the 
Aetolians was stationed, was carried on systematically  and wit11 
great energy;  the town was takcn by assault; the prrison and 
the citadel surrendered  at discretion.9  All the fair  prospects 
of  the Aetolians had now vanished, for it was more than prob- 
able  that  Antiocl~us  would  never  return  to  Greece.  What 
saved them was  the wish  of  the Roman generals to conclude 
this dificult war in the mountains against  a  poor people, and 
to cross over to the rich  countries  of  Asia;  and the policy  of 
the Romans, which was to prevent Philip attaining his purposes 
of aggrandizement,  also  prevented  the  utter  ruin  of  the 
Aetolians.  When, therefore, Lamia  was  on the point  of sur- 
rendering, the Roman consul, although the town had no doubt 
been promised to the king, sent  a  message  to  him,  ordering 
him to raise the siege, on  the ground that the consul had con- 
cluded a  treaty for  Lamia.  Thenccforth  Philip took no part 
in the war,  and confined  himself  to  extending his dominions 
towards the west, by conquering Athalnania and the Dolopians. 
The Aetolians  would  have  been  extirpated, had  not  the 
Romans had reasons  for  preserving them.  The Ronians now 
appeared  before  Naupactus,  and laid  siege to it.  The town 
would have been  taken had the Romans actcd with the same 
energy as at Heraclca;  but they carried on the siege with the 
wish  to  spare the enemy,  and  the Aetolians  having in tlze 
meantime  gathered  all  their  scattered  forccs,  the  Romans 
withdrew  from  the  place.10  The  war  came  to its  close 
with  the siege  of  Ambracia",  which  then  belonged  to the 
Aetolian state.  The peace  was  concluded  by the consul  M. 
Fulvius; and the Aetolians  obtained  tolerable terms, for they 
had only to pay a contribution  of  a  few hundred talents12, to 
rccognise the supremacy  of  Romc,  and to promise  to support 
Livy, xxxvi. 24, foll.  lo  Livy, xuvi. 35; Plutarch, Flamzn. 15. 
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her in  war.  Ambracia was saved, and passed peaceably  into 
tile  hands  of the Rolnans.  Cephallcnia  was  taken  by the 
~olllalls  and destroyed; Acarnania had  prcviously  fallen into 
tllcir hands.  The sicge of  Ambracia is one  of the most inge- 
llious in all ancient  history,  and  its  defence  does honour  to 
the Aetolians,  whose  wars  are,  on the whole,  not  glorious: 
for  that small  people, forcsaken by all  the  Greeks,  and led 
by  no  great  man,  now  defended  itself  with  extraordinary 
bnvery.  I have  here  somewhat  anticipated  the time,  for 
the siege of Ambracia took place  in the year 564.  Rome had 
thus secured all the landing places  along  this coast, and had 
opened to herself all the roads into Greece. 
LECTURE  LXIX. 
AFTER  Antiochus had left Europe, he defended himself  only 
with his fleet against  the Rhodians,  and the ships of  Attalus 
and Eumenes, among which there were  only  very few Roman 
With regard to the Romans,  he was as inuch at ease 
as if  he had been  secured from them by an impassable gulf1; 
and it was Hannibal alonc who induced him to keep possession 
of tl~c  Heller~pont.  This he did, but no more;  for he thought 
it sufficient to prevent tlzo  Romans  from  attacking him in his 
own  dominions.  An engagement  of  some  importance took 
place  in which  the king's  enemies  gained  some advantages; 
but afterwards  the fleets separated,  and that of  the Rhodians 
was  clisgraccfully deceived by the Syrians,  takcn  by surprise, 
and defeated.  M. Bmilius  llcgillus, a  Roman  admiral,  was 
already approaching with a  Roinan fleet.  How little the sea 
was  the elcment  of  the Romans  may be seen  from  the fact, 
that immediately after the Punic war they had given up their 
fleet, for  they never  kept  one  unless  they really  wanted  it. 
Hence we find them at Myonnesus with  not more  than from 
eighty to ninety ships, half of which, at the least, belonged to 
the Rhodians, who were by far the best  sailors of those times, 
and still showed a freshness like that of the best age of Greece. 
The fleet of Antiochus was  furnished  almost  entirely by the 
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Phoenician towns2, and was under the command of  Hannibal, 
but it was nevertheless  unable to join  another division of  the 
king's  fleet.  A  battle  ensued  off  &lyonnesus, in  which the 
Romans and their allies gained a decided victory.  The fleet of 
Antiocllus was almost  entirely destroyed,  and the remaining 
ships escaped into two ports on the coast of Caria.  The victory 
was @ined by the Rhodians,  but at the same time by fire, for 
the Rhodians had engines on board  their  ships,  by means  of 
which thcy threw fire upon those of the enemy.  This  roba ably 
resembled the substance which in later times was called Grecian 
fire: to judge of it from the manner in which the Greek histo- 
rians  speak  of  it, it was  not thrown with rockets,  and was 
certainly sometlzing inextinguishable and not generally known. 
This naval victory decided the war.  On the advice  of  Han- 
nibal,  Antiochus  had  endeavoured  to  keep  possession  of 
Chersonesus, which is connected with Thrace only by a narrow 
neck of land a few miles broad.  On it was situated Lysimachia, 
a strongly fortified place, whence strong walls ran to the Melas 
Colpos and the Propontis, so that on the land side an entrance 
could  be forced only by a siege.  A landing might have been 
effcctcd at several points, but the Syrian fleet might and ought 
to  have  prevented  it.  If  Antiochus  had  wished  to  lreep 
on the defensive,  he would  have  been  unassailable  in Asia. 
But  his  blindness  was  so  great that  he removecl  Hannibal 
from his court and sent him to  Pamphylia,  because he hated 
him as the man who  reminded him of  former counsels which 
had not been followed.  It is possible that by occupying Cher- 
sonesus he might have protected  Asia,  although he could  not 
have  done  so  for  any length of  time;  but the madness was, 
that the king evacuated it without making even an attempt to 
defend it.  The rich  stores  there which were  intended for a 
long campaign were given up to tlze Romans, and the garrisons 
were withdrawn from all the towns.  He  deceived either him- 
self  or  his  subjects  with the thought  that he  could  defend 
himself behind the Hellespont,  but that  coast too he gave up 
on  the approach  of  the Bomans,  and  withdrew  into Lydia. 
In like manner  the  Persians  did  not  prevent  the troops  of 
Philip from  crossing;  for  it is  a  fact  not  generally known, 
that Philip  had  already commenced  the war  againrt  Persia, 
The Pl~rcnician  towns,  30  powerful  in the time of  the  Persians,  appear to 
have wholly lost their importance.-N. 
alld  had led his  troops  into Asia before  Alexander  came  to 
the t11rone.j 
L. Cornelius  Scipio and his friend C. Laelius were consuls 
in the year 562,  and it was at this time that they quarrelled. 
Laelius aspired  to the co~nlnand  of tlze army in Asia; but the 
great Scipio, who had been the best friend of Laelius in private 
life, by his influence, which was still unbounded in the republic,  ,  " 
in inducing the senate to confer the command upon 
his brother;  but Lucius  Scipio would  nevertheless  not  have 
obtained it, had not his brother offered to serve as legate under 
him; for he could not become  consul,  the law  requiring that 
there should be an interval of  ten years  betweell  two consul. 
sllips of  the same man,  being  at this  time strictly observed. 
p. Cornelius  Scipio had in the meantime been censor,  and his 
extraordinary  influence was  clearly seen  on this occasion,  for 
Lucius  was  a very insignificant  person,  and was  elected  only 
for llis brother's  sake, as on a former occasion the great Fabius 
Maximus had procured  the consulship  for  his  son,  and then 
served  under  him  as  legate.  As  soon  as  the Roman  fleet 
reached the coast of  Asia,  and while thc  Scipios were  yet in 
Macedonia, there came ambassadors from Antiochus, expressing 
the wish of their king to restore peace,  and his desire to know 
the terms; he offered to give up Chersonesus and to recognise 
the freedom of  the Asiatic cities, Smyrna and Abydos,  wlzich 
had been taken by thc Romans,  and to bear half  of  the ex- 
penses  of  the  war.  These  terms,  offered  by  a  prince  who 
confessed himself  to be conquered,  were  not accepted  by the 
Romans.  Scipio declared that they would  havc been accepted 
at the time when Antiochus had not yet evacuated Chersonesus, 
but that he must  now submit  to his will.  The Romans  ad- 
vanced through Macedonia and Thrace by very difioult roads, 
but were  assisted  by Philip,  whom  they rewarded by giving 
up to him the possession of  the Thracian coast towns.  When 
they had crossed the IIellespont,  P.  Scipio  was  taken  ill,  a 
thing which often happened to him.  He could not accompany 
the army,  and was  obliged  to  remain  at  Elatca, an  Aeolian 
city.  This prevented  all  operations,  and Antiochus  availed 
himself of the respite for commencing fresh negotiations, which 
hOlvevcr led  to nothing.  Scipio  proposed  modcrate  term:, 
but  they  appeared  intolerable  to  the  pride  of  the  Syrian 
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king.  A son of the great Scipio, we know not how, had fallen 
into the hands of  the Syrians,  and was  treatcd  by them wit11 
much distinction.  The ambassadors first offered to restore him 
to freedom; but Antiochus,  who hoped  to obtain thereby the 
desired peace more surely, sent him back to his fi~tlier  at once, 
and without  ransom.4  This,  however,  did  not produce  the 
desired effcct ;  and as it was impossible to come to any terlns, the 
decisioll was lcft to a battle.  Scipio wished to avoid a decisivc 
engagement until his rccovcry; Antiochus, on thc other hand, 
was  anxious to fight.  The two armies met on  the frontier of 
Lydia,  near  Magnesia,  at the foot of  Mount  Sipylus.  That 
country is  intcrsccted  by moderate hills,  and  is  one  of  the 
iincst  in the world,  like all the coast-districts of  Asia Minor, 
in  contrast  to  the barren  countrics  of  the  interior,  which 
are exposed  to  frequent  injury  by  volcanic  agency.  Tllc 
Romans had only one consular army-thc  other was still cngagcd 
against  the Aetolians-that  is,  two  legions  with the corre- 
sponding  numbcr  of  allics,  a  few  thousand  Achaeans,  and 
some  auxiliaries  from  Eumciics,  who rulecl  only over  Perga- 
inus,  and soinc Ionian and Mysian  towns; the whole scarcely 
a~nountccl  to 30,000 soldicrs.  The  Syrian  army consisted of 
80,000 men; the main force was drawn up like a  Macedonia11 
phalanx,  probably composed  of  nations  from all countries:  it 
was a motley host  of Asiatics.  But there were among them 
some  nZaccdonians, dcscendants  of  the troops  of  Alexander, 
who, however, wcre  already inixcd with the Asiatic  popula- 
tion.  Antiochus  had,  bcsidcs,  pcltasts  with  Grcck  armour, 
and  a  nurnbcr  of  Asiatic  nations,  of  whose  armour  ncithcr 
Livy nor  Appian  tell  us  anything.  During three  days  thc 
armies  advanced  towards  cach  other,  and on  the fourth  the 
battle  was  fought.  The  irnmcnse  army  of  Antiochus  out- 
flanked the right wing of the Romans, whose left wing rested 
upon  a  stream which had no depth.  The Syrian arrny con- 
sistcd  of the  phalangite  reserves,  cavalry, clcphants, 
and war-chariots:  the elephants made no impression upon thc 
Romans, who had lcarnt to despise them; ancl they themselvcs 
had African elephants,  of which,  howcvcr, they made no use, 
because, unlike the African lions, they werc much weaker and 
more timid than the Indian ones.  Even  the masses  of  the 
Livy,  xxxvii.  34,  foll.;  Diodorus,  Fragm.  lib. xxix. Ezeerpt.  de  Legat. 
vi. p.  620. 
~~~~d~~i~~  which  at Cynoscephalae  had given  the 
-R~~~~~~~  so  much trouble, and which for  a moment seemed to 
render  the issue doubtful, was soon overwhelmed.  On another 
point ~~ti~~hus  drove the Romans back  to their caillp, but 
was then  The operatiolls of the phalanx were frus- 
trated by tllc wretched disposition which the king had made. 
His arlny mas  at first  drawn up in a number of  small Inasses 
intervals  between  them; and instead of  being  kept  in 
tllat order and employed, they were allowed to draw together, 
from fear, into one immense mass,  a thing which in extreme 
danger  could  be  available only in a  plain, whereas there, on 
uneven groulld, it gavc rise to the grclztcst confusion, and the 
light  arlned  troops  of  the Romans were  cnablcd  with  thcir 
javelins  and slings to make  such  an impression  upon them, 
that all dispersed in flight and confusion.  The attclnpt which 
was  made  at  first  to  use  the  scythe-chariots  against  the 
Romans had been cqually unsuccessful, the Romans dispersing 
them  by their  sliirmishers.  These  scythe-chariots  were  an 
Asiatic invention, but occur also among the Cclts, espccially 
in Britain:  when thcy werc used  the horses wcre frightened. 
The defeat of the Asiatics was so complete, that it was impos- 
sible to reasscnlblc the remnants of the army.  The loss of the 
Romans is said to have been  very small"  and this indeed is 
probable  enough, for  the soldiers  against whom they fought 
wcre not better than those whom Alexander had defeated at 
Arbela.  The king fled through Phrygia, and sent Zeuxis  as 
ambassador  to  Scipio to sue  for  pcace,  consenting  to acccpt 
any terms,  however humiliating they might be.  Scipio was 
delighted  to bc  able  to  conclude  pcace:  it is  possible  that 
L.  Sc,ipio, as was subsequently stated in the accusation  aPinst 
him, rcccivcd  presents on that occasion;  but there is no need 
for such a supposition,  as nothing was so desirable to a Roman 
consul, as to concludc peace  before  the arrival of' a successor. 
A prelilninary trcaty was  grantcd to Antiochus, on condition 
that  he  sllould  pay  down  immediately  500  talents  for  thS: 
during which  all the otl~cr  articles should be settled at 
2500 talents after the treaty should have received the 
of  the senate and people at Rome6, and 12,000 ad&- 
tiOnal  by  instalmcnts  of  1000 a-year.  Antiochus was 
Livy, xxxvii. 44. 
'  It is only acciclcntal that this point is not mcntioned slftcrwards.-N.  See 
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further to give twenty hostages, and among thcm his own son ; 
to  give up to the Romans  all  tlic  countries  west  of  Mount 
Taurus-that  is the whole of Asia Minor, with the exception 
of  the two Cilicias to the north of Mount Taurus.  The river 
Halys was to bc the boundary.  I-Ic  had  accordingly to give 
up all  that  he  possessed  in Phrygia,  and it was  afterwards 
disputed  whether  Pamphylia  also  was  comprised  under  that 
head.  Livy  and the fragments  of  Polybius  throw  no light 
upon this question, and the geography of those countrics is on 
the whole very  obscure;  but  as  far  as I understand Appian, 
Pamphylia  did not remain unclcr  the dominion  of  Antiochus, 
nor  was  it  given  to  Eumcnes,  bnt  remaiiicd  indcpcndcnt 
between  the two.  EIe  had  further to pledgc himself  not to 
interfere in the affairs of  Europe without the consent  of  thc 
Romans; not  to  carry  on  war  against  nations  allied  with 
Rome,  unless  he were  attacked; to givc up all ships of  war 
except tcn, and evcn his triremes, keep no elepliants, and raiec 
no mercenaries in countrics subject to Rome; pay a scparatc 
sum of money to Eumcnes; and, lastly, to deliver up EIannibal 
and some other men whom  he had received  at his court (this 
latter point was  a  mere  pretencc  to smooth over thc demand 
for the surrender of Hannibal);  but they cscaped.  This treaty 
was  signed in the year 562.  The pcace was not definitively 
concluded  till  some  time  after.7  A  single  battlc  in  a  war 
rashly undertaken lecl to this humiliating pcace !  It is incon- 
ceivable how a prince concluding such a pcace could be called 
the Great,  and yct he still had a  mighty empire, as large as 
Germany, France, and Spain put togcther ! 
In the spring of thc year aftcr this, Cn. Manlius Vulso, the 
successor of L. Cornclius Scipio, anxious for an opportunity to 
undcrtakc sorncthing  from  which  lie  might derivc fame  and 
wcalth-a  desire which is henceforward the prevailing charac- 
teristic of the Roman  generals-made  a campaign against the 
Galatians,  or  Gallo-Graeci,  in  Phrygia.8  In the  timc  of 
Pyrrhus these  Gauls had penetratcd  through Macedonia into 
Greece  as  far  as  Delphi;  afterwards  they  went eastward  to 
Thrace:  but whether they were, as the Greeks l.clate, induced 
to do so  by fearful natural phenomcna,  or  wcre attracted  by 
'  Livy, xxxviii. 38 ;  Polybins, xxi. 14, =ii.  26 ; Diodorus,  Frugm.  lib. xxi, 
ETC,  de Legat. ix p. 621 ;  Appian,  Syriuc. 39. 
Livy, xxxviii. 12, full.;  Polybius, xxii. 16, foll. 
reports  about tllc  deligI~tful  countrics  of  Asia  is  uncertain. 
JI~~~  remained  in  Thracc and ruled  over  tlie  country; but 
otllers, 20,000 ill number, crossed over into Asia  in two divi- 
sions,  the  one  going  across  the Hellespont,  and the other 
across  the Bosporus,  and  thcir  entcrprise was  facilitated  by 
the  feuds  of  the Asiatic  princes.  There they settled  011  the 
coast,  in thc territory about  Ancym,  in Phrygia, 
just, as at a later period, the Normans did in Ncustria.  They 
illhabitcd  thirty-three  towns,  in a  country which, though  it 
seeins to have been  destined by Providence to be  onc of  the 
lliost  flourishing  and happy in the world,  is now,  under tlie 
clespotism of barbarians,  like an accursed  desert.  They con- 
sisted  of  tlirce tribes,  bcaring  the strange names  of  Trocmi, 
Tolistoboii, and Tcctosagac.  The first two seem to have been 
formed during their wanderings,  for  they are not mentioned 
elsc.ivlicre.  Tlicy  united  with  the  Bithynians,  where  two 
small  kingdoms  wcre  growing  up.  The  Bithyliians  were 
Tllracians  settlcd between  Nicomcdia  and  Heraclea:  during 
the  timc  of  the  Persian  dominion,  they were  governcd  by 
native  princes,  and  aftcr  tlie  dissolution  of'  the Persian  aiid 
Maccdoniaii cmpircs, the lattcr of whicli had always been least 
consolidateci in  Asia  Minor,  they extended  themselves  and 
acquired  considerablc  importance.  Nicoinedcs,  thcir  king, 
took those Gauls into his pay, thcre being then only 10,000 
arincd men among thcm, defcated his  rival, and foundcd the 
Bith~nian  state,  which  gradually  became  Hcllenised.  From 
that timc the Gauls sold thcir services to any one who might 
seek  thcm, and made the whole  of western  Asia  tribl1tary to 
themselves.  Their  history  is yet in great  confusion;  but  it 
can be cleared up, many materials  existing for it.  They 
defeated by Antiochus  Sotcr, whereupon they withdrew into 
tlle lnountains, whence  they afterwards  burst forth whenever 
circum~tances  allowcd them, and all the neighbouring nations 
Paid  tribute to cscapc their devastations.  But when the war 
between Ptolemy Euergctes and Scleucus Callinicus, and after- 
wards that betwccn  the former and Antiochus Hierax  broke 
0%  they showed themselves thoroughly faithless, selling them- 
selvcs solnctilnes to the onc, sometimes to the other, and were 
the scourge of all Asia, until, to the amazement of every body, 
Attalus  of  Pcrffalnus  refused  to  pay  tribute,  attacked  and 
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supposition,  that  through  icllcness  they  had  become  q~~ite 
effeminate  and unwarlike,  like  the  Goths  whom  Belisarius 
found in Italy.  They never entirely recovered from this blow, 
though they still continued to  exercise considerilble influence, 
for  Asia  was  always  dividcd ; and although  Antiochus  was 
staying in those  countries, hc was  too mncll occupied  to turn 
his  attention  to them, and  would  not,  moreover,  have  been 
able to protect  that part of  Phr~gia  bordering on tlzc district 
inhabited by  the  Gauls.  Hence thcy still levicd  tribute  fdr 
and wide, and after thc hll of  Antiochus,  the Asiatic nations 
dreaded  lest  thcy  should  be  unable  to  defend  themselves. 
This gavc Cn. Manlius an opportunity of undertalring a  cam- 
paign against them,  and to come forward as the protector of 
the  Asiatics  against  the Galatians.  His demand  that  thcy 
should  submit  had  been  answered  by those  barbarians with 
a  stolida feroeia,  and he accordingly marched through  Phry- 
gin, and attacked thcm in their mountains, without, howevcr, 
extirpating them.  They continued in those districts, and pre- 
served their Celtic language for a remarkably long pcriod.  We 
find it even in the time of Augustus;  but they too became Hel- 
lcnised, and in  this conditionwe hnd them at the time of St.  Paul.9 
Thc campaign of Manlius Vulso against them was most desira- 
ble to the inhabitants of  Asia  Minor; but on  the part  of  the 
Romans, it was very unjust, for  Manilius Vulso undcrtook  it 
contrary to  the  express will of  the decem legati who followed 
him to Asia.  The war was brought to a close in two campaigns, 
but the  Romans  derived  no  ttdvantagcs  from it, exccpt the 
booty and perhaps a sum of  money  which  was paid to them; 
for the countries bctween wcstern Asia and the districts of the 
Galatians were not subject to the Romans, but only allicd with 
them.  The Galatians suffered so severe a dcfeat, that from this 
time forward they continued to live in quiet  obedience  to the 
Romans. 
The Romans  now  distributed  their  conquests.  Eumenes, 
who until then had been quite an insignificant prince, was now 
made  a  grcat  liing,  and received  an  indcpcnclcnt  kingdom, 
St. Jerome says, that he hcarcl the samc language in Pin-ygia as at Treves; 
but  this  cannot  be  referred  to  the  Galatians,  and  St. Jcrome  probably saw 
Germans who had  settled in Phrygia at different times, especially Goths in thc 
reign of  Theodosins.  It may be lookcd upon as an cstablishcd fact that Treves 
was German, and it is not likely that the  Gallic language  maintained itself  in 
Asia down to so late a period.-N. 
somprisillg  ;\lysia,  Lydia,  Phrygia  on  the  Hellespont,  and 
Great l>llrygia (the two mere  afterwards  colnprised under thc 
llallle Of the kingdom of  Asia, and its inllabitailts were called 
Asiai1i),  and  Ionia,  with  the exception  of  Smyma, Phocaea, 
Erythrae, and a few othcr Greek maritime  towns, which wcre 
constituted as republicslO,-a  kingdom for which he might be 
be envied by many a European king ;  but it was weak on account 
of the Asiatic cffcininacy of the people.  The Rhodians also were 
not forgotten, for they rcccived Lycia and Caria, with the exccp-  - 
tion  of  Telmessus,  which, no one knows why,  was  given to 
Eumcnes. This was an immense acquisition for a small republic; 
for &ria  were wealthy and excellent countries, from 
which thcy might derive very large sums of  moncy. With  the 
ancients, taxes were very hc:ivy;  the principal tax was the land- 
tax, amounting t,o one-third of the produce.  By such taxes, the 
Rhodians acquired great wealth, which they cmplo~ed  partly in 
military  preparations, and  partly  in embellishing  their  city, 
which was already one of grcat splcndour.  Thc Rhodians de- 
served, indeed, to possess such rich countries,  for they were  a 
thoroughly respectable people, who, as the Romans themselves 
owned, had not the levitas Graecorum but a scveritas discklinae 
equal to their own. 
Bcfore I  proceed  to  give  you  an outline of  the state  of 
morality and literature among the l3omans, I have to mcntion 
the death of  P. Cornelius Scipio, which is obscured by various 
contradictions.  It is a rerriarkable  instancc of  the nlanner in 
which fiillse and impossible  tales  have crept into the annals of 
those  times,  so  as  to make  it hol>eless ibr  11s to attempt  to 
arrive at a  positive convictioii as  to what  is historically  true 
and  what  is  mcrc  iiction.  Contradictory  occurrences,  and 
such as  took placc at different  times,  are here put together. 
What Livyll incntions hom thc speech of  Tiberius Gracchus, 
must be lookcd upon as sornetlling  inorc than the narrative oS 
an annalist.  There is  no doubt that, at one time, Scipio was 
callcd  upon  by the Petillii  before thc senate to answer to the 
charge of  having  reccived  from  Antiochus sums  of  money, 
and of  not having  given to the republic an account of  what 
he had gained in the course of  the war.12  This kind of  accu- 
'O  Polyl~ius,  xxii. 26, foU. ;  Livy, xxxviii. 39 ;  Diodorus, Fragnl.  lib. xuix;  Exc. 
de Legat. X. p. 621 ; Appinn, Syriuc. 44. 
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sation is one of  the earliest that we  find among  the Romans. 
The consuls had full right to dispose of  the nzanubiae and the 
money exacted from  a conquered enemy in what manner they 
pleased.  They might distribute thein among their soldiers, or 
make  them over  to  the treasury  of  the  republic;  but  they 
were obliged to be prepared to give an account of  the manner 
in which they had acted; and to demand such an account was 
considered by the people as their constitutional and inalienable 
right.  L. Scipio  had  given  no account;  and when  called 
upon to defend  himself  against certain suspicions, he sent for 
his account-books, and caused thein to be read before the senate; 
but his brother snatched thein from his hands and torc them to 
pieces, declaring it to be unreasonable that as he and his brother 
had so much enriched thc state, he should be taken t,o account 
for the trifling sum of  about  a  million  of  drachmae,  that is, 
36,0001.13  The fact that  Scipio could speak of  such a snin as 
a  trifle, shews how high the standard  of  property must  have 
been even as early as that time.  But this act of  P. Scipio did 
not remain without its consequences.  A charge was also brought 
against him of having been bribed by Antiochus; when he was 
summoned to appear before the tribunes,  he proudly said that 
the day was ill suited for litigation, since it was the anniversary 
of  the day on which he had conquered Hannibal at Zama, and 
when they were accustolned  to offcr sac,rifices in the Capitol, 
adding, ''  Let every one who has  the good of  Rome at heart 
follow me !"  I-Ie was  accompanied  by the whole people;  thc 
tribunes  alone  arc  said  to  have  remained  behind?l4  This 
charge may have becn  the one to which allusion was  made in 
the speech  of  Gracchus,  where  it was  stated  that  Gracchus 
himself had intended to arrest L. Scipio, but that P. Scipio on 
hearing that the praetor Terentius Culleo was going to conduct 
the trial, hastily returned from Etruria, and rescued his brother 
from the hands of the constable.  And P. Scipio too was accused, 
because animos plus quam civibs gcrebat.  He had not expected 
suclz a charge, and it may be that he then withdrew into volun- 
tary exile to  Liternum, a  Latin  colony,  or colonia  maritima, 
between  Cumae and Minturnae, or he had  previously resided 
there.  This ~nuch  at least  is certain, that he passed  the last 
years of  his lifc away from  Rome.  The belief  that  he .lived 
l3 Li~y,  xxxviii. 5.5;  Gellias, N. A. iv.  18, vii.  19; Diodorns,  Exc. Vatican. 
p. 78, foli. ed. llindorf.  '*  Gellit~s,  N.A. iv.  18. 
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at  it^^^^^^ as an  and not from choice, clerires support 
from the circulnstance that before his death a different person 
princcps  senatus;  such an exile mas easily effected, and if he 
settled there as  a  citizell of  Liternum, he thereby renounced 
his  Rolllnll  franchise.  It was  during the time when  hc lived 
at  ~it~~~~~~n  that  is  said  to have betrothed  his daughter 
Cornelia  to Tib. Gracchus;  but if  we consider  the age of  her 
sons, it seelns more probable that the engagement did not take 
placc till after Scipio's death.15 
L. Scipio, with his quaestor and legate, was declared guilty of 
having appropriated to himself the surn stated in the accusation : 
he did not become an addictus;  but his property, when confis- 
cated by the state, is said to have been insufficient to make up the 
sum.  It  would be rash to infer from this that he was innocent, 
since he might have squandered the money in the mcan time. 
After  the first  Punic  war, the  number  of' the tribes  had 
been  increased  to  thirty-five, a  large  portiolz  of  thc  Sabii~cs 
having obtained  the full  francllisc, of  m~hoin  two  new tribes 
were  formed,  the  Qnirina  and  the  Velina.  ?'his  happened 
nearly sixty years aftcr thc last  increase, so that a considerable 
stagnation in the developrneizt of the state had  already  taken 
place.  About  the  same  time, and  probably evcn  before  the 
first Punic war, many towns  were raised  to  the rank of  pre- 
fectures with the Caerite  franchise.  During  the Ilannibalian 
war there were  four  praetors;  but before it was brought  to a 
close  their  number  was  raised  to  six.  Spain now became  a 
province like Sicily, or rathcr was divided into two provinces, 
Hispania Citerior, and  Ulterior, into which two  praetors  were 
sent.  Southern  Italy had  likewise,  in consequelice  of  the 
Hannibalian war, rcceived  the  administration  of  a  province, 
and retained  it for  some time after: the praetor govcrning it, 
resided no doubt at Tarenturn, or in Bruttium.  Gaul was not 
yet redacts in provinciae forman~,  so  that  no  praetor was  scllt 
thither.  The greatest change-the  one most  deeply affecting 
the state, and which was fullowed by permanent consequences, 
--was  caused by the desertion of'maily Italian nations to Han- 
nibal.  They were punished, and the places which had bclongeil 
to them were deprived of all the privileges of tllc Italian allies; 
sorlle  were  treated  like  conquered  towns;  their  territories 
becarlle state iJm))ertJ',  or were left  to  the inhabitants ollly on 
'' Li-$-y,  xxx~iii.  57. 
TOL. 11.  0 a precarious tenure; otllers wlriclr  submitted  were  gellerously 
spared.  This happencd  to a great number  of  places in Sam- 
nium and Apulia, ~vhich  were severed from their communities. 
Those which  had  remained  faithful, probably  retained  tl~eir 
ancient  constitntion;  the Lucanians,  for  example, no doubt 
continued to elect their own praetor, as they had done  in  the 
Hannibalian  war ; but  all the Lucanian  towns who had  re- 
volted  were  separated  from  them.  The Bruttians, who  had 
been  most  in their revolt, lost their whole consti- 
tution: they  ceased  to be  allies,  and became  dediticii;  they 
had  to furnish  persons who  performed  servilc  duties, and all 
their landed property was confiscated.  It  is uncert~in  whether 
they had  previously been  in the same  condition  as the Sam- 
nites  and  Lucanians,  though  it is probable  that  they  werc 
treated  as foreigners, being  dcsccndecl from Greeks:  but they 
had after all been in an honourable condition, from which they 
now fell.  Tarellturn lost all its rights, but continued its forlorn 
existence  within  its walls, until it  gradually  dwindled away. 
This change among the allies, rendered  it more  difficult  than 
it had previously bcen for those who remained to ~eribrm  their 
duties  towards  Rome.  The revolt, moreover,  had  created a 
lasting  feeling  of  bitterness  between Rome and lnany It~lian 
nations.  The allies became still more  exhausted  through the 
practice  which  now arose, that many, availing themselves  of 
the right of isopolity, settled at IZomc, or in the Latin colonies. 
A portion of the latter had neglected their duty, twelve out of 
the thirty not  having  furnished  any  contingent  during  the 
expedition  of  Hasdrubal;  and now that circumstances  per- 
mitted it their rights were curtailed.  The effects of the Hanni- 
balian war were never effaced.  The Samnitcs, Apulians, and 
Lucanians had evcn previously suffered vcry severely; Etruria 
alone enjoyed a high degree of  prosperity.  In the last  years 
of  the war a state debt is mentioned, which was paid by three 
instalments;  but  the Maccdonian  war  had  so  much  drained 
the  public  treasury  that  the  third  instalmcnt  was  paid  in 
domain lands.  The Roman people themselves had  suffered  to 
the core.  The war had carried off an inlmense number of men; 
and as the census nevertheless shews no falling off, it is a poof 
that in the mean  time  many strangers, especially  freedmen, 
were admitted as citizens;  whence, the body of Roman citizens 
is henceforth something quite different from what it had been. 
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~h~~~ who  had  held  out  during the war, were  for the most 
part  impoverished.  In Livp'a  narrative  this  distress  is 
not visible  at all ; but we  know  from  other  sources,  that 
R~~~  was alnlost constantly visited  by famine and epidemics. 
The property of  many families was  situated  in the Falernian 
district  and  in  Campania,  which  conntries  were  completely 
devastated.  Others who had possessed estates in the revolted 
countries, had lost everything, so  that this war  destroyed  the 
whole  of  the national wealth.  The Greek towns, Croton and 
others, were never able to recover.  Another consequence was, 
that  the soldiers  remained  in  arms  for  years,  and that the 
legions  became  a  standing  army.  This  continued  after  the 
war,  and the eoldiers  gradually  became  accustomed  to  look 
upon  themselves  as  a pern~anent  order  of  men,  which  they 
had  hithcrto  never  been, as the legions had  been  disbanded 
every year, and newly  fornled  in the next.  This guarantee 
for the duration of republican freedom was  destroyed through 
the Hannibalian war; and thus we have here the germs of the 
subsequent ferments.  Vast estates had  been  acquired  by the 
extensive  confiscations, and  were  in the hands of  the nobles, 
both  patrician  and  plcbeian,  as  no  one  now  exercised  any 
control, the Licinian law having ceased to be applied. 
The history of  Scipio is very instructive, for it shews  how 
the state was hastening towards its dissolution.  No one thought 
of  the republic  being  in danger, and the danger was  indeed 
as  yet far  distant;  but  the seeds  of  dissolution  were  never- 
theless  sown,  and  its  symptoms were  already  beginning  to 
become  visible.  We hear  it generally  said  that, with  the 
victories of the Romans in Asia, luxury and all the vices which 
accompany avarice and rapacity,  began to break in upon them. 
This is indeed true enough,  but  it was only the symptom of 
corruption,  and  not  its  cause:  the  latter  lay  much deeper. 
After  so  many years  of  destructive and  cruel  wars,  during 
which the Romans  had  been almost  uninterruptedly  in arms, 
the whole nation was  in a frightful condition:  the poor were 
impoverished,  the  middle  class  had  sunk  deeper and 
and  the  wealthy  had  amassed immense riches.  The 
same men  lvho had  gloriously fought under  Scipio, and thcn 
lnarched  into  the rich  countries  of  Asia  as hungry  soldiers, 
returned with exorbitant  and ill-gotten riches-  the trea- 
sures  extorted  conquered  nations.  They  had  no  real 
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wants,  and  did  not know how  to  use  the  quickly  acquired 
riches.  In regard  to  the great lnen as well as to every tllillg 
else, things assumed  a  differelit character:  the sad moment of 
complete  degeneracy  is prcparillg ; the  generals  appcar  lilce 
robbers, and  carry  on  wars  only  with  a  view  to booty and 
plunder;  thc  exceptions  were  very few.  The  nobles  were 
haughty  towards  their  allies:  formerly  a  Roman  magistrate 
travelling  through  Italy put  up at  the  house  of  his  friend 
(hospes),  but it now  became  customary  evcrywherc to receive 
such  travellers  with  pomp.  The  games  tverc  exliibited  on 
such a scale as to  require immense fortuncs; in tllc year 580, 
there wcre no lcss than  150 gladiators at a funeral solemnity. 
The officers and nobles had now  opportunities to satisfy  their 
desires with splcndid buildings and luxuries of every kind, and 
to fill  their  houses  with  costly  furniturc,  carpets, plate, etc. 
Thc Romans had grown rich, but the immediate consequence 
was a brutal use  of  their riches.  Agriculturists  are excellent 
men,  so  long  as  they  live  in  favourable circumstances,  but 
when they acquire wealth on a sudden, they cxhibit a strilrillv  P 
proof of how difficult it is to makc a rational use  of it.  A sl- 
lnilar instance occurs in the history of Ditmarsch, where several 
ycars ago corrul3tion bccalne general at a time when, after some 
years of  scarcity,  thc people acquired wealth by extraordinary 
sales  of  corn;  but  soon afterwards  they wcre  again rcduced 
to poverty.  Thus, the Romans who had accurnulatcd immense 
wcalth, and did not know how to use it, bcgan to addict them- 
selves  to  gluttony.  Hence  it camc  to  pass,  as  Livy saysle, 
that  cooks who  had  before been  thc inost  despised  class of 
slaves, now became the most  expensive.  The Roman pontiffs, 
as  wc  see  from  their bills  of  fare  in Macrobius, rivalled  in 
their eating and drinking the canons of modcrn times.17  Before 
this  time  the Rornan  consuls had lived  like  simple peasants, 
but now exorbitant sums  were  spent upon Greek cooks:  glut- 
tony and the most disgusting vulgarity took the place offormcr 
frugality.  The Athenians lived frugally at all times, and the 
Greeks are on  the whole a frugal nation;  the Italians, on the 
other hand, can  be  frugal; but  at times, whcn  thcy  arc  let 
loose, they indulge in brutal intemperance. 
Although the form and appearance of the Roman constitutioit 
xxxix.  6. 
17  Sat. ii. 9;  Horat. Cann. ii. 14.26,foH. with thc notcs of the commentators, 
continued  to  be  democratical,  yet  the  nobles  could  do 
impunity.  I  need  only  relnind  you  of  L. 
Quillctius  Flalllininus,  the brother  of  Titus, who, merely  to 
his fiZvonrite  the pleasure  of  seeing a man strunoling in  t." 
the  agonies  of  dcatlil",  slaughtered  a  inan  of  Gallic  origin 
illlplored  his  assistance  either  against  an  unjust  ver- 
dict,  or because hc,  being  a  hostage,  had been  insulted-a 
crilne  Inore  horrible  than  that  of  the  Sultan  who  called 
in  a  inall and ordered him to be  beheaded, in order that his 
pailltcr might have something frightful to paint.  Cato ejected 
Iliin froin the senate.  Although the Romans wcre, in general, 
much  inore  con~cientious than  the  Grccks,  and  although 
I'olybius,  fifty years after this time, placcs thcrn very fiir above 
his own countrymen, still clnbezzlement of thc pubiic money, 
extortions from the allies, and acts of violence and wantonness 
of every description, are henceforth of quite colnlnon occurrence. 
This is the state of  things which  we  see  in the fragment of 
Cato's oration  De  Sunztu  Suol",  the gem  in the collectioii  of 
Fionto,  who  made  thc  cxtracts for  the emperor  Antoninus 
Pius:  the passagc shows that at the end. of  tllc sixth century, 
it was the gcneral supposition  that public  functionaries seized 
every opportunity to enrich themselves. 
All the differences between  the two estates had ceased,  the 
only  distinction  being  that between  nobles  and non  nobles, 
the patricians, as  an  ordcr,  had  lost  their  importance.  The 
last distinction according to .vvhich  one of  the consuls should 
always be a patrician,  entircly  ceases at the time  of  the  war 
against Perscus,  as  the  patrician fainilics had  almost  become 
extinct.  In  regard  to  the practorship,  the distinction  had 
been abolished;  for  the aediles  alone  it still continued.  But 
it was  nevertheless  very  difficult  for a plebeiall  who -was not 
noble to rise in the state; it was only now and then that a nouus 
homo, lilie Cato, forced his way up; and the whole nobility seclh 
to have been united as one man to oppose such intr~l~i~~~~. 
city on the other hand became  very much elnbcllished, 
and si'lcndid  buildings were erected; the courts of justice had 
for1ncrly heen held in the open air, as among our ancestors ; but 
now basilicae were built:  the name is  derived  from  the  aTo& 
l8 IJ1vy, xxxix. 42. 
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PUULXLIC$,  under which the paa~Xe;q  sat at Athens; it  mas a com- 
bination of threefold porches, in which the judges assembled in 
the open air, but under cover.  Cato was the first who built a 
basilica (Porcia) in the Forum:  by and by several others were 
erected;  aftelwards they were surrounded by walls,  and when 
the Christian religion was introduced at Rome, that form was 
regarded as the most suitable for Christian worship, as the differ- 
ent stoae might be assigned as distinct places, men and matrons 
assembling in the two side ~orchcs,  while the clergy occupied the 
central  one.  The high  altar and  the seat of  the bishop  were 
near  the spot originally  assigned  to the tribunal.  Hence the 
name  basilicae  has been  transferred  to all Christian churches, 
though  their  construction  might  be  quite  different.  The 
building materials  were  still  of  ancient  simplicity,  and their 
style the ancient Tuscan or Doric: no marble was as yet used. 
Cato was at this time the most remarkable man, a man of the 
good  old times, in the true sense  of  the word.  His name  of 
Priscus  is  expressive  of  his  Latin  origin  from  Tusculum. 
Rome  perhaps  never produced  another genius  of  so  singu- 
lar a  kind.20  The Romans  at  that  time  acquired  all  sci- 
entific  refinement  through  the medium  of  Greek literature : 
but Cato formed  an exception, for  although, at a late period 
of  his  life,  he  acquired  that language,  and  made  himself 
acquainted with the literature of  the  Greeks,  yet  in  reality 
he despised  the Greeks,  and his  peculiar  mode  of  thinking, 
his  style and language, are pure old Roman-a  circumstance 
which  shews  that  it  was  not  absolutely  necessary  for  a 
Roman  to be  imbued  with  the spirit ofthe Greeks,  in  order 
to  be  a  great  man.  He displayed  his immense  powers  in 
the most various waysa:  he was a great general, a great states- 
man, and orator,-in  his censorship he highly  distinguished 
himself,-  an excellent agricnlturist:  in short, an active man 
in all the affairs of human life, and indefatigable in his exertiolls 
for the good of his country.  He was, moreover, a man of con- 
siderable learning, and restless  in collecting  materials:  as  a 
prose writer, he was excellent in his way, but harsh and rough. 
There was  no  polish  in anything  he did,  nothing that was 
20  His biograplly, by Plutarch, is excellent;  for it is a subject which he could 
comprehend without a knowledge of the constitution, and without deep politicd 
insight:  all that it required  was  the  conception of  an individual character, in 
which Platarch is a great master.-N. 
&ivy, xxxix. 40. 
merely put on:  all  vas wit11  him the gift  of nat~~re,  nothing 
the result of artificial tmiiliag.  Livy, without wishing to attach 
nmv  blame  to  him-  for  he  loved  him-playfully  describes  -.-- 
hisJ conduct towards Scipio by the words  qui  vivo  eo  allatrnre 
+.s  (Sc$ionis)  magnitudinem solitus  estq2? His  peculiarities 
were those of  a man of  humble origin, who, being  endowed 
with immense energy, by it  forces  his  way  through  endless 
difficuilties:  he could not live  at peace with the noble and the 
~vcJt~ly,  for they and their acquired  manners were disgllsting 
- 
to hiln in the highcst degree, and to coinbat what was repug- 
nant to him was the natural turn of his mind.  With reg,zrd  to 
the conduct which he required of  every one to shew towards 
the state, we cannot charge him with affectation:  it arose from 
the purcst convictions.  L. Valerius Flaccus, his  colleague  in 
the censorship  and tribuneship, was the only man who agreed 
with him in sentiment; he hated everythillg that was ornamen- 
tal or elcgant, hence his patriotism clung especially to the past: 
he considered his coizten~~oorarics  as  degenerate;  his  beau ideal 
lay a  hundred years behind  him, and his happiness consistcd 
in ancient silnplicity, economy, and austerc inorality.  Cato had 
the nature of a lion, and was active with unremitting zeal.  At 
the age of eighty-six, he carricd on a great law-suit; and at the 
age of ninety, accused Scrvius Galba.  He was a Roman in the 
fullest sense of the word, 2nd was bent upon  seeing  the sove- 
reignty and grandeur of his nation firmly established;  but was 
inspired with an cxtraosdinary love of  justice.  Although  he 
did not like thc Greeks, yet he defended the Rhodians, and in 
like manner protcctcd the Lusitanians against the faithlessness 
and extortion of Galba, ns wcll as all those who were hclplcss or 
friendless.  He is  one  of  the grcatcst  and  most honourable 
characters in Roman  history: he resembles  the great  men  of 
Germany of  the sixtccnth  century, in whom  that which  we 
call rucleness was  nothing but the peculiar manner of  the tilne. 
Respecting  the other  Romans  of  that  age,  who  arc  usually 
callcd  grcl~t  men, I  have  nothing  to  say:  there  is  not  one 
among thcm who cleserves the name of a great man. 
In thccarlier times thc strength of  Rome  consisted  in hcr 
frce peasantry,  but this class of her populatioll was 
losing its importance and influence.  Onc ofthose  levies which 
the late war3 had required must have ruined Inally cntire families. 
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Another  change  which  had  lately  taken  place,  and which 
could  not  reinain  without  political  consequeaces,  was  the 
importance which  capital had  acquired.  Ever since the end 
of the first Punic war, when the Ronlaiis  gained  possession  of 
Sicily, we find  capitalists  engaged in enterprises and specu- 
lations to increase their moveable property; and this spirit was 
encouraged by thc hcility and impunity with whicll they could 
pursue their objects in the ~rovinces. Usury was  indeed for- 
bidden by the Roman law, as it was in later times forbidden by 
the canon law; but such  a law is unnatural, and of no avail, 
for, in dcfiance of the canon law:  various  ways  were  devised, 
wl~icll  enabled capitalists to take interest with impunity; and 
similar methods wcre resorted to at Rome, where capitalists did 
business  with foreigners,  or  substituted other names for their 
own.  The canon  law imposed  no  restrictions  on  the  Jews, 
and the Roman law dicl riot extend its protection to the Italian 
allies, or to freedmen;  so that a thonsand ways were left open 
to evade the law.  I11  the provinces the spirit of  usury found 
no obstacles at all.  The Publicurn  Romanum  bad  been  im- 
mensely extended, and portions of it were let out to f:arnz, such 
as  the mines  of  Spain,  the tunny-fisheries  on  the  coast  of 
Sardinia, the tithes of Sicily and Illyricum, and other countries; 
large sums of money were thus put into circulation, and the 
profits made  by these things were  as  great as those madc in 
modzrn times by speculators in paper  securities.  Whenever, 
for instance, a war contribution was to be raised,  the publicani 
were immediately ready to offcr the money at an interest  of  at 
least  12, but  sometimes  24,  or  even  36  per  cent., and the 
governors of the provinces took good care that such debts were 
paid.  Thus,  there began  to  be  an enormous  circulation  of 
money, of which, not a trace had previously  existed.  This is 
the  manner  in  which  the  class  of publicani  was  gradually 
formed.  Distinct traces of them are found in Livy as early as 
the second Punic warz3, although  it was not until the century 
following that they acquired their notorious importance, when 
they form a parallel to the money-dealers whom thc eighteenth 
century producetl. 
According to the common  account, the Great  Scipio died 
in the year  569, in which  also  Hannibal put an  end  to his 
life by poison, because the Romans very dishonourably required 
23 Livy, xxI11.48  and 49; xxv. 3 and 4. 
Prueias of  Bithynia  to  deliver 11in1  up to  them.  Eumenes 
stood in a servile relation  to the Romans:  his extensive and 
wealthy domillions  were so unwarlike  that  the small  state  of 
Bit1lynia was  formidable  to him; the latter also extended its 
power, and acquired a large portion of  Phrygia, on  the I-Ielle- 
spont.  In this war  Hannibal  conducted  the undertakings  of 
Prusias; and the Roman  ambassadors forthwith  demanded his 
surrender.  When Hannibal saw that he could not  escape any 
where, he took poison and died.  This demand of the Romans 
is one ofthe disgraceful acts of those times; and it is unpardon- 
able in T.  Quinctius Flamininus that he allowed hitneelf  to be 
madc use of for such an object.'"ut  virtue and the sense of 
honour were rapidly vanishing from the Roman republic,  and 
its condition was already most deplorable.  However, even in 
their  best  period  they would  not  have  been inore  generous 
towards an enemy like  IIannibal, as is clear from the example 
of C.  Pontius in the war against the Samnites. 
1,ECTURE LXX. 
Trig current ideas rcspccting Roman literature are no less one- 
sided than those respecting  the early  intellectual  condition of 
the Romans.  We  must not imagine that, previously  to their 
conquests in Greece, they were as ignorant of Greek  literature 
as, for instance,  our ancestors  were previously  to the  revival 
of letters, or that thcy had no literature of their  own.  It is 
certain, indeed, that the  Romans did not possess any such dis- 
tinct class of literary men as there cxistcd in Greece;  but with 
regard to their knowledge of  Greek literature  and poetry, we 
have the strongest possible evidence that the Romans, and the 
Italian nations  in general,  wcre  intimately  acquainted  with 
tlicm at a very cnrly period.  In the ancient works  of  art of 
the Etruscans and Oscans, we find representations of subjects 
from the ancient Greek fablcs, and of Greek persons, although, 
in passing  through the mouths  of  the people,  the  namcs  of 
these  persons  had  soinetiines  undergone  peculiar  changcs. 
Instead of Odyssens, for example, we find Ulixcs, which seems 
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to have been a Siculian forml; instead of  Ganymedes we find 
Catamitus;  instead  of  Laomedon,  Alumcntus,  and  others. 
These and similar instances prove that Greek myths  were ge- 
nerally known in Italy.2  But to understand  them must have 
been difficult for the Romans, especially for the Sabines and the 
original inhabitants of  Italy, whose rcligion was not a mytl1o- 
logy,  but a real tlleology; for their  divinities were  voodpeva, 
and their  mythical legends  referrcd  only to subordinate di- 
vinities; their  great divinitics consequently were  destitutc of 
those attributes which gavc life to the poctry  of  the Grceks. 
Among the Pelasgians and Latins, on the other hand,  there 
was a greater rescmblance to the elements  of  Grccian mytho- 
logy and poetry,  which struck root  also  among  the Romans 
tllrough the medium of the Sibylline books,  and the oracle of 
Apollo, so that Greck mythology and poetry soon bccame  in- 
telligible to them.  From the end of the first  l'unic  war, the 
poctry of the Grcelcs spread very generally through the mcdium 
of the Latin language, though in Rome itsclf, it probably ex- 
citedless interest than in other Italian towns.  The theatre of 
Tusculum, which, if we may judge  from the foundations dis- 
covered in the orchestra, cannot have been erected later than 
the second  Punic war but in all probability was built  much 
earlier, presupposes  the  perforinance  of  dramas,  whether  of 
Greek or of native growth. 
The atellanae, which we meet  with as early as thc close of 
the fourth  century,  are an  evident  proof  of a fresh  vein  of 
national poetry.  I believe the statemcnt  to be  correct,  that 
they were  extempore productions, lilie the poetry  of the im- 
provisatori of modern Italy, and they wcre  certainly not con- 
fined to the Romans.  As the atellanae present to us a kind of 
national  comedy,  so  the praetextatae  were very old national 
tmgedies.3  I  believe  we are  not  mistaken  in thinking that 
there was solne connexion between thcse  praetextatae and the 
solemn funeral processions,  in which  the masks  of  the  dead, 
who had curubs majores, were  carried  about  with all the em- 
blems  of  their dignity,  by persons  of the  same  stature; but 
even independently of this  connexion,  we  may believe  them 
to have  been  very  ancient.  There  is  no  mention  of  any 
An allusion to him occurs in a temple in ELLII~  (1)lut. Marc. 20.)-N. 
Compare vol. iii  p  310, foll. 
Compare vol.  i. p. 520, note 1150. 
praetextatae  than those  of Attius.  But the fact of his 
llavillg  composed them according to the rules of art, and in a 
poetical style, is a proof of their existence previously to his time. 
The trallslation  of  Greek  poetry  into  the  Latin  language 
was  a  great  and  most  important  step.  Livius  Androllicus 
is  called  a  Tarentine  captive,  probably  for  no  other reason 
but  because  he was confounded with M. Livius Macatus, who 
maintailled  himself at Tarent~m.~  The interval  betm~ecn  his 
alleged  departure  from  Tarentum,  and  the  time  when  he 
appeared  before  the  public  with his  dramas, seems to be too 
long, unless we suppose him to have spent only his early child- 
hood  at Tarentum.  The  accounts  respecting  him  are  very 
uncertain, for  in the  early times, the personal  character  and 
circu~nstanccs of  bards  were  generally  neglected,  and  the 
Ro~nans  in particular paid little attention to the history of  the 
lives  of  their early poets.  At a  later  period, thcy began  to 
compile historical information concerning them; but the most 
incredible things  were  put  together, as  we  sec  even  in the 
biographies of  Plautus and Terence.  To judge from his frag- 
ments, it seems that Andronicus had not acquired any mastery 
of  the Greek forms.  He translated the Odyssey, which, from 
its relation to Lntium, had greater  attractions for  the Romans 
than the 1liad5: he docs not, however, seem to have translated 
the whole of  the poem, but to have made an abridgment of  it 
in the national  Italian  rhythm, and not  in a  Greek  metre. 
The great  poem  of  Naevius  was  likewise  in  the  Saturnian 
rhythm.  All that Livius wrote  besides  his  Odyssey are  tra- 
gcclies, which, like the atellanae, were not  performed  in per- 
lnanent theatres, but on a kind of scaffolding in tlze Circus. 
Besides the great historical poem  of  Naevius, in which  he 
combined the latest history of  his country with  Greek mytho- 
logy ; he  treated,  e. g.,  of  the mythus of  the  Gigantes;  he 
wrote both tragcdics and comedies, as we must infer from  the 
titles.  That he was a great poet, wc may believe on the asser- 
tion of Cicero6, who had in reality no taste for the old national 
Poetry of  his  countrymen.  In the latter period  of his  life, 
Naeviu7 was  persecuted;  for  considering  that he had not the 
full  franchise,  he had  been  too  bold,  and  had  insulted  thc 
See Livy, xxvii. 34, and xxiv. 20. 
It i~ a very just idea, that Clrce was connected with Circeii, which is in fact 
the ancient form ot the fable. -N.  6  Brutus, C.  19. lletelli,  who  availed  tllen~selves of  the  circnnlstance  of  his 
being a Campaninn, and thrcw him into prison. 
\Vhen  Waevius was an  old man, Plautus, one of  the g;catest 
poetical  geniuses of  antiquity, was just  elitering  on  his  best 
period.  He slicws his great talent in liis bold and free, thougll 
solnewhat  singular  manner  of  dealing  with  his  characters. 
He takes Greek pieces wit11  Greek dramatis personae, and treats 
them with  a perrcct  irony.  He does not  translate  from  the 
Greek; but the Grecks, in his plays, speak, act, and are witty, 
as  Romans  would  be ; and  there  occurs  in  then1  nothing 
that could have been foreign to the Romaas.  All his person- 
ages display those peculiarities of charactcr which distingnislled 
the  aerarii, who  formed  a  lower  order  i11  tlie  population of 
Rome, and  consisted  chiefly of  frccdmen  and  strangers who 
had become  naturalised, but could not rise to the rank of free 
Roman warriors.  The scenes arc laid at Atl~ens,  Epidamaus, 
or Ephcsus, and the  names  of  tlle persons are Greek; but we 
are reminded every moment that  are in the very heart  of 
Rome.  Iic also  has  Greek  characters;  for tlie parasite  is, I 
believe, a Greek  and not  a  Roman  charactcr.  What malccs 
Plautus such a wonderful  poet is, that on the slippery ground 
which he had chosen, he always shews the most  extraordinary 
slrill  in  hitting  the  right  point.  His  languagc  is  no  less 
admirable than his poetical skill.  If we compare liis language 
with  that  of  his  prcdccessors,  we  find it greatly altered, en- 
riched,  and refined, whicli is  a proof  that  the  language  had 
bccn much cultivated evcn beforc his tiine; had  this not been 
the case, the  language  of  Plautus would  certainly have bccn 
very differcnt from what it is.  We  have fortunately the oppor- 
tunity  of  comparing  his  language  wit11  that  of  a  senatus- 
consultum of  thc Gfth century7, and that of  tlie tomb-stone of' 
Scipio Barbatus, whicli present considerable differences. 
Livius Andronicus was  the client  of olle Livius.  Naevius 
was a Roman citizcn, a municeps Campanus, and lived at Rome, 
though  olily with  the rights  of  an aerarius;  but as  regards 
Plautus,  it is  not  even  known  whcthcr  he  was  a  Roman 
citizen-he  had perliaps  not  given  up  the  franchise  of  his 
7 If  Niebuhr  alludes  to the  Senatusconsulturn  de  Bucchunalibus, we  have 
here  a "  lapsus  mernoriue."  Instead  of  the v uril  senatusconsultum,  we  rriust 
probably read bscriptio, or some such word, a9  Niebuhr was no  doubt  thinking 
of  the columna rostruta. 
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place.  He is  said  to  have  been  poor;  but  I do  not 
believe the  story,  that  he gained his  living  by working  at a 
11and-mill. 
Enni~ls  mas  a  gentleman,  a  Roman  citizen,  and  belonged  - 
unauestiollably  to  one  of  the  tribes.  He  was  somewhat 
younger  than Naevius,  and lived 011  terms of  great intimacy 
with  Scipio,  Fulvius  Nobilior,  Laelius,  and  the  principal 
men  of  the  republic, and was  not  only much esteelncd  per- 
sonally,  but mas  the first  who niade  the Romans esteem  and 
honour  men  of  literary  occupation.  Among  his  fragments 
there are some very excellent specimens of his poetry,  though 
his subjects were not of s lofty nature.  He  seems to have been 
weak in comedy and to have  despised it-a  rare saint ! but in 
epic poetry he was vcry respectable.  Some of his poems were 
writtcn in the national Italian rhythm, for instance, his Sabine 
Womene, and also his Saturae.  But, on the whole, hc followcd 
his  own  method;  tlie  metres  of  Plautus  are not altogether 
Greek,  and although they often coincide with the Greclc ones, 
still we  cannot  say that he borrowed  them.  The measuring 
of  syllables  according  to length  and shortness,  is Greck; the 
Romans did not  measure with  the same  exactness,  not  hav- 
ing the fine  ear  of  the Greelrs.  The lattcr have  their pure 
iambic and trochaic metres,  but  the same metres  with some 
modific:ations,  were  national  ainong  the  Romans  also,  as 
tlie aiiapacsts  are  among  the  modern Greeks,  and all  metres 
among some Slavonic nations.  I believc that tlie senarius is as 
little peculiar to the Latin language as  it is  to our own,  and 
that  Plautus  merely  adopted  it firon1 the  Greeks  as  Enliius 
adopted the hexameter.  The introduction of this latter verse 
produced at Roine the  same  revolution  in poetry as  in Ger- 
many;  and the hexnnlcters  of  Ennius are  nearly as  awliward 
and impcrfcct as the earliest Gcrman hexameters.  They have 
sometimes no caesura at all,  and sometimes wrorlg ones  in tlie 
fourth foot,  whicli renders  them altogether  unsatisfactory.  I 
must  confess  that,  much  as I like  the  numeri  and  ,yaks  of 
Plautus, I cannot he  pleased with the hexameters of  Ennius. 
Ellnius wished to try all the Greek metres, with the exception 
of the really lyric ones, and constructed them with more  accu- 
racy  than  the earlier  dramatists;  for  the senarius  has  more 
mea~urcd  syllal~lcs  and became  more  firmly established;  but 
"ul.  Victor, p. 324, Or., nith the note of d.  Mai. THE  LIGURIAN  WAR.  20'1 
between the verses of  Ennius and those of Virgil, we find the 
same contrast  as between the metrical forms of  the poetry of 
Klopstock  and those of Count Platen Hallermiinde.  The an- 
cient metres have a great many peculiarities, such as the entire 
suppression  of  short  syllables:  ego,  for  instance,  is used  like 
io,  as  one  syllable,  and  acc+ito  is made  a  da~t~l-~ecnli- 
arities which  are as  yet by no means well  understood.  En- 
nius is less original than either Naevius or Plautus; but he does 
not deserve the contempt  with which  Horace  speaks  of  him. 
He was a native of  Calabria,  belonged to a Hellenised ~eople, 
had received a Greek education,  and the Greek  language was 
his second mother tongue.  Having learned Latin  as a foreign 
language,  it is no wonder  that he wished  to introduce Greek 
forms into Roman poetry.  The literature of  the Romans was 
at this  time  very brilliant  in  comparison  with  that  of  the 
Grecks;  for the best Alexandrian period was over,  and,  when 
Livius Andronicus  began his career,  Callimacl~us  was  either 
already  dead  or  near  his  end.  Eratosthenes was  more of  a 
versifier than a  poet.  Antagorass and Aratus were dead: in 
short, Greek literature was fast dying away,  whereas at Rome 
it was  thriving with  extraordinary vigour;  and would  have 
done so still more,  if Ennius had not made the foreign influ- 
ence so  predominant.  For some time,  however,  the Romans 
held out against it. 
Pacuvius was  somewhat  younger than  Ennius, and a  son 
of  Ennius's  sister.  Re well deserves the name of  the deep- 
thinker.  Pacuvius  followed Aescl~ylus  and  Sophocles as  his 
models, and despised  Euripides, which is a very characteristic 
feature, and one by which he placed  himself in opposition to 
thc taste of the Greeks of his age. 
How familiar  the Romans were with Greek  literature  may 
also be seen from  the works which were  written immediately 
after the second  Punic war.  Fabius  Pictor and L. Cincius 
wrote  the history  of  their  country in the  Greek  language. 
Fabius is often  mentioned,  but no one,  not even  Dionysius, 
has ever  objected to him that his language  was barbarous or 
unreadable;  nay,  the very fact  that Dionysius carried his his- 
tory down only to the commencement of  the first  Punic war 
shews tliat,  in his  judgment,  Fabius was for the subsequent 
period all that  could be desired:  at the same  time, however, 
Fabr~c~us,  Bzbl. Gmec. iv. p. 461. 
he saw that for the early times of  Roman history,  Fabius tvas 
not  A  coiltelllporary of  his  was  Acilius.  Sub- 
sequently we still  find  many other  Romans who wrote  histo- 
rical  in Greek; the great Scipio wrote the history of his 
wars  in the form of  a letter to Philip of  &lacedonialO; in like 
manner his son-in-law, P. Scipio Nasica wrote the history of the 
war  against Perseusll; and  Aemilius Paullus engaged  Greek 
grammarians,  rhetoricians,  painters,  and  drawing-masters,  to 
instruct his sons. 
LECTURE LXXI. 
D~JRING  these  rapid and  complete  changes in all the forms 
of pivate and public  life,  the  Romans were  not inactive in 
extending their dominion;  for while their state was in process 
of dissolution, they did not knotv what to do except to conquer. 
Thc evil had  taken such deep root, that it would  have been 
hardly possible to proclnce any change; but nothing whatever 
was done towards effecting a cure, and demoralisation increased 
at a rapid rate. 
The Ligurian war  is not only insignificant, in comparison 
with  othcrs,  but extremely obscure, on account  of  our want 
of  an  accurate  geographical  knowledge of  the country.  It 
has some resemblance to the present  undertakings  against the 
Caucasian  tribes.  The Apennines are not, indeed, as  high as 
the  Caucasus, but they  offer  the  same  advantages  for  their 
inhabitants  to defend  themselves.  The Ligurians  were  ulti- 
mately  annihilated,  which  is always  the unavoidable  fate of 
such  nations,  when  a  powerful  state  is  bent  upon  their 
destruction.  The  Ligurian  tribes extended  in reality  as  far 
as the river Rhonc;  but as the Romans were chiefly concerned 
in  securing  the frontiers of  Etruria, they  made  themselves 
masters only of the territory of Genoa.  The wars did not extelld 
beyond  the river Varus, or the frontiers of  Provence, for the 
hostilities against the Salyes in the neighbourhood of  Massilia 
belong  to a  later  period.2  The  Ligurian  tribes  defended 
themselves and their poverty with such resolute determination, 
'O Polpbins, x. 9.  "  Polybius, nix.  6. 
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that the Romans, who could not expect any rich spoils, aimed 
at notl~ing  short of  extirp,zting  thcm, or expelling thcm from 
their  mountains.  The  consuls,  P. Cornelius  Cethegus  and 
hl. Baebius  Tamphilus,  therefore  trmsplanted  50,000 Ligu- 
rians  into  Samnium, where Froiztillus3 as  late as  the second 
century  of  our  own  era, found  their  descendants  under  the 
name of  the Cornelian and Baebian  Ligurians.  The war was 
brought to a close bcfore that against Perseus.  It  was especially 
for the purpose of  exercising  control over Gaul that the high 
road of  Flaminius, which went  as far as Ariminum, was  now 
continued, undcr the name of  via Flaminin,  as far as Placentia, 
and that the whole country south of  the Po was so much filled 
with colonics, that the Ccltic population disappeared. 
Ever since the successful campaign of  Scipio in Spain, the 
Romans had endeavoured to establish their doininion firmly in 
that country; they had  sent thither one, and  sometimes  two 
praetors,  and  kept  regular  troops  there.  From  the second 
Punic war,  or  perhaps  even  froin  the time of  Pyrrhus,  one 
legion seems to have been stationary at Tarentum, and another 
in  Sicily;  and  now we find  two legions  stationary in Spain. 
This system of  keeping stationary troops altered the character 
of  the wars of  the Romans, and had a decided influence upon 
all their civil relations.  In former times the legions had always 
been  disbanded at the end of  every campaign, and new oncs 
were  fonncd.  This method  had  the advantage.,  that  every 
Roinan  passed  through his tinie of  military service and  then 
returned  home, so  that  the soldiers were  never  separated  or 
distinct  from  the  citizens.  Now  things  became  different. 
The legions  stdtioned  in  Spain, for instance, remaincd  there 
for a  number of  years, married  Spanish women, and became 
estranged  from  Italy.  When  therefore  such  legions  were 
disbanded, many soldiers would  remain in Spain, unwilling to 
return to a country to which they had become strangers.  The 
Roman dominion  in Spain cxtendcd over Catalonia, Valencia, 
and Andalusia, as far as  Sierra  Morena, for  in the wars with 
the Ccltiberians, the latter pressed forward through tlic countlies 
of  their ncighbours.  The object of  the Romans in thcsc wars 
therefore  was  not  so much  to extend  their dominions  as  to 
secure what  they  had;  but at the end of  the second  Punic 
war their anthority seems to have become sonlewhat unsettled, 
De  Co!on. p  106. ed. G\)es 
until it was  re-established  in  his  consulship,  557, by  Cat07 
won  the hearts  of  the  Spaniards by  his  justice.  It is 
indeed  surprising  to see that  a  Roman  general with humane 
feelings was  always  able  to win  the affections and collfidence 
of  tllosc  tribes, and  to establish  the authority of  Rome for a 
time, until fresh acts  of  injustice  provoked  their resentment. 
The people  of  Spain  always  shewed  themselves  in  a  noble 
light.  But  Cato  succeeded  not  inerely  by his  justice  and 
bravery,  but also by his cunning, which was a prolnillent fa- 
ture in his cliaractcr as well as in that of the Romans generally 
froin  the carliest  times.  The  Spanish  towns  wcrc  strongly 
fortified,  for  the  Spaniards were  a  civilised  nation,  and to 
conquer  tllern was  a  mattcr of  great difficulty.  These fortifi- 
cations became the occasion of  a general war.  It is said  that 
Cato  sent  circulars  to  the  magistrates  of  seventy  or eighty 
towns, with the command  not  to open  them  before a  ccrtain 
day fixcd  by  him.  These  letters  contained, for  each  town, 
the conlmand to raze its walls to the ground on that day, and 
the threat that, in case  of  disobedience,  the town  would  be 
besieged,  and its inhabitants reduced to slavery.  Each town 
obeyed, imagining that it alone had rcceivcd such a command; 
and before the stratagem was discovered, the towns had already 
made considerable progress in the destruction of their fortifica- 
tions.4 
I11  the year 575, the consul Tiberius Selnpronius Gracchus, 
the son of that Gracchus who had distinguished himself in the 
war  against  IIannibal  by  his  brilliant  victoV  over  Hanno, 
and had  found  a  glorious  death,  and the father  of  the two 
unfortunate  brothers,  went  to  Spain.  He is  the same  who 
had  deeply  lamented  the  fact  that P.  Scipio  tried  to place 
hilnself  above  the law, but still would  not  allow him  to be 
punished like any other citizen.  Subsequently Scipio selected 
him  for  his  son-in-law.  The  hostile  feeling  towards  tho 
Romalls had  spread even  among the Celtiberians,  who occu- 
pied the countries from the sources of  the river Ebro, as far as 
the  frontiers  of  La  Mancha,  Andalusia  and  Valencia,  and 
inhabited chiefly the eastern part of  New Castile, the western 
Prt  *ragon,  and  the  provinces  of  Soria  and  Cuenp. 
They had in reality never heen  subject to the ~artbaginians, 
and their  mercenaries had  served  in the armies  of  both  the 
*  Appian, De  Rebu, Hzqan. 41.  Conlpare Livy, xxviv  17. 
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belligerent  parties.  They were now involved in a  war  with 
the Romans, ~vho  wished  to reduce thelll to submission.  The 
more  difficult  this  undertaking-the  Celtiberians  were  the 
bravest among the Spaniards-the  more was it incumbent  on 
the Romans to subdue those countries.  But Tib. Sem~ronius 
Gracchus  concluded  a  peace  with them, the terms of  which 
we know not, but they were so fair and reasonable, that those 
nations who had no wish to carry on the war, afterwards when- 
ever the Romans adhered to the terms, always looked upon them 
as the greatest  blessing  that they could*  have  implored  from 
heaven.5  The whole family of the Gracchi is distilzguished for 
its extraordinary gentleness and kindness, qualities which were, 
011  the whole,  foreign  to the Romans.  This peace  was  the 
means by which  Gracchus gained a hold  on he  affections  of 
the natives  of  Spain.  Had his  successors kept  to the terms 
of  the peace, the Celtiberians would have been allies as faithful 
and useful  to  the  Romans,  as  the Marsians  and  Pclignians. 
But other generals were extending  the Roman  dominion  in 
the western parts of Spain : the Vaccaeans, north of  the Ts~gus, 
and  the  Lusitanians  must  have  been  subdued  between  the 
years 570 and 580.  Their submission, however, did not last 
long, on account of the extortions of the Roman generals. 
In the meantime, a new storm arose in the East.  Philip of 
Macedonia  did not live to a great age; at his death he may 
have been about sixty years old, and he made excellent  use  of 
his long reign to strengthen his kingdom.  His expectations 
respecting the war  against  Antiochus  had not been  realised, 
though his circumstances had been  greatly improved  by the 
acquisition of  Demetrias  and a part of  Magnesia, by means of 
which  he encompassed  Thcssaly.  The Dolopians  had  con- 
tinued  to  be  subject  to him, although  they were  separated 
from  his  kingdom,  and he was  also  in possession  of  Atha- 
mania  and the Greek  towns on the coast  of  Thrace (Aenos, 
Maronea, Abdera, and others), which  he had first  talcen from 
the Egyptians, then given up, and at last re-occupied  during 
the war against Antiochus.  The Romans allowed this state of 
things to continue for  some time, but then they began insidi- 
ously to undermine his empire.  They supported Amynander, 
who expelled the Macedonian garrisons from Athamania"  and 
Livy, xl. 47, foll., dl.  3, foll.;  Appian, De  Rebus  Hzspan. 43. 
Livy, xxxviii. 1  -3. 
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they  readily  listened  to the ambassadors  from  the  Thracian 
towns and the Thessalians, who complained of Philip's  aggran- 
disement, and had been stirred up by the Romans thenlselves7, 
dtllough  they must have been convinced that he had 110  other 
but to strengthen himself  until  he  could  restore  llis 
former  power;  for  in all  he did, Philip was  too cautions to 
violate the treaty.  Eumenes, who wanted to obtain possession 
of  the towns on the Thracian  coast,  in order to extend  his 
dominion as far as the frontiers of IbIaccdonia, was particularly 
hostile  to  Philip.  The latter, on hearing  of  the meeting  of 
many ambassadors at Rome,  sent his son Demetrius, who had 
formerly lived  among  the Romans as  a  hostage,  and conse- 
quently had great connections there.  These negotiations  led 
to  no  results,  the  Romans  at that  time always  acting  with 
cruel  insidiousness;  and  the affairs  of  Macedonia were  to be 
settled by  Boman  commissioners.  Everybody in Macedonia 
was  afraid  of doing any thing which might bc displeasing  to 
the  Romans.  The  commissioners  were  received  by  Philip 
with feelings of great exasperation; but he yielded in what he 
could not help,  merely with a view to gain time.  Misfortune 
had  taught him  wisdom.  I-Ie  had  conducted  the first  war 
with Rome,  from which  he might  have  derived  advantages 
with laxity, and as a matter of  secondary importance;  and he 
had undertaken the one carried on directly against him with so 
little preparation, that by a  single defeat he lost every thing. 
But ever since the year 555, during the last eighteen years of 
his life, he had been making constant and serious preparations, 
and he, as well  as the Romans,  acted  faithlessly.  When the 
Roman army returned from Asia, he instigated the Thraciar~s 
to fall upon them and take possession  of their bagpge, while 
he endeavoured to secure himself  as much as possible against 
any attack that might be made on him.  The Romans, on the 
other hand,  endeavoured  to deprive  hiin  of  his  possessions, 
and he therefore  strove  to  make  himself  as  unassailable  as 
possible.  Not being allowed to keep ships of war, and being 
exposed  to  constant  attacks  at sea,  he formed  the  plan  of 
entirely abandoning  the maritime  towlls  which  had no con- 
siderable fortifications, and of  drawing the population into the 
interior  of  Macedonia.  He directed  all  his  attention  to the 
'  Liq-,  xxuix. 24, fc~l!.,  33, foll. ; Polyhiuq,  xxiii. 4 -  6, 11 -  16 ; Appian, De 
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increase of his finances, and with this view established settle- 
ments in Thrace.8  The  ork king  of  the Macedonian  mines 
mas  carried  on with donble zeal,  and the arsenals were filled 
with  arms;  he also  formed  settlements  of  Thra'cians  in the 
desolate  towns of Macedonia.  At  the same tirne he kept up 
negotiations with foreign powers, and comparatively disregarding 
the impotent kings of the East, formed friendly connexions w-ith 
the Thracians, especially  the Getae and Bastarnae.  The latter 
dwelt in Dacia, the modern Moldavia and Wallachia, and were 
inclined to abandon their abodes, because  the Sarmatians, on 
the Dnieper, were  at that  time  constantly  prcssing forward. 
Philip endeavoured to persuadc those tribcs to scelr ncw homes 
in Italy-a  plan which, seventy  years  later, was carried  into 
effect by the Cimbri.9  Such an undertaking on the part of the 
Thracians would have been the only means of giving the Roman 
power a shock; but the negotiations with those tribes, in which 
considerable progress had already been made, were interrupted 
by Philip's death.  Had those  nations actually invaded Italy, 
Philip would have been  sure to gain considerable  advantages; 
for the Romans were generally hated, and deserved to bc hated. 
Of virtue and honesty towards foreign nations, not a tracc was 
left among them; and of justice,  wliich had formerly been the 
very foundation of their religion, they had no longer any idea. 
Among the  many  things for  which they drew well-deserved 
hatred  upon  thernselvcs, we must mention here thc intrigues 
by which, both in free states and within the families of princes, 
they contrived to gain over to their interest the most contemp- 
tible persons;  who, encouraged  by, and  rcIying  on, the  pro- 
tection of the Romans, could venture to do anything.  By such 
mcans, they  created within the royal family of Mdcedonia, an 
enmity between the heirs to the throne,--Demetrius  and Per- 
seuslO: the former was the younger son of  Philip by his legiti- 
mate wife;  the latter the son  of a  concubine.  Demetrius had 
spent some time among the Romans as a hostage, and they had 
gained possession of his mind by holding ont to him the hope 
of  succeeding to the throne of  his father, and by the promise 
that they would recognise him and not Perseus.1'  After years 
of horrible accusations and plots  against Demetrius, Perseus at 
length succeeded in  inducing his  father to poison Demetrius. 
Polybius, xxiv. 8 ; Livy, xl. 3.  Livy, xxxix. 35. 
'O  Justin,  xxxii. 2.  Polybius, xxiv. 7.  .  'I  Livy, xxxix. 53. 
How  far Delnetrius may have gone to fi~vour  the scheme of the 
Romans, or  he was actually guilty of aiiytliing more 
a Inere transitory  unjust thought, cannot be  ascertained. 
According to the morals  of  the time, we  cannot suppose that 
Dellletrius was quite guiltless; but it is certain that the charges 
against  his father and Perscns, of which we read in Livy12, are 
very niucl~  exaggerated, and that the account of the manner in 
which Perseus calumniated him and seduced his father to murder 
him, beautiful as it is to read, is rather romance than history. 
Philip died soon afterwards, in the year 573.  It is perhaps 
one of those unjust suspicions whicll hang over so many thinus  P' 
whcn Livy13 calls the death of Philip peropportuna Perseo,  in- 
silluatiizg thereby that his death was brought about by Perseus. 
TVlly sllould not Philip, at his age, have died a natural death? 
How could he have conceived the idea  of  excluding  his  son, 
who mas certainly not an idiot, from the succession, and of fix- 
ing upon Antigonus, his cousin, a son of  Antigonus Doson, as 
h~s  successor?  All this is highly improbable.  l'hilip  is  said 
to have died of a broken heart at the wrong he had done to his 
son  Demetrius.  He left  his  kingdom  to  his  son  Perseus, 
stronger and inore powerful than any one could have expected 
at his  accession, and still less after  his disadvantageous peace 
with Rome. 
Perseusl* is one of those characters of which it is difficult to 
give an idea;  one of his prolninent features, however, was ava- 
rice.  This vice  was his  ruin;  he could n& separate llimself 
from the treasures with which he might ha&  raiscd a formida- 
ble power against the Romans.  When he promised subsidies to 
foreign  nations,  llis  avarice  did not  allow  him  to  abide by 
his  word.15  In  his  wars  he  was  undecided  and wavering, 
which  arose,  it  is  true,  partly  from  the  nature  of  the 
1'  Livy, XI. 23.  l3 XI. 57. 
l4 The name Pcrscus has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion.  Sclineider 
(Ausfuhrliche Grammut. der  Lateinzschcn  Spruche, vol, i.  part 2,  p.  71,  foll.) 
has a whole chapter about  the  declensiou of  it, but has  not  found  the simple 
solution of the rlnestion.  All Creek names terminating in evs, had in old Latin 
the termination es, and  formed  their  genitive  case in i; for example, Pzraees, 
gen. P~ruei,  not Piraeei, as we sornctirnes find it written in a barbarous way.  In 
later times, however, Eerscus falls under  the third  declension, but the  genitive 
is Peral, as if the nominative were Persu~. The accusative is Persen.  I have 
never met with the form Persum, although of Pbrueeus  the accuiative Pimeurn 
sometimes occurs.-N. 
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circumstances, but partly also from his own peculiar character. 
He was  not a general, for  he had no calmness  or  colnposure 
in moments  of  pressing  danger.  But me  niust  nevertheless 
say  of  him  this much,  that  so  long as  circumstances were 
not  harassing  or  perplexing, and  so  long  as  he  could  act 
according  to  his  own  plans,  he  was  always  skilful  in 
choosing  the  right  way  of  proceeding.  Respecting  his 
courage,  the  ancients  themselves  are  not  agreed  in  their 
opinions.  In the first  year  of  his  reign  he tried  to  gain 
popularity  among  the  Greeks,  and he  was  most  successful 
in his endeavours; for he won the Achaeans, Boeotians, Acar- 
nanians, Epirots,  and Thessalians,  one by one, and even  the 
Rhodians, and other islanders.16  During this period he concealed 
his avarice; he was even generous, dispensed with tributes, par- 
doned those  against whom justice  had pronounced  her severe 
judgments,  and opened Macedonia as an asylum to unfortunate 
and  exiled  Greeks.  In short his  popularity  rose  to such  a 
height, that the Greeks looked upon him as a prince in whose 
power it was to restore the  Macedonian  empire, and to drive 
the Romans  away from  the  eastern  shores  of  the Adriatic. 
There were however two parties in every town, a  Roman  and 
a  Macedonian  one; among  the  Achaeans  there  even  arose 
three,  a Roman, a Macedonian, and a patriotic one, whicli last 
was hated by the two others.  Thus Perseus came into Greece, 
and was received  with enthusiasm, as the Roman government 
became  every day more  oppressive.  He also negotiated with 
Carthage; but matters  had  already  come  to that point, that 
even  a  general  coalition  could not  have effected  much; for 
although  Rome's  moral power  was weakened, yet it had pre- 
served that of a wealthy statc, being able to hire and arm troops 
in distant countries. 
The Rhodians were not bound to the Roinans by any treaty, 
and therefore  could,  without  violating  any  obligation,  enter 
into friendly  relations  with  Perseus.  He  married  a  Syrian 
princess, the daughter of Antiochus Epiphanesl7,  who is accu- 
rately described in the Bible18, and in the fragments of Polybius, 
as a mad tyrant and  a  frantic man,  who  however  displayed 
considerable energy.  Perseus  hoped to find  a  usefl~l  ally in 
him.  A  sister  of  Perseus  was  married  to  Prusias.19  The 
j6 Livy, xli.23, foll.,fi.  5. Comp. Polybius, xxvi. 5.  l7  Livy, xlii. 12.  '' Muccub. i. 6.  1 ;  ii.  1. 14, feu., 9. 3, foll.  IY  Livy, xlii. 12. 
negotiations  tile Bastarime were  continued, and new ones 
were elitered  illto even wit11  the Illyrians.  These connexioi~s 
excited the  of  Icing Euinenes, and  his  fear lest he 
should fall a prey to  Prusias and Antiochus if  Perseus sllould 
be successful  against  the  Romans,  for  Perseus  held out  the 
kingdom  of Pergarnus  as  a  sort of  bait to the other powers, 
they niigllt divide ainong themselves as a fair spoil.  The 
coilsequence  was,  that  Eumenes  brought  colllplaints 
agnirlst Pcrseus before the Romans, who listened to his sugges- 
tions,  and  took  up the complaints  against  the  Macedonian 
king, as well as those against the Rhodians.  The small  tribes 
of Tlirace, which were oppressed by Perseus, justly or unjustly, 
Tvere likewise encouraged to bring complaints against him, and 
the Carians aiid Lycians, who  preferred  being inde~elldent  to 
paying heavy taxes to the Rhodians, were stirred up to  com- 
plain of the latter.20  In order  to weaken  the Rhodians,  the 
Romans, whose policy was  coniplctely Macl~iavellian,  gave to 
the Carian and Lycian  towns  the most favourable tl~ough  un- 
decided answers,  and thus  rendered  tl~c  Rhodians  more  and 
more disaffcctcd.  One party ainong them however was attached 
to the Romans, arld had yct power enough to prevent an open 
declaration of  hostilities.  The Rhodians were thus lrept quiet 
at the beginning  of  the war  with Perseus.  Eumenes hiinself 
went to Rome, and was splendidly received; the Romans even 
thereby intending to show their hostile feeling towards Perseus, 
who  however  remained  quiet, having been  called  the friend 
aiid  ally  of  the Roman peoplc, and his  ambassadors  having 
been received and honoured with presents. 
Perseus  therefore had reason to hope that, unlcss he himself 
broke the pence, the Romans would leavc hini alone.  But ill 
the meanwhile,  an attempt was made  at Delphi to assassinate 
Eumenes on his return from Rome."  The devising of such  a 
plan for getting rid  of an enemy is just what might have been 
expected of Perseus,  although he afterwards positively denied 
having  had  any  share  in the attempt.  It may  be  that the 
whole affair was merely a wretched farce  of  Eumenes, to give 
the  Romans a handle for commencing the wllr;  but it is almost 
too bad to Suspect such  a  thing  without  evidence.  The no- 
mans required Perseus to deliver up some persons who enjoyed 
20  Polybius, xxvi. 7; Livy, xli. 6; compare xllv. 15. 
l1 Livy, xlil.  15, full.;  Appian, De  Rebus Maced. 2. p. 521, ed. Schweigh. 218  MARCIUS PIIILIPPDS.  PROGRESS  OF  THE  WAR.  219 
whole country east of  the Adriatic would  have been in a state 
of  rebellion;  but  he  was  undecided,  and  confined  himself 
to a  small  plan  which  he had  devised, and in carrying  out 
which  alone  lie  could  be  active ; he was  incapable  of  the 
grand undertakings which were necessary for the overthrow of 
the Roman empire.  Thus he entered into the deceitful  pro- 
posals  of the  Rolnan  consul  to conclude  a permanent peace, 
during  which  Crassus  withdrew  from  a  perilous  situation, 
whereupon  the negotiatiol~s  were  of  course  broken  off.  In 
like manner, when Marcius Philippus was afterwards opposing 
Perseus  in Thessaly with insufficient  forces, he offered  him  a 
truce, which was  to be followed by a  peace ; whereas it  only 
gave the Romans  time  to  send reinforcements  to the consul. 
In  the third year of the war Perseus was particularly fortunate ; 
he even drove the Romans  out of  Macedonia  into  Illyricum, 
and yet had time enough to protect  his  kingdom  against  the 
attacks of  the neighbouring  Dardanians.25 
LECTURE  LXXII. 
IN  the third year of the war,  Persells evacuated Thessaly,  but 
kept possession of Magnesia and withdrew to Pieria,  a tract of 
coast extending from l\iIount Olympus to the gulp11 of Thermae, 
where his army took up its winter-quarters.  Tempe alone was 
occupied by one  of  his  generals.  There the Roman  consul, 
Q. Marcius Philippus, made a bold attempt, for being stationed 
at the entrance of Tempe,  at the foot of Mount Olympus,  and 
not bcing able to force the entrance, he endeavoured to evade 
it, and tried with immense exertions to cross the vast mountain 
of  Olympus  with his troops,  so  as to  pass  round  the Mace- 
donians.'  The latter  not  expecting  such boldness,  tl~ouglit 
themselves quite safe.  It was  not without incredible dificul- 
ties that the Romans arrived at the northern foot of  Olympus; 
and here they found themselves in a position whcre they might 
have  been  cut to pieces.  The whole  undertaking  deserves 
censure; for if Perseus had had his wits about him, the Roman 
25  Livy, xliiu, 5.  '  Livy, xliv. 6, foll. 
army  might  have  been  completely  destroyed.  But he left 
Dium, after having set fire to a portion of it, evacuated Pieria, 
and retreated  to Pydna.  The Roman  general  himself,  after 
having advanced as far as the river Ascordus,  finding his situ- 
atioll  perilous,  returned to Diuin  and thence to Phila.  The 
hfacedonians,  emboldened  by this  apparent  flight  advanced 
again.  The advantage, however,  which the Romans  derived 
froin this undertaking was,  that Tempe was  evacuated  by the 
Macedonians. 
Some  decisive  step,  however,  had now  become  necessary. 
Public opinion became more and more changed respecting the 
issue  of  the war,  although the Romans  made slow progress, 
like the progress of  a  besieging  army; but  the  Greeks were 
undecided  in the highest  degree,  some  relying  upon  others, 
hoping that a coalition would  be formed  against  the Romans, 
and that fortune would turn against them.  As they had reached 
their highest point,  it was believed  that they must fall,  as all 
the states of  Greece  had fallen.  The Rhodians thought that 
the  time had now come for shewing that they were independent. 
They were highly exasperated against the Romans,  and hoped 
to see them  defeated,  in order  to be  able  firmly to establish 
their own authority in Lycia  and Caria;  but they too  were 
disappointed  in  their  expectations.  The relation  subsisting 
bctween  Perseus,  Prusias  and  Antiochus  had  lately  gained 
more strength :  Antiochus however had less zealously interfered 
in the aflairs of Europe, but availed himsclf of the opportunity 
of  recovering Egypt.  As therefore he did not threaten Asia 
Minor, Eumenes began  to feel  more secure;  he even  altered 
his whole policy, and thought it more advisable to support the 
interests of  Perseus than those  of  the Romans.  Secret nego- 
tiations were  commenced,  which, however, could not  remain 
concealed  long in  such  a  demoralised age, and the Romans 
never  forgave  Eumenes this apostasy.  The Bastarnae,  too, 
with whom Pcrseus had long been  carrying  on  negotiations, 
were now in movement2, and Genthius,  king of  the northcrn 
part of Illyricum  (his kingdom and genealogy cannot be accu- 
rately  defined,  tllough  his  country seems  to  have  been  the 
modern Upper Albania) with  the capital of  Scutari (Scorda), 
Was  likewise  allied with Perseus.  Genthius was not  a  power- 
ful prince,  but would still have been  a formidable neighbour 
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to the Romans,  if he had resolutely declared hinzsclf in favour 
of  their enemies.  But both the Bastarnae  and tlie  Illyrians 
expected subsidies from Perseus.  On this occasion, the Mace- 
donian  king  shewed  his  contenzptible  character;  fur,  after 
having promised  Genthius 300  talents,  he sent him only ten, 
and kept back the rest,  declaring that hc would  send  them in 
a  sllort  time; but  the fact  was,  that he  wished  to  deceive 
Genthins,  for hc could not prevail  upon  himself  to palt with 
his moncy.  Genthius, not suspecting Perseus to be  capable of 
such meanness,  threw,  at his instiption, the Roman  ambas- 
sadors into prison,  so  that now he had  no  longer any choice 
between  Rome  and Macedonia.  In like manner,  it was  an 
unpardonable mistake that Pcrseus did not send tlze Bastarnae 
into Italy, according to the grand scheme of his father. 
In the year 584, L. Aeinilius  Paullus, the son  of  him who 
had fallen at Cannae,  was  madc consul for  the second  time. 
Tlze Romans were convinced of the necessity for increased efforts 
to bring tlze Macedonian war to a close, and provided hiin with 
the means of attaining this object.  The Rhodians had  unfor- 
tunately  for  tllemselves,  attempted  to mediate between  the 
Romans and Macedonians, in a manner which had offended the 
former.  The war disturbed their commerce, and they did not 
by any means wish to see the Romans victorious, as they owed 
their independence to the equipoise between the several states. 
Tlzey came forward rather impetuously, pleclgiag themselves to 
induce  Philip  to  conclude  peace;  but  the Romans,  however 
heavily the war weighed upon them, did not  wish  for  peace, 
and  the  language  of  the Rhodians  was  oflcnsive to  them. 
The Rhodians  felt that at home they were powerful  and re- 
spected  by their neighbours,  so  that whenever opinions were 
divided on any subject, it was in their power to give the cast- 
ing vote, as had been  the case in the war anainst Antiochus.  a. 
Such  circumstances  are  always  very  deceptive;  and in this 
instance they made the Rhodians forget the enormous dispropor- 
tion between their own power and that of  the  Romans.?  The 
language which they used towards the Ronzans wns not what it 
should havc been, but their wish was to save Macedonia  from 
destruction. 
Perseus  opened  the last campaign ~~~ithout  any  additional 
forces, except those of  Gentl~ius,  who continued his hostilities 
Polybius, xxix. 4; Livy, xliv. 14. 
against  the Bolnans.  Tlze king had taken  his winter  quarters 
in ~~~~d~~i~,  and wllen  the Romans  broke  up, he retreated 
before thcln behind the Cambunian mountains;  a  lofty range 
which  sepRratcs Thessaly  from the coast land  of  JIacedoaia, 
of  tile  most  beautiful  countries in the world.  But this 
time too  ~nouiitains  were evaded;  the lofty and broad Olym- 
pus, the tops of which are covered with almost pcrpctual snow, 
lies between the Peneus and Pieria.  Tempc, which formed the 
pass, was fortified.  There werc indeed many other roads 
across Olympus; but most of thcm were fortified in such a man- 
ner that Paullus thought  that no advantage would be gained 
by an  He discovered,  however, a path  leading right 
across one of the highest summits of the mountain, which, owing 
to its inaccessible naturc, was lcss strongly guarded : thither he 
sent young  Scipio Nasica  thc son-in-law of  Scipio Africanus, 
with 8000  men,  to  march  round  the enemy's  camp.  This 
undertaking would  not have succeeded, if Pcrseus had been a 
great gcncral: but hc who attacks always has advantages;  the 
insurmountable height was passed, the Macedonian army found 
the Romans in its rear; the advanced  corps  were  beaten  by 
Scipio Nasiea, and Pcrseus was obliged to change his position. 
He now drew up his army behind Pydnz, with a decp mountain 
torrent  in his  front; for  through  that  narrow  coast  land,  a 
number of deep torrents flow down mount Olympus parallel to 
one another into the sea, and behind each torrent lines had been 
drawn up, in order to resist the Roizians at every stcp,  if  they 
should penctratc through Tempe.  Meantime the Romans had 
crossed the nlonntain opposite the left wing of the Macedonians, 
so that tllose lines on the banks of  the  torrents were useless, 
and the blacedonians were obliged to throw thcmselvcs behind 
the last, in the neighbourhood  of  Pydaa.  The Romans were 
thus in Pieria,  the country of  Orpheus,  and tllis was a great 
step gained; but the Macedonia11 forces were yet entire.  The 
decisive battle,  in which  the Maccdonian l<ingdoln  found  its 
inglorious end, wa3 fougllt near Pydne  111 the space ofa 
hour, the whole army of  Perseus  was  defeated:  the infintry 
was  cut  to  pieces,  and  the  cavalry  escaped  in a disgraceful 
manner, but witllout  any considerable  loss.  The  loss  of  the 
was trifling ;  some say that they lost only 9 1 men ;others, 
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a  man  who  mas  not  fi~vourably  disposed  towards  Rome: 
he is not the celebrated Posidoaius, but a contemporary of this 
war who wished to justify  Perscus.4  The Iring  had  now  no 
confidence in any one, or any thing,  for  his  country was  ex- 
hausted in the extreme; and the great fault of the Macedonians 
was faithlessness towards their princes in times of need.  He  fled, 
and, escorted by some Cretans, endeavoured to save himself with 
his remaining treasures, as if it  had been possible to find anyplace 
where they could be safe.  He therefore  offered  to his com- 
panions a part of his treasures, but in the madness of his avarice 
he soon repented;  so  that when  at  Amphipolis  he got  some 
breathing time, he cheated them out of what he had ~romised 
them.  All the towns opened thcir gates  to the Romans.  If 
Perseus had wished to save his life as a free man, he might have 
gone to his allies in Thrace,  and thence to some of the  Greek 
towns on the coast of the Euxine,  which  could  have  had no 
motive  for  deliverizg  him up to the Romans.  But he acted 
like a blind man, and went to Samotl~race,  to seek  an asylum 
in its inviolable sanctuary, which he may have considered  all 
the more safe, because certainly the worship of  the Penates at 
Lavinium  and the worship of  Samothrace were  of  the same 
kind.  As  a private person he would indeed have been safe here, 
but it was foolish to expect that under the present circumstances, 
the Romans would  leave him there; but his chief motive was 
to save the beloved money which he had taken with him.  I3e 
found however that he was surrounded by traitors, and after he 
- 
had put one of them  to death,  the others deserted him.  I-Ie 
now wished to embark for  Crete,  or  according  to others,  for 
Cotys in Thrace; but the captain, whom he had already paid, 
deceived him.5  His eyes  were now opened;  he saw that his 
fate might be like that of Pausanias, as the Roman praetor had 
already coino to seizc him or starve him to death.  A cowardly 
love of  life induced  him  to surrender to the Roman admiral 
Cn. Octavius, and he, like  Genthius, was  reserved  to  adorn 
the triumph of his conqueror. 
1,. Aemilius Paullus, who now set about regulating the affairs 
in the East according to the instructions which he had received 
from  Rome, made a cruel use  of his victory, if  we may judge 
from our own feelings of humanity.  One hundred and ten years 
'Plutarch,  Aemil. Paul. 19.  Li~y,  xlv. 6. 
after  the war with Pyn.hus,  the Eon~ans  took  vengeance  on 
~~i~~~~,  which lIad  become  involved  in the fate  of  Pyrrhus. 
lts  inhabitants were divided, and some had declared  in  favour 
of Macedonia.  There was no national feeling  among them ;  al- 
though they may not have observed  the treaties which bound 
them to Rome, yet the cruel vengeance  taken by the Romans 
cannot be justified.  The  Roman soldiers took up thcir quarters 
among  the Molossians,  and here scenes  took  place  like the 
massacre  of  Glcncoe, in Scotland,  though not  with  so  much 
cunning:  but in both cases a massacre tool< place in the midst 
of a population which believed  itself to be in perfect  ~afety.~ 
The inhabitants of  seventy places,  occupied  by the soldiers, 
were lirst coinmandcd, under  penalty of  death, to deliver  up 
all their gold and silver (which amid ordinary ~lundering  might 
have been lost or clestroyed to a great extent), and immediately 
afterwards,  the soldiers in a11  the places fell upon the devoted 
people.  150,000 men are said to have been  sold as slaves,  or 
put to death; and thcir towns to have been  destroyed.  This 
is horrible, and shows the degenerate condition  of  the Roman 
people, because in their own state there was  no equipoise,  but 
only an unbridled multitude.  Servitude deprives man of  half 
his virtues, but perfect freedom to do what he pleases,  creates 
double vices:  in the possession of the sovereignty of the world, 
the Romans  thought  that  they  might  do  anything.  After 
such  cruelty,  which  was  perpetrated  at  the  command  of 
L. Aemilius Paullus, we cannot possibly with Plutarch, reckon 
him  among  the  number  of  great  and  virtuous  Romans. 
His mode  of  acting would  have been  cruel  enough even in 
the course of  a war;  and I cannot  see the reason why many 
persons call Aemilius Paullus a mild and humane man.  It  was 
in a similar manner that he acted in Boeotia;  and throughout 
Greece  the party  which  favoured  the  cause  of  the  Romans 
received  Roman  soldiers to crush  their opponents,  and they 
raged with real fury.  In Aetolia where the Roman party had 
the  hand, it committed an act which almost surpasses all 
belief:  among  other things  they broke into the senate-house, 
and  the  senators suspected of  being favourable to Macedonia, 
were put to death instantaneously, at the request of the leading 
men  the Roman  party, who received  a  Roman  garrison 
Livy,  xlv.  34;  Plutarch, AemJ  Paul.  29 ; Appian, De  Rebus Illyr. 9 ; 
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coinmanded by A. Baebius.7  This dreadful policy was extended 
to the Achaeans  also, alllong whom  the party of  Perseus had 
been  less  strong  than  the one  which  had  endeavoured  to 
maintain  their  dignity,  which  had  been  insulted  by  the 
Romans.  The latter  had  kept  none of  tlle treaties with  the 
Achaeans.  They had admitted ambassadors from separate places, 
and even encouraged  people, as in Lacedaemon and Messenia, 
to come forward with accusations against the Achaeans, whereas 
according to the treaty,  the ambassadors  of  the whole  con- 
federacy alone should hme  been listened to.  It  was cvident that 
the Romans were anxious to disturb the unity of the people, for 
they demanded that the exiles should be recalled.  There was 
among  the  Achaeans  a  traitor,  Callicrates,  who  had  sold 
himself  wholly  to  the  Romans,  and  was  so  detested  and 
accursed  by his  countrymen,  that they dreaded  to approach 
him or to touch his  garments; but the more he was despisetl, 
the deeper  he sank  in his baseness.  After  the victory over 
Perseus, there appeared  ten  Roman commissioners  in Grecce, 
and two of  them, C. Claudius and Cn. Domitius, came among 
the Achaeans,  declaring that among  the papers  of  Perseus, 
there had been found clear evidence of the treachery of  several 
distinguished Achaeans, and requiring the Achaeans  to pass a 
decree,  that  all  those who  had  been  supporters  of  Perscus 
should  be put to  death.  The Achaeans gave  a very appro- 
priate answer, requesting  the  Romans  to name the offenders, 
that they might  be  tried,  and  punished  according  to  law. 
But tlle Roman commissioners  refused  to condescend  to this, 
and insistcd upon a decree being passed pronouncing death on 
the  Macedonian  party  in  general,  before  they  would  bring 
forward  a  list  of  them.  When  the  Romans  were  pressed 
further,  they  declared  that all  those who had  been  strategi 
were  guilty.  One  man,  Xenon,  who  had  been  strategus 
himself,  now rose,  and declared  that he was  so convinced  of 
his own innocence, that he would willingly submit his case not 
only to a court of  his  own  countrymen, but to the Romans 
themselves.  This offer came opportunely for the Romans, and 
they immediately got Callicrates to make out a list of  upwards 
of  one thousand persons, who were to quit their country and 
go to  Italy,  to be  tried.  Some of  them  made  their escape, 
and were  at  once  declared  to  be  convicted  criminals  who 
P~Iybius,  xxx  14; Liv, xlv. 28 and 31. 
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,igllt  be  pllt  to death wherever  they should  be found.  The 
others,  on  their  arrival  at  Rome,  were  not  placed  before  a 
court  of  justice,  but  mere  distributed  as  hostages  in  the 
Illunicipia  of  Etruria.  Seventeen  years  after  this event, not 
Inore than 300 of them were alive.8 One among these Achaean 
hostages was  Polybius, the historian:  his coadition, however, 
was  soon iiz~~roved,  as  he bccaine acquainted wit11 the great 
Rolnnn fdlnilics, and Acmilius Paullus selected hiill to give his 
sons a Greek education.  From this time forward it is difficult 
to say what belongs to Roman and what to universal liistory. 
Macedonia  was  nominally  declared  free.  No  Roman  pro- 
consul was  sent  out  to undertake its administration, and the 
taxes were  reduced  to half  the amount which had becn  paid 
to  the kingsg:  an  instance  which  proves  that  the  Romans 
Icvied  tributc  even  in  those  couiltries  which  were  not 
constituted as provinces.  The country was cunningly dividcd 
into four republics,  and in such a  way that  tribes raturally 
connected  together were severed  from  one another, and were 
annexed  to a  republic with which  they had  no  natural  con- 
nexion ; the connubium and commercium  were  abolishcd : a 
truly Machiavellian policy.  The objcct  of  this  measure was 
to  destroy  all  national  fceling  in each  of  the  four  stateslo, 
and yet the Rornans  actcd  as  if  they were  really  giving to 
those people a republican  constitution.  Each state obtained a 
syncdriuni; and under the pretext of removing those who were 
dangerous to  this new  equality, they expelled  all  persons  of 
rank  and distiizction  from  the country.  The advantage  of 
this  arrangement  soon  became  visible  in  the insurrection  of 
the Pseudo-Philip. 
The triumph  of  Aeini1;us  Paullus  was  the  nzost  brilliallt 
that  had  yet  been  celebrated,  on  account  of  the  immense 
treasures  which  adorned  the procession.  The biogrsplly  of 
Paullus by Plutt~rch  is well  wort11 rcading, ancl  the account of 
his  triumph is very instructive:  he brought with llim 
two millions of our money.  From this time mc lnust date the 
great wealth  of the Romans, but the condition of the people 
grew  and worse:  the cancer  of  poverty  spread  further 
Year,  and  the number  of  beggars  increased, while  one 
of  the population  accumulated enormous riches.  lfora1 
also began  to show  itself  at Rome, and sometilncs 
'  Pauqanlas, vii.  10.2.  Pl:~tarch, Aem~l.  28.  10  Liqr, xli. 29, foll. 31 
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we  meet  with  series of  the most  monstrous  offences;  nay, 
even  before  the  war  against  Perseus,  Roman  history  has 
recorded  some horrible crimes, with almost  incredible ramifi- 
cations.  At the beginning of  the seventh century, two of the 
most distinguished  Roman ladies, the wives of  consulars, were 
accused  of  having poisoned  their husbands, and were  put to 
death  by the decree  of  their own  cousins.'l  The republic 
grew  richer  in the same  proportion  as  the inner  or  moral 
condition  of  thc  people  became  worse.  During  the  war 
against  Perseus,  taxes  had  still  been  raised;  but they were 
afterwards  abolished,  though  I  believe,  that  they  were 
again resorted to during the Social war,  when everything was 
changed into money, a circumstance, of which I have no doubt, 
though it is not mentioned anywhere.  Most writers12 speak as 
if the spoils  of  Macedonia  had  been  so  ample,  as to render 
contributions  for  war  unnecessary.  But  those  spoils  were 
deposited in the public treasury, and it  was rather the continual 
revenues derived from Macedonia,  Illyricum, and other coun- 
tries, which rendered it now superfluous to impose  any direct 
taxes.  Indirect taxes, such as tolls,  duties, etc.,  continued to 
be paid,  and some of  them  were very high,  at least  in later 
times.  The peculiarity was that they were raised, like customs 
duties, in a number of ports, while in the interior of the country 
everything was circulated free of duty. 
After the destruction of  the kingdom  of  Macedonia,  there 
remained only the Rhodians,  who had provoked  the Romans 
by their pride;  and the Romans,  wishing  to overthrow their 
power also,  declared war  against them.  When the Rhodians 
saw that there was no possibility of  escaping,  they descended 
to the lowcst  humiliation  to conciliate  the Romans.  Those 
who  had  actually rendered  themselves  guilty by keeping  up 
a correspondence with Perseus,  facilitated the negotiations  of 
their  country by putting an end to their own  lives,  so that 
only corpses were delivered up to the Romans.  Others fled from 
their homes,  but finding no asylum anywhere, they likewise 
were at length compelled to bring their wretched existence to 
an  end.  Polyaratus  and Dymon  unfortunately  were  really 
guilty;  they were exiled and fell into the hands of the Romans, 
l1 Livy, Epitome, 48. 
l2 Plutarch,  Aemil.  Paul.  38.  Compare  Cicero,  De  OJ.  ii.  22; Pliny, 
Hist. Nut. xxiii.  17. 
who  now took from  the Rhodians  the placcs which they had 
before given to them, nay even those which they had possessed 
long  before.  Stratonicea had  belonged  to them  for  the last 
eevellty years.  It was  not  without  great  difficulty  that  the 
skill of the Rllodian  ambassadors and the interest which  Cato 
tool< in the nhodians,  averted the war; but they had to sub- 
Init to the hardest conditions.  They lost Caria and Lycia, with 
the exGeption of  the nearest  places  on the coast,  so  that they 
did  not  even  retain  their  most  ancient  possessions  in those 
countries.  Thus the Rliodians who had so long been on terms 
of friendship with Rome,  had  to congratulate  themselves  for 
obtaining  an  alliance in which they acknowledged  the sove- 
reignty of  Rome and promised  to support  her  in her  wars.13 
Within their own country,  however,  they retained their inde- 
pendence, and confined theinselves to thcir small but beautiful 
island.  In this they showed  their  good  sense;  and by their 
commercc they continued to enjoy general estimation. 
The war against Perseus was followed  by a period  down to 
the beginning of  the third Punic war,  so barren of  important 
events that Polybius,  when he made a  sccond  edition  of  his 
history,  after the destruction of  Corinthl*, wrote thc interme- 
diate period, from the Macedonian war to the taking of Corinth, 
merely as  an introductory  sketch  to the subsequent  history, 
which formed a work quite distinct  from  his earlier  history, 
and was  connected with it  only by the slight sketch  of  that 
intermediate period.l5  I shall follow his example,  and relate 
only that which is necessary to fill up the gap. 
One  of  the points which must not be overlooked is,  that at 
the close of the sixth century the Romans began  to attack the 
Gauls in the Alps.16  Soon after the war against  Perseus  they 
protected the Massilian colonies of  Antibes,  Nizza,  alld  other 
towns,  against  the  Ligurians.17  The whole  country round 
Genoa was already subdued by the Romans,  whose object was 
l3 Livy, xlv.  10 and 25. 
The first  cdition of his history ended with the destruction of  the kingdom 
of Macedonia and its immediate conscquences, the reconciliation of the Rhodians 
with Itomc, and the carrying away of the Achaean hostages.-N. 
'"his  peculiar view respecting thc work of  Polybins which Niebuhr  rcpeat- 
edly expressed (vol. iii. p.  42),  is perhaps  to be  understood in this  manner: he 
makes the first edition go down to the end of  the 30th book, and considers the 
remaining books as the later addition. 
IG Livy, Epttoma, 4G and 47.  17 Polybius, xxxiii. 4. 
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gradually and as occasion offered, to make themselves  masters 
of  the whole  coast as  far as  Spain (601).  In the East about 
the same  time,  they endeavoured  to subdue the Dalmatians, 
and to gain possession of  the country extending from Zara to 
Ragusa.  They succeeded indeed, but their conquests were not 
lnsting.  They were successful in Corsica also. 
The guilt of the kings Prusias and Euinenes differed  in de- 
grec, the former being related to Perseus by marriage, the latter 
having been Ksitliless to  Rome.  Prusias excited  the indigna- 
tion of his contemporaries by his contemptible conduct, for he 
appeared  at Rome  in  Roman  dress,  his  head  shaved,  and 
wearing the cap of a freedman, and prostrating himself  on the 
ground in the senate house  he declared himself  a freedman of 
the Romans.  He gained  his  cnd,  inasmuch  as  the Romans 
did not curtail his dominions,  but he was obliged  to give his 
son Nicomedes as a hostage,  and by him he was afterwards to 
be  overthrown.  Eumenes  was  forbidden  to  come  to Rome, 
and  his  brother  Attalus implored for  him  the mercy of  the 
Romans. 
About the same time, Antiochus was carrying on war against 
the  two  minor  princes  of  Egypt,  Ptolemy  Philometor  and 
Euergetes 11. (Physcon), and their sister Cleopatra.  Coelesyria 
was lost,  and their possessions  comprised  only Egypt,  Cyprus 
and  Cyrene.  Antiochus  Epiphanes  tried  to  make  himself 
master of these countries, and was successful.  He had advanced 
as far as Memphis, and, as almcst all the Egyptian towns were 
unfortified,  his  victory  was  certain; Alexandria  alone might 
have resisted.  But the Romans would  not allow him  to ac- 
quire such an extensive empire, and sent the celebrated embassy 
of M.  Popillius,  who,  with his staff,  drew a circle  around  the 
king and compelled him, before  quitting the circle,  to declare 
that he would  evacuate  Egypt.  The Romans now  acted as 
mediators  between  the two princes,  giving to  the younger, 
Physcon, Cyrene and afterwards Cyprus also,  and to the elder 
$he rest.  Physcon  at first  became  reconciled  to his  brother; 
but they  afterwards  disagreed  again.  The detail  of  these 
transactions docs not belong to Roman history. 
At that time thc Parthians also began to extend their power. 
The country east of  the desert and the ancient Hyrcania,  the 
coast-land of the Caspian Sea, had been taken possession of by 
them.  Media, Susiana, and Persia too, did not remain long in 
tile hands of the Syrian kings (until 620),  and thus were laid 
tile foundatiolls of  the great  Parthian  empire.  In  630  the 
Partllisns  had already taken Babylon. 
ln  Spain the wars still continued and were  conducted with 
tile greatest energy,  against the Celtiberians.  If the 
other Spanisll  llations  had  co-opcrated with  the  Celtiberians, 
tllcy  migllt have been  able to repcl the Romans  and confine 
tllem to tile coast, as they could not have sent very numerous 
armies to Spain.  ~ut  this was not done, for the Spaniards did 
not feel the necessity of a national union,  and tlie Lusitanians 
were  quite  satisfied,  provided  they  themselves  were  left  in 
peace.  The  Celtiberians  were  likewise  desirous  of  peace, 
and  the  Romans  succeeded  in gradually  gaining  tracts  of 
country from them,  especially  the district of  Cuensa  in  tlie 
south,  and parts of  Lusitania and Estrcmadura.  In the west 
they advanced  towards  the Vaccaeans  and  Salamanca.  The 
Lusitanians were  an ingenious and able people,  but they had 
not yet got  a general  such as shortly afterwards  arose among 
them.  All these tribes, as well as thc Celtiberims, would wil- 
lingly havc  recognised  the supremacy  of  Rome,  and  have 
strengthened  her  military power,  had the Romans  only been 
inclined  to inakc peace on tolerable  conditions.  But this was 
not  their  object;  thcy  wanted  to  reduce  Spain  to  perfect 
submission  and  rule  over it.  What they promised  they did 
not perform;  and hostilities always began afresh on the arrival 
of a new gencral,  so that no one could place any confidence in 
the Romans.  I11  this manner the time was approaching, when 
a new anrl grand historical drama was to commence. 
During this period there are no changes in the constitution, 
which  ever since the first  Punic war remained  outwardly the 
same.  A  few  laws were  passed,  and  a  few  attempts  made 
to remedy  the prevailing  evils, but without  effect.  In this 
manner arose the lea Voconia, forbidding the practice of making 
women heirs,  and of  leaving legacies  to them, except in the 
case  of  a  father having an only daughter, and no son.  This 
regulation respecting  an only daughter  (~'T~ICX~~~~)  arose out 
of the gentile relations, bccause  such a daughter, as in Attic&, 
was obliged to marry a member  of her gens, so that the pro- 
perty remained  in the gens.  This law,  however,  shows that 
the spirit of family was already becoming  extinct.  Cicero in 
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to the notions of his own age.  The deterioration in the minds 
and feelings of the Romans, however, had already gone so far, 
that  a  single  law like  the  lex  Voconia was no longer able to 
check  the evil.  Matters were then as they were in England 
forty years ago, when a general and wisely plaiiiied  legislation 
might have stopped the downward tendency of the state; but 
such  suitable  and  thorough  reforms  are  of  extrclnely  rare 
occLlrrence  in history: fate leads states to their downfall, and 
I  foresee  that  within  fifty  years  England  will  experience  a 
complete political change.18  At  Rome a few laws were passed 
against the wishes of certain individuals, but everywhere loop- 
holes were found, by means of which they were evaded.  The 
lex Aelia  et  Fzdfa was another important law; but when  and 
how it was  passed  is  very uncertain.  It is  usually regarded 
as a single law; but from Cicero it appears probable that there 
were two, and they must have been of great importance.  The 
substance of what it enacted, at least so far as it is known, was 
that the tribunician  transactions  with  the people  should  be 
liable  to  be  interrupted  by the auguries:  a  proof  that  the 
ancient  forms  still  continued  to  be  respectcd.  As we,  of 
course, regard the whole system of augury as an  imposition, this 
measure appears to us a mere  extension of priestly deception, 
and we wonder that such a thing could happen in an enlight- 
ened age.  But it was to be  a  mere form:  the power  of the 
tribunes had reached a fearf~tl  height;  and as the augurs were 
now authorised to state what signs might stop the proceedings 
of  the assembly  convened  by the tribunes,  no  one believed 
that those signs were  sent by a  supernatural  power, but they 
were  regarded  as only  means in the  hands of  the optimates 
to check the tribunes.  By the lex Hortensia the tribunes had 
acquired the power of passiiig laws without the sanction of the 
senate;  and now the augurs, one-half of whom were patricians, 
and  the  other half  plebeians,  though from  the most  distin- 
guished  families,  might  prevent  such  resolutions,  and  limit 
the otherwise unbridled power of the tribunes.  The form of the 
new  law is certainly offensive and unworthy, the augurs being 
obviously obliged to deceive, but its object to create a counter- 
tribuneship in matters of legislation was liighly desirable.  This 
law is mentioned only by Cicero, and Clodius abolished it. 
la This remark  was  made  in  1826,  that  is,  previously  to the carrying of 
the Roman Catholic ema~icipation. 
A~~~~ the  nhidi show to what degree matters 
had become  cllanged  at Rome, it must be inentioiled  that, iii 
the  year  600, one tribune,  or  the  whole  college,  ordered 
the consuls to be ilnprisoned for having acted ~ulfairly  in levy- 
ing tmops.19  SSucll a decree of  the tribunes is SO  foreign  to 
the anciellt constitution,  that this occurrence  alone suffices to 
show the complete change that had taken place, and that then 
no  confidence  could  be  placed  in a man's  personal conscicn- 
tiousness.  Formerly those bound  to serve in the armies were 
singly by tlie consuls, and people hd  borne this from 
the earliest times.  At  first all were taken, afterwards only the 
most  able,  and those who had  already been  trained  in  war. 
As the legions now were always stationed for  a long time in 
distant provinces,  tlie  duties of military service became  nlorc 
oppressive,  and many tried  to get exempted  by favouritism, 
tlie  tribunes  preventing  any individual whom  they favoured 
from  being  enlisted.  Moreover,  as  the  empire had  become 
very extensive,  levies  must have continued to present greater 
and greater difficulties,  the men having to appear in person. 
The selection  of soldiers was now abolished, and the general 
conscription was  arranged in such a manner  as to make the 
lot decide upon a man's  duty to serve, after which excuses  or 
reasons  for exemption might be brought forward.  This was 
not a change for the worse;  but the tribunes at the same time 
demanded that cach of them should have the right to exempt 
ten of the individuals drawn by lot, and as the consuls opposed 
them tlley were imprisoned.20  The neccssity of making enact- 
ments against  bribery had become even  more pressing  before 
the end of  the Gfih  century.  They were  directed  against 
venality, for the constitution of tlie centuries had been changed, 
and attempts at bribery had become  possible.  Whether  the 
lea  Cornelia  de  ambitu  is that  of  Cornelius  Cethegus,  or  of 
Sulla, canllot be determined, although the fornlcr is generally 
looked  as an established  fact; but it is  that a law 
de  ambitu  was  enacted  as  early  as  the year  570, a  fact 
which  llas  become  solnewhat  better known  from  the Milan 
scholia on Cicero.21 
l9  Livy, Epit. 48.  2%ivy,  Epit. 55. 
21  Schol. Bob.  in  Orot. pro  Sulla (Orelli's  Cicero, vol. v. pt. 2, p. 361.)  The 
reading in Livy, xl. 19,  is  very doubtful, whence the belief  that the law may 
have  originated  wit11  Sulla.  Others  refer  this  Carnelian  law  to  the consul 
Cn. hmelius Dolabella  (A.  U. 595),  and quote  Livy, Epit. 47,  in  support  of 
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LECTURE 
THE  outbreak of the third Punic war had long been prepared 
by the relations  existing  between  Carthage  and  Masinissa. 
The peace with Rome lasted for upwards of fifty years, during 
which  the Carthaginians  did not  give the Romans a  single 
reason for complaint, nor  do the Romans themselves mention 
any.  We  must suppose that this interval was  a  time of pros- 
perity for  Carthage,  for  after  it we  find  the city  very  rich 
and  populous;  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  that the 
obstacles  which  prevented  the maritime  nations  of  the East 
from  entering  upon  extensive  commercial  enterprises,  were 
of  great  advantage  to  the Carthaginians.  During  the wars  . . 
between  Egypt  and  Syria,  for  instance,  the  Cartl~agmians, 
who were neutral,  were allowed  to sail  and trade where they 
pleased.  Tlie  energy of  the Carthaginians being  prevented 
from exerting itsclf abroad, was directed towards their internal 
affairs, and towards the increase of  wealth.  But still so  long 
as  that state  of  things lasted,  in which they were  kcpt in a 
sort of minority, their national character and their constitution 
seem  to have  fallen  into  decay.  The government was weak, 
and the anarchical ascendancy of the people, according to the 
remarkable statement of  Polybius, was an old evil, yea  older 
than at Rome,  and I believe that Carthage had become a wild 
democracy, and was  in a  state of total  dissolution.  A power 
like that of the consuls  at Rome had long  ceased to exist at 
Carthage, and that of the senate too was very much limitcd. 
An eastern people governing itself as a republic, without those 
institutions which in Greece and Rome formed a check upon 
democratic  extravagance,  could  not  but  become  completely 
lawless.  What we positively know is  but little, and we can 
only here and thcre catch a glimpse of  the real state of tlliilgs 
among the Carthaginians. 
The great outward  cause  of  their  sufferings was  ever  anci 
anon Masinissa.  It is  not  improbable  that he may have rc- 
ccivcd secret instructions from  the  Romans; but, even  if  this 
was not the case, he was  convinced  that, however  glaring his 
acts of injustice might be, the Romans would not declare against 
him.  Tlie Carthaginians endured  everything with extraordi- 
nary forbearance, in order not to give  Bome  any occasion  for 
making war upon them, for they clearly saw that  their bright 
and happy days  were  gone, and they  resigned  themselves  to 
their nlclallcholy  fate.  And this is the only reasonable course 
that call be  under such circumstances;  though a nation 
must not cease to be aware of  the heavy  sacrifice it is making, 
or forget the fact that it is unhappy; for, as soon as this feeling 
is gone, demoralisation, baseness,  and cowardice, step  into its 
place;  and I am  rather inclined  to believe  that, at least  to a 
certain extent, this was the case with the Carthaginians. 
The disputes began  not  long after the close of  the second 
Punic  war.  Masinissa made impudent claims to the most ancient 
Phoenician settlements, the rich coast of Byzacene,  which  the 
Carthaginians had possessed from the earliest times.  Polybius 
says, that that district belonged  to the Carthaginians as early 
as the time of the Roman kings.  This was indeed so audacious 
a demand, that the Romans did not dare publicly to declare in 
favour of Masinissa.  Scipio  Africanus  went  over as Roman 
commissioner  and  arbitrator, and the circumstances  were  so 
clear, that he could not possibly decide the dispute in favour of 
the king; but, with an unpardonable policy, he declined  pro- 
nouncing  a  vcrdict, so  that the Carthaginians  and  Nasinissa 
remained  in their hostile position towards each  other, and the 
former  must have  been  convinced  that  any active resistance 
would involve them in a war with Rome.  They were accord- 
ingly obliged to keep on the defensive.  Their situation was as 
unhappy as that of  the states  with which Napoleon had made 
peace to prepare their destruction, he himself  giving the lie to 
all  truth.  It was  unfortunate  for  Carthage,  that  Masinissa 
reigned upwards  of  fifty ycars  after  the peace  of  Scipio; and 
throughout his life, he managed his  conncxions with Rome so 
skilfull~,  that the sad condition of Carthage became worse and 
worse.'  Matters thus came to such  a pitch that, at last, a war 
broke out betwecn the Carthaginians and Masinissa. The exact 
time at which this took place is one of those points which can- 
not be accurately determined:  but I am not  inclined  to place 
the event 8s  near  the outbreak of the third  Punic war as is 
done.'  The  territory  of  then 
' Appian? De  XC~ILS  Pun. 68; Livy, xlii. 23. foil., compare zonnras,  ix.  15. 
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the modern Tunis and the western part of Tripoli, the interior 
of which had been in the possessioll of  Masinissa even before 
this time.  By his constant conquests, he had  become  one of 
the most powerful rulers of that ~eriod,  and was much stronger 
than  Carthage.  Had the Carthaginians taken up arms  at a 
proper time, they would  perhaps  have been  able to keep him 
at a distance:  but this was neglected.  They had assenlbled  a 
considerable  army under a general Hasdrubal.  Their ~revious 
misfortunes had not made them more warlike; they did not do 
what Machiavelli wished  to  be  done for  his  native city, and 
had not yet come to the conviction that they must rely upon 
their own valour, and at the same time lighten the burdens of 
their subjects.  The evil of their military system had not been 
removed, and their armies still consisted  of  mercenaries;  they 
had the additional misfortune  of  having  an unskilful general. 
Hasdrubal  marched out against  Masinissa  with  an  army  of 
50,000 men; and, although the battle was  not decidedly  lost, 
yet he considered himself conquered, and retreated without se- 
curing his communication with Carthage.  He was accordingly 
cut off, and began to make proposals of peace, which Masiniesa 
haughtily rejected, and refused to allow the surrounded Cartha- 
ginians to depart until, being driven to extrcnles by famine and 
distress, they gdve hostages as a security for their keeping peace, 
undertook to pay 5,000 talents within lifty years, and acknow- 
led Masinissa's  usurpations.  When the defenceless men who 
had been deprived of their arms, departed, Gulussa, Masinissa's 
youngest son, fell upon them and cut them nearly all to pieccs. 
Although Masinissa had the hostages  in his possession, he de- 
manded that the peace sllould be observed, and even complained 
to the Romans, saying that the Carthaginians did not intend to 
keep it.  The Romans, as usual, sent commissioners, who, with 
a truly diabolic spirit,  deferred  giving any decision, but insti- 
gated Masinissa.  They sent their reports to Rome, informing 
the senate of the great resources which Carthage still possessed; 
for the Carthaginians seem to have made great preparations for 
several years before  the war  with Masinissa broke out  They 
had, it is true, no ships of'  war, but they were abundantly sup- 
plied with materials  for  building  a  fleet;  their  arsenals  were 
filled with arms and timber:  they were, in hct, fully prepared, 
correct, since, according to the common opinion, the war of  Maslnlssa is placed 
very near the outbreak of  the thlrd Punic war. 
and that witl1 the greatest justice, since  they were under no 
restrictions  in tllis  respect  by their treaty with Rome.  The 
R~~~~~ required them  to destroy  or  deliver  up their timber; 
and wllile  the subject  was  discussed  in the senate, old Cato 
perpetually repeated his advice to destroy  Carthage-a  blind- 
ness  hardly  conceivable in so wise a man.  The sovereignty of 
the world had give11 to the Roman senate an importance which 
formed a compensation for the loss of its influence in the inter- 
nal  of  Rome through the ascendancy of  the democratic 
element; and the senators began more  and more  to feel  that 
they were kings.  In  regard to Carthage, the senate was divided 
into two parties:  the one, actuated by a blind hatred, thought 
that Carthage must be  destroyed, feeling  that  Rome was  the 
object of universal hatred;  the other party  was headed by P. 
Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who, like many others, seems to have 
clearly perceived the condition of Rome. Opinions were divided, 
however, as to the reinedy which was to be applied, some think- 
ing that help was  impossible, and that accordingly they must 
live  quickly, and enjoy  the shortness  of  life-a  man  of  this 
kind was Cato; others, like Nasica, thought that the evil might 
at least be retarded in its progress by outward remedies, because 
a thorough reforin was  perhaps impracticable.  A small party 
which aftelwards came forward, with Tib. Gracchus at its head, 
wanted to attempt a radical  cure by strong means.  Whether 
Nasica's  policy towards Carthage  arose  from a love  of justice 
also, is uncertain;  but it is at any rate possible that the son  of 
the man who was called the Best  wished to be just:  certain it 
is, however, that his opinion was not  adopted.  It was  deter- 
mined to destroy Carthage.  PJhen Masinissa had defeated the 
Carthaginians, and it was thought that the object  might now 
be easily attaincd, the Romans took the Carthaginians to account 
for their war with Masinissa, as if it  had been a violation of  the 
existing treaty, although it  had been only an act of self-defence. 
The'  Carthaginians,  broken-hearted,  sent  one  embassy  after 
another,  imploring  the  senate to say  what  they  had to do 
to maintain peace ; but they were deceived by equivocal answers, 
alld assurances that nothing should be undertaken against them3, 
if tlleJ'  would but  endeavour  to  make  reparation  to  Rome. 
Resistance seemed so hopeless, that extreme humiliation on the 
part of Carthage was necessary.  Peace prevailed in all the rest 
of the world, and Rome was undisturbed. 
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In  603,  the consuls M. 'llanilius and L. Marcius Censorinus led 
two consular  armies, consisting, it is said,  of  80,000 foot and 
4000 horse, among whom there were perhaps many other troops 
besides  those of  the Italian  allies to Sicily.  They landed at 
Lilybaeum, where the troops were organised, and where the last 
Carthaginian ambassadors were directed to apply to the consuls, 
who had full  powers  to treat  with them.  The Carthaginians 
saw  indeed  that their  destruction  was  aimcd  at,  and  that 
nothing  remained  for  them  but to  defend  themselves  to the 
last; but yet  their  ambassadors  appeared  before  the  consuls, 
who declared that the senate  did not  wish  to  encroach upon 
the freedom  of  the  Carthaginian  people;  that  they  should 
retain their freedom, if  they would submit to the orders they 
might receive; but,  as  they  had  so often violated  the peacc, 
as it was known that they had made large ~re~arations,  and as 
they were dividcd into so many parties, the consuls  desired to 
have some security; and for this purpose  they demanded that, 
within thirty days, 300  children  of  the noblest  Carthaginian 
families  should be delivered  up into their hands  as  hostages. 
These children  were  sent  over  to  Sicily by  their parcnts,  in 
heart-rending  de~pair.~  Carthage  had  no  fiiend  in  all the 
world.  Even her  most  ancient  allies  became  faithless;  and 
Utica, without having any grounds for complaint, but despair- 
ing of the fate of Carthage, had thrown itself into thc arms  of 
the Ronzans, and had  been  received  by  them  contrary to the 
treaty with Carthage.  After the Romans had, in this manner, 
secured the submission of Carthage, their army crossed over to 
Africa, and landed, partly  at Utica,  and  partly  at the place 
where  Scipio  had  bccn  encamped  (Castra  Cornelia).  The 
Roman consuls now took a military position, and informed the 
Carthaginian magistrates, that they were  ready  to treat  with 
them  on  anything  that  had  not  been  settled  previously. 
When the Carthaginian ambassadors  appeared before the con- 
suls, they were told that the Romans had information about all 
their ~roceedings;  that,  contrary to the treaty, ships had been 
built; and that thcir arsenals wcre filled  with arms intended to 
be used against Rome : that, therefore  the Carthaginians must 
deliver up all their arms, men of  war, and artillery;  for, they 
said, as Rome was  able to protect them, and as the peace with 
Masinissa was  sanctioned,  there was no reason for Carthage to 
"olybius,  xxxvi.  2. ;  Appian, I. c.  76. 
possess  arms;  all the preparations  that had  been  made 
could have  other object  than to make  war  against Rome. 
~~~d  as  this coln~nand  was,  still  it  was  obeyed.  ,411  their 
arlns were collveycd in  1000  waggons under  the eyes  of  the 
colnlTlissioners illto  the  Roman  camp.  On  their landing  in 
Africa, ille Romans  had  demanded  corn  for  their  army, and 
they had received  it from  the stores of  Carthage,  which  was 
thereby brought to  the verge  of  famine.  The Carthaginians 
now believed  that they had  satisfied  the Romans  in every re- 
spect.  But when  the ambassadors  had  their  last  audience, 
they were led through the lines of the Roman army, before the 
tribunal  of  the consuls, and were told that the governlnent of 
Carthage had  shewn its good-will indeed, but that it had  no 
colltrol over the city, and that Rome could not be safe, so long 
as  it was  fortified; the  preservation  of  peace,  therefore,  re- 
quired that the people should quit the city, give up their navy, 
and build a new town, without walls, at a distance of ten miles 
from the sea-coast.  When  the ambassadors  attempted  to re- 
monstrate against this demand, the consuls  replicd,  that they 
had promised safety to the people and not to the walls, that the 
former should  suffer  no harm, and that they might live away 
from the sea as well as the Romans.  This announcement pro- 
duced the highest  dcgrec  of  despair  among the ambassadors. 
Their last desperate request was, that before the return of the 
ambassadors,"thc consuls should allow the Roman fleet to appear 
before Carthagc, to intimidate the city.  This was not treason, 
but the suggestion of despair; for the ambassadors forcsalv that, 
on their return  to  Carthage,  they would  be  exposed  to the 
fury of an enraged people; and some of them, who had formerly 
advised their countrymen to be moderate, had not tlie courage 
to  return,  but rcmained  with  the  Romans.  Those  who did 
return refused to give an answer to the people  who had come 
out to meet them, and with  tears  reported  the answer to the 
senate.  The indignatiou and fury which  this news excited  in 
the city of  Carthage were SO  great, that the people determined 
to perish in the ruins of their city.  All the gates were instantly 
shut, and all  the  Romans  and  Italicans, who happened  to be 
there, were  seized and  tortured  to  death.5  This the consuls 
not expected.  They were, according to the Roman stan- 
dard,  men  of  cultivated  minds  and  good  education;  but, 
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distinguished  as Manilius was as a jurist,  he was incapable of 
com:nanding an army.  They themselves may have thought the 
fate of the unfortunate city so terrible, that their hearts ached, 
and that they  did  not  carry  out  their  design  with  vigour. 
Had they immediately  appeared  before the city, they would 
have taken it, and there would have been less misery; but they 
remained in their camp, expecting that the Carthaginians would 
surrender.  This whole transaction with Carthage was a cursed 
and diabolical undertaking. 
The city, situated on a peninsula, was protected on  the land 
side by a treble  wall,  three miles in length, forty-five feet  in 
height, and twenty-five in thickness (in  ancient times arsenals 
had been  there);  but on the side along the bay of  Tunis, it 
had only one somewhat  lower  wall.  The Romans, who ex- 
pected  to find a  defenceless population,  attempted  to storm 
both walls.  But despair  had suggested  to the Carthaginians 
means of defence on both sides; and they rcpelled the assault. 
Everybody was engaged, day and night, in the manufacture of 
arms, with enormous and unexampled exertions.  The women 
gave their hair to make ropes for  the catapults; slaves were li- 
berated  and all the walls  were  guarded.  Hasdrubal,  whom 
they had been  obliged  to send  into  exile on  account  of  his 
conduct, carried  on a  war against Masinissa, independently of 
Carthage, with an army of  20,000 fugitives, and ravaged the 
open country.  The sentence  of  his banishment  was  now re- 
pealed,  and he was  made general of  the Carthaginian  forces 
out of the city. 
This war  was  not  decided  until  the fourth  year  after its 
commencement.  The history of  it  is  so distressing, that it is 
painful to me to think of, much more to rclate.  There can be 
nothing  more heart-rending than this last struggle of despair, 
which was necessary, and yet could not end otherwise than in 
the destruction of  Carthage.  I will not, therefore, enter into 
the  detail.  At first, one  might  rejoice  to  see  the Romans, 
with their great  forces,  fail  in their  attempts:  the awkward 
consuls were  defeated  by despair.  We  do not know who had 
thc command  in  the  city,  but  it,  defended  itself  bravely: 
outside of it there were two generals, Hasdrubal  and  Himilco 
Phamaeas.  The manner  in which  the latter  carried  on  the 
war, relieved his native city by various diversions, and supplied 
himself  with  provisions,  bears  great  resemblance  to  that  of 
F~~~~~~~~  Ferrucci, during  the siege of  Florence  by the em- 
peror Charles V., in the years 1529 and 1530: he accomplished 
a thousand  brilliailt  feats, until  he fell  into the hands of  the 
spnninrds,  who, acting like the French in the Tyrol, hung him. 
~~t  Himilco Phainaeas, who displayed great military talents, 
shewed  in the  end  how  great  the moral  corruption  of  his 
country was, and  that  he lived in an age in which all sense of 
honour had  become extinct.  For, after  having  accomplished 
things which were  really brilliant, and  which  ought  to have 
induced him to remain  faithful, he entered  into  negotiations 
with the Roman consul:  declaring to his own friends that the 
fate of  Carthage  was  decided;  that every one's  duty  was  to 
take care of  himself;  that, for  this  reason, he would conclude 
a treaty  for himself;  and that  he would  assist  any one  who 
would not identify his own fate with that of Carthage?  Some 
thousands, with their officers, followed  his  example, and went 
over to the Romans.  This was a great misfortune for Carthage. 
The Roman  senate did  not blush  to honour this traitor with 
magnificent  robes, extensive estates, money, and other things. 
Hasdrubal  twice  defeated  the  Romans,  who  had  raised  the 
siege  and retreated  into  the country.  An attempt of  their's 
on Hippo likewise failed.  It  now appeared as if fortune would 
turn in favour of  Carthage. 
Masinissa  again  shewed  himself  to  be  a  vulgar  eastern 
traitor;  he does  not  deserve  the praise  of  the Romans, who 
call him socius Jidelissimus :  he was  in reality a profligate  and 
unprincipled  oriental sultan.  Hitherto his  fidelity  to Rome 
had  been  natural  enough, for  he owed  his  greatness  to  his 
connexion  with  Rome; but he  now began  to think  that  it 
would  be  better for  him  if Carthage  were  saved,  than if it 
were destroyed;  for  he was  very cunning, and foresaw that if 
Carthage became a Roman province, he could  extort  nothing 
from it.  This however  was  not  all:  he also  knew that the 
Romans, according to their maxim, )ella  ex bellis swere, would 
one day attack his  kingdom  also;  that if  Carthage existed  no 
longer, there would be no motive for the Romans to spare him; 
and  he was  conscious, moreover,  that his  friendship  towards 
the Romans was not  SO  enthusiastic  as to give him a claim on 
the  Permanence of their favor and indulgence.  Mistrust arose 
between  him  and  the  Romans:  he sent them no troops, bnt 
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only asked what they den~aaded.  The Romans, perceiving the 
offensive  nature of  his  conduct, replied  that  they would  let 
him know in due time;  to which he answered that he would 
wait for their orders.  Subsequently they did ask for his assist- 
ance, and it was granted.  Hc even began to negotiate with 
Carthage, wishing  that  it sho~~ld  throw  itsclf  into his  arms 
unconditionally.7  Those who are acquainted with the history 
of  the  East, will  remember  many  ~arallels  to his  conduct.8 
The Romans consequently  found  that  he was  anything  but 
inclined to support tlicir undertaking.  Had the Carthaginialls 
submitted to Masinissa, or his son Gulussa, he would  unqucs- 
tionably have come forward  as  their  protector;  and it is  not 
impossible  that the Roman  dominion  in Africa  would  then 
have been  broken.  It was  folly  in the Curtl~aginians  not  to 
do so; but the state of  the open  country may have prevented 
them. 
The attacks upon Carthage now ceased, and the two consuls 
confined  themselves  to  carrying  on  the  war  against  Has- 
drubal and Himilco;  but Hasdrubal  completely defeated the 
consul  Manilius,  so that he was  obliged  to retreat with  his 
army  to  Utica.  In  the  following  year,  604,  the  consuls 
L. Calpurnius Piso and L. Mancinus went to Africa, and con- 
ductcd the war very unskilfully.  Hasdrubal encamped a few 
days' march from the town, in a strong place called  Wepheris, 
and all attempts to dislodge  him failed.  It is astonishing to 
find  that  the Carthaginians, without a fleet, had the sea opcn, 
and received  their provisions  by sea.  The slow  progress  of 
the war, in which the Romans took only a few towns, excited 
astonishment  throughout  the  world.  Just  at  this  time  a 
rebellion broke out in Macedonia, under a pseudo-Philip.  The 
Spaniards also conceived fresh hopes;  and shortly aftcr, Achaia 
also  rose  against  the Romans.  This state of  general excite- 
ment, which  extended  decp  into the  interior  of  Asia, must 
have  suggested  to the  Carthaginians  the  hope  that Nemesis 
would  intervene, and make  Rome  herself  the victim  of  her 
ambition. 
The  Romans  felt  the  more  ashamed,  as  thcir  disgraceful 
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roll~uct towards  Carthngc  must  necessarily  have  been  felt 
by  them;  and hence the discontent with  their  generals  was 
very  great.  In the year  U.C.  605, P.  Cornelius  Scipio  was 
lllaclc corlsul.  Public opinion  distinguished  him above all his 
contemporaries.  We generally call  him  Aeinilianns, a name 
he never  bears  in the classical age.  Analogy and the 
usus  lopuelzdi  frequently  differ  very widely, and such  is  the 
case ]lere, for according to analogy he might have been called 
hemilinnus.  He is called P. Sc+io,  Paulli Jilius, and Cicero 
always  calls him  so;  the name  Aemilianus  in  the  Fasti is 
an invention  of  later  timess:  I am  so  strongly  convinced 
of  this,  that  I  would  unhesitatingly  declare  any  passage 
of Ciccro to  be  spurious  if tlie name occurred  in it.  Scipio 
has  a  great  reputation  in  history,  which  however,  in my 
opinion,  is  not  altogether  well  deserved.  He  was,  it  is 
true,  a  very  eminent  general  and  a  great  man;  he  did 
many  a  just  and  praiseworthy  thing;  but  he  made  a 
show  of  his  great  qualities;  and  Polybius,  his  fricnd  and 
instructor  in military affairs, who in other respects  loves him 
very much,  shews  in  his  narrative  quite  clearly  that  the 
virtues  of  Scipio were  ostcntatious.'O  Things which  every 
other  good  and  honest  man  does  quietly,  Scipio  boasts  of; 
because  they are  not  common  among  his  own  countrymen. 
We feel  ashamed of  the age in which such things are relatcd 
as if  they were  sonlething  extraordinary.  He had  received 
varied information from Polybius who had especially instructed 
him in strategies.  What distinguishes him besides his military 
ability is  an unflinching  political  character:  he belonged  to 
those who wishcd, by all means, to maintain the state of things 
such as it actually was.  He felt colnfortablc in it, and every- 
thing which existed  had  in his eyes an indisputable right to 
exist, and lie never asked whether it was  right or wrong in 
its origin, or how detrimental  its injustice was to the republic 
itself-  Even  where  he saw  the clcplorablc condition  of  tile 
stat% and knew the cvil  consequences that would result from 
it,  nevertheless  persisted  in  upholding  the actual  state o~ 
things;  but he perhaps  thought  that any attempt  at 
would  shake the republic to pieces.  I ]<now many good  and 
Vn  thc current editions of the Capitaline Fasti, the name Aemilianus in the 
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thcy ought to be made.  The younger can in 110  way be com- 
pared with the elder  Scipio, who was a  tllorough genius, and 
felt that he was  above his uoatcmporaries.  Notwithstanding 
his  great lovc  for  the pcoplc,  he hated  the individual  who 
placed  himself  on  an equality with him:  his  absence of  pre- 
judice bordcred on tl~oughtlessness,  whereas the younger Scipio 
was an artificial man who wanted genius.  His education was 
much Inore  perfect  than  that of  the elder Scipio, for he pos- 
sessed  all  thc lcilowledge  of  a  highly cultivated  Greek,  and 
lived  on  tcrms  of  intimacy with  such distinguished  men  as 
Polybius and  Panactius.  He allowed himself  to be employed 
by his countrymen in two fearful  destructions which were  rc- 
volting to his feclings, but he did not do all he could to prevent 
them:  the elder  Scipio tvould  not  have destroyed  Carthagc. 
Subsequently his conduct towards Tib. Gracchus, his brother- 
in-law, deserves  severe censurc : he then joined  a thoroughly 
bad party, supporting it with his influence and power, whereby 
he made himself odious to the people, as is seen at his deathl1; 
but we must at the same time acknowledge, that he was a very 
distinguished  general  at a  time when Rome was not rich in 
military geniuses. 
LECTURE  LXXIV. 
CICERO  has bestowed  his special favour on this second Scipio. 
Wc  sometimes feel  a similar interest  in a person in history or 
literature, if, on placing ourselves in his circumstances, wc dis- 
cover that we arc one with  him; wc then come to fcel with 
him and in him, and thus assign to him a character different 
from that which he really possessed: and the position of  Scipio 
is indeed somewhat  similar to that of  Cicero.  Alt,hough thc 
lex Villia annalisl was otherwise strictly observed, and although 
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Scipio was yet vcry young, still when suing for the aedilesliip, 
lie mas lllade col~sul  by the nnaiiinlous desire of the peoplc, and 
witllout llilll the war would have been protracted a long time. 
Carthage, as I have already remarked, was situated on a pen- 
insula,  but  did  not  occupy  the  whole  of  it,  as  has  been 
erroncously  inferred  from  tlle statement "hat  it mas  23,000 
paces in circumference.3  The  wholcpeninsula seems  to have bccn 
surrounded by a  kind of  rampart,  as is now lrnown from the 
excavations made by J. E. Humbert.  The  town has  been  so 
colnplctely  destroyed  by t11e  Romans,  tllat  no  buildings arc 
foundabove the ground, but foundations of  buildings are  still 
visible.  The ancient city of  Carthage  lay between  the treble 
wall  running  across  the  isthmus,  and  a  line  dividing  the 
peninsula into a western  and an eastern  part.*  On  the neck 
of land, thc city, as already remarked, was protectcd by a treble 
wall.  Next to it was Bozra, tlie citadel,  somewhcre about thc 
centre of the place occupied by the city.  Whcther  n portion 
of the space assigned to the city was distinct fiom the rest ancl 
bore a  articular name is not known, but seems to mc probable 
enough.  The north-eastern  part of  the penillsula was ca;llcd 
by the name of Megara; and in this district it was dificult for 
Livy, Epit. 51.  Compare Strabo, xvii. p.  832. 
This opinion  has  been  refuted  by  the  researches madc  on  the  spot  by 
Colonel IIumbcrt, a sincere, open, singlc-inindcd,  and straightfon?.mcl  soldicl; 
who was for several years in the service of the Dey of Tunis.  Thc result of his 
investigations have not yct found their way  into  books,  but  his  drawings and 
papers fell into thc  hands  of  a  real  adventurer,  Camillo Borgia, a ncl,hcw  of 
Cardin~tl  Borgia, who bad great talent for drawing.  IIe abused the confidence 
~vhicll  Colonel IIumbcrt had placed in him, by copying his drawing-j, and giving 
tl~em  out as his own.  What I here say is known to many,  but in Gcrmany no 
one is aware of it.-N.-Thc  work of  Camillo Borgia,  as  far  as  I know,  ]las 
never bccn publisllcd; but the learned Dane, Estrup,  saw  tho  MS.  at Naples 
after tl~c  death of C. Borgia,  and  rnacle  some use of  it fbr  his  work "Lincae 
Topopaphicac Carthaginis Tyriae,"  IIafniae, 1821.  By IIumbert himself wc 
have, "Notice sur quake  cippes sEpn1craux ct dcux fragmens, d6couvcrts en 18 17 
hill. le sol de l'ancicnnc Carthagc," $ la Haye, 1821. 
l1 The introduct~on  to the Somnium Scipionis cannot be looked vlpon as his- 
torical; even the statement that Scipio first went to Africa as tribune of the soldiers 
under Manilius and  Censorinus is not  correct:  it  is one of  Ciccro's  historical 
blunders.-N. 
The leges annales which exi~ted  in the time  of  Cicero had  been framed  by 
Sulla; but in the time of  Scipio the lex Villia (Livy, XI.  44) was nnquestionabl~ 
The treble wall. 
Byrsa. 
Harbour. 
The newly  dug C'tnal. 
Megara (Magalla). 
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forces to land, the coast being steep;  it is now called El Marsa. 
011  the south-western side was the  port-town.5  The harbour 
of  Cothon was  artificially made  with a  narrow  entrance, and 
consisted  of  sevcral basins, like the docks in London.  From 
the road, ships passccl into  the con~nzercial  docks,  and thence 
by a canal to the arsenal, which was situated on an island  and 
strongly  fortified.  Round  these  basins  were  buildings  with 
the equipments  for  each  ship.  This port-town  was  of  later 
origin.  In the course of time a large suburb had been formed 
in Megala or AIagalia, the situation of  which  cannot be accu- 
rately  determined;  it  consisted  of  many  gardclzs,  but  was 
likcwisc  surrounded by a wall.  When C. Gracchus, and after 
him Julius Cacsar, endeavoured to restore the city, they heeded 
the curse that lay on  the ancient  site, and built  the Roman 
Cartl~a~e  in Megara, by the side of the ancient city"  as may be 
distinctly seen from  the  Roman  antiquities  found there.  Of 
Carthaginian  antiquities  nothing  but  toinbs  have  been  dis- 
covered, which cannot, of course, surprise us, for it  was outside 
thc city. 
Appian  is  our  only  detailed  authority  for  this  war,  and 
fortunately he has  here  copied  Polybius,  for otherwise  he is 
below all criticism.  But even  as  it is, his accounts, as well as 
those  of  Zonams,  are very obscure  and unconnected.  From 
them we only see that Scipio landed in front of  the peninsula, 
established himsclf  there, and took  thc  suburb; so  that Car- 
thage was confined to the old town and its ports.  Even in the 
year before Scipio's consulship, L. Mancinus  had  discovered a 
spot on the northern  side  of  Megara,  where  an army  might 
land and establish itself.7  After this was taken,  Scipio began 
to besiege the city itself with all his energy:  it was useless to 
attack Carthage on the land  side whcrc  it  was  protcctcd  by 
the treble wall,  and he thcrcfore  directed  his  attacks  against 
the southcrn  side.  The Carthaginians  soon  began  to suffer 
from scarcity of provisions, and a famine would unquestionably 
have conlpelled  thcm  to submit; but,  in the  meantimc,  the 
Carthaginians summoned Hasdrubal to the city, and he formed 
a fortified camp on the isthmus; but when the suburb was taken, 
See Livy  and  Strabo,  11.  cc. ;  Appian, De  Rebus Pun. 95, foll. ; Polyl~ius, 
i. 29 ; Orosius, iv. 22. 
ti  Appian,  I.  c.  136 ; Plutarch,  C.  Gracrhus,  11,  Jul. Caesur,  57 ; Livy, 
Epit. 60;  Dion Cassius, xliii.  50, lii. 43; Pausanias, ii. 1.  2. 
Appian, 1.  c.  113. 
he was  seized with a panic,  and threw himself  into tlic  city; 
whcrcupon the llolnans took possession of  his  camp,  so  that 
Carthap was  no\v  surrounded.  Bitl~yas,  another  Car- 
thaginian  general,  wlzo  had  remained  in  the interior  of  the 
country, with tlle greatest resolution and indefatigable exertions, 
succeeded  in  carrying  into  tlzc  city,  convoys  of provisions, 
through the miclst of the awkward  ships of  the Eomans  In 
order )o  prevent  the rcpetition of  such  boldness,  Scipio had 
recourse to stopping up  the mouth  of  the  harbour;  this  was 
casy because the bay was  very shallow,  and  he  succeeded  so 
conlpletely that the whole bay is  now a swamp, though illis is 
partly the result of the nlud and sand which are driven thither 
by the current from thc Syrtes.  Its extcnt can now be  recog- 
niscd only from the nature of the ground, as in  Italy  the port 
of Trajan is rccognised in the place called Porto.9  Prom this 
dam Scipio, by mcans  of  engines,  cndcavourcd to destroy the 
quay of'the harbour.  The dcspcratc  struggles  of  the Cartha- 
ginians  to  prevent  this  almost  surpass  conception;  yet  the 
greatest  thing they  did was,  whcn  they  perceived that they 
would soon be shut up,  they  set about digging a new passage 
out of the harbour, through the narrow neck of land by  which 
the harbour was  separated from the sca;  and that they secretly 
built in their arsenal a fleet of 50 triremes, with which they sailed 
through the new passage into the sea, to attack the Roman fleet. 
The  lZornans were  so  perplexed  and  confuscd  at  this sight, 
that Polybius (in  Appian)  is  quite right in tllinlring that, if 
the Carthaginians  had  attacked  them  at this momcnt,  thcy 
might have dcstroyed the Roman fleet entirely, for the Romans 
had entirely neglected tlleir navy.  But hcrc we  see the same 
thing that we so often meet with in the histov  of lnan : after 
their superhuman  exertions thcir resolution  filed; they hesi- 
tatcrl for 8 few  days;  and while  the Ro~nans  were  preparing 
tllclnsclvcs to meet a serious attach, the Carthagillinns irrcpsr- 
hly lost  the  fruits  of  their labour.  The Romans, who  had 
renounced the sea,  prcpred thcir  ships as 6011 as they could, 
and  the Carthaginians  were  repelled chicfly  by  tile  Cmcco- 
Asiatic  ships  of  Sida, which  fought  in  a  peculiar  lnamcr. 
Four of  th~e  small  ships of  Sida  cast  ancllor,  turned  upoil 
"'c~  as  an axis,  and thus  defcndcd themselves against 
the attacks of  the Carthaginians.  The otllcrs  followed  their 
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examplc, and the Carthaginiaas were obliged to retreat.  When 
on the following day  the Carthaginians again sailed out, grcat 
confusion arose  within  the channel, wllicl~  ~~nfortt~nately  had 
been made,too narrow;  as  thc ships werc hurrying out of  the 
port,  many  of  them  were  thrown  by the  Rolnalls  against 
the quay, and  the fruit  of  their  enormous  exertions was  de- 
stroyed.  It  is sad to see how cvery thing was lost through the 
unhappy chance of  a  single  moment.  Scipio now took  POS- 
session  of  that part  of  the harbour  which  was  destined  for 
merchant-ships, and procceded  thence through the canal till he 
rcnched the arscnal.  Onc part  after another  of  the city was 
thus  takcn; and  as  the  Carthaginians  saw  that  the arsenal 
could not bc dcfcnded, they first,  perhaps too hastily, set  fire 
to it, and then to the store-houses of thc ships. 
The Romans were now in possession of both harbours; and 
Bozra, the citadel,  which  was on that side  not  protected by 
walls, became  thc object  of  the contest.  The treble wall  on 
the isthmus, however, was not yet in the hands of the Romans. 
Thc struggle which  now cominenccd is similar to that of Sar- 
agossa  in  Spain  in  1808.  The three  main  streets,  leading 
from the harbour to the centre of the citadel, were lined with 
rows of  houses, of fi.om six to eight stories in height, and with 
flat roofs;  all thcse houses,  as  we nzay imagine, wcre of solid 
structure"-'; and those streets seem  to have been the seats of 
wealth and of  the old  families.  Evcn in the description  we 
rccognise the gradual formation of the city.  The houses werc 
conquercd one  by  one,  by breaking through the walls  from 
room to room and from house to house; for the means of blow- 
ing up the houscs, which  were used at  Saragossa,  wcrc  thcn 
unknown.  The struggle  was  at the  same  time  carried  on 
upon the flat roofs of thc houses; when the soldiers had fought 
thcir way up the stairs, and driven thc unfortunate inhabitants 
out of the last flat, bridges  were  formed from  the roofs acroqs 
the streets.  The overwhelming forccs of the Romans rendered 
the victory certain.  In addition to all this, a complete famine 
raged in the city,  and  the living  fed  upon the bodies  of  the 
lo  As regards architectural beauty, wc must consider Carthage as a city like 
the fine towns of Greece, or like Rome;  but Carthage was built on a more g~a11d 
and magnificent  scale; in  confirmation of  which we need only  remember that 
the streets were constructed according to artistic rules, which were unknown to 
the Greclic.  The firit construction of  regular streets is ascr~bed  to the Cartha- 
yinian-, aod I believe, ~vith  justice.-N.- Scc Isido~us,  xv. 16 5 6. 
slain, yet no one would  hear  of  surrender.  Hasdrubal  more- 
over, llad treated the Roman prisoners with such cruelty, that 
olle could have thought of  it.  After  one  part of the city 
been taken with much bloodshetl, the Romans stopped and 
fire to the houses;  while the Carthaginians retreated before 
the flames,  the  Ronlans  pulled  down  the  houses,  ancl  thus 
formed an imlncnse  heap  of  ruins  agzzinst  the  wall  and the 
citadel.  The frightful description of  this conflagration is cvi- 
taken from Polybius, the unfortunate eyewitness of  the 
atrocities there committed.  The soldicrs purposely buried  the 
wounded  who were  yet  alive,  under  the  ruins.  Amid this 
unspeakable misery, the Romans penetrated into the old town, 
and every one now tried to save his life; the priests with  cm- 
blclns  of  truce  came  out,  imploring  the conqucror  to  sprc 
thcir lives.  Scipio  issued  a  proclamation,  that  the  lives  of 
those who would come out, should be safc.  Thus the remain- 
ing po1,ulatioi~, 50,000 in number,  came  forth;  only the Ro- 
man clcscrters, with Llasdrubal and his family, withdrew to thc 
highest point of the citadel, a great sanctuary which is called 
'Aatc?qrr~eiov.1~  Hasdrubal was base cnough to beg of Scipio 
to save his  life,  which  was  readily granted,  that  he might 
adorn  the  triumph  of  the  Roman  gcneral.  Gut  his  wifc, 
standing on the pinnacles of the temple,  gavc vent to her in- 
dignation at this cowardly act of hcr husband, and threw her- 
self  with  her  childrcn  into  the flaincs.  Her  example  was 
followed by  the  descrtcrs.  Thus pcrishcd  Carthage,  after it 
had existcd for  nearly  sevcn  llundred  years;  and  Scipio  was 
master of  a bloody heap of  ruins; but inany things must ]lave 
bcen  preserved,  as  he  took  from  the temple many  Siciliall 
monuments, which he sent back to Sicily.  The scllatc had not 
dcstro~cd  Capua nor Tarenturn; but Scipio was obliged by its 
will to destroy Carthage; he now complctcd the work he had 
comlncnccd by drawing  a  plough  over thc site, the symbol of 
its destructioll for  ever,  and  the departing army left  bchincl 
nothing but  the most  perfect  desolation,  amid  which  sixty 
Years later Marius was sitting.  The captives wcre treated more 
or less humallely;  most of thcm werc sold as slaves, some were 
Put to death; a few of the more illustrious persons experienced 
a  better  fate,  being  distributed  among  the  to\vns  of  Italy: 
these  last  was  Bithyas.  The life  of  thc  unwortl~y 
" Appian, 1. c.  130; Strabo, xvii. p. 832. 248  WAR  IN  MACEDONIA. 
Hasdrubd was spared by the Romans, whose ancestors had put 
to death  the great  C. Pontius.  A  part  of  the territory of 
Carthage was given to the kings of Nnmidia, the three sons of 
Masinissa,  who was  dead,  and  the rest  was  constituted as a 
Roman province, pverned by a proconsul or praetor. 
At  this time a wzr, which had in the meanwhile broken out 
in Macedonia, was  already  concluded, and the fall  of  Achaia 
was near.  As reprds the  Macedonian  war, it is almost im- 
possible to conceive  how  a whole nation  could allow itself to 
bc imposed upon in such a manner.  The Pseudo-Demetrius in 
Russia was, according to the best historians, not by any means 
an impostor;  and the only  reason  why he was not recognised 
was the fact  that he had become a Roman Catholic while hc 
was educated  in Poland, and that he had  adopted European 
manners.  Sebastian  of  Portugal, although  there  is not that 
amount of evidence in his favour which there is for Dcmetrius, 
was probably the unfortunate princc hiinself.11 But the Pseudo- 
Philip of Macedonia was a real impostor, probably  a  Thracian 
gladiator, whose name was Andriscus, and to whom it occurrcd, 
no one knows how, to givc himself  out as the son of Pcrseus, 
to whom he probably  bore  some  resemblance.  Such imposi- 
tions  arc not uncommon in Asia, and during the middle agcs 
a fcw  instances  occur  in Europe also.  The war broke out as 
early as the consulship of Scipio (Carthage being destroyed  by 
him when proconsul),  and pcrhaps even the year before.  The 
Pseudo-Philip  first  appeared  in Macedonia, whcrc  he  fonnd 
some followers; but, bcing unable to maintain himsclf, he went 
to the court of Dcmetrius, the king of Syria,  who delivered him 
up to the Romans.l"emetrius  was just thc person to commit 
such an act, for he had  every reason to rcstorc, if possible, his 
rclations with the Romans, having only just escaped punishment 
from them. Aftcr the death of his brother, Antiochus Epiphanes, 
he  had fled from Rome to secure his succession.  The llomans 
had scnt commissioners into  Syria, because  they  had  learned 
that the Syrians, contrary to their treaty, kcpt  elephants, and 
had built more ships than thcy  were  allowed.  One  of  thcse 
commissioners  was  killed  during an  emeute at Laodicca,  and 
Demetrius only averted the vengeance of the Romans by sur- 
11  Lessing, in his Litteraturbriefe, has  excellent discussions on this subject, 
although it is onc which, properly speaking, he was not familiar with.-N. 
'"ivy,  Epit. 49. 
rendering  the pilty  persons and killing the elcphants.  Under 
tllesc  circlmlstances, it was natural for Delnetrius to deliver up 
Andriscus.  At Rome, the adventurer was  so  much despised, 
alld  so  carelessly  watched, that  he  found  an opport~~i~it~  to 
escape.  Aftcr  the  triumph  of  Aemilius Paullns, it was well 
knoGn tllnt Perseus and his sons were kept in captivity at Alba, 
on lake Fucinus, ill the country of  the  Jfarsians.13  The king 
survived  cruel &te only two years; he had clung to life  so 
0  oestion  childishly, that he would  not  avail hiinself  of  the su,& 
of Aelnilius Paullus to make awdy with himself.  was pro- 
bably killed by having been perpetually disturbed in his sleep. 
His elder son died in the same manner, and thc youngcr  lived 
in extreme degradation;  the latter was a person of good talent, 
he  learned  Latin, and gained  his  daily  bread  by  acting  as 
scribe  to  the municipal  council  of  Alba.  Beyond  this  we 
know nothing of him. 
When Andriscus  appeared in Thracc, whither hc had fled 
from  Rome, and  where  the  Romans  wcrc  already  feared  or 
hated, numbers of people gathered round him, by whose assist- 
ancc he was enablcd to enter hfacedonia, whcrc he imincdiatcly 
issued  a  proclan~ation  declaring himsclf  the son  of  Pcrscus. 
The Rolnzlns being cngaged against Carthage had no army in 
tliosc  parts,  so  that  the impostor  had  only  to conquer  thc 
Maccdonians,  whom  he defcated  on  thc eastern bank  of  thc 
Strymon. To the great amazement of all, he crossed this river, 
and gained a second victory over the Macedonians, after which 
thcy all submitted to him.  His success was extraordinary; and 
he assumcd the diadcm under the name  of Philip.  nlacedonia 
must at that time have been  in rather  a  wretched  condition; 
for, after establishing the farce  of a  republic, the Romans had 
transplantcd the noblest Maceclonians  to Italy;  and as the rest 
of  the population mere  very credulous, and had from ancicnt 
times been used  to  kingly  power, Andriscus  madc  the most 
astonishing  progress.  He then  invaded  Thessaly, where  he 
likcwisc found followers, and which would have been inevitably 
lost, had not Scipio Nasica, who happcncd to be there, assembled 
tho contingents of  the  Greeks, and repelled  Philip.  At that 
tirnc, therefore, the Creeks werc still faithful.  Andriscus was 
in reality a tyrannical man.14 Polybius in one of his fragments 
l3 Pol~l~ius,  Excerpt  Vat.  lib. xxxiv.-xnv~i,  p.  79, cd. Lucht. 
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calls him &v;lp  crrvyv&.1"ut  hc neverthcle~s  knew  how to 
make people respcct him.  His  exertions wcrc extraordinary, 
and hc cvea ventured to carry on the war  against the Roman 
praetor, P. Juvcntius Thalna, whom he defeated, and then again 
entered Thesstzly.  The affair had now assumed a serious aspect, 
and the praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus was sent against him with 
a  considerable  army,  which  he  increased  with  auxiliaries. 
Metellus landed on the coast; and the ~osition  of  the usurper 
was particularly difficult, from the circumstance  of Macedonia 
being in some parts accessible by sea.  The Achaeans, however, 
were beginning to shew a rcbellious spirit, and the prolongatioll 
of the war would havc been followed by an insurrection.  After 
several engngemcnts, Metcllus drove the pretender out of Thes- 
saly.  Philip retreated to the ncighbourhood of  Pydna, whcre 
Perseus had been defeated, and being followed by Metellus, tllc 
decisive battlc was fought.  The Macedonians being  superior 
in numbers, dispersed to make a predatory excursion;  Metellus 
availed hirnsclf of the opportunity, and  Philip was completely 
defeated.  But the conqucst of  Macedonia in this insurrection 
was not as easy as formerly, for  many places  defendcd  them- 
selves, because they anticipated worse trcatment. It must have 
been on this occasion that Pella was destroyed:  Dion Chrysos- 
toin16, in the iirst century of  our era, speaks of it as a town  in 
ruins.  At present it lies buried under mounds of earth, which 
indicate its site; and the most  intcrcsting  remains  of  ancient 
art might be  discovered  there; but  the present  condition of 
a ions  Europe affords little  hope  of  soon  seeing  any investig t' 
made there.  Andriscus was taken prisoner in Thrace, whithcr 
he had flcd after the battle, and was put to death.  l\ll[acedonia 
becamc a regular province, and tlienccforth  a  governor seems 
to have bcen annually sent to it. The few privileges which the 
Macedonians yct possessed, wcre taken from them. 
EIad the Achaeans clearly  known  what  they wanted, they 
would  have  exerted tllcmsclves  at the time when Andriscus 
rose against thc Romans;  but inlprudcncc led them into follies 
which could not have  any beneficial  consequences.  The his- 
tory, or rather thc explanation of the decline and fall of Achaia, 
is foreign to my plan;  but I may make a few observations, to 
give you some notion of the state of  things there.  Although 
'5 Excerpt. Vat.  p. 85, cd  Lucht.  l6  Orat. xxxiii. p.  12, foll. ed. Reiske. 
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it cannot be denied that the causes  which brought  about the 
dorvllfall of Acliaia werc disgraceful to the Achaeans, yet that 
dowrlfall  was  followed  by  circun~stances  which  rendered  the 
colldition  of  the  survivors more deplorable than it had been 
before, and this excites our sympathy for them.  That degener- 
ate people, moreover, still contained many excellent men.  The 
Romans had long since resolved upon the destruction of Achaia; 
and through the instrumentality of traitors, especially Callicrates 
and  Andronidas,  they  exercised  unlimited  influence  there. 
Hence there arose many causes of disturbances; and when those 
traitors had established themselves, they too were no longer as 
willing as they had been to  promote the ol~jccts  of the Romans. 
The wholc inischief  rcsnlted  from  the unfortunate  act of vio- 
lence committed by the otherwise exccllent Pllilopoemen, who 
isjustly called the last  of  the  Grccks.  He cntertaincd, from 
his inG~ncy,  a deadly hatred of Sparta, and ever sincc Clcomenes 
had dcstroycd his native city  of  Mcgalopolis, his  chief  object 
was to subduc Sparta.  I-Ie availed hilnsclf of  the war of Rome 
against Antiochus to compel Sparta to join the Achaean league, 
and to adopt thc customs  and fwms  of  the  confederacy;  for 
among  the  Achaeans,  such  an  amalgamation  took  place, 
although it does not occur in other similar confederacies of an- 
tiquity.  Achaia  then  comprised  the whole of  Peloponnesus, 
and formed a confederation of states, which was as irrational as 
our unfortunate Germanconfederacy, in which the pettiest prince 
has, in reality, as important a votc as the stateon which tllc safety 
of Germany depends. It  also resembled the  American colifedcracy 
previously to  the constitution of Washington, when Delaware, 
for  instancc,  with its  70,000 inhabitants,  was  on an equality 
with Virginia, which had  a population of  half a million.17  It 
was  this  irrational  constitution  which  ruined  the  Achaean 
league.  Elis was a great city and country, ancl Laconia, even 
without its maritime towns, was largcr than all Achaia proper. 
The latter had only twelve towns,  some of which were  surely 
not  more  important  than  Sinzig  on  the  Rhine,  yet  each 
of these towns had  the same vote as  Sparta.18  Some modifi- 
cations,  it is true,  wcre  made  to render this state of  things 
"  A similar state of  things is found  in the history of  the  Dutch republic., 
where EIolland, which formed more than one-half  of  the populat~on,  and pald 
58 Per cent of the tmes, had the same number of  votes as Zceland, which paid 
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bearable.  A secoild point was still more revolting:  as Sicyon 
had adopted the Achaean v6pPa (which was  quite right),  so 
also Sparta was  obliged  to abolish  tlie laws  of  Lycurgus, to 
which the people mere so mucli attached; and a few years before 
the war against Perscus, they had bcen compelled to adopt the 
Achaean vdPbpa.  Spartans at thi~  time can  hardly be spoken 
of,  there bcing  only Lacedaemonians;  the forlncr had  disap- 
peared,  and  the  population  of  the  city, consisting  of  the 
descendants  of  perioeci  and neodamodes, had  acquired  under 
Cleomencs the full franchise uuder the name of Lacedaemonians. 
These Lacedacinonians had adopted the laws and thc &ywy;l of 
Lycurgus,  and this was with them a point of ambition.  It  was 
therefore a great cruelty on the part of Philopocmen to compel 
them to give up those laws, for the new constitution interfcrcd 
with the whole  busincss  of  daily lifc; and the Achaean laws, 
moreover,  wcre such that not very much good can be said of 
tl~cin;  and whatever may be alleged against the Spartan order 
of  things,  still it  trained able warriors.  Hence thc Laccdae- 
monians  tried  to get rid of  that hateful  connexion,  and this 
attcinpt was followed by long negotiations.  At the beginning 
of  the 7th century thc Achacan constitution was still in force; 
and a  Lacedaemonian  Menalcidas  mas  evcn  strategus of the 
Achaean  league. 
About  this  time  unfortunate  cparrcls  occurred  betwcen 
the Oropians and thc Athenians, thc former of  whom  bought 
the  assistance  of  Menalcidas for  ten  ta1.lcnts.  This aid came 
ilzdccd too latc; but still he cxtortcd from  them the stipulated 
sum,  and although he  had  previously promised  a  part  of  it 
to  Callicratcs,  he  afterwards  kept  the  whole  for  himself. 
The charge which  Callicrates now brought against him, was 
the causc  of  all the misfortune  of Achaia,  for Menalcidas ex- 
crtcd  liimsclf  to  scparatc  Spnrta from  the confederacy;  and 
he succeeded.  During the ncgotiations  which  wcre  carricd 
011  at Rome in conseclucncc, both Mcnalcidas and the Achaean 
ainbassador  deceived thcir  constituents, cach bringing  forged 
dccisions from Rome.  This happencd  during the most unfor- 
tunate  period  of  the  third  Punic war.  When  Laccdaemon 
declared itself independent of thc confedcracy, a war broke out 
between it and the Achaeans, in which tllc former was worsted. 
Menalcidas was  a ~vretchcd  gencral; and the Lacedaemonians 
were so hard pressed,  that they wcre obliged to make a treaty 
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by wllicll  the Achaca~1s  pined  all  they wanted.  Menalcidm 
made arvay wit11 liimsclf, and the Laccdaemonians agnin joined 
the Achaean league. 
The Romans had  not  bcen  able to decide ~vhat  conrsc  to 
pn15m;  but when in the year  605 tlrcy clearly Saw  that  Car- 
tllnge would fall, they spoke in n different tone t~ the Achaeans; 
and they now took  a  step wlzicl~  tllcy hacl  undoubtedly long 
before  made  up  their  minds  to adopt.  The Achaeans  had 
committed an act of direct disobedience,  and had thereby pro- 
voked  the  vengeance  of  the  Romans,  although during the 
insurrection of the Pseudo-Philip  tllcy had  remained  fi~ithful 
and assisted  the Romans.  But it lnay have  becn  the vcry 
prosperity of  Acliaia  that induced  the Romans  to  destroy it. 
Tlzc cxtellt of  Acl~aia  at that time cannot be accurately ascer- 
taincd, but it seeins to have comprised  the whole of  Pclopon- 
ncsus  and Mcpra;  ancl  although attic&, Phocis  and  Locris 
did not bclong to it, yct evcn more distant places were connected 
with the leaguc by isopolity,  such  as  Heraclea  near  Mount 
Octa,  and  Plcuron  in Aetolia.  Thc  Roman  comlnissioners 
C. Aurelius Orestcs and his colleagues, who appeared at Corinth, 
dcclsred it to be the will of the Roinan senate that Lacedaemon 
slzould be independent,  and  on  the ground  of  the disordcrs 
arising from the combination of so many lzeterogcnous elements, 
they demanded that all tl~osc  places which had not been united 
with Achaia  at the time  of  the treaty with  Philip,  but had 
1)elongcd to his dominion,  should  be separated from the con- 
fcdcracy; thcse  places wcre Corintl~,  Orcholncnos in Arcadia, 
TIeraclca and Plcuron17; whethcr Elis and Mcsscne wcre likcwisc 
inclurled in tlie numbcr,  is unknown,  bccausc Appian's  infor- 
mation is too scanty,  but the Exccrpta  of  Constantinus  Por- 
phyrogcnitus  will  probably yet throw  much light upon  this 
pc~iod. The portions  to be  givcn  up formed  about one.half' 
of  Pcl~~onnesus,  and comprised  the  most  important  towns. 
The Achaean council assemblccl at Corinth would not listen to 
the wllolc of this mcssage, but ordcrcd the doors to be thrown 
open and the people to bc summoned to witness the crime of 
the ~o~nans.~~  The rage of  the people was unbounded; and 
"  Livy,  Epit.  51;  l'ausanias,  vii.  14;  Dion  Cassius, Fragm.  Utsin. 766; 
.Justin, xxxiv. 1  ;  Polybius, xxxvlii.  1, foll. 
'' We often find in Roman authors the expression that Corinth was destroyed 
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the Roman  ambassadors  returned  to  their  lodgings  without 
receiving any answer;  the people  dispersed in the town  and 
attacked  the Lacedaemonians;  all  the houses,  not  excepting 
those of the Roman ambassadors, were searched, to see whether 
any Lacedaeinonians were concealed in them.  Aurelius Orcstcs, 
the chief of  the ambassadors,  was resolvcd to take vengeance; 
but the Roinan  senate was  not  inclinctl  to inflict punishincnt 
at once. 
LECTURE LXXV. 
Trr~  Roman senate did not trust its allies, and again sent coni- 
missioners,  so  that by submission  the Achaeans  might  have 
saved  themselves.  But  the  demand  of  the  Romans  was  a 
.glaring injustice.  Roman history during this period is unfor- 
tunately  full  of  atrocities  and  arbitrary proceedings  against 
foreign  nations ; there  is  henceforth  nothing  pleasing  in it. 
We can  only seek  for instruction, for just  at the time when 
it loses  its  moral  interest,  the whole  history  of  antiquity  is 
swallowed  up  ill  it; and whatever  part of  universal  history 
does not come under the history of  Rome is so unimportant, 
that  it  is  not  worth  being  studied.  The Achaeans  could 
hardly  hope  to  induce  the  Romans  to  desist  from  their 
demands;  they ought to have submitted to  necessity;  and it 
was  madness  on their part  to set themselves  against  it.  In 
such circumstances, those  persons  who  use  the boasting lan- 
guage ofpatriotism mislead their nation, and are themselves the 
inost outrageous tyrants, but those who preach  submission  are 
looked upon with contempt.  The case of  the Achaeans was 
similar  to that of the unfortunate Jews in their last struggle 
against the Romans described  by Josephus, where thosc who 
pretcndcd to be the advocates of liberty were the most furious 
tyrants, tlzough they were considered as patriots ready to sacri- 
fice every thing for  their  country.  I refer  you,  by waj-  of 
dictionaries,  for it does  not imply that the ambassadors weic actually boatcn: 
pulsare  in its technical sense means in general to znsult an ambassador,  to treat 
him in a manner contrary to tho  laws  of  nations;  e,en  an impropcr crppellutzo 
of an amhaf.sd.dor,  hy which his djgnitj nai ~iolated,  was called pulsc,tl3.--N. 
illustration,  to the  Jereiniall,  who  justly  comrlaii~s 
it mas tile  fkllse prophets who  led the people  to senseless 
l,,ldertaltings.  Such was thc case among the Achaeans:  those 
lvllo  spoke of  i~ldcpendeilce  were  not  the me11  who had  the 
best intentions; the rcal patriots were  those wllo advised their 
countrynicn to keep peace. 
The insult  had been  offered to the Rolnan  alnbassa- 
dors did llot  call forth immediate  revenge, for Rome was yet 
engaged in  wars against Macedonia and Carthage;  but it 
mas kept in rcserve,  and embassies went to and fro between 
Rome and Achaia.  Callicrates,  the traitor, who had been  at 
the head  of the Roman  party, had completely sold himself to 
the Romans.  After  his  death the Achacalzs were  under  the 
influeilcc  of  Critolaus and Diaeus, the most furious opponents 
of  Callicmtes,  who  were  literally  madmen,  exhorting  the 
Achaeans  to  the  inost  determined  resistance  against  Rome. 
If they had  given  the matter but a moment's  thought, they 
would  necessarily  have  seen  that it was  impossible  to  stand 
against the Romans,  even  if  the Homeric  gods  themselves 
could  have  comc  to  their  assistance.  Critolaus  kept  the 
Roinan  ambassadors  in a  state of  ignorance.  Thc Achaeans 
assembled only twice a-year ; Critolaus summoned one of these 
assemblies, promising  to  introduce the ambassadors, but sent 
a  secret message  to all not  to come,  and then declared that 
according to the laws of thc league, no new assembly could be 
convened  till after the lapse  of  six months.  The Achaeans 
now began their warlike preparations : we can hardly conceive 
the folly of so  little and insignificant a people imagining that 
thcy could hold  out against  the Romans.  They had for  the 
last fifty years been under  the protection  of the Romans, and 
cluring that period they had only occasionally carried on petty 
warfare;  for  the  greater  part  of  that  time  they  had  been 
inactive:  they had no standing army, but only a militia, which 
had yet to bc trained.  They had spent their happy time very 
ill  in ind~llgillg  in sensual  pleasures,  and  had  neglected  to 
prepare themselves for  the evil day that was coming.  From 
the newly discovered fragments of  Polybius, we see that they 
had  not  anticipated  the  possibility  of  a  danger  that might 
threaten their very existence;  and a moral depravity,  which it 
is distressing to contcmplatc,  had spread  very widely  among 
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had tlie wantonness to declare war against the Romans.  The 
Boeotians  and  Chalcidians,  who  mere  as  tl~oughtless  as the 
Achaeans, joined  them.1  The Aetolians  did not follow their 
exainplc, perhaps bccause  tliey  were  glad to see their rivals 
embark in an undertalcing  in ~vliicli  they could not but fail. 
Critolaus led a small army towards Thessaly, probably hopillg 
to  find  the  Pseudo-Philip  still  able  to hold  out agail~st  the 
Romans, who would thus have been shut up between two hos- 
tile armies.  He had imagined that Macedonia would  continue 
the war, and that Thessaly would perhaps join liiin iminediately 
on his arrival; but before he reached Thcnnopylae, the fate of 
Macedonia was decided.  In  Heraclea, at the foot of Mount Octa, 
which had bcfore joincd the Achaeans, but in coinpliancc with 
the command of the Romans had renounced tlie Achaean con- 
federacy, there was still an Achaean party. A corps of Achaeans 
which  had  already  passed  Thermopylac, and  was  besieging 
Heraclea, hastily fled back to the main army, as soon as Mctel- 
lus arrived with his  forces, and joincd  Critolaus who had not 
yet reached Tliermopylae.  Experience indeed had shewn that 
the pass  could be evaded, but  the  recollections  of tlic place 
might at least have invited the Grceks to a glorious death.  But 
the worst  they  could  do, thcy  now did, in hastily brcaliing 
up  to  march  to  the  Isthmus.  As  soon  as  Metcllus had 
heard  of  the invasion  of  Thessaly, he hastened from  Macc- 
donia to meet  the Achaeans.  Near Scarpheaz, he encountered 
their  rear,  and  created  such  a  panic  among  thein  that 
thcy  were  scattered  like chaff  before  the  wind.~Crolaus 
himself  vanished  fiotn  the  field  of  battle,  and it is  highly 
probable  that  he  may  have  sunk  with  his  horse  in  tlic 
marshes on  the sea  coast."  Story-tellers  seem  to wish, by 
this inystcrious statement, to  marl< him  as  the evil demon  of 
Greece.  After the Achaeans were thus completely routed, the 
Romans entered Boeotia; and a detachment of 1000 Arcadians, 
who had not advanccd further than Elatea in Phocis, but were 
now rctrcating in consequence  of  the news of  the battle,  fell 
Paasanias, vii. 14;  Livy, Epit.  52; Polyl~ius,  xl. 1, foll.  Tl~c  Chalcidisns 
were pcrhnl>s  afrdd of  losing their recently-recovered indrpcndence; these cir- 
cumstances are obscure.-N. 
2  Some MSS of 1829 have Thonium in Locris, probably a momelltary slip of 
the tongue. 
3  Pausnnias. vii. 15; Vell. Pat. i.  11 ; Livy, Epit. 52;  Polybins, xl. 3, full. 
Pausaniss, vii. 15, 3.  Corriyare Livy, Epzt. 52. 
into tile ]lall~s  of  the Romans in the neighbourhood of  Chae- 
ronea,  were  all  cut  to  pieces.  The distressing state of 
Greece  at  tllis  tirne  is  well described  in the fi.aginents  of 
Polybius, which also shew how greatly he has been  wronged 
by the reproach of a want of  feeling for the woes inflicted  on 
his country, for all he says is the expression  of  the most un- 
speakable grief. 
Metellus advanced towards the Isthmus.  All the inhabitants 
of Thebes quittcd their city and sought refuge on the heights of 
Cithaeron and Helicon.  Metellus after taking the city sllcwed 
a humane disposition  and a wish to  spare the Greeks,  for  he 
pitied them; but it was  of  no avail:  he could  not act as  he 
wishcd, partly on account of  the conduct of the Greeks thein- 
selves, and  partly  because  Providence  had  dccreed  their de- 
struction.  What had  happeacd  at l'hebes  was  repeated  in 
ncarly all the othcr towns,  for  no  one thought  of defending 
himself.  The  Iloman  fleet  in  the  meantime  sailed  round 
Pcloponnesus, and landed some troops near Patrac in Achaia, 
who ravaged the country in the most barbarous manner, for it 
was  every where  impossible  for  the  Achaeans to defcnd thc 
coast.  The contingents of those districts were thus prevcntcd 
from  marching  to  the  Isthmus,  and  endeavoured  to defcnd 
their own towns; but in vain.  Diaeus, who was now strategus 
of the Achaeans, had enlisted  all the slaves capable of bearing 
arms,  and  yet his  army consisted  of  not more  than  14,000 
men, although Achaia had  enjoyed peace for  half  a  century; 
this small number shews  the  high  degrcc  of both  the moral 
and the political misery of  Greece,  a  country in which every 
thing is so casily restored, and in which wcaltl~  and abundance 
flow  from  ever  inexhaustible  sourcm.  IIe  was  encampl*l 
near Megam; but  on  the approach  of Metcllus,  hc  retreated 
towards the Isthmus.  The Achacans ought now to have made 
peace, for Metellus was of  a noble nature and had the good of 
Grcecc at heart; he even  offered  to negotiate, but Dineus, a 
man Perfectly  mad  and without conscience, who ought, like 
pa~i1ls  Brutulur, to have put an end to his  life now instearl 
ofaftcrwards-  for  in that case, it would  ]lave beon  easy  for 
the Achaeans to obtain a favourable peace, in which the sevc- 
of  the confederacy would  have  retained  their inde- 
pc11dent existence-fancied  that  he was  able  to  defend  the 
'stlllnos:  he  N'jeCLe(l  all  proposals  of  peace,  and  his  action 
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predominated at Corinth.  Before Mctellos  reached the Isth- 
mus, IhI~~mmius  hastened  to  take the cornlnalld  of  the army; 
he was not of as  gentle and humme a  disposition as Metellus, 
for all  that he sought was  laurels  for  himself  and booty for 
thc Romans.  He tried to arrive before Metellus had concluded 
peace, for the latter,  although a  plebeian  like hlummius, yet 
belonged to a family which had long been in the possession of 
curule offices; he was a nobilis, and would probably have  pre- 
vailed upon the senate to sanction tlie peace;  Mummius, on the 
other hand, was a novus homo, and not aristocratic.  The  Achaeans 
wcre successful in one cavalry engagement, and this so dazzled 
them that they provoked the Romans to a battle, in which they 
were so speedily and so completely defeated, that there was no 
possibility of facing the  encmy again.  The impregnable Acro- 
corinthus ought to have  bcen defended; but while the wholc 
army in its flight passed  by  Corinth,  seeking  shelter  in  the 
mountains,  the entire population  of  Corinth, who saw  their 
own defenceless  condition,  fled  towards  the Arcadian  moun- 
tains.  The  city  and  citadel  were  abandoned, and no onc 
remained behind.  On the third day after the battle, Mummius 
tllinliing it impossible that the people should have quittcd tho 
city without attempting to defend it, ordered the gates to be 
broken opcn, and convinced himself that the place was dcscrted. 
Thus the Romans took  possession  of  Corinth  and  began  to 
plunder it.*  Corinth  possessed  the  most  splendid  works  of 
art, which were either carried away or destroyed, and thc town 
itself was reduced to a heap of ashes:  the honesty of Mummius 
was tliat  of  a  barbarian.  All  thc  Corinthians were  sold  as 
slaves; Thebes and Chalcis were likewise destroyed; respcctillg 
other towns,  it is uncertain how they were dealt with.  In the 
time of Pausaniasfi Thcbcs was only a smallvillage within the 
Cadmea.  The population of the whole of Pcloponnesus would 
have been  soId  into slavery,  had  not  Polybius,  through his 
friend Scipio, induccd the senate to make some fair regulations. 
Greece became a  Roman  province,  and only a  few places  as 
Sparta  and Athens, which had taken no part in this war re- 
mained liberae civitates.  The real  province  was  Achaia, and 
the other  Greek  countries  formed  only  an  appendix  to  the 
province,  which  was  governed  by  the  praetor  of  Achaia. 
Phocis and Boeotia were obligecl to pay tribute, a thing which 
Pausania~,  vu. 16.  ix.  7.4. 
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&Iley  had ,lever done, even under the rule of Macedonia.  They 
received,  moreover, a uniform constitution,  in the formation of 
wllich Polybius had a share, and which is said to have much 
contributed  to the recovery of the people;  but the Greeks were 
paralysed,  no one being allowed  to have landed property in a 
state of  which  he was not a member;  all o~or+'~ara  of the  ' 
nations  were  abolished;  all the  concilia,  and   roba ably  the 
commercium and connubiuna  between  the  several  places  also, 
were  forbidden.  The territory  of  Corinth  was  made  ager 
publicus  Romanus.  During this distress  of Greece,  Polybius 
fulfilled the bitterest of duties:  he returned  to his country to 
obtain, by  his  mediation,  tolerable  terms  for  those who sur- 
vived, and to save many a relic dear to  his feelings.  He thus 
obtained the restoration  of the honours paid to  Philopoemen, 
whose  name  the Romans hated7  The  lot  of Polybius was 
that of a physician who has to make a  desperate  cure  on his 
own wife or children.  Love indeed  inspired  him,  but that 
very love causes such an operation to rend thc heart far more 
painfully  than  if  s stranger performed  it.  Such  couragc  is 
more  than  heroism:  to endure such  things in the  country 
where he had formerly lived in happiness,  not to despair in the 
midst  of  general  despair,  and then to  induec  tyrants to be 
moderate, and in the end to gain a  certain object after all,- 
these  are  characteristics  of  a  great  man.  The  author  of  a 
petulant essay on Polybius, which appeared several years ago, hs 
only exposed  his  ignorance  by not acknowledging the true 
greatness of  Polybius.  All concessions that wem in any way 
favourable  to  Creccc,  were  obtained  solely  through  his 
exertions. 
The  wars  which  had  been  carried  on  in  Spain  for 
many years may be divided into great periods:  the first comas 
down to the end of the second Punic war; the second extends 
from  that  time  to  tlie  peace  of  Sempronius  Gmcchus,  the 
result of which was,  that the Ilomans became masters of Cata- 
lonia,  Valencia,  Andalusia,  the western  part  of  Aragon and 
the east of Castile,  and acquired a kind of supremacy over the 
Celtibcrians.  In one of the articles of this peace, the Spaniards 
had pledged themselves not to build any more towns.  But, at 
the close of the sixth century,  when the Celtibcrians ertondcd 
the circu~nfercnee  of  their town of  Sepal,  for the ptlrpose  of 
'  Poljbiue, xL8, foll., Excerpt. ?Cat. p. 89, ed. Lncht. 
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concentrating themselves in it, the Romam, referring to that 
article of the treaty, interfered, and a fresh war broke out, which 
lasted for nearlv four vearsn,  and may be called the first Celti- 
berian war, as A  was ik reality confined to the Celtibcrians, who 
consisted generally speaking of four tribes.  The Romans, with 
their much superior forces, at first made progress, but, on many 
occasions,  they were  fairly beaten.  The small tribes  - in -  the 
,  " 
mountains of  Old Castile Ad  western  Aragon werc  of  a  tho- 
rouglily  heroic  character;  the Arevaci,  however,  were  thc 
most important of  them.  Formcrly thcy had no doubt been 
dangerous  to their neighbours,  but now all their  efforts werc 
directed solcly to the maintenance of thcir independence.  Thc 
Romans, however superior in thcir forces, were unable to bring 
about a final  decision,  and fortune was  so  little favourable to 
thcm that it seemed as if Providence wishccl to remind them or 
Nemesis,  as  a  slave  is said to have reminded his  conqtleror 
whilc celebrating his triumph.  Thc consul M. Claudius Mar- 
ccllus,  the grandson of the Marcellus who had becn five timcs 
consul during the period of  the second  Punic war,  was a man 
of ancient Roman virtue and of great humanity, who honoured 
and respected  those  peoplc who werc  struggling  for  nothing 
but their freedom.  He  therefore cndeavourcd to interccdc for 
thcm, and procure them a peace on equitable terms.  But the 
Roman senate  maintained  that it was incompatible  with the 
dignity of  the republic  to conclude  a pcace with  an inferior 
nation, and that the Ccltibcrians must submit to their discrctioll 
bcfore anything could bc said  about pcace.  Marccllus,  therc- 
fore, seeing  no othcr way of  putting an end to the war,  and 
abhorring the miseries which might be inflicted on the Cclti- 
bcrians by a crucl successor, managed to gain thcir confidcnce. 
It is remarl~ablc  to sce thc extraordinary power which personal 
qualitics always had over thc minds of the Spaniards, and how 
they gave their full confidence to one general, while there were 
others whom they would not trust on any condition.  They fol- 
lowed the advice of  Marcellus, who concluded a very reasonable 
peace and receivcd hostages.  The hostages, however, were sent 
back,  and he merely  obliged  them  to provide  a  number of 
horsemen to serve in the wars  in  Spain,  and  perhaps also in 
Africa.  For the present  the mar was thus concludcd.  Other 
generals,  however,  such  as  L. Lucullus who succeeded  Mar- 
"man,  De Rebus Hispan. 44. 
in spain, behaved quite differently.  Lucnllus had flattered 
himself with the idea  that lie could  subdue  the Celtiberians, 
which  he  was  now  prevented  froin  doing  by  the peace  of 
Marcellus.  He accordingly stirred up a war  against  the Vac- 
caeans  lived in thc  ncighbourhood  of  Salamanca,  and 
conducted it with varying succcss, though owing to the want 
of  unity among  the Spaniards,  the Romans gradually made 
some progress. 
About the samc timc,  anothcr war  had  brokcn  out in thc 
south  of  Lusitania.9  Thc  Lusitanians  did  not  inhabit thc 
whole  of  Portugal;  they extended  only a  little  north  of  the 
Tagus,  occupying  the  southern  part  with  the cxception  of 
Algarbia,  and wcrc  allicd  with  the Bcttones  in the  Spanish 
part of Estrcmadura.  They were a nation of robbers and vcry 
different  froin  the Celtibcrians,  who  were  a  serious,  consci- 
entious  and just  pcople;  and the Lusitanians  were  thcrcforc 
just  as troublesomc to the ancicnt  Spaniards as  the Romans; 
but thcy had hithcrto  been without any such great leadcr  as 
thc onc who soon  afterwards appcarcd  among thcm.  On onc 
occasion when  thcy had robbcd thc Roman subjccts in Anda- 
lusia,  a war was commenced against them, which the Romans 
carried  on  in a  very  horrible  manncr,  as  was  thcir  custom 
during that time.  A  spccimcn  may  be  seen  in the  fate  of 
Cauca.  Lucullus had promiscd to pardon  that town,  on con- 
dition of its surrcndering its arms; but when the pcoplc, trusting 
his word,  hacl  done  so,  they werc all  massacred.  It was this 
hithlessncss which rendered the resistance of the Spaniards so 
dcspcratc.  Thc Lusitanians were excellent as light troops, and 
vcry troublcsomc to the Romans by their prcdatory excursions; 
but there is nothing to excusc the conduct of the Komans towards 
thcm.  Thc Romans undcr Scr. Sulpicius Galbn wcrc victorious, 
and a portion  of the Lusitanians, who sougl~t  for mercy,  gnve 
hostages,  smcndcrcd thcir horses,  and wcrc willing to submit 
to any terms that might be dictated.  Thc consul, declaring thd 
I'e  know them to bc forccd to war by distress, promised to trans- 
plant  them  and give thcm  scttlcmcnts  in a  fertile  country. 
Sulpicills Galba,  who made  this promise  was a  distinguished 
rhetorician and jurist,  of one of the first patrician families, the 
pillar 2nd light of  the aristocracy;  yet by his conduct hc for- 
feitcd  his  own honour and that of  his anccstorg.  Hc ordered 
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the Lusitanians to encamp in three divisions at some distance 
from one another, and after having treacherously induced them 
to surrender their arms, uncle? the promise that they ~hollld  be 
restored to them in their new country,  he ordered all of  them 
to be massacred.10  One of those who escaped on that occasion, 
was Viriathus,  a man who caused the Romans  to do penance 
for that act of treachery, by a war which lasted for several years, 
in which the Romans  covered themselves with  disgrace.  It 
may be  that this cruelty  did  not arise  from  Galba's  savage 
nature alone,  but in part also from  the fact that he could not 
trust the sincerity of  the Lusitanians.  But however this may 
have been,  honest old  Cato  brought a  capital  charge against 
him  for  this  crime; and  Sulpicius  Galba  would- have  been 
condemned  to death  had  he not implored the mercy  of  the 
people  by producing his  own  young  children  and  those  of 
his cousin." 
Out of this war, in which Galba had disgraced the name of 
Rome, arose that against Viriathus.  If, as we read in an epi- 
tome of Livy'2,  he carried on the war against the Romans for 
fourteen years, we must suppose that he had acted a prominent 
part in the Lusitanian war.  In the earlier part of  his life, he 
had been a common  shepherd  and a  robber,-two  characters 
which, in the south of  Europe, are commonly united, and are 
SO to this day in Italy.  He had  sworn to take vengeance on 
the Romans, and now roused his countrymen to revenge.  He 
put himself at the head of a small band of his former comrades; 
for  Spain,  from  the character of  the nation, has always been 
the scene of guerilla warfare, for which the Spaniards are most 
adapted through the nature of their country and their own in- 
dividuality ;  with them, lawful order goes for nothing, whereas 
a man's personal influence is all-powerful.  Viriathus was re- 
garded as the hero of  the nation, and enjoyed  unlimitcd  con- 
fidence.  He rarely ventured upon a pitched battle against *the 
Romans;  his method of carrying on the war consisted in lying 
in ambush, in cutting off supplies, evading the enemy, and in 
quickly dispersing after a  defeat.  If I were  to relate to you 
how he wore out the Roman armies, how he was present every 
where with his light cavalry, dispersed the Romans, and then 
10 Appian, De Reb. Hispan. 59, 60. 
l1 Suetonius, Galba, 3; Valer. Maxim. ix. 62.; Cicero, De Orat. i.  53, Brutus, 
20, pro  AZurena, 28; Pseudo-Ascon. in Divinat. p. 124; Liq,  Epit. 49. 
l2  Lih. 54 in fine. 
c.onquered theln  one by one, and how many  Rolllan  generals 
he defCated-more  than one of them lost his life,-the  narrs- 
tive mould be attractive and interesting  indeed, but my time 
does not  me to (10  so.  Suffice it to my  that he main- 
tailled llilnsclf against the l%omrtlls  for a  period  of  eight years 
(605-612);  Roinans  met  him  with  superior  forces,  but 
lie always evaded them, and  then suddenly appeared in their 
rear, surrounded them on impassable roads, took their baggage 
ancl destroyed them i11  detail.  In this manner, he made  him- 
self master of the whole  country, the inhabitants  of the coasts 
of Andalusia and Valencia, who had always becn the most un- 
warlike, alonc bcing subject to the Komans, and fast becoming 
Latinisccl.  Tllcre Viriathus appcarcd as  an  enemy;  but the 
country  with "hiclch  he  was  peculiarly  familiar,  and which 
looked upon him as a friend, extended from  Portugiil  through 
Estrc~nadura,  as  far  as  Aragon:  in this  tcrritory,  he moved 
about with extraordinary  rapidity wit11 his light cavalry  and 
infantry, and  the Romans rarely  gained any advantage over 
him.  In thc end, they found thc~nsclvcs  compcllcd to conclude 
a  formal  peace  with  him, in  which  they  recogniscd  him as 
socius and amicus populi Romani  aequissimo jure,  as if he had 
been  a king  aequo jure  with tlzemselves.  It was contrary to 
Roman principles to conclude such a peace, by which Viriathus 
and his pcople became quite sovereign.  The peace was honestly 
meant on his part, but it was not lrept by the Romans:  it was 
violated  thc  very  next  ycar.  The  proconsul,  Q.  Servilius 
Caepiol?, like all the Roman generals of that time, was anxious 
only for a triumph and booty;  hc  accordingly stirrcd up the war 
afresh, and was treacherously authorised by the senate to injmc 
Viriathus  u-hcrever  he could.  The war  thus re-commenced 
while, nominally, negotiations were carried on.  Some Lusita- 
nian  traitors offered to murder thcir own leader.  They went 
into  his  tent, where, finding him  aslcep, they cut his throat, 
and before any one  suspected  his  death, they returned to tllc 
Romans to rcccivc thcir blood-money.14  For the Lusitanians, 
it only rcmaincd to bury him (6l2),  and they  did  so with an 
enthusiasm which has becoinc celebrated in history: the friends 
great man fought with one  another on  his  tomb, until 
fell.  This self  sacrificing act  of  the fiicds  of  JTiris- 
ti'us forms  a  singular contrast  to thc general  of  tile 
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Lusitanians, for we frequently meet with instances of the most 
malicious treachery, and we shall form a tolerably correct notion 
of them, if we compare them with the modern  Spaniards, who 
still shew the same character in many things.  But although the 
modern, as well as the ancient Spaniards-  the Celtiberians must 
always be excepted -  are distinguished for their love of money, 
still their treachery is oftener to be ascribed to their fearful party- 
spirit thin to their avarice.  The Spaniards seem to act on the 
principle, that friendship is mortal, hatrcd immortal.  They  nevcr 
become rcconcilcd to those with whom they  have once quarrelled ; 
and this featurc appears both in ancient and in modern timcs. 
Their mode  of  warfare is  likewise the same as it was of old; 
for  they have  nevcr  fought a  battle in the open field, cxcept 
under  the  command  of  a  Hamilcar  or a  Hannibal;  and in 
modern  times  under a  Gonsalvo de Cordova who formed the 
Spanish  line,  or  an Alba under  whom  it was still excellent; 
but they are excellent in petty warfare, and in the defence of 
fortified places : in the lines, they are good for nothing.'5  There 
are many other features  besides, which the modern Spaniards 
have in common with their ancient forefathers.  Perperna could 
not maintain himsc!f  in Spain against Pompey, nor could the 
successors of Viriathus against Caepio.  Unless a general inspirc 
the Spaniards with  confidence  in his own  pcrsonal  qualities, 
they have no confidence in themselves.  The Lusitanians now 
carried on the war under several generals, but none of the suc- 
cessors  of Viriathus was  as  great  as  he, none being able  to 
command pcrsonal confidence.  D. Junius Brutus Gallaicus con- 
cluded a peace with them, and they accepted the offer to settle 
in  a district of Valcncia as a kind of Roman colony, whcrc thcy 
founded a town  of  the name  of Valentia.  In this very mild 
climate, they soon lost their warlike  spirit.  It  is remarkable 
to see  with what  fiacility  this Brutus  made  conquests  in thc 
north-west of Spain, and the north-cast of Portugal; in modern 
timcs, too, those people have shewn littlc perseverance,  cxcept 
against the powcr of the Moors.  He was the first Roman who 
advanced  into  the country  of  the  Callaeci, across  the rivcr 
Minho.16  This cxpcdition was, it  is true, mcrely transitory, but 
it left a deep impression;  the permancnt  subjugation of  those 
countries did not take place till a later period. 
Thcsc conquests, which shed  so  great  a  lustre upon Rome, 
l5  Comp. above, p. 69, roll.  "  Florns, ii. 17; Livy, Epit. 55. 
belong to the time in which the wars against  the Celtiberians 
were carried on so unsuccessfully. The Celtiberians were divided 
into several small tribes, the more important ofwhich were the 
Titthi, and Arevaci.  We  are not able to give a satisfac- 
tory account of the constitutions and conditioll of the people of 
Spain;  but it is evident that the Ccltiberians must have had a 
republican  constitution,  and  were  not  governed  by  kings 
like  the  nations  in  southern  Spain.  But  although  the 
Celtiberians  had  a  national  constitution,  still  their  im- 
portant  cities  secm,  like  the  towns  of  Greece,  to  havc 
had  an indcpcndent  political  existence.  The Arevaci  had 
two  great  towns,  Termantia  or  Termestia,  and  Numantia. 
Thc Celtibcrian wars  began  in the year  609, and ended in 
619 or 620; if  we consider  the comparative  insignificance of 
the people that hcld out in these wars, their long duration is 
almost  inconceivable.  At first  most of  the Celtibcrians were 
in  arms,  but  gradually  one  place  after  another  fell  off. 
Nuinantia was stronger than Termantia, although the number 
of  its soldiers  did not  amount to more than 8000 l7; and in 
the course  of  the war  even  this  number decreased,  so  that 
during the blockade only 4000 were  left.  It  was situated  in 
a very rough district, amidst rocks and mountain torrents, in 
the ncighbourhood  of  the  modern  Soria.  The longer  this 
war  lasted,  the more formidable  it became  to  the  Romans. 
Thcy twicc  concluded  a  pcace,  but  broke  through it  each 
time, till at lcngth scipio Africanus was appointed once more 
to torture to death a brave people. 
LECTURE LXXVI. 
WE are generally inclined to believe that thc ancient Spaniards 
were barbarians, but if by this name we understand  savages, 
they were certainly not barbarians.  The Turdetani werc civil- 
ised at a very early period1 ;  they had  an alphabet similar to 
that of  the Libyans, and their coins are infinitely bettcr than 
those of  any European  nation during  the middle ages.  We 
have also ancient  inscriptions, of  which however  no rational 
interpretation has yet becn givcn, and which can be explained 
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only through the medium of  the Basque language.  With the 
exception of  Baron Wilhelm von  Humboldt, there is no one 
in  our  days  who  could  throw  any  light  upon  the subject. 
Some persons pretend to find in the alphabet of  the Turdetani 
a jargon  of Greek;  but this is an absurdity. 
During  its  first  years  the  war  against  Numantia  was 
carried  on  by  the  Romans  without  any  success.  In the 
year  611  the consul  Q. Pompeius,  the  son  of  Aulus',  ob- 
tained  the command  in  Spain.  He was  unfortunate  in  his 
undertaliings ; the Numantines even conquered his camp, and 
his  position was  so desperate, that he thought it advisable to 
offer  peace.  The Numantines, who wished  for  nothing  else, 
accepted the offer;  and in order  that the peace might obtain 
the sanction  of  the Roman senate, they were requested nomi- 
nally to submit to Rome,  to pay a  certain sum of  money,  to 
promise  to  serve  in the Roman armies  as auxiliaries, and to 
give hostages, who however wcre to be sent back afterwards.? 
All this they did.  But this reasonable peace  did not  satisfy 
the Romans,  as  Polnpeius  had foreseen; it was  annulled  by 
the  senate,  or  at least  by the command  of  the senate,  not 
observed by the successor of  Pompeius,  M.  Popillius  Laenas. 
The Numantines then sent ambassadors to Rome, appealing to 
the treaty of  Pompeius, to which the officers of his army bore 
witness;  but Pompcius  employed  every means to inducc the 
senate to annul the treaty that he might not be made answer- 
able  for  it,  and the war  was  renewed  with  greater  forces. 
A  few  years  later  the  command  was  given  to  the  consul, 
C. Hostilius Mancinus.  This Mancinus  has acquired,  by his 
misfortune,  great celebrity,  and  a,  kind  of  moral  reputation, 
which,  however,  is very  equivocal.  The terrified  Spaniards 
left Nuinantia to its fate, and Mancinus  advanced as far as the 
suburbana, thc gardens and cemetries of the city.  Being there 
repulsed in an engagement, the Numantines pursued him, and 
the Romans, who retreated  in disorder,  came  into a  district 
Hc is so called to distingnisll him from another of  the same namc.  I-Ie was 
onc of  the anceqtors of  Pompcy the  Great,  and wns at  thc  head  of  the aris- 
tocracy of  his timc, although he was the son of  a musician.  This fact itself  is 
very characteristic.  IIe was a man of  talent, and acquired his wealth in a not 
very honourable manner;  but  after having  once  obtained  great celebrity and 
having become rich, he mas welcome to tlic faction of  the  aristocrats; whereas 
Tlh. Sempronius Gracchus, of a plebeian but tmly ancient and noble family, was 
at the head of  the people.-N.  a  Appian, I. c. 79. 
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from  there  was  no  egress,  so  that nothing  was  left, 
except  either to sue for peace or to perish.  But the xuman- 
tines  having lost  their  confidence  would  not hear  of  peace, 
altho~gl~  the terms offered by Mancinus were very favourable. 
At that time Tib.  Sempronius  Gracchus was in the Roman 
camp  as  quaestor,  and  as  the  Numantines  remembered  the 
fair peace concluded by his father, and the recollection  of his 
honourable  conduct towards  all the Celtiberians was  so  vivid 
with them, that his son was the only one whom  they would 
trust,  he was  obliged  to pledge  his  own  honour  before they 
could  be  persuaded  to  trust  Mancinus.4  The  Numantines 
shewed a noble confidence and benevolence towards Gracchus; 
for having lost his account-books in the camp which had fallen 
into thc hands of the enemy, he went through the midst of 
their  army  to  Numantia,  and  the  inhabitants,  his  former 
enemiw,  gladly returned  to  him  his  papers,  though  they 
might easily  have  retained  him  as  a  hostage.  The Roman 
army of 20,000 men, independent  of the allies, was dismissed 
without being disgraced, and Numantia stipulated only for its 
own independence and friendship with Rome.  When aftcr- 
wards this peace  excited the displeasure of  the senate, Man- 
cinus  acted  the  same  part  as  Sp. Postumius had  after  the 
defeat of  Caudium5:  he advised the senate to deliver himself 
and his officers up to the enemy, to do penance  for agreeing 
to  the  unauthorised  peace  which  was  thus  to  be  annulled. 
The people sanctioned the decree as far as Mancinus was con- 
cerned,  but rejccted  the part  rclating  to his  officers, out of 
reg,zrd for Tib. Gracchus.  Mancinus accordingly was delivered 
up; but the Numantines refused  to accept him, and sent him 
back, that the curse of the perjury might fall upon tlzosc who 
had committed it.6 
After this  again  a  few years  passcd without  any progress 
bcing made by the Romans;  and it  was obvious that there was 
no hope of bringing the war to a close, unless Scipio Africanus 
was  made  consul,  as Appian says7,  in spite of  the laws.  If 
this is not a false statement, we must confess that we  do not 
know  what  lams  are  meant;  for  ten  years  having  clapsed 
since his first consulship,  he must  by this time have attained 
 pian an, 2.  c. 80.  Comp.  Plutarch,  Tib. Gracchus,  5, foll.; Aurcl.  Victor, 
De  vzr. illuctr. 64. 
5  Compare vol. iii. p. 220, foll.  '  Veueius Paterc. ii. 1.  1.  C.  84. 268  SCIPIO  SENT  AGAINST  NUnfANTIA.  DESTRUCTION  OF  NUMANTIA.  269 
the age  prescribed  for  the coilsulship  by the  leyes  annnles. 
There seems to be some inisunderstanding in Appian8, unless a 
law existed absolutely forbidding the same person to be invested 
with the consulship  twice.  When Scipio set out to extirpate 
thc small people  of Numantia, he took with him many recruits, 
allies and volunteers  from  all parts of  the world,  Numidians 
as well as men  from  the far East.  All offcrs  of the Numan- 
tincs were rcjcctcd.  Scipio found the army in a statc of great 
disordcr; and it was  not without difficulty that he succcedccl 
in introducing  a  better  discipline  among  his  troops.  They 
amounted  to  60,000,  and  with  them  hc  marched  against 
Numantia.  The town was  surrounded  on thrce sidcs by the 
river Durius, and was therefore  situated on an isthmus, which 
was  strongly fortified.  After having driven the Numantincs 
into their town,  which was only thrcc miles in circumfcrcncc, 
he surroundcd it with a  line of pallisades, and a  doublc ram- 
part,  as  thc  Spartans had  done  at Plataeae.  On these  lines 
he established balistac, by means of  which the Romans endea- 
voured  to keep the despairing  Numantines  at a  distance,  it 
being their objcct to destroy them by hunger, and tlicy thcrc- 
fore took  all possiblc precautions  to prevent provisions being 
introduccd  into  the  town.  For  a  timc  the  Nuxnantincs 
rcceived  sacks  of  flour  by  the  river  Durius;  but  in order 
to  render  this  impossible,  Scipio threw into the river  long 
beams,  which  wcre  armed with  saws  and  darts,  and  being 
fastened  to  the banks,  they  floated  both  above  and  below 
the  town,  which  the  rafts  with  provisions  could  thus  no 
longer  reach.  How long  this  fearful  blockade  lasted  we 
cannot  say.  All  attempts  of  the  Numantines  to  break 
through  the  Roman  fortifications  failed.  On  onc  occasion, 
howcvcr, some mcn succccdecl in a bold undertaking, forcing 
their way to the distant town  of  Lutia, where they lnet with 
such admiration of their courage, that sevcral hundrcd young 
men offered thcir assistance, and a general insurrection scemed 
on the point of  brcaking out.  On this occasion  Scipio actcd 
in a  manner of  which we  cannot  think  without  a  shudder, 
but which  shews what  kind of  man  hc was.  To follow the 
Numantincs  to  Lutia  was  his  duty, but  he committcd  the 
atrocity of cutting off the hands of about four hundred young 
mcn who wcrc brought  before  him  as friends  to thc cause of 
Corny. Livy, Epit. 56. 
the  ti^^^.  After  thc  Numantines  had  consumed  all 
their  provisions,  &cr  they  had  for  some  timc  been  living 
upon the corpses of  their eneinics  and their own friends, and 
had experienced all thc horrors and miseries  sucl1 as we have 
seen  inflicted  upon  Missolonghi,  they at  length  wished  to 
surrcllder.  Scipio demanded that they should  lay down their 
arlns  and  surrender  at  discretion.  The  Nu~nantincs  thcn 
begged  for  a  truce  of  thrce  days  to  consider  the  proposal. 
This tilne they employed, cspccially the persons of  the llighcr 
classes, in destroying thcir wivcs and children, that they might 
not fall into the hands of thc Romans; and the slaughter which 
tllcy made among  theinsclves was  so  grcat, that on  the third 
day 0111~  a small number came forth from thc town, in such a 
condition that thcir faces shewed scarccly any traccs of  human 
fcaturcs.  Scipio sclcctcd fifty for his triumph, who were after- 
wards~robably  bchcaded, and the rest  wcre sold  as  slaveso; 
bat thcy are said  to have bcen  so infuriated  that some madc 
away with theinsclves, and othcrs liillcd  their mastcrs, so that 
in a  short tirnc not a single Numantinc was  left.  According 
to some authors all  the Numantines Bad  put an end to their 
livcs, bcforc thc Romans cntered  the city; but this statcmellt 
is  unhistorical.1°  Numantia  vanished  from  the facc  of  tlle 
earth,  and was  never  rebuilt  by the Romans.  The day of 
punishment for the awful deed was not far distant. 
Evcn before thc fall of  Numantia, a scrvile war had broken 
out  in  Sicily,  the  particulars  of  which  bclong,  properly 
speaking,  not  to  a  history  of  Romc,  but  to  that  of  Sicily. 
This  insurrcction  had its origin  in the clccreasc of  tile popu- 
lation of  thc island, where,  in conscqucncc  of  the numerous 
wars, faniinc and  plamucs had  mgcd  in the same dcgrcc as ill 
br  ,  Germany during the  lliirty-ycars' war.  Hardly  twenty-four 
years had passcd aftcr the conclusion of the first Punic war, when 
the second broke out, and completed the devastation of  Sicily. 
Its state of  desolation was  like that of  Ireland aftcr the 
of  Limerick in the reign of  William 111.  Many of  the con- 
quered places had been razed to the ground, and whole districts 
had become ayw publicus, which were occupied by speculators, 
and formed into cxtcnsive estates.  They were chiefly used as 
Pasture  land, just  as  in the time of  Arcadius and  Honorius, 
when, as we see from the Theodosian Code, Calabria, Lucnnia 
Appian, 1. c. 97,  foil. 
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and Bruttium were almost  entirely changed  into vast  pasture 
lands.  The  proprietors  were  partly  Siceliots  and  partly 
Romans,  who  kept  large flocks  of  cattle, and  whose  herds- 
men  formed  gangs of  robbers.11  Immense numbers of  slaves 
were kept  on  these estates12, thousands  of  them being  often 
together  on  the same property.  Formerly  slaves  had  been 
rare, comparatively spcalring;  but, after the destruction of  so 
many towns,  we hear of  vast  multitudes  of  them,  and they 
were sold in the markets for a mere trifle.  Imagine the three 
Punic wars, the war in Syria about the inheritance of  Antio- 
chus Epiphanes, the numerous pirates along the whole coast of 
Cilicia, the ravages  in Achaia, Macedonia, Africa, and Spain; 
and remember that, in poor countries, men were always carried 
away, and sold as slaves-and  you will be able to form a tole- 
rably correct  estimate of  the number  of  slaves.13  The slaves 
in Sicily were treated very cruelly, being  obliged  to cultivate 
the fields in chains.  Among them there were of course many 
able  men from  all countries,  who deserved quite a  differcnt 
fate, and could not  but be  thirsting after the blood of  their 
tyrants.  A  servile war  thus  broke  out  in ,Sicily;  and  wc 
cannot  wonder  that  a  similar  insurrection  occurred  at  the 
same time  in Greece.  The cause  was  the same everywhere. 
Formerly agriculture had been carried on in Greece chiefly by 
freedmen, and it was not till now that it passed into the hands 
of  slaves.  The war lasted for upwards of  three years;  several 
Roman armies were completely defeated, and a  consular army 
under  Q.  Rupilius  was  required  to  subdue  the  island  in 
620, for tlic slaves were masters of  the strongest  places, Enna 
and Tauromenium.  Their leader was  a  Syrian of  the name 
of  Eunus, who like Jean Frangois in St. Domingo, in  1791, 
assumed  the diadem.  The war was  carried  on with the same 
inhuman barbarities  as  are perpetrated  in all  servile wars, in 
the  Wcst  Indies  or  North  America.  The  devastation  of 
11  The herdsmen in all parts of  Italy, are still a degcnerate race of  men.  I 
have frequently spoken with great  rcsspect of  the Italians as husbandmen,  but I 
repcat that the herdsmcn  are degenerate.  In the state of  N~KJ~~S,  the cccle- 
siastical  states  and  Tuscany,  there are but  few;  whcn  they  arc not  robbers 
themselves, thcy are the comrades and spies of*robbers.-N. 
12  Diodorus, xxxiv. Eclog. 2. p.  525, foll. 
13  It has  been  said that, in  the slave-markct  of  the island of  Delos, 10,000 
slaves mere sold every day: but  nothing  can be  more absurd  than  this;  and. 
from thc account given by Strabo (xiv. p. 668), it is clear that he ollly meant to 
say, that on one paxticdar day 10,000 slaves mere sold.-N. 
sicilY was  colnpleted by it; and thirty years later, the same 
circumstallces  the same effects.  The detail is fear- 
fully illtcresting,  but, as I have already said, docs not belong 
to Roman history. 
During this time, Attalus Philometor of  Pergamus, the son 
of Eulnelles  had died, and with him the dynasty of Philctaerus 
had becolne extinct.  The  first  princes  of  that family which 
had been  raised  by the Ron~aiis  were,  on  the whole,  clever 
men,  and of  a mild  disposition,  and  the country  flourished 
them, altllough much may be  said  against their policy, 
if we take morality as our standard.  But the last Attalus was 
a man of differcnt character:  his reign was  tyrannical, and he 
himself was  one  of  those  contemptible miscreants whom  we 
meet with  only  in the  history  of  the  East,  where  a  little 
natural perversity is easily  carried to the highest pitch, as in 
the case of Sultan Ibrahim.  In  the East, men sometimes take 
a delight in what is  most  unnatural  and disgusting, and thus 
become tr~~e  incarnations of  a  base and satanic nature.  Such 
a man was Attalus.  The only art he occupied  himself  with, 
was that of cultivating poisonous plants; and what amused liiin 
most was, to get rid of his nearest kindred.14  He died without 
issue, and left his whole kingdom to the  Romans, who certainly 
would not casily have rccogniscd any one else as his succeesor; 
for  they  looked  upon  his  kingdom  as  their  own  property, 
which they had a right to  dispose of, just as a master had  the 
right of  succcssion to the cstate of  his  slave  or  his  freedman 
who  died  without  having madc  a  will.  The  remarks  of 
Florus15, therefore,  on this affair  are foolish.  Rome thus ac- 
quired a new and extensively rich province, but possession of it 
was not obtaincd without bloodshed.  There was a natural son 
of  Eurnenes,  the predecessor  of  Attalus,  called  Aristonicus, 
who clairned the kingdom of Attalus as his lawful inheritance. 
According to eastern notions, such a man was  not  disqualified 
for succeeding to the throne, so that but for the will of Attalus 
he mould have bccn the lawful heir.  Soon aftcr his brother's 
death, he took possession of  the diadem without any difficulty, 
for the people  of  pergarnus dreaded  the dominion  of  Rome, 
having become acquainted with the tyranny  robbery of the 
Roman Praetors and proconsuls, who annually appeared among 
them.  Many towlls declared for  him, while others which had 
"  L)iOdorus, xxxlv.  Elc.  cfe vl1.t.  et vtt.  p. 601 ;  Justin, -yi.  4.  15  ii. 20. 272  DEFEAT OF ABISTONICUS. 
recently  received  their independence  at the hands of the Ro- 
mans, such as  Ephesus,  made  preparations  against him.  As, 
howevcr, there was  no one in the world  who could givc him 
assistance, it is inconceivable  how he could have the madness 
to believe  that he would  be  able  to  hold  out  against  the 
Romans, and how he found any support among the people  of 
Pergainus.  The ncighbouring  states of  Cappadocia, Pontus 
and Bithynia were very small, and the last two utterly unwar- 
like; the Syrian kings too were near thcir end, and their whole 
attention was  directed  towards  the East, where the Parthians 
were  extending  thcir  power  and  had  already  conquered 
Babylon.  Yet  the war  lasted  much  longer  than had  bccn 
anticipated.  The effeminate  inhabitants of  the magnificent 
country of  Lydia  and  Ionia  carried  on  the war  in some  re- 
spects, with great resolution;  and,  bcsidcs  them,  Aristonicus 
had many Thracian rnercenarics  in his army.  On the part of 
the Romans, the war  was  badly  conducted,  as their generals 
thought  of  nothing  but  enriching  themselves,  and  turning 
everything into money,  instcad  of  making the proper usc  of 
their victories:  they were,  in fiict, glad when a powerful and 
wcalthy town revolted, because it afforded them an opportunity 
for plundcr.  The Romans had not only a consular army, but 
also troops from Bithynia and Pontus;  notwithstanding  which 
one  Roman  commander,  P. Licinius  Crassus  Mucianus,  was 
defcatcd and taken  prisoner.  This man  has a  reputation  in 
history, and yet he had shown such rcvolting avaricc, that thc 
Asiatics took vcngeancc by maltreating his dead body: so easily 
a person might then acquire the reputation of an honest man ! IIc 
died  however with courage, for he caused himself to be killcd. 
The war was at length brought to an end by M. l'crperna,  ancl 
M.' Aquillius, who snatched the triumph  out of  the hands  of 
Pcrperna.  Aristonicus was  taken prisoner at Stratonicea, and 
adorned the triumph at Rome.l6.  The end of this, as well  as 
of the Servile war, belongs  to a later  date than the yea,r  619 
which  is  the  year  of  thc  tribuncship  of  Tib. Scmpronius 
Gracchus.  Thc reduction  of  Sicily falls in thc year 620, and 
the defeat of  Aristonicus in 622.17 
IG Snllust, Fragm. Hist. lib. iv; Tell. Paterc. ii. 4. 
'7  Thc Annales of Zumpt deserve to be  recommended, and, with tho  exccp- 
tion of R few inaccnracies, they are satisfactory.  For the early periods of Grcck 
history, however, the work is not  always founcled on careful  investigation.-N. 
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The province  of  Asia  was  now  regularly constituted, but 
witllin  llarrower  limits.  Rome behaved  generously towards 
the native p-inces.  The dominion of Nicomedes was extended, 
and Mithridates of Pontus obtained Mrtgna Phrygia, though not 
till tile  tribuneship  of C. Gracchus, who seems to have spoken 
the  measure,  since  this unnecessary giving up of  a 
country  had  pobably been  effected  by hfithridates, through 
a regular purchase  from the Roman commissioners. 
The constitutional changes  of  this period  are for the most 
part  unimportant,  the  distinction  between  ~atricians  and 
plebeians having  ceased.  In the year 622, we find  for  the 
first  time  two  plebeian  censors.18  The first time that  both 
the  consuls  were  plebeians,  had  been  in  the  year  580, 
a  fact  recorded  in  the Fasti,  where  we  read ambo  primum 
de plebe.19  It is  strange  that  Livy  does  not  mention  it; 
but  circumstances  had  now  so  long  been  ripening, that no 
one  thought  of  opposing  the  election  of  two  plebeians. 
Dionysius  saysZ0 that  in his  time  there  were  no more  than 
fifty patrician  families left, which is  not  to be  understood of 
gentes, but of families  in the ordinary sense  of  the word;  so 
that,  for  example,  the  Scipios,  Cethegi,  and  Lentuli  were 
considered  as  three families.  My belief  is, that  at the time 
when  the consulship  was  in the hands of  two plebeians, the 
number  of  patrician  gentes,  whose  members  were  invested 
with  public  honours,  did  not  amount  to  more  than  fifteen. 
But these gentes were not taken into account, since the curiae, 
in which alone their influence could be exerted, had lost their 
political importance long  before, and their influence was only 
that of separate families.  Thus, in the Aemilia gens, we have 
only the Lepidi, Paulli, and Scauri; in the Cornelia gens, the 
families of  the Scipios, Sullae, Lentuli, and Cethegi, etc.  All 
the  familics  of  a  gens,  moreover,  were  not  nobiles.  Thus, 
the Claudia  gens  contained  only one; and  the Valeria gens, 
only that  of  the Messalae:  in short, the patricians  formed  a 
very trifling  number.  The noble  plebeian  families,  on  the 
other hand, were  very  numerous, and  constantly  increasing. 
A  very great  majority  of  the senators  were  plebeians;  and 
A new and improved  edition  was  published  at Berlin  in  1838,  under the title 
"  Annales  vcterum regnorum et populorum,  imprimis Romanoram,  confecti a 
C. T. Zumptio." 
l8  Livy, Epit.  59. 
Compare vol. iii. p. 70.  20  Dionysius, i.  85.  Comp. vol. i  p. 329. 
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ever  since the end of  the Hannibalinn war, most of  the prae- 
tors had been plebeians : among six praetors there was scarcely 
one patrician.  Nor can this be regarded  as anything extraor- 
dinary, for  it was  the natural consequence  of  circumstances. 
In the time of  the Gracchi,  we find  ~atrician  and plebeian 
families indiscriminately on both sides;  App. Claudius, belong- 
ing to a  family  which  had  formerly  headed  the patricians 
against the plebeians, was the father-in-law of  Tib. Gracchus, 
agreed with him, and carried  into effect the laws enacted by 
him; whereas tllose who were most furious against the Gracchi, 
and  most  interested  in  defeating  their  measures,  were  all 
plebeians,  with  the exception  of  Scipio Nasica.  The feuds 
between  the two  orders  had  been  transferred  to  the  novi 
homines  and the nobzles.  It is  only  the  unlearned,  though 
often  ingenious  historians  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
especially those  of  foreign  countries (Frenchmen), that were 
mistaken on this point, believing that these nobiles were patri- 
cians,  although the change had bcen  known  ever  since the 
revival of  letters.  At Rome, nobody thought any longer of a 
distinction  between  patricians  and plebeians.  This may ac- 
count for Livy not mentioning the change, since, in reality, the 
distinction had altogether ceased.  But the number of patricians 
was  then  still  sufficient  for  the  censorship;  and  hence forty 
years more passed before both censors were plebeians. 
About  this  time, a change must  also  have  taken  place  in 
the aedileship, which, until then, had  been divided in such a 
manner, that it  was  held  alternately, one year by patricians, 
and the other by plebeians ; for  the patricians  had been  less 
jealous  about this office on account of  its costliness. 
Various other changes besides must have occurred during this 
period;  they were not, indeed, of a legislative nature, but were 
manifested in the whole habitus of the Romans.  Among these, 
I reclron the entire change in the character of the tribuneship. 
A tribune at this time was like a despot, with absolute power. 
A few years after the time of Gracchus, the tribune C. Atinius 
Labeo ordered the censor  Q.  Metellus to be thrown down the 
Tarpeian rock, because he had excluded him from  the senate; 
and it was only with  difficulty that he was  saved  from  the 
hands of this tyrant by another tribune, on whom his relations 
called for protecti~n.~~  Such wild acts of tribunes, which  are 
''  Livy, Epit. 59; Cicero,pro Dmo, 47. 
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not  unfrcquent  during  this  period,  prove  that the tribunes 
thclnselves no longer knew what they really were.  The same 
Atinius carried a law of great importance, that the tribunes of 
tllc people should be senators by virtue of their office, and that 
they should  not  be  excluded  from  the senate  on  any other 
grounds than those  on which  other senators were  excluded.22 
By this law,  the senate ~vould  have become an entirely dcmo- 
cratic and elective  assembly; but,  although  Gellius  supposes 
that this law remained in force, yet it cannot have bcen of long 
duration. 
LECTURE LXXVII. 
THERE  was a time when the name of the Gracchi was branded 
with  infamy,  and when  they were  looked  upon  as notorious 
only for their arbitrary  proceedings,  and as the ringleaders of 
a tyrannical faction attempting to interfere with other persons' 
property,  and another time,  when they had a celebrity which 
they themselves would  have  detestcd;  but  such  opinions,  as 
well as the old view of the agrarian laws, are now undermined; 
and, although the intricate nature of the uger publicus  may not 
be  universally understood,  yet,  in Germany1, the correctness 
of the results of our historical investigations is generally rccog- 
niscd2,  and I do  not  think  that  there  is any one who still 
cntertains the old opinion about the Gracchi. 
Tib. Gracchus was the son of  the elder Tib. Gracchus,  who 
had  concluded  the peace  with  the Celtibcrians,  by Cornelia, 
the daughter  of  the elder  Scipio,  who was  given to him in 
marriagc, not by her father, as Livy states, but by hcr relatives 
after her  father's  death.  130th were  known  to be  the most 
virtuous bcings in that corrupt age:  the good old times conti- 
2<cllius,  xiv. 8; Zonaras, vii.  15. 
W~th  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  some  obscure  and isolated  comcr  of 
Anstria.-N. 
Sce vol. ii. p.  130, foll.  Some Frenchmen still cling to their false prejudice$; 
but in America my views have been  adopted,  as I see from a  review  of  my 
History of  Rome;  the author,  a  remarltable  man,  statcs thnt  therc was not a 
perbon 111 thc world to mholn the notion thnt the Graecl~i  dl,l not attack pli\ate 
property nas not perfect13 new when it was first promulgated hq  me.--N. 276  THE  AGER PUBLICUS.  THE AGER PUBLICUS.  277 
nued in them.  Of  twelve  children three only survived,  the 
two brothers,  Tiberius and Caius,  and a  daughter  who  was 
married  to  the younger  Scipio (Paulli f.).  The sons  were 
educated,  under  their  mother's  superintendence,  by  distin- 
guished Greeks and a Campanian, C. Blossius, who had received 
a complete Greek education, and even wrote Greek poetry, for 
we now know that he composed comedies in the style of Rhin- 
ton3-a  proof to what a degree Greek literature then flourished 
in Italy, as is in fact stated by Cicero.  He  was somewhat older 
than Tiberius whose teacher and friend he was; and a follower 
of the Stoic philosophy,  which at that tillle was suited to the 
wants of all noble minds,  and particularly to a nation like the 
Romans.  As Tiberius, through the great favour of the people, 
advanced  in his  public  carcer,  having  distinguished  himself 
even at the taking of Carthage,  where he and C. Fannius had 
been  the first  to scale  the walls,  be became quaestor,  and in 
this capacity induced the Numantines  to accept  the peace  of 
Mancinus.  Its rejection by the scnate exasperated him.  It is 
unfortunate that the history of these times has come down to 
us only in hasty accounts at second  or even  third hand,  espe- 
cially by Appian  and Plutarch; the latter wrote the lives  of 
the  Gracchi  with  feeling,  but  in perfect  ignorance of  the 
circumstances of the time, though the moral part of the account 
is beautiful.  Both writers, however, often allow themselves to 
be misguided by the scandalous anecdotes of some now unknown 
author.  Plutarch was thus led to believe that Tiberius' vanity 
had been offended by the rejection of  the peace with Nu~nantia; 
but in a mind like that of Tiberius we can surely find motives 
for exasperation in something very different.  He  had concluded 
the peace as an honest man, and to see it trodden underfoot in 
defiance of all good faith,  must have irritated him against the 
rulers of the time.  How a man of Gracchus' disposition must 
have felt it his duty to venture upon such dangerous political 
measures (~oX~re6pa.ra),  is best explained by the consideration 
of  the servile war in Sicily;  for there the real  cancer  in the 
general condition of the people manifested itself most clearly. 
Ager publicus4 was land conquered in war,  and belonging to 
3 I know of no passage where this is mentioned.  Does Niebuhr perhaps con- 
found Blossius with Blaesus?  for the latter is known to have written  plays in 
thc style of  Rhinton. 
Comp. Lect. on Rom.  Hist. T-01. i. p.  192, foll. 
tile  The use of it mas given either to Romans, or to 
natives, or to  on certain conditions, viz.,  on payment of 
tenth ofthe produce of  arable land and of  the cattle,  of a 
scriptura for the use of pasture land in proportion to the llulnber 
of  The Licinian law had ordained that no one should 
Inore tllan five hundred jugers of  it.5  The occupatiol1 
of such public land could indeed be transmitted from father to 
son as an inheritance,  and it could be sold or disposed of  in 
other  but the occnpznt  always  remained  a  precarious 
tenant,  or a tenant at will,  whom the owner,  that is thc re- 
public,  had  the right  to turn out,  whenever  it was thought 
necessary to apply such land to other purposes.  When a person 
posscsscd more than the law allowed, he was  liable to punisli- 
ment, and the surplus was to be confiscated. 
The manner in which  the Licinian law was  observed,  was 
such as might have been expected under the circumstances.  L. 
Postumius niIegillus  was  punished  for  having  employed  the 
soldiers of  a legion in the cultivation of  an extcnsive tract  of 
domain IandG;  and it is a well-known fact, that Licinins Stolo 
himself emancipated his son, that he might bc able, in his name, 
to occupy a greater portion  of  public land than his  own law 
pcrmitted.7  Everywhere persons possessed more than the legal 
amount,  and the very fact that these lands were not property, 
but secured only by the jus praetorium,  there being no juris- 
diction in the districts where  they lay,  afforded  to those who 
wished to enrich themselves,  great powers  to eject  those who 
occupied  small  tracts  of  land.  With us,  in France,  and in 
England, small pieces of land are worth much more than when 
united in large masses,  but in the south,  especially in Italy, 
large estates arc far more valuable,  so tliat there the number of' 
small farrns is continually diminishing, and all landed property 
becomes accumulated  in a few hands.  Down to the war with 
Pyrrhus, immense tracts of land had been acquired;  and during 
the time of  the Punic wars,  the public  domain was  increased 
an  enormous  extent.  A  great part of  it was  used for the 
foundation  of  colonie~,  or was assigned  to the Roman 
but, in this case also,  the republic seems to have  tllc 
ownership for itself.  After the Hannibalinn war, a numbcr  of 
were  founded,  and  extraordilla~~  assignments were 
made  the veterans of  Scipio only in Apulin, Samnium, and 
'  Compare vol. iii. p.  13.  See vol. iii. p. 413.  '  See ~01.  iii. p. 52. 278  TENURE  OF  LAND  IN  ITALY.  CONDITION  OF TEE ROMAN  POPULATION.  279 
I believe  also  in Lucanias; since the time of  C.  Flaminius, 
nothing had ever been assigned viritim to all the plebt'  'ians,  as 
had been done in ancient times. 
A man who himself farms a ~iece  of land which requires no 
capital can, of course, pay a much higher rent than a man who 
cannot farm it himself; for the latter requires labourers, whereas 
the former  not  only reaps  the whole produce of the soil, but 
has not to pay any wages.  I have a very accurate knowledge 
of the present system of agriculture in Italy, and am acquainted 
with  large  Garmers, who  have  vast  possessions,  which  they 
managc exceedingly well, but  who are an abominable class of 
men, and must lead to the ruin of  their country;  although in 
some  respects  they have a title  to praise, which  is not  suffi- 
ciently ackno~vledgcd.  But I also know small independent pea- 
sants, the most respectable class of men in Italyg, and I very well 
remcmbcr one poor peasant of Tivoli,  who was striving to recover 
his small estate from the hands of a usurer, and exerted  all  his 
powers  to  satisfy  his  noble  pride  in being  an independent 
proprietor.  On that occasion, I saw very clearly the value  of 
wages, and how important it is for a family to  have a piece of 
land which  they can cultivate themselves without the employ- 
ment of labourers.  In Italy, the moncy is in the hands of the 
few, thc nobles;  and, in unproductivc seasons,  the peasant  is 
obliged to sell or pledge his piece of land.  During the middle 
ages, the number of these small proprietors was very great, but 
at present it is greatly reducecl, and  is  ever  on  the decrease. 
111  my inquiries at Tivoli, I learned that formerly almost every 
citizen had his hide of land; but that, in times of war, many had 
bcen obliged to sell their property; so that, fifty years ago, the 
number of  small landed  proprietors  was  five  times,  and 400 
years ago fifty times, greater than at present.  I can assert this 
the more confidently,  as I have  my information  from  the old 
statistical documents of Tivoli itself,  drawn up in the fifteenth 
century.1°  Sonninol1 has 4000 inhabitants,  but  the whole of 
its territory  belongs  to five  or six  individuals; the rest  are 
beggars and robbers. 
In Livy, xxxi. 4, Lucania is not mentioned. 
With these sentiments, and those which follow, compare a letter of  Niebulrr, 
in Lebensnachrichten Cber B. G.  Nieduhr, vol. ii.  p.  398, foll. where a more de- 
tailed description of the state of the Italian peasantry is given. 
'0  Comp:rre Lebensnachrichten uber B.  G.  Niebuhr, vol. ii. p. 404. 
" This name has been put in here by conjecture, for all the MSS.  notes have 
Solino, a place which I cannot find. 
It was exactly  sucll  a ~tatc  of  things as this which presented 
itself  to  ~ib.  Selllpronius  Gracchus.  While the  number  of 
lloman  citizens was increased  every year by Italian allies, who 
obtained tile Roman franchise, and inore especially by freedmen, 
wllo,  on the whole, bore the stamp of  slaves,  the  nulnber  of 
lmded proprietors decreased.  The numerous  slnall  estates of 
former  times  were  no  more.  During  the Hannibalian  war 
had become altered; for where, for exalnple, a poor 
peamnt was the neighbour of a rich one, the former  had  been 
compelled, during tllosc times of distress and epidemic disorders 
among the cattle, to borrow money  from  his  neigllbour,  and 
not bciilg able  to give sccurity, lie  had undoubtedly to pay a 
high  rate  of interest.  Now  the son  of  such a pcassnt  was, 
perhaps, scrving in thc legions, and if the father  happened  to 
bc attacked by illness, hc was obliged to engage labourers.  In 
this manner he was reduccd more and more, and if  in the end 
he mas not able to pay the intcrcst,  he was coinpclled  to give 
up his land to his neighbour.  I11  this  and various other ways 
many a small estate  had passed  into the hands  of  the rich l2 
Such  a  change  of  property  increases in its progress  like  an 
avalanche.  The Licinian law had enacted that, on  every  one 
hundred jugers of the domain land, a certain number of citizens 
should be einploycd as free labourers or cottagers, in order that 
it might  be cultivated  by  frecmen and not by slaves.13  But 
this enactment had not becn obscrvcd, and thousands of  slaves 
wcre employed on account of thcir clieapness,  just  as in  Por- 
tugal, from the sixteenth century down to the time of  Pombal, 
ncgro slaves were employed for the same  rcason;  whence  mu- 
lattoes are also found there.  It is not improbablc that thc first 
idea of  reform  occurred to Tib. Sempronius  Gracchus,  when 
on his march from Spain  he  passed  through  Etrnria,  on  the 
extcnsivc cstates in which he saw far and wide no free labourers, 
but numbers of SI~VCS  in chainsl4, while  the  freeborn  Romans 
wcrc rcduccd to beggary. 
The population of' llome was bccorning more and more a true 
populacc, while in the  country  the number  of the  poor  was 
increasing to an awful cxtent.  It was  a  state  of  things 
that towards which,  unfortunately all  Europe is, at  present, 
hastening; but the difference  is,  that  the  had  it  in 
l2  CatO?  a~:.flln.  Hist. Nut. xviii. 6 and 7; Sallust, Jugurth.  41. 
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their power to remove tile evil.  Few Romans  reflected upon 
the causes out of which  it had grown; but  many  must  have 
known that the misery would never have reached that height, 
if the Licinian law had  been observed,  if  men had  been  ap- 
pointed to watch over its proper execution,  and if  the  newly 
acquired lands had from time to time been distributed,  or their 
occupation been rightly conducted.  Every one,  like the king 
in Goethe's play, wished for a diferent state of things,  but  no 
one had the courage or will  to  undertake  the  reform.  After 
the second Punic war it would not have been  very difficult to 
accomplish the object.  In the midst of  great political  shocks 
and sufferings, there occur moments which must be seized, and 
in which the disease can be overcome;  but that  moment  had 
been neglected at Rome, and was now irreparably lost.  Seventy 
years had now elapsed from the time of  the Hannibalian  war, 
and every one who contemplated the condition of the republic 
must have felt like a person who  is  suddenly placed  before a 
yawning  abyss.  C. Laelius  is  said to have intended to inter- 
fere and to help, but afterwards to have  given up the idea as 
impracticable.  Hence he is said to have received the surname 
Sapiens, either in mockery, it not being prudent  (sapiens)  to 
put one's hand intoa wasp's nest, or to indicate his real wisdom.15 
All  the  great  Roman  families  were  concerned  in  these 
things,  for  there were  surely  few  illustrious  families  which 
were not in possession of portions of the public domain exceed- 
ing by far the lawful  extent of  500 jugers, or which did not 
keep  upon  them more than the legal number  of  a  hundred 
large and five hundred small cattle.  To offend  these families 
was unavoidable,  if the Licinian law was to be strictly carried 
into effect.  But the law was perfectly clear,  and might have 
been enforced with the utmost strictness;  and if this had been 
done  according to the letter, no  one  could have  raised  any 
objection,  any  more  than  at present  a  farmer  of  domains, 
though his  ancestors have been  tenants for  many years,  can 
object to the government when, at the expiration of his term, 
he is  told  that he must leave his farm,  that his holding the 
land alone is considered detrimental to the state,  and that it 
must be  parcelled  out and  distributed  among  other tenants. 
But there was,  on  the  other  hand,  a  kind of  equity  to be 
observed,  and  as  the law  had  so long been  in abeyance,  it 
l5  Hutarch, Tib. GTUCC~.  8. 
not have been fair to abolish  all at once the old abuse, 
and  thereby  to injure many interests.  The possessors might 
say: "  Even  C. Flaminius  did not  apply  his law to domain 
land:already  occupied, but only to newly-conquered  land, and 
he thus tacitly acknowledged  the right of possession.  &'lore- 
over, having advanced money to the state in thc Hannibalian 
war,  we  received  in return assignments  of  the ager publicus, 
has thereby  become  our property."  Since  that  time 
nearly a hundred years had again elapsed, and those lands had 
consequently becn in the possession  of  a family for the ~eriod 
of a hundred, and other lands even of  150 or 200 years;  and 
where they had not  continued in the same family, they had 
been bougllt  of  them by others who never thought  that these 
lands would be taken from them.  Many might have said that 
they had  acquired  them  bona  jde;  many  also had  received 
them in a  desolate  condition after having been  ravaged  and 
laid  waste  in  war,  and  had,  at great  cost,  cultivated  and 
changed  them  into  fertile fields  or  olive  plantations,  which 
require a long time before  they bear  fruit; others had  spent 
large  sums  in  erecting  extensive  buildings  on  those  lands. 
The  question  therefore  naturally  arose,  whether  all  these 
things should be sacrificed by the occupants. 
No  one can  be  more  spotless  in his  sentiments than  Tib. 
Gracchus  was;  even  those  who long after,  blinded  by party 
spirit, censured his undertaking, such as Cicero, whose noble 
heart  always  gains the upper hand where he has acquired- a 
correct  siew of  a  subject,  give  him  this testimony;  Cicero 
calls him sanctissimus homo.  The statesmen of antiquity were 
not the poetical natures which they are generally believed  to 
have becn; they had  to pay exactly the same  regard  to  cir- 
cumstances as those of modern  times.  Tib. Gracchus clearly 
saw, that if matters continued to go on without improvement, 
absolute ruin would be the consequence, and that Rome would 
sink into despotism.  Had he demandcd that the letter of the 
law should be complied with, he would have acted with perfect 
legality; but it would, nevertheless, have been  in the highest 
degree unfair.  He therefore  formed  a  different  plan.  The 
bill  he brought  forward  enacted  that no  one  should occupy 
more than 500  jugers  of the domain land, and 250 jugers  for 
each  of  his sons, who was yet in patria potestate.  This, how- 
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the expression  nequis plus  quam  MILLE  agri jugera  haberet.16 
He further wished  to enact that the lands thus recovered  by 
the state should not be allowed to be sold, in order to prevent 
the wealthy  Romans  from  sooner  or  later  acquiring  them 
again.  Therefore,  far  from  wishing  to interfere  with  pro- 
perty, he endeavoured  to raise  a mere possessio into real pro- 
perty, wl~icli  no one should  be  allowed to touch.  Buildings 
erected  on land, which according to this law was to be  taken 
from the possessors,  were  to be valued,  and the price to be 
given  in money  to  the owner  of  the buildings.  The only 
difficulty now remaining was this.  Those who had 
such  lands  and paid  for  them  their actual  value,  lost  their 
money.  A man, for instance, who possessed  400 jugcrs,  and 
bought 400 in addition  with ready money,  lost the value  of 
300  jugers.  What should have been done in such a case?  The 
state ought undoubtedly to have paid a moderate price for such 
lands, and then no one could have objected.  And, indeed, this 
plan would  not have involved any difficulties, for the numbcr 
of  those who possessed  more  than  1000 jugers  cannot,  after 
all, have been  so  very  great,  and  certainly  the vast  public 
treasures could not have been  applied  in a better way.  Five 
hundred jugers form a considerable estate  (as much as seventy 
rubbii at prcsent), and are even now  consiclcred in Italy a  re- 
spectable property  (I myself  would  not wish to have a larger 
one);  in a fertile district, a person may derive from it a net in- 
come of  5,000 crowns, if it is well cultivated by a good tenant. 
Thc sentina rei publicae, or  the poor -  who  werc a burden  to 
the statc and a disgrace to the Roman people, for as they could 
not be excluded from the comitia, they sold their votcs-might 
thus have been removed from thc city, and made honest citizens, 
and in this manner the  object of  Gracchus  would  have  becn 
fully and complctely attaincd.  It is ever to be lamented that 
Gracchus did not adopt this course, which was absolutely neces- 
sary, whatever it might have cost the republic.  Even this plan 
would undoubtedly have  called forth vehement  opposition  on 
the part of the wealthy aristocrats, but certainly not that bitter 
cxasperation  which  Gracchus had to encounter, and to which 
lie fell a victim.  There were  many  who  felt how dangerous 
l6  Thus I emend the pasqagc  in  Livy, Epit. 53.-N.  Comp. Aurel. Victor, 
De  Pir.  illustr 64;  Appian, De  Bell. Civzl. i. 9; Hist. of  Rome,  vol. ii. p.  133, 
note 272. 
was the disease under which Rome was labouring;  but most of 
tlleln considered  its condition  perfectly hopeless, and thought 
tllat it was impossible to interfere without calling forth a host 
of other evils. 
Tib. Grnccllus  did  not  stop  short  here:  he is said to have 
an extension of  the Roman franchise17;  but the 
accounts we have of this, as of all the other parts of the under- 
tal<ing of  Gracchus, are so  obscure  and incomplete, that we 
cannot take this for certain.  From his  actions, we clearly see 
that 11c  was aware of the fact, that the middle class of  citizens 
had vanished almost entirely, and that in order to restore that 
class, it was  necessary  to grant to the Italian allies  the full 
rights  of  citizenship.  A  wise plan!  This rcgencration was 
quite in the spirit of the ancient laws : it aiined at reviving and 
extending the higher classes, just  as  of  old  the Licinian laws 
had given to the republic which was shrinking into an oligar- 
chy, a new life, and commenced  the second brilliant period in 
the history of  Rome.  There were in Italy thirty Latin  colo- 
nies containing many citizens of great respectability, who could 
vote in the tribes of  the Roman assemblies, and felt that their 
station  was very nearly  equal to that of  the Romans.  These 
Latins wcre  in the position in which  the plebeians had been 
about two hundred and fifty years before;  nay, there existed in 
those towns much more intellcctual culture than at Rome.  It 
was  the  objcct  of  Tib. Gracchus  to admit  these  to the full 
Roman franchise, and there can  be  no  doubt that he also in- 
tcndcd  to  give the suffragium to any municipia  sine suffragio 
which may yet have existed. 
The party of  Gracchus contained many of  the most distin- 
guished men, who were certainly as great losers  by his law as 
the Scipios; but they wcre nevcrthelcss ready  to support the 
noble  cause.  Even  Appius  Claudius, his  father-in-law, who 
in most points shared the pride of his family, but in this respect 
resembled  App.  Claudius  the  Blind  in  his  best  moments; 
1'.  Mucius Scaevolal8,  the  great jurist, whowas consul that year's; 
P-Licinius  Crassus,the father-in-law of Caius Gracchus,and otllers, 
saw the necessity, and encouraged Tib. Gracchus, although they 
l7  Vellei. Patere. ii. 2. 
''  Plutarch, Tib. Gacch.  8  and 9; Cicero, Academe  i, 5. 
I9  Both the consuls of that year were plebeians, which shews tho abqurdity o 
French and Italian historians who speak of  a struggle between patricians and 
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unquestionably  occupied as much of  the public domain as  the 
opponents of  Gracchus.  It  is difficult to describe the exasper- 
ation of the opposition party",  who violated even  the laws  of 
public decency; for men of  distiilction  and chalnpions of  the 
oligarchs no sooner perceived that their interests were attacked, 
than they displayed  all the greediness  and avarice which  we 
usually  see only in persons without any education:  they had 
recourse to excesses such as  are generally comnlitted  only by 
the lowest of the rabble. It is one of the most revolting sights, 
when  such  men  are  guilty  of  conduct by which  they place 
themselves  entirely  on  a level with the ~opulace- and such 
was the conduct of those oligarchs.  No one had hitherto shewn 
any disregard to  Gracchus  or  his Gamily;  he was the noblest 
among  the  young  men  of  his time, and enjoyed  among  his 
countrymen the same degree of respect as among the barbarians. 
Every one acknowledged his virtues, and even those who had 
none themselves could not deny that he possessed virtues, or as 
they may have called them-follies.  But all this was forgotten 
by his antagonists: they spoke of him asa rioter and a mutineer, 
who was actuated by the most abominable motives; and a coali- 
tion was formed  against  him.  P. Cornelius  Scipio Nasica,- 
the grandson of him whom, in the Hannibalian war, the senate 
had  called  the  best  of the  Romans,  and  the  son  of  Scipio 
Nasica, who  had likewise  been  called a  pattern of a Roman, 
and had  zealously  exerted himself to preserve  the  manners 
of the olden times,  who  himself also  was considered to be an 
honest  man  of  the  best  kind, and  in  many  respects  may 
have deserved that title,-now  conspired  with the infamous 
Q. Pompeius.  But still we cannot conclude from this fact that 
he was  a  thorough miscreant:  he was  only a man who had 
become hardened and intractable in his oligarchical pretension*, 
who saw  his enemy in the light in which his interest placed 
him, who  hated  him, and  wished  to  hate him  with justice. 
The senate no longer had the power which the patricians  had 
formerly possessed against the plebeians;  it did not posscss the 
ancient veto of  the  curiae;  for, according  to  the  Hortensian 
law, the bill of  Gracchus  did not  require the sanction of  the 
senate, but  as  soon  as  the tribes  had passed it, its execution 
The whole opposition was confined to the senate, for the tribunes, with tllc 
exception of  M. Octaviue, and  the assembly  of the people, supported Gracchus-N. 
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could  follotv immediately.  By a  most strange anomaly, the 
tribunes could now be checked  only by one another, the veto 
not existing where it  was  most  necessary;  the only means of 
crushing a bill was the tribunician intercessio.  All, therefore, 
that  the opponents  of  Gracchus  could  do  was  to  incite his 
colleague, M.  Octavius, against him. 
In solne  Roman  families  we  find  certain sentiments, and 
opinions hereditary; and such  opinions  are  more  than  mere 
political  maxims.  This is the case in all free  countries, and 
is one of  the talismans by which  republican  constitutions  are 
preserved.  A  person  born  in  a  certain  family,  finds  his 
political  line  of  conduct,  as  it were,  chalked  out for  him. 
Thus in  England, every one  knows  to a  certainty  to  what 
party a  Russell belongs, just  as the church in which  we  are 
born prescribes to us the views we have to adopt.  There are 
also  certain  family characters, and all the Gracchi are distin- 
guished  for their mildness,  their  unaffected  and sincere love 
of  the  oppressed,  a  feature  which  we  can  trace  through 
three  generations:  we  first  find  it  in  the  Gracchus  who 
was  contemporary  with  the  second  Punic  war,  then  in 
Gracchus, the censor, who married  the  daughter of  the great 
Scipio, and lastly in his  two unfortunate  sons.  To dwell on 
such  characters as  these  is  the  more delightful,  as  they  are 
seldom  met with  in  Roman  history:  in our  own  days  they 
seem to be quite extinct. 
LECTURE LXXVIII. 
As there was no other way of preventing the agrarian bill  of 
Tib.  Gracchus  being  carried,  than  by inducing  one  of  the 
college of  tribunes  to  interpose  his  veto,  the antagonists  of 
Gracchus contrived to gain M. Octavius for  that  purpose.  If 
the notion,  that  the tribunes  originally  belonged  to a class 
of  Romans  different from the ruling party, is utterly ground- 
less, it is  still more  so in regard  to the  times  of  which  we 
are now  speaking; nay, we  may  say, without  any hesitation, 
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by  such men  as  belonged  to  consular  families, and  that  a 
plebeian  very seldom obtained the  consulsl~ip  without  having 
previously been  a  tribune.  Thus the tribunes  were  just  as 
much  persons of distinction, as  those who were invested  wit11 
the highest magistracies;  and it  was by no means  an extra- 
ordinary case that a man like Gracchus was among the tribunes. 
All  novi  hornines  passed  through  the  tribuneship, and  any 
plebeian, who had the opportunity of being raised to this office, 
was  assuredly very glad to obtain it. M. Octavius belonged to a 
distinguished family, though perhaps not one of the first; as he 
would himself have been a great loser by the law of his colleague, 
the opponents  of  Gracchus  prevailed  upon  him  to put  his 
veto upon the bill.  We  cannot say anything against Octavius 
personally;  he had  previously been a friend of  Gracchus, but 
now gave way to party spirit.  Gracchus offered to make good 
his  loss  out  of  his  own  property.  But Octavius  could not 
accept  this offer  without  lowering  himself.  Gracchus  then 
entreated and besought  him  to  give  up his  opposition,  but 
in vain.  Octavius was  bound by  his  word  and  obliged  to 
act  in  the  spirit  of  his  faction,-the  worst  thing  that  a 
man  can  do  in  a  party  struggle.  The  question  now was 
whether  Gracclzus  should  drop  his  bill  which  was  calcula- 
ted to save  the nation, but  was opposed by vice and avaricc, 
merely because  a  man who had been  his  friend had sold his 
vote  to  a  bad  faction? or  should  he  venture  upon  a  step, 
which  though  contrary  to the letter, was  yet in the  spirit 
of  the constitution?  He decided  upon the latter course, and 
intimated  to Octavius that unless ha yielded, he himself would 
be obliged to proceed to extremes, and to propose to the people 
to deprive him of his office.  This was indeed an irregularity, 
but Gracchus might have  said  in his own defence, that a tri- 
bune who was independent  of  the people was an abuse, and a 
still  greater  irregularity.  Consuls  had  been  deposed  more 
than  once;  the  people  had surely  the  right  to  take  away 
a commission from a man to whom they  had  @ven it; and it 
is an absurdity, if, in a republic,  this right  is  not maintained. 
The tribunes had only the commission  to bring  proposals be- 
fore the people,  and surely a person who has rcceived a com- 
mission may also be deprived of it.  Graccl~us  was therefore in 
reality right, but as far as the forms were concerned, he over- 
turned the constitution.  Yet it was a  case,  as  he might have 
said7 in  necessity  broke through all laws; and in order 
to act as far  as possible  with  perfect justice,  he offered  that 
his own deposition  should be  put to the  vote first.  As  Oc- 
tnvius persisted in his refusal, Gracchus, who saw that his object 
could not be attained in any other way, proceeded to carry his 
threat into effect.  When seventeen tribes had already accepted 
tile proposal7 Graccl~us  again entreated Octavius either to desist 
from his opposition  or to give up his  office; but as  Octavius 
still  the eighteenth  tribe voted,  and his  tribune- 
ship  was gone.  Octavius wishing to produce  a  disturbance, 
did not  leave  the  rostra,  until  Gracchus ordered  him  to be 
dragged away by force, an act which made upon the spectators, 
the  odious  impression  which  the senate and  rulers  desired. 
Gracchus had thus been  driven by his  opponents to an act of 
formal injustice, and those  who  had no feeling  of  right and 
wrong triumphed over him,  as if he had really  violated  the 
laws of the constitution. 
Thc agrarian law was  now  carried without  opposition, and 
a permanent triumvirate  was  appointed,  to see that the law 
was fairly carried into effect; it consisted of Tib. Gracchus, his 
brother  Caius,  and Appius  Claudius.  From the "  Somnium 
Scipionis"  we  see  that the socii  and Latini joined P. Scipio, 
nay there are many statements which provc that they, like the 
senate,  opposed  the agrarian law.  We can  understand their 
reason  for  so  doing  only  by  combination;  there are various 
ways of  accounting for it, one of  which is  certainly the true 
one.  Laws, unless  it was expressly stated  otherwise, did not 
affect the allies;  this we know particularly in the case of  the 
laws concerning usury.  Now it is  possible that the Licinian 
law had  made  no mention of  the socii and Latini, and that, 
therefore, they, if they had  the right of possessio, were  not 
limited  to the measure of  500 jugera.  Wealthy persons  may 
have acquired  latifundia  in distant  parts by purchasing lands 
from  the earlier  Roman  possessors;  and  such  persons  would 
now have been disturbed by the Sempronian law.  This much 
is  certain,  that  some  share  in  the  ager publicus  had  been 
granted to the socii and Latini; the Campanians, e.g. possessed 
an extensive ager publicus, which they can have obtained only 
as allies; and the Marsians had a share in the Apulian pasture 
lands-  It is  not probable indeed that Gracchus should  have 
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deny it.  It is more likely, that, for the present  many places 
were  left  in  possession  of  their  ager  on  condition  of  their 
paying  the legal  amount  of  rent,  but without  the Roman 
people restoring to them on that account their property taken 
from them in war.  If the latter was now taken from them, it 
was indeed hard for them.  That they received compensation, 
we  know positively, from  the case  of  Carthage.  The allies, 
thus, had  the same  interests as  the wealthy  Romans.  But 
however this may have been, the allies felt hurt, and this afford- 
ed to the rulers a fair pretext, behind which they concealed their 
avarice, for saying that they were defending the rights of  the 
Roman subjects; pretending  that they were obliged to protect 
the subjects irrespective of their own interests.  This hypocrisy 
deceived even a clear-headed inan like Cicero, who is in a sin- 
gular perplexity about this and similar relations:  in his heart, 
he sides with the Gracchi, but through his  acquired  opinion, 
he decides  against  them, though with evident embarrassment. 
He is excused by the circumstances under which he wrote the 
books "  De Re Publica" and "  De Legibus."  The opposition 
of the Latins caused great difficulties to Gracchus, for by com- 
bining with the allies, the optimates were enabled to take their 
stand  against  the popular party.  Thus the oligarchy  gained 
its victory through the support  of  the allies  whom  it after- 
wards most disgracefully sacrificed, almost in the same manner 
as the Irish Roman Catholics were sacrificed at the time of the 
Union with England. 
At this time, as early as the beginning of  the year, Attalus 
died;  the  constitution  of  the  province  of  Asia  fbrms  an 
episode  in the tribuneship  of  Gracchus,  in which  he again 
showed  himself  as a  profound  statesman, and acquired  great 
reputation.  In  the  bequest of Attalus, there were vast treasures, 
as is always the case with eastern princes, who, however much 
tliey may squander, always amass more.  These treasures were 
brought  to Rome, and Gracchus is  often  blamed  for  having 
proposed  that  tliey  should  be  divided  among  the  Roman 
people.  But there was  no  wrong in this.  As in.  the small 
cantons of  Switzerland, every Roman  citizen  was  a  member 
of  the sovereign  body;  the aerarium was ever increasing, the 
tributes yielding such an immense surplus of revenue, that the 
citizens  had  already been  exempted  from  paying  any direct 
taxes.  Now as the great majority of  citizens had sunk into 
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the deepest  the distribution mas quite justifiable, espe- 
cially as lands were to be assigned to them, and they required 
money to purchase the necessary iinplcments.  The triumvirs 
for  tile distribution  of  thc ager  had  first  to  ascertain  which 
lands belonged  to the republic, and which to private persons, 
for inany had been sold, and many in the midst of a conquered 
country, had  been  left to their former  so that the 
drawing up of  an  inventory was  extremely  difficult.  The 
Roma:,s  had  such  registers  as  we  have,  registers  of  landed 
property,  for  the purpose  of  fixing the amount of  taxation; 
but  they were neglected, because  Rome was  the ollly  seat of 
government, and there was scarcely any sub-delegation. 
The time was now approaching when  tho tribunes for  the 
next  year  were  to be  elected.  The tribunes  entered  upon 
their office on the ninth of December, but for a long time past 
-we  do  not know when  this custoni  began-the  elections 
had taken place very early in the year, at the co~nmencement 
of  July,  or  at the end of  June, the harvest  time  in Italy. 
The tribunes at that time  always  appeared in the senate, and 
took  part in the discussions;  and as  Tib. Gracchus was there 
treated with the most vulgar and unbridled fury, it must have 
been evident to him, that if he should one day be without his 
sacred magistracy, he would  be the victim of  his  opponents. 
He would,  after  the  expiration  of his  tribunesliip,  still have 
been  triumvir  agrorum  dividendorum, but he would  not  have 
been iiiviolable.  He therefore  offered himself, in accordance 
with the law, as a  candidate for  the tribuneship for the year 
following.  This was the more  agreeable to his  enemies, as it 
was  contrary to the existing custom.  The custom may have 
arisen out of the mcrc circumstance that, for a long period, no 
tribune  had  held his  office  for  two successive years;  but  in 
early times  the re-election  of  the same  man is by no means 
uncommon.  When  the tribe which had the praerogativa had 
elected him, and the second had given its vote the same my, 
the  opposition  party  declared  the  votes  to be  illegal, 
~emandccl  of  the tribunes  to  stop the election.  Q.  Rubrius, 
the colleague of  Gracchus, who presided  at the election, Ilcsi- 
tated, not knowing what to do ; and Mummius, the succeseor of 
Octmius, orered to take the place  of the president, while the 
other tribunes demanded that the preriCJency  be decided 
lot.  These disp~ltes  occupied the whole dry, ~vhicli  passed 
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away witllout  anything being  decided.1  In the earliest times 
the plebes assembled in the Forum, but as early as the time of 
the Hannibalinn war, they always voted in the area iu front of 
the Capitoline  temple.  I have hitherto  been  unable to dis- 
cover when this change was introduced.  The votes, moreover, 
seem to have been given at this time viva voce,  while formerly 
they had been given by means of tablets, a ~ractice  which was 
afterwards  only restored  by the  lex  Cassin,  which  therefore 
cannot be regarded as an innovation, as is usually done.  Pro- 
fessor  Wunder has  clearly  shown this.  Let no  one believe 
that it  is  possible  to esteem  Cicero  more than I do; but I 
must  nevertheless  confess,  that he  has  occasioned  this  and 
other errors respecting the constitution. 
Thc events  which  occurred  on  that  day  convinced  Tib. 
Gracchus  that  his  life  was  in danger,  and  he went  about 
among  the  people,  like  an  accused  criminal, with  his  only 
son,  begging  them  to  protcct  his  and  the child's  life.  It 
was  his  misfortune  that the elcction  took  place  at this sea- 
son  of  the year,  for  the country people,  who,  at any other 
time  would  have  flocked  to  Rome  by  thousands  to  sup- 
port and protect  him,  were  now  detained  by their  labours 
in the fields.  The populatiol~  of  the city was  not only indif- 
ferent towards Gracchus, a  great number of  them  havino  ? no 
interest whatever in the affair, but was under the most decided 
influence of  the optimates.  In this  instance too we sce how 
the constitution had  become different from what it had  been 
in former times, though not a single iota of  the laws had beell 
altered.  when  the territory of  Rome did not extend farther 
than about fifty or  sixty miles  from the city, every one could 
come to Rome on extraordinary occasions, and the rustic tribes 
could  be rcally represented  by the Romani rustici;  but after 
the assignments  made  by C. Flaminius  some  country-people 
lived at a  great distance,  as  far as  the Romagna,  and it was 
iinpossible for them to come to the city to attend the asscmblics. 
The constitution which had  been originally framed for a city, 
thus became perverse and injurious. 
The election  was  to be continued  the next day,  and  the 
people  assembled  with a  prescntiment  that  blood  would  be 
shed.  Tib. Gracchus himself was scarcely armed.  The senate 
was  assembled  in  the  temple  of  Fides.  When the people 
I  Appian, De  Bell. Czuzl. i.  14. 
Tvcre asselnbled a tumult broke out, and the uproar became so 
violcllt  that several benches were broken.  The senate which 
was in the neigl~bourh~~d,  on hearing of the con~motion  among 
the people,  declared  it  seditious,  and  Scipio  Nasica  called 
upon tl~e  consul Mucius Scaevola to employ force.  The latter 
appears in a  doubtful light.  According  to most accounts he 
seems to have been  favourable to Gracchus, but according to 
others he opposed him; if we suppose  that he was a  man  of 
a weak  character, who feared  his  faction, we may account for 
the contradiction.  Nasica saw that a bold stroke would decide 
thc matter, and accordingly called upon the senators to follow 
him; and on stepping out of the temple, all declared Gracchus 
guilty  of  high  treason.  The people  withdrew  before  these 
illustrious men, and the senators took  of every thing 
that  could  be  used  as  weapons.  There seem  to have  been 
scaffoldings all round the arca  (it is still customary in Italy to 
put up benches whcrever there is  anything to be seen),  some 
of  which  broke  down.  A  lie  had  been  spread abroad,  that 
Tib. Gracchus had  appeared with the diadem, to get himself 
proclaimed  king.  No  one  surely believed  in this  impudent 
calumny,  except  perhaps  a  few  foolish  senators,  and  those 
whose  interest it was  to assert  it."oine  of the people, who 
had no leader, and no clear notion  of  what they wanted, dis- 
persed.  The senators took the pieces of  the broken seats, and 
attacked the few unarmed men who still surrounded Tiberius, 
and who  did  not  venture  to  raise  their  hands  agsinst  the 
senators.  Tiberius fled  down  the centum gradus towards  the 
Velabrum.  There he slipped, and a common man, or one of the 
senators,  or of the colleagues of  Gracchus-for  many claiined 
the honour--was  the first who struck him on the head with a 
piece  of  wood,  and as he fell down stunned, the murder was 
completed.  A number  of his  followers shared the same fate, 
and their corpses were thrown into the Tiber.  The body of 
the great Gracchus himself  was washed ashore, and left  to rot 
in the fields.  He was not yet full thirty years  old  when  he 
died.  Many  more  were  taken  prisoners  as  his  accomp1icrs. 
The real  persecutions,  however,  were carried  on in the gear 
following,  by the consul,  P. Popillius  Laenas, in  a  manner 
of  the Illquisition,  or  of  an Allla.  Thousands were 
consigned to prison  with or without a judicial verdict, though 
Plutarch, Tlb. Gvacch. 19. 
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this Popillius was descended  from a  man mho, in the time of 
I,icinius, had been  one of the greatest champions  of liberty.J 
The cruelties of this monster may be read in Plutarch's life of 
Tib. Gracchus.  One man was killed by being  thrown into a 
vessel containing  snakes.  It is  sad to find that even  Cicero 
considers this Laenas an honourable man.  There is one anec- 
dote which I cannot leave unnoticed,  and which refers  to an 
cvent that must have takcn place  either then, or a few years 
before  the consulship  of  Popillius  Laenas,  when  the friends 
of  Gracchus were summoned  before an inquisitorial  tribunal. 
The most intimate friends  of  Tib. Gracchus were not warriors 
or  statesmen,  but  Greeks  of  cultivated  minds,  such  as  Dio- 
phanes  of  MityIene  and Blossius  of  Cuma.  The latter  was 
a  Greek  for  although the inhabitants  of  Cuma 
spoke  the Oscan  language,  yet they were  in reality GrecBs. 
When he was  summoned by the lictors  to appear before  the 
tribunal of the consuls, and was questioned  about the connec- 
tion between  himself  and Gracchus,  he openly  avowed that 
he was his intimate friend, and  on  being  asked  whether he 
had  always  obeyed  his  commands,  Blossius answered  in the 
affirmative, adding that Gracchus had never dcsircd  anything 
that was bad.  At length he was asked, what he would  have 
done  if  Gracchus  had ordercd  him  to set fire to the Capitol. 
Blossius replied : "  Gracchus would never  have  given  such  a 
command; but  if  he  had  I should  have obeyed  it, for  I all1 
convinced that it would have been for the good of the peoplc." 
This answer of Blossius has been  censured, but the  fault  was 
theirs who put such a  captious question to him.  He saw  in 
Gracchus  his  own  exalted  self; and the word  he spoke, does 
not  disgrace  him,  but  those  who  wrenched  it  from  him. 
Blossius  escapcd, but afterwards niade away wit11 himself, that 
he might not fall into the hands of thc tyrants.  The persecu- 
tions of  Popillius  Laenas cannot be characterised in any other 
way than by saying, that they were the most horrible murders: 
all whom he put to death were pure and innocent victims. 
It is remarkable that, notwithstanding their victory, the rul- 
ing party did not abolish the triumvirate.  In  thc place of Tib. 
Gracchus, M.  Fulvius Flaccus was elected;  but thc activity of 
the triumvirs was limited and nothing was done, for those who 
were called upon to produce the title deeds to their possessions, 
See vol. lii. p. 46, foll.  Plutarch, Tzb. Gracch. c. 20. 
eitller  did  not  appear, or  did not givc in thcir  declarations. 
~~t  wllea  the first fury  had  passed  away, and the oligarchs 
saw that tlley were  playing  a  dangerous  game,  they  allowed 
the laws  of  Gracchus to stand,  and for  the sake  of  appear- 
ances,  they  appointed  the  consul  Tuditanus,  to  settle  the 
disputed  points.  But he, instead of deciding anything, led an 
army into thc field, and the matter  was  deferred.  Whether 
anything  was  actually  done,  cannot  be  decided.  When 
Appius Claudius died, C. Papirius Carbo, a disciple of Gracchus, 
but, as  usually  happens  in  such circumstances, an unworthy 
one, was appointed in his stead.  Carbo followcd the footsteps 
of Gracchus, but with evil intentions.  This is  the misfortune 
of revolutions : the course  of  evcnts  carries  away  the  good 
will1 the bad, if  they take a  part in them.  A man  of  great 
distinction who had lived through all thc terrors of the French 
revolution, but had kept his hands clcan, once said to me: "  You 
do not know what a  recollection  it is  to have  livcd  during a 
revolution:  one begins the attack  with  the  best, and  in  the 
end one  finds  oneself  among  knaves."  Such  times  as  thc 
rench revolution are no longer  to  be  feared, and  centuries 
may pass before a revolution breaks  out in Europe."ut  in 
such times, it cannot be said impressively enough, that circum- 
stances are often such  as to  draw the most  innocent  persons 
into  the  current, without  their  being  aware  of  there being 
anything dangerous in  it.  Circumstances  are  often  so  fear- 
fully  complicatcd, that  only  those  who, with  an  iron deter- 
mination, rcgard nothing and fear nothing, are  able to  stand 
and see their way.  In this manner honest tnen  may continuc 
to be  the  supporters of  a  government, which, without  thcir 
knowing it, has already passed into the 'hands of knaves.  We 
have now come  to that period  of  Roman  history,  when  the 
explanation of  the mere forms of the constitution is no longer 
sufficient,  but when the men thcrnseIvcs must bc considered tach 
byhimsclf, each bcing a separate psychological  problem.  ne 
spectacle which is presented to our eyes is that of men engaged 
Thi~  fcelirlg of security and the firm conviction of  Niebuhr,  that no statc of 
Europe had to fear :t revolutiol~  are expressed in several of  his letters publisl~ed 
in the Lebensnachrzchten.  Hence his extraordinary surprise at tl~e  outbrcalr of 
the French revolution of July 1830.  The  writer of thcso lines very well rccollcctr 
the (lay when thc news of it rcached Bonn.  Niebuhr, wlro had  read  them  just 
before  entcrilig the lecture room, spoke during  the whole  11ol1r  about  nothing 
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in coinbat with one another for the spoils of  the dead body of 
the state.  Papirius Carbo was  a  man  of  great  talent, a  cir- 
cumstance which often  deceives  us;  but we  must  remember 
that a man may even be benevolent and  affectionate, and may 
yet be in the powcr of  the evil spirit.  I have linown persons 
who were all that is amiable  and good, in times of  peace, but 
who, under the influence of the demon of war, committed acts 
of  which  everybody  would  have  thought  them  incapable. 
Carbo was a man of  that character, so that the  report of  his 
having murdered Scipio is  not  at all  incredible, although  it 
may be false.  Scipio may have died  a natural  death, for it is 
not unfrequent in southern countries that  persons  are said  to 
have been poisoned, who are in reality carried offcluite naturally 
by a sudden  death, in an attack  of  putrid  fever.  But Scipio 
may  yet  have  been  murdered, for  he had  exasperated  the 
people  in  the highest  degree  by conduct  of  which  no one 
can approve. 
Scipio was besieging Numantia when he  received the news 
of the murder of his brother-in-law, and expressed his approval 
of  it.  When he rcturned  to  Rome, Carbo  called upon him 
openly to express his opinion as to the justice of  the  death  of 
Gracchus.  Scipio 'gave an evasive answer, saying that  it was 
just,  if  Gracchus  actually intended  to  make  lii~nself  king. 
This accusation was  scnseless, and  Scipio  drew  upon  himself 
general indignation.  The oligarchs themselves were divided; 
those who had taken a  part in the murder of  Gracchus, were 
not on that account all friends of Scipio, but all stood in need 
of him ;  and it was flattering to  his vanity to look  upon  him- 
self as t,he protector of  the  Latins  and allies.  The death  of 
Tiberius had by no means dccided the question; it  continued 
to be agitated with undiminished vehemence.  Scipio intended 
to spealr in the assembly against the carrying into effect of the 
Sempronian law, which was  never  abolished, as  we  see  both 
from  the original tables of  the lex  Thoria  (A. U. 640-650), 
and from the few fragments of  a later agrarian  law.  On  thc 
evening before the day on which he was to address the people, 
Scipio retired at an  early hour to meditate  upon  his  speech, 
but  in the  morning  he  was  found  dead  in his  bed.  This 
sudden death  excited  a  suspicion  of  murder; but  strange to 
say, noA  investigation was instituted, although the ruling  party 
must have had an interest in the inquiry.  But it was perhaps 
feared lest tile result of  it might implicate  that  vcry party9 
g. Q. pompeius or Metcllns.  Some  even went  so far as  to 
accuse  Scipio7s wife,  Semnpronia,  the sister  of  Gracchus,  of 
having poisoned her hodand.  But all  accounts  we against 
the suspicion that he  was  His body was carried on an 
open bier, and  Inarks of  poison ~vould  have been  seen;  if  he 
diet1 an unnatural death, he must have been strangled- 
The  period  from  the death  of  Tib. Graccl~us,  to the  first 
tribuneship of' C. Sempronius  Gracchus, is marked  by several 
attempts of  both parties; for the question about the new distri- 
bution of lands could no longer be suppressed.  Unfortunately 
the particulars  are not recorded.  It is  a  great  pity that the 
sixth dccad  of  Livy is lost.  We know that  even a  tribune, 
M. Junius Pennus, made an enactmcllt quite in the spirit of the 
oligarchy that the civic  franchise  should  not  be  given to the 
Italian allics, but that they inight retain their lnnds.7 AS  how- 
ever a wish  for  the franchisc had once arisen among them,  it 
could no longer be  refused.  In many towns ol the Marsians, 
Samnites, and other nations of Italy, there were largc, wealthy, 
and very illustrious families, whose morals were uncorrupted, or 
at all events  superior  to t,hose of  the  Romans,  and who, on 
their incorporation with  Romc,  would  very  soon have  been 
superior to the  Roman  nobles:  and yct they wcre  excluded 
from the franchise, and not even tolerated in the city.  A dis- 
content spread among the allies, like that which we have seen 
produced  in  Ireland on  the Catholic  cmancipation  question. 
When they saw  themselves  deceived  in every  way, they en- 
tered into a conspiracy, which however is buried in obscurity. 
Even in the tribuneship of Tib. Gracclius, the suhjcct had bccn 
discussed  whetl~cr  the franchise  should  not be  givcn  to thc 
Latins, that is, to those Latin  colonies which had not rcceived 
it in 41T8, cs1~ccially  Tibur and Praeneste, and perhaps also to 
the l3crnican towns, but more cspceially to the colonies.  These 
colollies consisted of Roman citizens  and Italians of  every de- 
scription, who livcd accorcling to the  Latin law,  and had tile 
first claim  to the lxoman  franchise.  Tib. Gracchus is indeed 
said to haye thonglit of  proposing a law to satisfy their wis]les, 
In P1utarch C. Gracch. 10, however,  we read-$v(orvaav  y&p  ao~~o: 
KalrrariAvoav r%v  KP~ULV  6akp 705 rahv @oF~O[~~~~,  p+,  llsPlnET+,s  r$  air:B 
$'dvou  hrov~;vov  .Y;v~?T~L,  which can hardly be referreti to C.  Gmcchns. 
Cicero, De  Oflciis, iii.  I1  ;  compare  Appian, De  Bell. Civil.  i,  21. 
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but he probably deferred  or  never  carried out this intention. 
They then supported the senate against him, and now demanded 
the rights of  Roman citizens as their reward.  We have  un- 
fortunately merely a few traces of  the particular  circumstances 
of  that time, and can hardly conceive how Fregellae, the most 
flourishing of  the colonies could be so mad as to think of com- 
pelling  tlle  Romans  by force to grant its  request.  We  find 
Fregellae in arms, but the other  Latin towns took no part in 
the struggle, the colonies being scattered all  over the country. 
The real Italian allies, who stood one degree lower, may have 
been malicious enough to rejoice at the inconsiderate  conduct 
of Fregellae, for they did not always like to see the Latins ac- 
quiring such privileges, and the nature of  their demands  was 
quite  different.  Fregellae,  which  thus  stood  alone,  was 
besieged,  taken  and  destroyed  by  the praetor  L.  Opinlius, 
so  that not  a  trace  of  it is  left,  and heavy  vengeance  was 
taken  on  its inhabitants.9 
LECTURE  LXXIX. 
IT  is a well attested fact, that in point of talent Tiberius Gracchus 
was excelled by his brother Caius, who was essentially different 
from him.  The  comparison  in Plutarch  between  Agis  and 
Clcomenes  and  the  two brothers  is  very happy.  We have, 
properly speaking, no specimen of the oratory of  Tiberius; but 
of the speeches  of  Caius  there  are  extant  several  fragments, 
which perfectly justify the praise bestowed on them by Cicerol, 
who could not be mistaken on this ~oint,  and who declares that 
he was the first who, in an old literature, appeared with a new 
language;  just  as  in French  literature,  Corneille  forms  the 
transition  from  the old  fashioned  to the classical style.  But 
still the language of C. Gracchus was no doubt much more old- 
fashioned than that of  Cicero, or that of Sisenna; it bore how- 
ever the character of  a more modern age, being free  from the 
stiffness and harshness  of  the  earlier  languagc.  He was  the 
Livy, Epzt. 60; Plutarch,  C. Gracch. 3;  Vell. Paterc. ii. 6; Aurel.  Vict. 
De  Vir. illustr. 64; Asconius, ad Pison. p.  17, eil. Orelli. 
' Brutus. 32. 
first cultivated,  and elegant writer among the Romans. 
scipio and Laclius were still surprisingly rough and harsh, and 
Tiberius  even more  so than Cato, as we now see from 
a l1itllerto unl<llown  fragment2 of a  speech  of  Laelius,  in an 
ullpublislled  commentary on Cicero, discovered  by &hi.  It is 
furtller probable that Caius was more of  a  statesman  than  his 
brotllcr; at any rate he displayed his talents more, the cause of 
wllicll may have been the circumstance that his public activity 
lasted lollger;  for while the career of Tiberius  did  not  extend 
beyond  a period of  seven months, Caius took an active part in 
public asairs for two years previously to his tribulzeship, during 
the two years of his tribuneship, and also for  six months  after 
it.  'rhe  statement  that Caius  owed  his education  and  the 
development of his individuality chiefly to his excellent mother 
dcscrvcs full credit.3  In the filial  relation  of  the  Gracchi  to 
their mother, we see anothcr  trace  of  the  humanity  of  their 
family;  for this filial attachment  is a trait  rarely to be  found 
among the Romans of this, or of  any other period of  their his- 
tory.  Amiable domestic relations  are  extrcinely rare  among 
the Romans,  though we  have a few instances  of  them  in the 
case  of  Horace  and his  father,  and  in that  of  Tacitus and 
Agricola, although Tacitus was unhappy in his own family. 
Caius was drivcn by a  sort offatality into a path where cer- 
tain destruction awaited him.  Broken-hearted and deprived of 
all hope by the death of his brother,  he was  anxious  to keep 
aloof from the high offices  of state; he was, it is true, triumvir, 
but this could not  be  avoided,  and he wished  to act merely 
whcrc he could do so without shaking  or  upsetting the  actual 
state of things; but an inner voice did not allow him to follow 
his own inclination, although he plainly saw destruction before 
him.  The eyes of  his  own  countrymen,  as  well  as  those  of 
foreigners, were  fixed upon  him  from  an  early  period.  IIe 
had served  for  twelve  years,  and  his unassuming  behaviour 
when he was quaestor in Sardinia,  and various  actions wllicll 
were allytlling but  calculated to produce this effect, attracted 
the attention of the people  towards him: for  the young  man 
who  shewed  most  perfect  disinterestedness, was a silent 
reproach and an object of hatred to all.  As the soldiers  were 
That commentary is  now  printed  in Auctores  Classici e  Vaticanis  Corld. 
editi, rura. A. Mai, vol ii. Rome, 1828.  (Scholia Bobiens. in Cic. Mzlon. c.  7,  in 
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deficient in warm clothing, and the senate, from avarice, refu- 
sed to give the necessary molley,  Caius  did  not  rest until  he 
had  collected  in the  province  and elsewhere,  the means  of 
furnishing the men withwarln cloaks.  He also induced Micipsa, 
king of Nurnidia, to send over a cargo of corn.  All this excited 
jealousy and hatred; and the Senate endeavoured  to keep him 
in Sardinia, the climate of which was even then so unheulthy, 
that hopes were erltertained that he would  Gall  a victim  to  it. 
According  to law, he was not obligcd to remain  there longer 
than one year; but the senate endeavoured to put off his election 
to the tribuneship, just as Charles I. rcfuscd to convoke parlia- 
ment.  But in these and similar  cascs,  those  who are  in the 
possession of power only render things worse  by their attempts 
to check the course of events.  C. Gracchus, who had been three 
years in Sardinia, returned to Rome without  asking  for  leave 
of absence.  When he was  brought to trial  ibr  this  step,  he 
was acquitted, as it was too manifest that it was only by intrigues 
that he had been kept at a distance.  FIis defence of  his  con- 
duct made such an impression, that not only the tribunes took 
him under their protection,  but hc was elected tribune for the 
following year,  and that  too  under more favoura.ble auspices 
than his brother;  for among the extensions of  the tribunician 
power, which a guilty conscience  had  induced  the senate  to 
sanction after the death  of  Tiberius, a plcbiscitum  had  been 
passed,  enabling  a  tribune  who  wished to carry a bill, to be 
re-elected  for  a  second year.  In the year  629,  C. Gracchus 
entered upon his tribuneship.  I-Ie  was  honest  and pure  like 
Tibcrius; but passionate, superior to him in power,  and more 
definitely  coizscious  of  what  he wanted.  In rcgard  to  the 
possession of the ager publicus, he had  indeed,  in the first  in- 
stance, only to carry into effect the law of  his brother, but he 
contemplated much more extensive reforms;  for being tribune, 
he had as much legitimate power as the senate, and accordingly 
he did not come forward as a rcvolutionist.  But was there any 
possibility  of  success?  This WAS  the  question.  In his  own 
mind he was convinced that the matter  might  wccccd:  it is to 
be lamented that we do not know his entire plan, and that the 
inost important poiilts havc come down to us  in an extremely 
corrupt form.  His legislation  consisted of a number of  single 
laws conccrning the inost different branches of the government 
and administration of the state.  What we  know  of  them  is 
enoLlgh to shew how little he was of a demagogue ;  they contain 
allparently  the greatest contradictions, which  vanish, however, 
we hme gained the right point from which to view them; 
there we perceive that he would  not  give  himself  up to  any 
faction, but rather availed himself  of  the fidctions for the pur- 
pose of carrying his salutary reforms, offering to this party one 
advantage, to that, another, while he himself stood intact. 
His first step naturally was to avenge the death of his brother 
and his friends.  Kasica had gone with a commission  to Asia, 
whence he never returned;  but many others of his party were 
yet at Rome, and against  these  Caius directed  his  operations. 
EIc brought forward two bills:  one enacting that those who had 
been deprived of an oEce by the people, should not be allowed 
to be candidates for any other : the second, that any magistrate 
should be liable to a capital  charge, who had  put to death  a 
citizen without a formal sentence having been passed upon him*. 
The first of these bills was evidently aimed at Octavius, bnt C. 
Gracchus withdrew  it  at  the  request  of  his  mothcr.  The 
second, which was  mainly directed against  Popillius  Laenas, 
was carried.  But  Laenas  of  his  own  accord  quitted  Italy5. 
These two laws were the inferiae  on the tomb  of  his  brother; 
but lie did not stop here.  The execution of  the agrarian  law 
had been decreed,  and although  things  went  on  slowly,  yet 
some progress was made, and Caius remained triumvir. 
His subsequent  legislation  embraced  every  branch  of  the 
administration, and is of  the most varied nature.6  Those who 
infer from his legislation that he was a demagogue, are greatly 
mistaken:  the laws themselves  contradict such  a view.  The 
measure against which most has been said is that which ordered 
that corn should be  distributed among the poor inhabitants  of 
the  city; that is  that  the modius  of  corn  should be  sold to 
them at the low price of three-fourths of an as,  this being the 
fourth part of the usual price.7  This was by no means a bribe, 
but an act of  kindness  to the poor  who stood  in need  of  it. 
In order to understand this law, we must remember that Rome 
received  immense supplies of  corn, and that  its treasury  was 
Plutarch, C. Gracchus, 4 ; Ciccro, pro Rabirio, 4. 
We possess a beautiful fragment  of  the  speech in which Gracchus brought 
forward this bill against Laenas;  it is the beginning  of  the speech, and is  cen- 
sured by  Gellius (xi. 13,) in a pedantic manner.-N. 
Plutarch, I.  c. 5. 
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so well filled, that it was unnecessary to change the corn into 
money.  At  the time of the Social war, the treasury contained 
about  sixty  millions  sterling.  The best  use  that could  be 
made  of  it was  to benefit  the people,  that is,  the sovereign, 
to which in reality it belonged, and a  vast  number of  who111 
were as poor as the poor in our own days.  What should such 
a population of  free men do?  Were they to beg? or  should 
the state support them?  The idea of  the dignity of every in- 
dividual belonging to a free  state lies  at the bottom of  Inany 
things  which occur in a  republic;  it is the duty of a republic 
to talre  care  of  its members,  even  of  the most  insignificant, 
and this is to a certain degree the case with the poor's rates in 
England.  In a despotic state this idea  has no  meaning; but 
with a free and proud nation, it is a  duty to provide for  those 
members  of  the  community  who  are unable  to  provide  for 
themselves.  The numbcr of  real paupers at Rome must  have 
been immense.  Many of them were not included in any tribe; 
others, such as  the descendants of  freedmen, belonged to the 
tribus urbanae;-and  were these people to be allowcd to starve? 
Both the Gracchi entertained the idea  of  turning as many  of 
them as  possible  into  industrious husbandmen; but this was 
not practicable in every instance,  for  many  had no claims  to 
portions of  the public  land, as  the distribution  of  lands may 
have been made according to tribes.  If, in our days, a part of 
the revenue of  a  capital town  were  set apart  to  pamper  the 
poor, it would indeed be culpable, although capitals are in most 
cases  more  favoured  in this  respect  than other towns.  But 
C. Gracchus  had  no  intention  of  giving  away  the corn  for 
nothing;  he only gave  it at so  low  a price that, with  some 
labour, the poor  might be  enabled to support  themselves and 
their children.  As he was a zealous, active, and creative man, 
he built large  corn-magazines,  the ruins  of  which  were dis- 
tinctly seen at Rome down to the sixteenth century, between 
the Quay, the Aventine, and the Monte Testacio; but no trace 
is now to be seen of those horreapopuli Romani.  I believe that 
it is from this time that we  have  to date  the  distinction  be- 
tween the plebs urbana  and the thirty-five tribes.  The chief 
elements of  that plebs consisted  of  free Roman  citizens of the 
lower orders. 
Another law of C. Gracchus was proposed with the object of 
making  the service in the armies  easier.8  The soldiers  had 
Plutarch, 1. c. 5. 
forlnerly been obliged  to  provide  the~nselves  with  the neccs- 
sary weapons, and a part of  their pay was  deducted, to defray 
the expenses of repairs and improvements.  The republic  was 
now so rich, and the treasury  so  well filled, that it was  by  no 
means a great sacrifice to provide the soldiers with clothes and 
arms from the public treasury.  This law accordingly was car- 
ried by C. Gmcchus.  He also made new roads through Italy, 
improved those which existed already, and brought their con- 
struction to a degree of perfection  which  it had  never  before 
attaincd.9  He gave a  new impulse  to  the ~nving  of  streets, 
and it seems probable that it was  owing to him that the great 
Roman high-roads acquired that excellence which  we still  ad- 
mire in them;  for  he  ordered  them to be  paved with basalt, 
~vhich  had hitherto been  employed only in a sniall portion  of 
the via  Appia.  These  works  gave  employment to the poor 
who thus obtained the means of  living. 
All these measures were of an administrative nature, but he 
now proceeded to measures  relative to  the constitution.  The 
senate, at that  time,  had the management  of  one of  the most 
important branches of  the administration,  without being sub- 
ject  to  any control.  Even Polybius observcs, that  the grcat 
power of the senate in so democratic a republic, arose from two 
causes;  first, from the fact  that the finances were in its exclu- 
sive power, in consequence of  which many were dependent on 
it in regard to their fortunes.  All the revenues  of  the state, 
arising from tolls, mincs, tithes, etc., were given to companies 
of  rich persons  to farin,  and  these again  employed  in tlzcir 
business  persons of  the lower  or even lowest orders, who con- 
secluently wcre  all  dependent  on the senate,  which  possessed 
the  supreme managcmcnt.  We must  not,  indeed,  imagine 
that every one thus employed,  derived his income, as with  us, 
from a  public office; but in point  of  fact  the  result  was the 
same, the state providing  for  a  large number  of  its subjects. 
Hence Romans multiplied immerisely in the provinces as  nego- 
tiator%  and became the vampires of those countries.  This was 
the first circumstance by means of which the small number  of 
senators could  maintain  itself so  safely.  The second was  the 
f:act, that all those  persons necessarily  had  their supporters in 
the senate  itself, and that the judges  in almost all important 
cases were senators, viz., in all those which did not affect real 
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quiritarian property.  It  is a false though widely spread opinion, 
tllat there existed in ancient Roine a  sort of trial by jury; but 
the fact is  that such an  institution did not exist till after the 
time of the Gracchian legislation.  A case of  delictum man@+ 
tum, in the early times,  rcquired no trial among the Romans; 
it was only necessary  to  establish  the identity of  the person, 
and  the praetor  at once  applied  the law.  In other  cases, 
both criminal and those civil ones which did not belong to the 
foruin of  the centumviri,  the  sentence of  a single arbiter was 
required  to  enable  the practor  to pronounce a final verdict. 
The  complaillt  was  brought  before  the  praetor,  who  after 
thirty days appointed a judex;  the latter proceeded according 
to  certain  forms; and from his verdict  thcre  was  no  appeal, 
for the ancient appeal to the people had been abolished, and 
it probably had never existed except in judicia publica.  Ever 
since the beginning of  the seventh century a number of  law- 
suits, for which special quaestors had formerly been  appointed 
to bring the cases before the popular courts, had been referred 
to  ordinary court-days,  especially  thc  actiones  repetundarum, 
that is, the charges brought by unfortunate provincials against 
their governors;  for such cases,  however,  several judices were 
appointed; but whether there was only one or more, they were 
always senators, and this was a powerful ineans of strengthening 
the authority of the senate.  These judges, however,  were in 
the same predicament as those on whom they had to pass sen- 
tence.  This was a source of corruption, and the most scaiidalous 
verdicts were pronounced,  the judges making,  in fact,  a vcry 
lucrative traffic  of  their  office,  for a scnator when  appointed 
judex  by lot, allowed  himself  to be bribed  in  the  most  dis- 
graceful manner.  No one denied this, and no one was ashamed 
of  it; those  who were  not  vcnal,  were very  few,  and  often 
acted only from prudent calculation.  The power of bringing 
a  charge  against a  governor was  in truth  much  more  dctri- 
mental  to  the provincials than  beneficial,  for  the govcrnors 
now not  only endeavoured  to enrich  theinsclves,  but had to 
to spend  large sums to bribe  the judges,  who again had  no 
object  in view except to enrich  themselves.  All feelings of 
honour had  vanishedlO; the  senators only asked "How many 
'O  A striking analogy to this  state of  things is exhibited at Naples.  Prince 
Canosn, a Neapolitan minibter,  a very eccentric but talented man, once said to 
me,  that at Naples a man might have as many false witnesies as he could wish, 
will you  give  to  obtain your  acquittal?"t  was 
evidellt  that under  circumstances the state was hastei~iiig 
towards its doWafall.  A  change had  become  necessary,  and 
considering  the facts  of  the case,  that  of  Giacchns  was  no 
doubt the best,  although it was actually followed by evil con- 
sequences.  C. Gracchus,  who  knew  very well  that  it must 
be a ]lard %-inter indeed before  one wolf  will  seize up011  ano- 
ther, turned his attention to the equites,-the  order which now 
constituted,  in  some  measure,  a  middle  class  between  the 
senators  and the lower  pcople, altl~ough  some  of  them  pos- 
sessed immense riches;  consisting of  citizens possessing  more 
than 100,000 denarii (400,000 sesterces).  Things had reached 
that point which wc now see in France, where no standard of 
distinction exists except that  of  wealth.  C. Gracchus saw in 
the equites a desirable  equipoise to the senators.  From what 
are  called  the people  he expected nothing at all; for he well 
knew that they were  no longer  worth anything,  and that to 
some extent they consisted of a populace just as corrupt as the 
Keapolitan lazaroni.  C.  Gracchus therefore  sought  a  remedy 
in that portion of  the population which  consisted  of  the rich 
and wealthy,  who had no interest in screening the sins of  the 
rulers;  he could, in fact, do  nothing else.  By the lea Sempronia 
judiciaria  he composed  the judicia  of  300 equites,  who were 
now to be the only judges,  instead of  the 300 members of  the 
senate.  There arc, it is true, three different  opinions  on  this 
point, but after the investigations of Manutius it can no longer 
be doubted that, these 300 equites mere  to be the only judices 
from among  whom  in each particular  case  the single judices 
were talicn  by lot.  At first this arrangement was very bene- 
ficial,  for the new judices  had  no such extensive  family con- 
nections  as  the noble  senators; but  on  the other  hand they 
were not 6dir judges for the provincials.  The Roman farming 
companies, generally consisting of  equites,  had been  guilty of 
acts of glaring injustice in the provinces, which were tormented 
by the goverllors also.  The oppression of the latter now ceased; 
but the governors who  wished  to  come to an  understanding 
wit11 the farmers  of  the revenue,  might  buy  them  over by 
at the rate of a carolina (about  sixpence) a-picce.  When afterwards I asked a 
distinguished Neapolitan,  whether this assertion was not unjust,  he said  that if 
a man would early on this traffic on a large scde, he might obtain any number 
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allowing thein to go beyond  their contracts, and e. g., to take 
one-fifth  instead of  one-tenth as tribute.  If this  was  agreed 
upon, the equites,  in their turn,  sccured  impunity to the go- 
vernors in case of  actions for extortion being brought against 
them.  This was an enormous abuse, but ~roduced  by circum- 
stances; the condition  of  Rome and Italy, however,  and in 
short of all parts of the empire in which the companies of farmers 
had nothing to do, was improved by the change. 
This was like a clap of  thunder upon the senators.ll  After 
an independent body of  judges had thus been  formed,  Caius 
Gracchus  substituted  a  committee  of  them  in the  place  of 
the  worthless  popular  courts,  which  thenceforward  were 
callcd  together  only on  rare  occasions by way  of  exception; 
and  extraordinary  inquisitions  ceased  altogetl~cr.  This law 
was in reality  an encroachment upon  the democracy,  and in 
truth a very necessary one,  for C.  Gracchus  knew the people, 
and saw what a wretched class of men they were. 
In order to introduce some bctter blood  into the thirty-five 
tribes,  he proposcd  to bcstow the Roman  franchise  upon  the 
Latins, who consisted of the original Latin towns and upwards 
of forty colonies.  Thcy had been in existence  for  300 ycars, 
and during the last two centuries they had bcconle complctcly 
amalgamated with Rome in language and manners, and Grac- 
chus probably  intended  to form  them into new tribes.  The 
other Italian allies,  from the Marca Ancona down to Lucania 
in the south,  nay all  Italian places  as far as the Alps,  were 
to step into the relation in which the Latins had hitherto been12, 
that is, they were to have the right of voting in the assemblies, 
and thus to be prepared to become full citizens in about thirty 
or  forty years.  It may be  that something  was  actually car- 
ried  into  effect, but we  do  not  know what.  The plan itself 
was so wise  and useful  that  all intelligent Romans,  who did 
not  wish  to  see  either  the  aristocrats  or  the  democrats 
gain  the  upper  hand,  must  have  been  rejoiced  at  it.  In 
many  Latin  towns there wcre  families  of  distinction,  which 
would  have settled  at Rome, as in the time of  Augustus  the 
Asinii  (who  were  Marrucinians),  Munatii,  and  others  did. 
Cicero  expressly  states" that, previously  to the  Social  war, 
Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i.  22; Vdl. Paterc. ii. 6; Tacitus, Annales, xii.  60. 
Compare Lhy, Epit. 60; Plutarch, C.  Gracch. 5. 
l2  Appian,  1.  c.  23; compare Vell. Patere. ii. 6; Plutarch, C.  Gracch. 5. 
l3 Pro Archia poeta, 3. 
Greek science and literature were more cultivated  among the 
Latills  than ainoilg  the Romans.  Therefore,  instead  of  iii- 
creasing  the Roman people by freed-men and a low populace, 
C. Gracchus  intended  to  add  numbers  of  wealthy  and well- 
educated Latins.  I do not know of  any wiser or more praise- 
worthy plan than this. 
Many of  his  laws concerning  the administration are either 
not  known  at all or known merely  froin  slight allusions,  but 
all  those  of  which  we  have  any knowledge  are  excellent. 
Tcn years had passed away since Attalus had  bequeathed  his 
kingdom  to the Roman  people,  and seven  since Aristonicus 
had  been  conquered;  but  the affairs  of  Asia  had  not  yet 
been  settled,  and the governors  availcd  themselves  of  this 
neglect for the purpose of  satisfying  their avarice by plunder. 
C. Gracchus at lcngth carried a law by which tlic province of 
Asia was regulated:  this law is admitted, even  by Cicero,  to 
have been  a model of  wisdom.14  Especial  care was  talten  to 
arrange the farming of  the public revenue in such a manner 
that the interest of  the state was perfectly secured. 
While C. Gracchus assigned lands to the people, and endea- 
voured  to  turn  as  many  of  them  as  possible  into  honcst 
peasants, he did not by any ineans sacrifice the interests of  the 
republic;  for the tithes which the state had  hitherto received 
from those lands were not abolished (according to a passage in 
Plutarch, which  would  otherwise have no meaning), so  that 
the republic  lost nothing.  It was evident to him that  Rome 
could  be  saved  only by returning  to her own  principles, and 
he therefore imitated  the ancient  Romans who had renovated 
and, as it were, refreshed the people, by extending the franchise. 
He opened good prospects for the Italians who wcre to succeed 
to the ~rivileges  of  the Latins, for he undoubtedly hoped tliat 
a peaceful development of  the principle would  lcad to further 
and still more beneficial reforms.  Ile even malle proposals to 
change the manner  of  voting, by which  tlie  repliWic would 
not llave consisted of the city alone, but would have 
all Italy. 
The senate  had  hitherto  distributed  the provinces  at dis- 
cretion, which had given  rise to the most detestable systcln of 
bribery.  Thc elections of  lnagistratcs took  place  at this time 
l4  In  Verrcm, iii. 6.  Thiq is, as  far  I know, the only passage  in wl~ich 
C~ccro  <peaks of  this law, but he there says nothing m praise of  it. 
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long  before  the close of  the year,  and  the new consuls  and 
praetors  referrcd  to the senate de  pou-inciis,  each applyiug for 
limself  and  trying  to obtain  that from which  he  hoped  to 
amass  most  ~vealth;  and  the  senate,  on  persolla1  grounds, 
dccided what commissiolls were to be  given  to the consuls  or 
praetors.  C. Grcchus now made thc wise law, enacting  that 
before the elections took place the senate sl~ould  decide which 
provinces  were  to be  given  to  the consuls  or  pnetorsl5,  SO 
that the persons  to whom  they were  to be  given were as yct 
unknown;  the division of  the  provillces  was  then  made  by 
lot, and  only  in a  few  instances  by  the senate,  so  that all 
favoritism was  at an end.  This law removed at once some of 
the most  glaring abuses in the administration.  There can be 
no doubt that it was  Gracchus who enacted that the elections 
should  take place  so early in the year, in order that the year 
might  not expire  before  the curule chairs  were  filled  anew. 
This is  one  of  the  essential  and  permanent  irnprovelnents 
effected  by Gracchus; for  we  find  it in force  even  seventy 
years after his death. 
C. Gracchus passed  his  laws  in the  years  629  and  630, 
in both of  which  he was tribune.  His tribuneship was  less 
stormy than that  of  his brother,  and  his powers  were  much 
more extensive  and undisputed.  He caused  himself  and his 
fiiend M. Fulvius Flaccus, and probably also Q. Rubrius to be 
appointed triumvirs for the purpose of founding new colonies16, 
for he was a man of restless activity extending over all depart- 
mento of  the state; and this he was enabled to do by virtue of 
his tribunician power.  He also founded a colony near the site 
of  ancient Carthage, which provoked the hypocritical zealots, 
who  said  that that  colony  would  one  day be  dangcrous  to 
Rome,-a  most  senseless thought, though  some were foolish 
enough seriously  to  entertain  it.  This opportunity was very 
welcome  to his enemies, and while he was  thus  quietly pro- 
cecding in founding several colonies, in which the Latins and 
Italicans were allowed to take part, the  jealousy and exasperation 
of  the aristocrats rose to the highest pitch, and the scnate had 
recourse to a pcculiar  kind  of  stratagem.  M.  Livius  Drusus, 
one of  the colleagues of  C. Gracchus, was  prevailed  upon  to 
try to undermine  his  popularity.  Here we  have an  instance 
Is  Cicero,  pro domo, 9 ; Sallust, Jugurth. 27. 
l6  Vell. Paterc. i.  15; Plntarch, C.  Grucch. 8; Appian, I. c. 24. 
in which it is clearly seen  that the col~stitution  of  Rome was 
suited more for a city than for a whole llation.  Livius endea- 
voured  to outbid C. Gracchus in conferring benefits  upon the 
people;  he actcd in the name of  the senate and succeeded; for 
the masses never take the trouble to consider who the man is that 
offers them advantages; and in this instance, they were unable to 
recognise in the actions of C. Gracchus the purity and sincerity 
of his intentions.  The majority of  the  inhabitants of  Rome, 
whom  I  call Romans only with great  reluctance, consisted of 
freedmen,  and  their  children  or  grand-cl~ildren, and  they 
perhaps  thought  that  Gracchus  intended to buy and deceive 
them.  As Livius held out to them  the  same  advantages  as 
Gracchus, or evcn greater  ones, the  multitude  followed  him, 
although they must have seen  through his  scheme.  Such is 
the character of the Italians to this day; for if a man vcntures 
to give them his advice on  any matter, out of  true  sympathy 
and  with  the  greatest  possible  disinterestedness,  they  will 
always  indulgc  in  the  suspicion  that  he  has  some  impurc 
motive  for  doing  so, and  that he is  a  knave.  This trait is 
co~nmon  to all classes in modern Rome.  I myself  have sccn a 
striking  instance  of  it  in the case  of  a  citizen  of  a  small 
town, who  had  a  collcction  of  coins  which  he  wanted  me 
to value.  He, imagining  that I  wished  to  deceive  him, im- 
mediately asked me for one which I wished to purchase  three 
times its real  value, although  at first he would  have sold  me 
every one of his coins at one third of  the price he  now asked. 
Livius abolished the tithes of the lands distributed, and instead 
of the two colonies which Gracchus had contcmplated, founded 
twelve, each of which  was to consist of  3000 citizens.lr  The 
wealthy Romans had no objections to  allowing  this, since the 
only losers by the measure  were  thc  unfortunate  old inhabit- 
ants, who till now had been only precarious tenants in the dis- 
tricts where their fathers had been conquered;  and the wealthy 
had their estates only in those parts  wllere  the ancient  towns 
had  been  destroyed.  Whether these  colonies  wcre  actually 
established  may bc  questioned, but  as  those  of  C. Gracchus 
were, I do not see why those twelve also should not have been 
founded, and I conceive them to bc the XII.  coloniae of' which 
Cicero speaks in his  oration for Caccina.18  They can  have no 
connexioll with the events in thc I-Iannibalian war; for eighteen 
''  Plutarch, C. Gracch. 9. 
la  c.  35. 
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colonies  had  rernailled  faitllfullg,  so  that  eighteen  and  not 
twelve must have  obtained the advantage  of  the commercium, 
If therefore, as I think, these  twelve colonies  were  not  quite 
new ones, but twelve Latin towns which still had a large and 
unoccupied  territory,  so  that  a  great  additional  number  of 
citizens could find room in them, it is clear that these colonies 
may have obtained greater ~rivileges  than others.  C. Gracchus 
saw that the thoughtless multitude followed the senate and  its 
tools, whose sole object was to deceive them.  There  are  two 
classes of men, the one consisting of those wlzo are sincere and 
open,  who  seek  and love  the  beautiful  and sublime,  who 
delight in eminent men, and see in them the glory of their age 
and  nation;  the  other comprising  those  who  think  only of 
themselves, are envious, jealous,  and somctimes  very unhappy 
creatures, without having a  distinct  will  of  their  own:  they 
cannot bear  to see great men in the enjoyment of  the general 
esteem, but take a delight in finding out some foible in them. 
These latter, a set of men more fatal to mankind  than original 
sin, rose against C. Gracchus :  they ridiculed him as a doctrinaire, 
as a theoriser.  He had enjoyed the general  esteem too  long, 
he was  too  spotless, too pure, and too glorious  not  to be  an 
offence to many; for every one was rcminded  by his  example 
of  what  he ought to  be:  it was  the  greatness  of  Gracchus 
which  determined  them  to  bring  him  down, just  as  the 
Athenian  citizens  voted against  Aristides,  because  he  was 
called the Just.  It  is not surprising to find that this  disposi- 
tion  existed  among  his  colleagues; and thousands  of  others 
wanted to make  him feel that they  entertained  no gratitude 
towards him.  When therefore the tribunes for  the following 
year were  elected, and  he offered  himself  as  a  candidate, he 
was taken no notice of, but still remained  triumvir.  There is 
no necessity for  supposing that his  colleagues were  guilty  of 
firtlsehood to prevent his  election; for it was only  among  the 
better part of  the middle classes that Gracchus  seems to have 
had many  followers; but  they had little political  powcr, and 
the nobles among his friends were thoughtless persons. 
l9  ((Livy. xxvii. 9 and 10.)  It has  been  proposed  to read  in thc passage  of 
Cicero xiix. coloniurvn~,  instead of xii. coloniarum;  but this conjecture cannot bc 
admitted, xiix. not occurring in any ancient MSS.-N.-See  Savigny, Zeitschrift 
fur yesch.  Rechtswissenscl~.  v. 2. p. 237. 
LECTURE LXXX. 
L. OPIMIUS, the destroyer  of  Fregellae, and a powerful  sup- 
porter of the senate, was now raised  to the collsulship, whicll 
he had  in vain  the year before;  for C. Gracchus, who 
then possessed the highest  degree of popularity, and was con- 
vinced that the people would do anything to please  him, once 
requested them to promise him something, and when the pro- 
mise was  made, he asked them to elect  C. Fannius consul- 
none of  whose ancestors had yet l~eld  this dignity-instead  of 
Opirnius,l just as in the ancient romance the ladies ask favours 
of' Icing Arthur.  Gracchus had thus incurred the in~~lacable 
enmity of  Opimius, and Farlnius Caithlessly deserted him, and 
made  common cause with his  adversaries, although it would 
have been  difficult  for  F'annius to obtain the consulship with- 
out the support of  Gracchus.  Opimius again was a plebeian, 
and yet like Popillius Laenas, lie sidcd with the nobles against 
Gracclius.  The oligarchical party actually tried to find a sub- 
ject for a  quarrel.  Gracchus  was  divested of the sacrosaacta 
potestas  of  a  tribune, and  as  his  life  was  not  silfe,  he was 
always surrounded by a number  of friends.  The measures of 
tlic senate  displayed more  and more  their hostile  spirit,  and 
even the foundation of his colonies, which had been sanctioned 
by the senate itself, was  to be suspended by a  decrcc  of  the 
senate.  This led to a discussion, and one of the tribunes, who 
had been appointed by the influence of the oligarchs, adclrcssed 
thc pcople assembled in front of the Capitol, and spoke against 
Gracchus.  When the latter catne  forward to dciknd himself, 
they charged him with having tumultuously  interrupted the 
tribune.  Opimius, who was offcring up a  sacrifice, purposcly 
sent one of his lictors ostensibly to procure something  neces- 
sary for the sacrifice, and the man, pressing through the crowd 
of Gracchus' fiiends, insulted them by  out L' Make way, 
you  bad  citizens,  for  the good  ones."  A  tulnult  arose,  and 
the man was kill~d.~  At the instigation  of  Opimius  and the 
oligarchs the body was  carried  to the Forum,  ill  to pro- 
duce solnc great and tragic scene,  as if  he had been  a martyr 
1  Plutarch,  C.  Grucch. 11. 
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i11  the  good  cause.  The  senate  now,  for  the  first  times, 
made  a  decree  that  the  collsuls  should  take  care  that  the 
republic nlight not suffer any iiijury-a  decree which invested 
Opin~ius  with  dictatorial  power,  because  it was  no  longer 
custoinary to appoint a  dictator,  the curies  having  ceased to 
exist, and it being therefore impossible  to observe  the ancient 
forms.  C. Gracchus took leave of his wife and children,  and 
went  with  11.  Fulvius  to  the Aventine,  which  had  at  all 
times  been  a  place  of  refuge  for  the oppressed.  Gracchus 
had not  anticipated  the misfortune,  and his  party was  quite 
unprepared;  he had no power to oppose the senate, and never 
thought of going to extrcmes;  he could not make up his mind 
to  shcd  one  drop  of  blood.  His friend  and  colleague, the 
consular M. Fulvius, a man of a bolder  and more  dctermined 
character, armed as many of the populace and as many slaves 
as he could, to defend himself.  Their conduct was like that oi' 
Brutus and Cassias.  The elements  of the old plebeian move- 
nients no longer existed, and the populace  of the city was in 
such  a  degraded  condition  that they had  no  sympathy  for 
Gracchus, nor could he feel any for them.  They abandoned 
him to his fate, considering him to be either  a cunning poli- 
tician or a fool, and were  satisfied if the gifts wliich  he had 
procured  for  them  were  continued.  The consuls  therefore 
had no difficulty;  the only thing they had to do was to attack 
the Aventine with  a  small force.  The city was  either para- 
lysed  or  indifferent.  The fact  that  the  equites,  who owed 
their existence as a  distinct class to Gracchus, and who from 
this  time  forward are  mentioned  along with  the people,  as 
equites et populus, acted the part  of mere  lookers-on, is at first 
sight rather surprising, but is  easily accounted for by the fear 
which  is  so  peculiar  to wealthy persons  whose property does 
not consist of land but of capital.  There is, on the whole, no 
class of  men more  cowardly than that of  mere capitalists, as 
we sec in the history of Florence and of all other republics. 
Gracchus sent to the senate to negotiate, but they required 
his party to surrender at discretion.  The Aventine was feebly 
defended, and the clivuspublicius, leading up from the Circus, 
This innst  be  understood to mean  that it was the first time after the aboli- 
tion of the dictatorship (abont the middle  of  the sixth century.)  The forn~ula 
uideant consules ne  quzd detrimenti respublica capzat, is very ancient, and occurs 
first in  k.  u. 290.  Liv. iii. 4. 
ms  fillken by  storm.  Fulvius  Flnccus  then sent his  son,  a 
fine  eighteen  years  old,  to the  senate  to  sue  fbr  a 
truce.  Tl1e first time he was sent back;  but when he came  a 
second time,  Opiinius  ordcrcd him to be thrown into prison, 
and  afterwards  to  be  put  to  deatli.  When  the  Avcntinc 
was  taken,  Flaccus  himself  was  discovered  in  some  house  . . 
and &in.  Graccl1us leaped  down  fio~n  the steep precipice 
near  tile  temple  of  Diana  on  the Aventine, at present  the 
church of  St. Alessio, in order  to reach the Sublician bridge; 
but he strained his foot, and as no horse was to be had, it was 
only  with  great difficulty  that  supported  by his  friends 
arrived  at the bridge.  His friends  Polnponius and Laetorius, 
two ccluites of  great wealth, acted differently from the majority 
of  the wealthy Romans:  they fought  like  EIoratius Cocles  at 
the bridge, and defended C;racchns  against the pursui~ig  enerny, 
until  they were  cut to pieces.*  Gracchus  in thc mean  time 
fled  across  the Tiber illto  a  sacred  grove  (lucus  Furiarum), 
which however  affordcd  him  no protection, for Opimius had 
promised  to give the weight of  his  head  i11  gold  to any one 
who should  bring it to him.  Gracchus was  soon overtaken, 
but it is probable that some faithful slave, or client, put an end 
to his life.  Every one knows the horrible  barbarity of  Sep- 
timuleius  of  Anagnia,  who,  himself  a  stranger  to all  these 
disputes, filled the head of  Gracchus with lead  to increase its 
wcight.  Opimius  put to death, during his consulship,  more 
than  3000 persons,  all of  whom  may  be  said  to have  been 
murdered.5  Some of  the friends  and  supporters of  Gracchus 
may  have  escaped.  Tlle state of  things was,  on  the whole, 
like that at Naples  in  1799, and all those who fell as victims 
were  mcn  of  distinction.  The bloodshed  continued for two 
years,  and  the  murderers  called  theinselves  boni  homines, 
boni  cives!  Some of  those who had belonged  to the party of 
Gracchus becamc apostates, and among them we find C. l'apirius 
Carbo, who must  have  gone over  vcry early,  and who,  aftcr 
being  raisrd  to thc consulship, defended  Opimius against  the 
tribune, 0. Decius, who accused  hi111  of  having put to death 
Roman  citizens  without  a  trial.6  Carbo, after having 
'  I'lutarch,  C. Gracch.  16 and  17; Appi,tn,  I.  c.  i.  26; Aurel. Victor, De 
Vir.  zllustr. 6.5.  P~u~sPc~,  LC.; Orosius, v.  12. 
(Clcero, De Oratore, ii. 25, comp  39;  Livy, Epit.  61).  It is cnrious to see 
how great  the power  and  inflocncc  of  tradition  is in  some of  the tribui1ici:m 
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Opimius, became the favourite of  the oligarchs.  But he soon 
found himself  attacked by P. Licinius Crassus, a near relation 
and perhaps the brother-in-law of C. Gracchus, the sarne ofwhom 
Cicero speaks so often  in his "  Brutus,"  and in the masterly 
dialogue '' De Oratore."  He was  a man  of  very great talent 
and genius, but as  in most  orators of  the time,  these natural 
endowments  were  not  cultivated  as  they  had  been  in 
C. Gracchus.  Crassus  too began  his  career with the popular 
party, but afterwards deserted  it: he went over to the senate, 
and  became  the declared  champion  of  the oligarchy.  His 
apostasy,  however,  has nothing in it that is odious, and no 
blame can be attached to him for it.  His coming forth against 
Carbo was the first blow which the victorious  party received; 
his attacks were so severe, that Carbo put an end to his life by 
taking a  solution of  vitriol (atramentum sutorium).7  All this 
was satisfactory to the feelings of  those who still cherished the 
hope that a better time would come.  But things remained as they 
were.  The cquites were very much intimidated, and the con- 
sequences  of  the independencc  of  the judges  had  not  yet 
become visible.  But matters were brought to a crisis by the 
war against Jugurtha; for it was then that the baseness of  the 
ruling party showed itself  particularly; and hence Sallust with 
his fine tact chose it as the subject for description.  But before 
I proceed to rclate the history of that war, I must give a sketch 
of  the cxtension of  the empire. 
I  have  not  spoken  of  the  foreign  wars  of  the  Romans 
during  this  period;  and,  as  our  time  is  very  limited,  I 
or recur after the lapse of  a  long  intermediate  period.  An analogy to this is 
seen in England,  in the family of  the Russells.  As instances of  it in Roman 
history I may mention  tllc  Maclii,  Poblilii,  Licinii,  and Dccii.  A Decius is 
mentioned  among the fiist  tribuncq,  and it  was  a  Decius  who now  had  the 
conmge to accuse Opimins.  In the political  condition  of  our country we can 
scarcely form  a  correct  notion of  such a principle;  but in antiquity and  in all 
free countries it preserves the identity of  sentiment from generation to gencm- 
tion, and is tho security for the identity of the political state of a nation.  Where 
this principle docs not exist, we may (declare  without hesitation that the line which 
runs through the nation is made of  sand, and may break off  any where and at 
any time; so that such a nation  is a mcre asserr~blage  of  individuals, but not  a 
state with  an hereditary  constitution.  I have mentioned  this, because  it is  a 
thing so completely foreign to us, and  because some of  us might be in~lir~cd  to 
look ulmn it as an enslaving principle.--N. 
7  Cicero, Ad Famtl. ix. 21, says cantl~ar~dus  sumpsisse dicitur.  Niebuhr here 
confounds  C.  Carbo with  Cn. Carbo, a  person  of  tlle same family,  who  wljcn 
accused  by  M.  Antonius,  sutorio  atramento aLsolutus  putatur. 
can  now only just  direct your  attention to them.  From the 
tilne  of  Tibcrius  Gracchus  to  that  when  the  Jugurthine 
war  broke  out,  the Spaniards  had shewn  but little hostility 
towards  the Romans.  The Balearian  islands  were  taken  by 
Q. &fetellus, one of the four sons of Metellus Macedonicus,  all 
of  obtained the consulship.  The Metelli were now the 
grcatest among the illustrious plebeian familics, and represented 
the pride of the aristocracy.  They produced great characters; 
and all that can be censured in Metellus Numidicus, for instance, 
leaves his personal character untouched.  The Balearian islands 
were concluered by one of  his brothers,  and another subdued 
tile Dalmatians, who appear henceforward as subject to Rome8, 
so that now the Romans could  avoid the Adriatic and go to 
Greece by land. 
The Roman dominion in Gaul was likewise extended.  Soon 
after the death of  Tib. Gracchus,  the  Romans  undertook  the 
first campaign  in  Transalpine  Gaul.  They were  masters  of 
almost  the whole  of  Spain and of  Italy nearly as  far  as the 
foot  of  the  Alps  (Aosta  did  not  belong  to  them);  but  in 
Gaul itself, in the country between the Alps and the Pyrenees, 
they had not yet attempted to gain a firm footing; all that they 
had done there consisted  in their having,  at the beginning of 
the  scventh century, secured to the Massilians,  their  ancient 
allies,  a tract of  land along the coast,  against  the Ligurians. 
The first  opportunity for  establishing themselves  there,  arose 
in a war of  the  Salluvians or  Salyans against the  Ligurians. 
The Salluvians, who occupied  the country from  Aix as far as 
Marseilles,  were defeated.  They had obtained assistance from 
the Allobrogians,  one of  the greatest nations of  Gaul,  which 
occupicd  Dauphine  and Savoy,  as  far  as  Lyons.  They too, 
having been defeated, applied to the Arverni.  Ever since the 
Hannibalian war,  the Arverni  had  the patronage,  or, as it IS 
called in the history of Greece, the supremacy over the greater 
part of southern Gaul; they were governed by kings, and were 
in possession of a splendid empire.  In the time of  C. Gracchus 
the Romans were engaged in a war against their king, Bituitus, 
and the Allobrogians, and gained signal victories, on the Rhonc, 
near Viennc, under Cn. Domitius Allenobarbus and Q. Fabius 
Maximus Allobrogicus.  Bituitus, about whose riches all kinds 
of tales ]lave come down to us, tricd to obtain pardon from the 
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Romans,  but the generals  sent  hiin to Rolne  to illlplor~  the 
mercy of  tlle  senate.  He accordingly went to  Rome without 
having coine into drditionem; but trusting in the honesty of the 
Boil~an  rulcrs he was arrested,  aild spent the reinaindcr  of his 
lifc at Alba on lake Fucinus,  where  Syphax and Pcrscus had 
died.g  After  these  victories,  we  inust  conceive  the  Roman 
province to have extended  as  Far  as Dauphin&; the Allobro- 
gians,  however,  although  they recognised  the suprcnlacy  of 
Rome,  wcre  not  subject  to  it.  But  Provcnce  and  lowcr 
Languedoc  formed  a  rcal  Roman  province;  and,  although 
there was not always a practor  or a  proconsul  rcsiding there, 
yet  the  whole  administration  was  that of  a  province.  The 
exact  time  when  that country was  actually constituted  as a 
Roman province can only be guessed, as we do not possess the 
books of Livy in which  he niust  llavc mentioned it.  Aqule 
Sextiae was the first Roman colony beyond the Alps. 
The  first  appearance  of the  Cimbri  belongs  to  the  ycar 
638.  After the subjugation of Dalmatia, thc Romans attacked 
Croatia,  and this is  said  to  have  provoked  the  Scorcliscans. 
But it is more  probable,  that the migration of  thc Sarinatae 
stirred up the Scordiscans from the east;  the latter now invaded 
Macedonia and Greece.  This was one of the greatest calamities 
of the sixth and sevcnth centuries of the city, and belongs to 
the most fearful in the history of the world,  inasmuch as in it 
were  destroyed  most  of  the beautiful  reinnants  of  antiquity. 
That period resembled the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
of modern times.  In  regard to Italy, this destruction continued 
until the period of  Augustus,  when material  prosperity of  a 
certain kind began  to arise.  The consul C. Porcius Cato was 
destroyed  in  Thrace  by  the  Scordiscans;  and  Macedonia, 
Thessaly, and a part of Greece were inundated with swarins of 
barbarians.  But by far the most important war of  this period 
is that against Jugurtha.  The description which  Sallust  has 
given of it is one of thc bcst specimens of ancient literature in 
either language,  and I am  almost inclincd to prefer  it to his 
Catiline.  But both works  are peculiar phcnomcna  in Roman 
literature:  they  are  what  we  call  monographics,  which  are 
otherwise unknown among  the Romans,  except perh,?ps Coe- 
lius  Antipater's  history  of  the  Hannibalian  war,  of  which, 
Livy, Epzt. 61; Floruq, iii. 2; Vell. Patcrcul. ii.  10; Appian, De  Reb. Gall. 
12; Eutropins, iv. 22. 
however,  we know  the nleinoirs of  Fannius were of 
a different nature  'lhe books of  Sallust arc llot written 
ill the forln of  the character of which he evidently trics 
to avoid: his illtentioil  was  to write history in a compact and 
manner.  The works of Sallust are of such a kin4 that 
the  more  we  read  them  the more do we find  to admire in 
them: they are true models of  excellent historical compositio~l. 
As regards the Jugurthine war  I can do no bettcr  than refer 
you to Sallust's description of it. 
Wllcn Masinissa died,  he had regulated  his kingdom,  and 
entrusted  Scipio wit11  the execution  of  his will.  He left his 
kingdom to his three sons, Gulussa,  Micipsn,  and Mastanabal. 
We  must not in any way conceive those princes  as resembling 
the chiefs of the tribes which now inhabit those countries,  for 
LivylO  expressly states  that  Mastanabal was  well  acquainted 
with Greek literature, so that he was not a barbarian.  I-Ie was 
so far master of  Greek that he wrote in it.  We must also re- 
member that, at the taking of Carthage, its libraries were given 
to those Numidian princes.  These facts shew how wrong our 
notions are, if we consider the Numidians and all those tribes 
to have been barbarians.  There can be no doubt that at that 
time,  even  the rude Thracians  were  not  wanting in Greek 
civilisation, and at a later time we find it  even among the Par- 
thian~.  The  civilisation  of  the  Greeks  had  extcnded  very 
widely, especially since the fall of the nation.  The Numidians, 
like the Libyans, had an alphabet of their own, as we see from 
the tnonuments of  several  towns in those  districts.  Colonel 
Humbert found a bi-lingual inscription, Punic and Libyan, on 
the gate of  a town;  in  Cyrene we find  inscriptions  in tlircc 
languages,  Punic,  Greek,  and one unknown tongue.  I11  the 
desert of' Sahara, among the Tuarilcs, the travellers Clapperton 
and Denhain found an alphabet quite different froin the Arabic, 
and I am convinced that it belongs  to the  Libynn  language, 
which  is  still  found  in the  Canary  islands,  throughout  the 
desert,  and in the oases  as far as  the Nile  and the Barabras 
above  Egypt.  Denham"  is  to0  superficial  to comprehend it; 
but it will  be possible to read the Libyan inscriptions, as soon 
as  we  know  the  whole  alphabet,  of  which  Denham  gives 
lo Epit. 50. 
" I cannot answer for the correctness of this name, it being found in only one 
MSS. of  thc notes taken down in the course of 1826 and 1827, and written too 
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only  one  letter.  This subject  will  one  day  be  completely 
cleared up. 
Gulussa and Mastanabal  died early; the latter left  no legi- 
timate children, but only Jugurtha, a son by a concubine; and 
thus the vast  Nuinidian empire,  extending from the frontiers 
of  Morocco to the Syrtes,  Leptis  and Tripolis,  fell  into the 
hands  of  Micipsa  alone.12  EIe  had  two sons,  Adherbal  and 
Hieinpsal.  Juprtha, who from  his  childllood  had excelleilt 
talents,  and  had  always  gained  the  affections  of  all  who 
came in contact  with  him,  attracted  the  atten~ion  of  king 
Micipsa.  But,  when  the latter  discovered  that the talents 
of  his  young  nephew  were  far  superior  to those  of  his own 
sons,  he was  led  by  jealousy  to send  him  to  Spain, where 
Scipio  was  collecting  troops  from  all  countries  against  the 
Nunlantines, hoping that he would  there terminate his career 
in the war  against  Numantia.  But Jugurtha was  spared by 
fortune; he distinguished  himself',  and became  the  intimate 
friend  of  Scipiol3; he  even  demanded  to  be  placed  under 
Scipio's  protection,  that  Micipsa  might  not  murder  him. 
Some noble Romans moreover tried to persuade him to cause a 
rcvolution, and provided him with money, as he had no pros- 
pect  of succeeding to the throne in a legitimate manner, for 
akcr Micipsa's  death the kingdom  was  to remain  undivided. 
When Jugurtha left  Spain, he received  fi-om Scipio a letter 
of recommendation to Micipsa, who was thus forced to become 
reconciled to him; and in his  will he even placed  him  on a 
footing  of  equality  with  his  own  sons-probably  in  com- 
pliance with the wish  of  the Eomans-and  the three princes 
were  to  govern  their  empire  in  common.  Hiempsal  was 
proud  and ferocious,  and wantonly  insulted  Jugurtha as  an 
intrudcr, though he was unable to cope with him in any way. 
As thcse  princcs  could  not  live at peace  with  one  another, 
they resolved to divide the kingdom;  but Jugurtha, not satis- 
fied with this,  caused Hiempsal  to be murdered.  Jugurtha7s 
character was like that of an Albanesc,  bold,  audacious, cun- 
ning, and adroit; he had no notion of the sanctity of  an oath, 
no  honesty,  no  humanity:  he was,  in  short, of  a  Satanic 
nature.  He made  an attempt  on  the life  of  Adherbal also, 
who,  however,  fled to the Romans.  They, from  their par- 
tiality for Adherbal, decided in his favour, and sent a commission 
l2 Sallust, Jugurth. 5.  l3 Sallust, Juyurtl~.  7. 
to  divide  the  country  between  him  and  Jugurtha;  but 
latter bribed  the colnmissioners so  effectually,  that in the 
division lie obtained  the inost warlike and iinportant part of 
tile kingdom.14  But he aimed  at the whole;  whence  a war 
soon broke  out.  Adherbal  at Rome implored the senate for 
assistance  against  the usurper.  The senate  at  first  thought 
his  request  quite  just,  but the ruling  oligzrchs,  headed  by 
Opimius, the murderer  of  Gracchus,  declared  for  Jugurtha, 
for they were bribcd,  and peventcd any decision being come 
to.  Meantime Adherbal was bcsieged in Cirta.  The Italians, 
who were with Adherbal, advised him to surrender, and tried 
to stipulate that his life shoulcl not be endangered; but Jugur- 
tha cared  little  about  this,  and  even  gave  vent to his  rage 
against  the Italians.  Adherbal  was  in the greatest distress; 
but his complaints at lZome  were  fruitless in consequence  of 
the influence  of  L. Opimius; for  emissaries of Jugurtha were 
staying at Rome with large sums of money, and bribed every 
one.  But when the condition of Cirta had reached the highest 
pitcli of distress, some of Adherbal's  friends escapcd from the 
town,  and carried  the  most  mournful  letters to  the  senate. 
A new commission was  accordingly  sent, but this again was 
bought over by Jugurtha, and returned without having effected 
the raising of the siege.  Nemesis, however, induced Jugurtha 
not to keep his word to Adherbal, who surrendered and stipu- 
lated only for his life, any more than to the Italian and Roman 
negotiatores  in  Africa,  who  alone  had  supported  Adherbal, 
and now  likewise  surrendered.  He ordered  them  all  to be 
killed, in ordcr to satisfy his revenge.  This was  too  bad, and 
even those who had hitherto cspoused his  cause were obliged 
to  be  silent.  A  Roman  embassy  arrived  at  Utica  to  talie 
Jugurtha  to account; but he evaded  their  summon9  in the 
lnost  audacious  manner:  he  deceived  them  and  pined his 
object.  The  chief  of  these  ambassadors  was  M. Aemilius 
Scaurus, a  great man in Roman  history:  but we  are,  never- 
thelcss,  in the greatest  difficulty  respecting him.  When in 
earlier years I read in Horace15, 
Rcgiih~m  ct Srauros, animacquc mngnac 
Prodigum Paullum, ctc., 
I  imagined  that there must  be  in his  history  many things 
which I did not know, for I was not acquainted with anything 
" Sallust, Juyurth. 16. 
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to justify such praise.  As regards  Horace, it is a surprising 
fact, that no  one can  be more ignorant of the history of  his 
country than he is:  he confounds e. g. the two  Scipios,  and 
although  he ridicules  Ennius,  he had read  so  little of  him, 
that he believes  him to have sung of  Scipio, the destroyer of 
Carthage.16  It is  at all events a great mistake  of  Horace to 
use the plural Sc~uros,  for the son of our M. Aeinilius Scaurus, 
whom Cicero defcnded merely to confer a favour on his family, 
was  a monster,  and thc Verres of  Sardinia.  This un-Roman 
spirit in Horace leads him to depreciate the great minds of the 
early Roman litcrature.  He was a man of elegant and super- 
ficial education, and even in his knowledge of Greek literature 
is not to bc coinpared with Virgil.  Hence so  many strange 
things  in his  odes  where  he  had  misunderstood  the Greek. 
He took  the forms of his  odes from a few Greek lyric poets. 
When he speaks of Homer as nodding, he shews his ignorance; 
to Lollius he writes that he had again read  Homer, though it 
was  perhaps  for  the first  time  since he had  left  school.  In 
other respects  he possessed an excellent and far more versatile 
and fertile genius than Virgil, but the latter was more indus- 
trious  and laborious,  whereas  Horace  was  idle,  and  always 
indulging in relincd  enjoyments.  The contrast  between  the 
two poets is very striking, and would  be a fine subject for  an 
essay.  What seeins to speak in favour  of our Scaurus, is the 
great  veneration  which  Cicero  entertained  for  him.  Cicero 
considers it one of the most pleasing recollections of his youth, 
that at the age of seventeen he was  introduced by his  father 
into the house  of M. Aemilius Scaurus, then a venerable  old 
man, and formed the acquaintance of Alucius Scacvola, and all 
the great men of that age, who received him with distinction, 
because  they recognised  in him  the future great man.  He 
came among them with the desire peculiar to all noble minds, 
to attach himself to men more advanced in years than himself, 
and to purify himself through their influence.  Thus he ideal- 
ised those men, and this feeling remained wit11  him through- 
out his life.  Even as an old n~an  he loved those men  of his 
~outh,  and it is with this feeling that he speaks of  Scaurus. 
Sallust  is  charged  with  malignity,  but  he  is  certainly  not 
unjust when, full  of  indignation,  he brands a man for  ever. 
l6  See Bentley on Horace, Cflrni. iv. 8,1?, who, however, for metrical reasons, 
expunges the line.  Others behew that there is e gap in tha passage. 
scaurus  at the tilne  at which he is  described by  Sallust, was 
on tile  verge of tllat period  of life, when the active vigour for 
carrying on war is already weal~ened,  but not tl~at  for  inanag- 
illg  a  when he became old, and had extricated himself 
from the connexions into which he had fallen, feeling that he 
was  a  man  who  had bclonged  to a  better  age,  and had  to 
maintain a greet reputation,  it seems that outwardly 11e  lived 
ill  an  honourable  lawful  manner.  In this  state  (her0 
knew and admired  him.  But if we look  upon  scaurus as a 
man,  any such bias  in his favour, wc can say nothing 
witllollt ftLlIillg  into the greatest contradictions, for at different 
times  hc is  pitc  a  different man.  Therc are persons who at 
one time display a  vcry  honourable  character, though at an 
earlier period of their lives they may have acted  as very bad 
citizens,  and  as  if  they  had  no  principles  whatever.  As 
instances  of  such  men  in the  history  of  England,  in  the 
sevcnteentlz  century,  we  may  mention  Shaftesbury,  and the 
patriots  under  Charles II., who at one time kept up a  secret 
correspondence  with Louis XIV., while  at other times  they 
were  real  patriots.l7  The fundamental  features  in  the  cha- 
racter  of  Scaurus  were  very  great  pride,  decided  talent, 
and inflexible  party  spirit.  He was  a  great statesman,  and 
during the last twenty years  of  his  life  scems to have  acted, 
if not in a virtuous manner, yet with great consistency, so that, 
at least as far as appearance  gocs,  he  deserves  the reputation 
which he has in history.  That his conduct during the Jugur- 
thine war, is not an  invention  of  Sallust, is evident from  the 
history itself.  His conduct, at the time whcn he was one of the 
commissioners at Utica, was blameless, for he was particularly 
hostilc towarcls Jugurtha.  But aftcr the cleath of  Adllcrbal, 
things became too  bad:  the  consul  L.  Capurnius Piso  Bestia, 
wished to enrich himself  by the war, and at any rate to con- 
cludc a peace, if he should be paid for it.  At  first, therefore, he 
made common cause with some honest people, who desired that 
Jugurtha  should be punished.  In tlzis spirit he caused himself 
to be sent with an army to Africa at the same time when  the 
second commission went out.  The war was  at first conducted 
'I I know a man who bas a great name in history, and who at one time, it is 
true, with the consent of  his government, did not scbruple to appropriate  advan- 
taps  to himielf w~th  the nt~nlst  indelicacy, hot who,  at  other tlmeq, has actd 
llke a true pohtlcal Lro.  nilan is a change~blc  being.-N. COD.IYISSIONERS  SENT  TO  AFRICA.  32 1 
honestly, but negotiations were soon entered into ;  for Jugurtha 
contrived to persuade Bestia and Scaurus that peace would be 
far more advantageous  to  them  than  war.  He remained  in 
point of fact, in possession of his kingdom, but nominally sub- 
mitted to the Romans.  In order that the senate might sanction 
the peace,  the  fosdus  was  ehanged  into  a  clientela.  Thirty 
elephants, money, a large number of cattle, and deserters were 
surrendered to them; but the whole transaction was a shameful 
masquerade,  for  the deserters instead  of  being sent to Rome, 
where they were to be executed,  were  allowed to escape,  and 
the elephants were  given back  for  money.18  This treaty ex- 
cited the greatest indignation at Rome, and C. Memmius, a bold 
tribune,  came forward to  expose  the whole  of  the  revolting 
proceedings. 
LECTURE LXXXI. 
BESTIA'S  treaty  with Jugurtha was  so  revolting and scanda- 
lous, that C. Memlnius carried a decree that an inquiry should 
be made into those transactions;  and L. Cassius, who was then 
looked upon as a man of the greatest integrity,  was appointed 
to examine the state of affairs in Afiica itself.  Cassius was no 
doubt a man of high rank,  a patricianl,  but was  unconnected 
with any faction; he was pure in a corrupt age, and hence de- 
nounced  crime without regard  to  persons.  His word was of 
such weight that Jugurtha, in reliance  upon  it, ventured  to 
come to Rome to be  tried.  In Jugurtha's whole  conduct, in 
relation to Rome, we see a singular wavering between boldness 
and a feeling of weakness.  IIe was on the point  of  betraying 
his accornpliccs, to prevent  which  there was  no  other means 
than an abuse of  the tribunician power:  so C. Baebius, one  of 
the tribunes, was bought over to forbid  Jugurtha to speak  in 
the assembly.  The tribunician power had thus become strong 
for evil, but feeble for  good.  Jugurtha, encouraged  by such 
proceedings,  during  his  stay  at Rome, murdered  Massiva,  a 
Sallust, Jugurth 29. 
See Lectures, vol. i. p. 200,  and Htst.  of  Rome, ii. p. 173,  where the Cassii, 
af~er  Sp. Cassius Viscellinus,  are called  plebeians; but the passage  of  our  text 
belongs to the Lectures of  1826,and the other to the Lectures of 1828 and 29. 
young  Numic]ian, and  a  descendant  of  Ifasinissa,  who  was 
,.hell  stayillg  at Rome,  and who had  been  led by the consul, 
sp. Albinus, to entertain hopes of  succeeding to the throne  of 
Nunlidia;  Jugurtha  escaped  to  Africa  in  safety, leaving  his 
sureties behind him.  The senate, however, now annulled  the 
transactions  \vith  Jugurtha,  though none  of  his accotnplices 
were punished, and sent the consul Sp. Albinus with an army 
to  Africa.  He conducted  the  war  in  a  slow  and  careless 
manner, and on returning to Rome to be present at the consular 
electiolls,  entrusted the conimand to  his  brother  Aulus,  who 
allowed himself to be imposed upon to such an extent that he 
was surrounded by the Numidians.  Jugurtha with  his  gold 
now worked upon the army, and not only strangers, but even 
Roman  tribunes  allowed  themselves  to  bc  bought;  then 
when all was ~reparcd,  Aulus was  attacked, defeated  and lost 
his camp;  he was obliged to conclude a disgraceful treaty with 
Jugurtha, which however was not sanctioned at Rome. 
As matters had gone so far, it was impossible to hush  them 
up any longer.  Q. Caecilius Metellus  now obtained  the com- 
mand, and was  provided  with  great  military  forces.  Three 
quacstors were appointed to inquire into the transactions with 
Jogurtha;  -they  were equites,  and  did  not  forin  a  popular 
court,-one  of  them  was  M. Scaurus, who according  to  the 
statcment  of  Sallust2, was  in danger of  being  implicated  in 
the inquiry, but was so skilful as to contrive to get this office in 
order to conceal thc part he himself  had taken in former pro- 
ceedings; he accordingly carricd  the investigations no furthcr 
than was consistent with his own safety.  Many of his accom- 
plices, and among them Opimus who now had to atone for the 
murder  of  Gracchus, were  condemned, and  the whole party 
completely lost the  public  favour.  It is  inconceivable  how 
Cicero could be mistaken about  a man  like  Opimius;  but  in 
judging of a person  we  should  never  blindly  follow  others; 
those who then fell were assuredly all  guilty.  It is  unfortu- 
nate that we do not know  these  quaestiones  very  accurately; 
but this much is certain, that by the disclosure of the bareness 
of the optimatea, these people, who wanted to be looked  upon 
as the best, received a blow from  which t]ley never recovered. 
The  equites  who  were  now  the  judices  formed  a  dccided 
o~position  to the senators.  From  this  moment  the  division 
Jicgrrth. 40. 
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began,  which  afterwards  led  to  the  civil war  between  the 
parties of Marius and Sulla.  Respecting  the internal liistory 
of Rome dnring this time  little  is  known, and  not  even  the 
names of those who were put  to death by the sentence of  the 
quaestors.  That  Opinlius  and Bestia  fcll  is  certain, but  in  .  known.  regard to othcrs little iL 
Metellus conducted the war for two years in a manner which 
deserves our greatest respect, although he made some mistakes ; 
but inany of his exploits are among the most brilliant recorded 
in history.  For the details I refer you  to Sallust.  Jugurtha 
engaged  in an  open  battle  only  once,  and lost it.  Metellus 
was the son  of  Metellus Macedonicus,  and obtained  the sur- 
name  Numidicus.  He is  one  of  those  characters that  are 
easily misunderstood:  we  cannot  say unconditionally that  he 
was a nobleminded  man, for  although  a plebeian, he was  full 
of the prejudices and  selfishnesss of  the nobles.  He had from 
his childhood entertained the conviction, that the  government 
must be conducted in an honest manner.  He  patronised persons 
born in humbler stations, for he had great regard for real merit, 
but hc required tliat they should put a  check upon themselves 
and not strive after the highest offices.  In this light we must 
view his relation to Marius, to whom he was at first favourably 
disposed; but  as  soon  as  Marius  sued  for  the  consulship, 
Metellus, in the blindness of passion, bccame his enemy.  Men 
like Metellus are found to this day among the high nobility of 
England, who look upon the  privileges of their own  order as 
the first and  most  inalienable  of  all  rights, and  who  when 
crimes committed  by members of  their  own order  are  to  be 
inquired into, step forward to gloss over the foul stains.  These 
considerations  make  the  remarkable  character  of  Metellus 
rquite  clear : his  personal  character  was  quite  blameless, but 
his pride did not permit him to be just.  He rejected  all  the 
proposals of Jugurtha, employed the king's own Punic artifices 
against him, so as to oblige him to disarm, in order to purchase 
hopes which were  not realised;  and  when  Jugurtha  actually 
wanted to  escape, by making  concessions,  froin  the destruc- 
tion  which  he  clearly  saw  before  his  eyes,  Metellus  made 
demands which  would  have  rendered  him quite  defenceless. 
Jugurtha again  showed a mixture of  pusillanimity  and bold- 
ness, and an inability to accommodate  himself  to  his  circurn- 
stances.  He wished  to surrender hinlself to Metellus, having 
already  surrelldered  all  his  arms  and elep!~aats and 200,000 
pounds of  silver; but when  the time  came for  delivering up 
his own person, he fled to the desert  districts of Mount Atlas, 
although he had deprived himself of all resources. 
The  war however was  protracted, and  110  one  kncw  how 
long it would yet last,  when the  opinion became prcvale~lt  at 
Rome that it was the fault of Metellus that it had not yet bccn 
brought to a close, although no one had  reason  to doubt  his 
virtue.  He was incorruptible,  disinterested, a grcat statesman 
and general, and his ~ersonal  character was respected, but his 
preteilsions were unbearable;  and it cannot be denied that this 
trait in his character brought great sufferings upon his country, 
ancl that the immense  irritation of  Marius would never  have 
beell roused had not the whole party of the o~tiinates  set their 
engines to  work to  keep  him  down.  The  accounts  of  the 
ancients respecting the descent  of Marius  do not  agree  with 
one another: sollie represent  him as a man of  very low birth, 
others  (Velleius  Patcrculus)  raise  him  somewhat  higllcrz; 
but  it  is  quite  certain  that his  ancestors  were  clients  of  a 
municipal family of  Arpinum, which docs not  however imply 
that they were not free  men.  His name  is  Campnnian, and 
consequently Oscan:  it is  probable, that  his  fanlily  removcd 
from Campania  to Arpinum, and  there becaillc  clients of  the 
Herennii.  He was poor; but this  did not  do hini any  harm: 
and I also believe  it to  be  true tliat  he served  at first  as  a 
common soldier, and that at a still earlicr period he worlrcd as a 
field labourer.*  But his extraordinary genius must  soon  have 
become manifest,  otherwise he would nevcr have bcen  ablc to 
rise so high; for it was a rarc occurrence among  the Romans, 
especially  in later  times, for  a  common  soldier  to rise above 
the rank of a military tribune, unless  indeed he  had  the very 
best connexions.  But Marius  rose  without  them.  He was 
early  known  at  Rome  as  an  able  centurion,  and  when  hc 
~ffered  himself  for  the military  tribuneship,  he  elected 
with great applause.  At the time when he callie forward as a 
candiclatc for the aedileship, he must have acquired considerable 
property; but he was unsuccessful.  Soon afterwards, however, 
he  obtained  the praetorship, in  which oace  Ile  acted  very 
1lonorably; but even  then  the oligarchs acted  badly  towards 
l'llltarch,  Mar. 3; Vcll  Paterc. ii.11; Snllnst, Juyzrrth.  63. 
See the paisage of Jul-end, quoted in TO].  iii. p. 11. 
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him.5  He, however,  maintained  his  ground  against  their 
charge  of  ambitus,  which  was  at that  time  an  every-day 
occurrence;  for every one was accustomed to spend his money 
when  he offered  himself  as  a  candidate  for  any  office, and 
then  to makc the  crime, of  which  hc himself  was  guilty, a 
charge  against  his  competitors.  When  Metellus  went  to 
Numidia, he made Marius one of his legates.  It was  at  that 
time not very uncommon for a homo novus to rise to the  office 
of praetor;  and  when  Saliuste  says  that  a  homo  novus  had 
never before obtaincd thc  consulship, he is mistal<en; for  out 
of the six praetors, four usually rose to the consuls2iip; and  it 
was in this w,~y  that  Fannius had  becn  made  consul.  The 
children of' a praetor, however, were not homines novi. 
Marius, who at the time of  the Jugurtlline war must have 
been a man of my age (1829), about fifty  years old, signalised 
himself  greatly in the Roman army in Numidia.  I-Ie was very 
superstitious, and here we find, for the  first time, a superstition 
pointing to the East; he was always accompanied by a Syrian, 
probably  a  Jewish,  prophetess,  of the name  of  Martha,  in 
whose counsels  he had  implicit  faith.7  Once,  while  he was 
offering a sacrifice, something had  happened  which,  as he be- 
lieved,  promised  him  thc  highest  honours  of  the rep~blic.~ 
Encouraged by this omcn, he resolved to seek the consulship. 
This presumption was more than Metellus could brook, and he 
therefore tried  to  dissuade  him  from it, and to detain him in 
the camp, by throwing ridicule on his  ambitious scheme.  But, 
when Marius resolutely applied to Metellus for leave to go to 
Rome, the lattcr forgot himself  so  far  as to say  that he need 
not be in a hurry to obtain  a  refusal,  and that he had better 
wait until his (Metellus')  son could bc elected as his colleague. 
The son of  Metellus was  a young  man  of  about  twenty, and 
had according to the leges annales, to wait twenty years longer 
before he was allowed to sue for the consulship.  Marius never 
forgot this mockery:  he was  enraged  and got his  friends  at 
Rome to exert their influence with the  people  in his  favour. 
Metcllus now for the sake of  appearances yielded, hoping that 
Marius would arrive too late, as he did not grant him lcave  of 
absence till twelve days before  theelection.  Marius, however, 
reached the coast with  immense  exertions; and a  favourable 
wind enabled him to arrive at Rome before the day of  election; 
Plutarch, Mur. 5.  Vz~qurth.  63.  Plutarch, Mar. 17. 
Plutarch,iMar. 8; Sallust, I. c. 
he Was received by the people with extraordinary favour, and 
was elected consul by a great lnajorit~. 
~t is unjust  to  call  the  Gracclzi  demagogues,  but Marius 
deserves that name in-the fullest sense.  He flattered the  po- 
pulace, as othcrs flatter men of influence, and took pleasure in 
appearing among  them  as  one  of  tlieir equals.  He was not 
fit  for  the time in ~vhich  he lived; for he had a peculiar kind 
of  pride,  which  many  circumstances  tended  to wound;  this 
perpetual irritation exasperated him, and led him into his un- 
fortunate career.  Greek education and  Greek  literature were 
then as prevalent, and thought  to be  as necessary, as an inti- 
mate  acquaintance  with French literature was  in my youth; 
and, if we recall to our minds that period of  our own  history, 
we may understand how great the demand for Greek literature 
must have been at that time.  Cato learned  Greek  in his  old 
age; but he did learn it, and was very familiar with the litera- 
ture of his own country also.  Marius did not, like him, cling to 
the earlier traditions, which were  already beginning to disap- 
pear; he was  undoubtedly acquainted with Greek, which  was 
then quite necessary in society, but he despised it, as well  as 
the litcrature which was then fashionable among the Romans, 
but  which  was  unknown  to  Marius.  He possessed  great 
wealth, which can have been acquired only in war; and it is a 
remarkable characteristic  of  the times,  that lie was neverthe- 
less considered  as  a  man  of  incorruptible  manners,  as  a  vir 
sanctus;  merely  because he had  not  robbed  the republic like 
the majority  of  his  coiztemporarics;  whereas,  in the  earlier 
times, Fabricius, Curius and otliers were thougl.it sancti, because 
they pos~esscd  none of the luxuries of  life.  Marius' talents  as 
a general were  immense, and it was the consciousness of  his 
superiority  in this respect that bore him aloft.  The opinion 
of the nation was not divided on this point.  He was  as great 
on the day of  battle, as in the disposition of  his  troops and in 
the art of  fortifying his  camp;  and  in the  management of' a 
campaign  he was  unrivalled.  He had  few  friends,  for  tllc 
prominent features of his character were bitterness, hatefulncss, 
and cruelty;  but  he was,  at the same  time,  the man 
Providence  had  sent  to  save  Rome; his  bad  clualities  were 
forth by those who oppressed  and  provoked  so extraor- 
dinary and  distinguished  a  man.  Mctcllus,  when  compared 
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hostile encounter wit11 him, he ~ould  have been  instantly  de- 
feated;  for Marius was an extraordinary man, of great foresight, 
and free from all rashness.  At tiines when it was necessary  to 
act, llis energy knew no bounds; and he had at once the clearest 
possible insight into all the circumstances and relations  of  the 
case.  His  hatred  of  the optin~ates  led him to bring  many a 
charge against them, which,  although really  unjust, appeared 
to him  perfectly just. 
The tribunes  of  the  people  at Rome  proposed  that  the 
province of  Nnmidia, should extra ordinem be assigned before 
hand, and  as  the people  unanimously agreed to this, Marius, 
after being raised to the consulship, received the command  to 
bring the war against  Jugurtha to a close.  On this occasion, 
Metellus  again shewed a mean spirit.  Not being able  to bear 
the sight of Marius, he departed  to Rome in secrets,  leaving 
the army to his legate Rutilius,  an excellent man, who  after- 
wards became the victim  of  party spirit,  by joining the oppo- 
nents of the optiinates; for  the democratic party as soon as it 
had gained the upper  hand,  showed  itself just as bad as  the 
oligarchic party had been before.  Marius terminated the war 
in less than two years,  showing  on all occasions the greatest 
boldness and ability.  Sallust  describes  this  cspecially  in his 
account of  the siege  of  Capsa,  how he dispersed the cavalry, 
etc.  The  Romans  did  not  advance  much  beyond  Cirta, 
and  Jugurtha went  to Bocchus,  king  of  Mauretania.  with 
whom  he was  connected  by marriage, and who  had  at first 
assisted  him  in  the  war,  but  soon  listened  to  proposals 
of  the  Romans,  and by delivering  up  Jugurtha into their 
hands  madc  peace  with  them.  This  took  place  after much 
deliberation, Bocchus hesitating for !a  long time,  and wishing 
to detain Sulla, who  conducted the  negotiations.  At length 
he gave  up Jugurtl~a,  who afterwards  adorned the triumph 
of  Marius.  A  part  of  Numidia  was  added  to  the  pro- 
vince  of  Africa; but the  greater portion  remained  an inde- 
pendent kingdom,  the kings of  which  probably belonged  to 
the family of  Masinissa, but we do not know the particulars. 
Juba, in  the time of  the Caesarian  war, was  descended  from 
the anonymous king who now succeeded.  Bocchus was recog- 
nised as an independent sovereign. 
The war against Jugurtha was  thus concluded; and it was 
s~~ll~~st,  Juqurth. 8fi. 
high tilne indeed,  for  the  republic  required  the  talents  of 
jgarius  in  a  war,  conlpared  with  which  that  against  the 
~~~idi~~  king was little and insignificant.  The Cimbri  and 
Teutones were expected  on  the frontiers of  Italy, after  they 
had cut to  the armies of  Q. Servilius  Caepio and  Cn. 
Mmlius.  Marius,  by the unani~nous  call  of  the nation, was 
appointed consul for the second  time, contrary to the existillg 
laws, which, on the one hand, did not allow a man to be made 
consul in his absence, and on tlie other hand, required that the 
salne pcrson should not be re-elected till after the lapse of  ten 
years.  Marius triumphed on new year's day, on which he also 
entered on his second consulship. 
The Cimbril" were not  real  Gauls, but Cymri, of  the same 
stock as that to wliich  belonged  the Welsh, the  Basbrctons, 
the early inhabitants of  Cumberland (which derives its name 
from them, and where traces of  the Cymrian language existed 
till  about  100 years  ago),  and  the whole  western  coast  of 
England.  Whether Ulster was inhabited  by Cymri, is uncer- 
tain.  The Picts  of  Scotland  were  likewise  Cymri,  and the 
Belgae  also  belonged  to the same  race;  they were,  to somc 
extent,  mixed  with the Gael,  but the Cyinri  must  have  pre- 
dominated  among  them.  In their  great  migration,  in  the 
fourth and fifth centuries, they went as far as the Ukraine, and 
under the name of  Celto-Scythae, extended eastward as far as 
or even beyond  the river  Dnieper,  where  they  were  called 
Galatians.  But the whole questic-in about  thcse  nations  is 
one which  we cannot  settle with  proper  accuracy.  Through 
circumstances with whicli we  are imperfectly  acquainted,  but 
probably,  by the progress  of  the  Sarlnatians or  Slavonians, 
these tribes had  been  driven  from  their  abodes,  and  threw 
thcmselves back  upon  their own kinsmen  in Moldavia, Wal- 
lachia, Hungary, etc.  They first expelled the Bastarnae, then 
the Scorcliscans and Tauriscans; and, before tlie outbreak of tllc 
Jl~gurthinc  war,  in  A. U. 639, they appcarcd  in Noricum,  on 
the frontier of  Italy, which extcnded in reality over Carintllia 
and Croatia, as far as the bay of  Trieste-a  district which mas 
already inhabited  by Gauls who were under  tllc  protection of 
tllc I<olnans, as is always the case with small tribes living near 
a  po~crf~l  nation without  being  subject to it.  The Cimbri, 
'O  Compare Lectures,vol. i.  p.  323. 
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who remained behind, appeared on the middle Danube and in 
Bohemia,  attacking  the  Boians, a  kindred  tribe,  as  well  as 
foreigners, in order to acquire a territory to live in; but they 
were  repelled.  It must  have  been  there,  on  the  middle 
Danube,  that  they attacked  all  with  whom  they  came  in 
contact,  and  joined  the  Teutones.  That  the  latter  were 
Germans, as  even their  name indicates,  is  as  certain  as  that 
the Cimbri were  Cymri, or, more  generally spcalcing, Gauls. 
Many  Gallic  words  have  a  general  affinity to the Cymrian, 
and yet the languages  differ  so much from  each other, that 
the Cymri and Gauls do not  understand  one another, though 
both are comprised under the generic name of the Gallic nation. 
The Teutones may have been pushed forward, like the Cimbri, 
by the progress of  the Sarmatians from the East.  If what  is 
related  from  Pytheas' travels  is  true, that he found  the Teu- 
tones  on  the east  coast  of  Prussia,  it would  seem probable 
that they were pushed forward by the Sarmatians from northern 
Poland.  In Gaul they evidently appear  as the companions of 
the Cimbri, and the names of  the leaders of  the two  nations 
show  that the one was  a  Gallic  and  the other  a  Germanic 
people;  but whether the Cimbri  and  Teutones had  already 
united  their  forces  in  Noricum,  or  whether  their  junction 
took place subsequently is unknown. 
The Romans sent out an army to protect the Carnians under 
the consul Cn. Papirius Carbol2, probably a son of the Carbo who 
had put an end to his life when accused by L. Licinius Crassus; 
but he was defeated in 639, in the neighbourhood of Noreia, by 
the Cimbri, who seem to have fought alone there.  The Cimbri, 
satisfied with this victory, did not follow- it up by descending 
into Italy, either because they were overawed  by the name of 
the Romans,  or  for  other reasons  unknown  to us.  What is 
surprising is,  that they spread over the mountainous parts of 
Austria and Bavaria, to the north of  the Alps, districts which 
were then inhabited  by Celts, and whence they proceeded  to 
Gaul.  In the general  state of  dissolution, they were joined 
by the Tigurini, a tribe from Helvetia,  and by the Ambrones. 
From what country the latter came  is totally unknown;  one 
might almost suspect that they were Ligurians from the Alpine 
mountains, but the question  is  an  inextricable problem.  The 
Cimbri with their associates now threw themselves  into Gaul, 
l2  Appian, De Reb.  Gall. 15; Livy, Epit. 63. 
like a horde of no made^, with an immense number of waggons 
loaded with women, children,  and  booty.  These four tribes, 
solnetimes  united,  sometimes  separated,  thus  fell  upon  the 
civilised world.  It  is difficult  to determine the places where 
they defeated  M.  Junius  Silanus and M. Aurelius  scaur~s~~, 
for our accounts are incredibly scanty, as Livy is here wanting, 
and Zonaras could not make use of the seventeen books of Dion 
Cassius,  are lost.  According to one statement, it might 
almost seem that in one of  these battles  the Romans had ad- 
vanced as far as La Roclielle, between Poitou and the Garonne.ls 
Another defeat was sustained  near the lake of  Geneva by the 
consul L. Cassius Longinusl"  and the Romans had to purchase 
permission to depart by giving up half of their baggage.  Thus 
defeat  followed  defeat.  The Romans wished  to  protect  the 
Transalpine Gauls,  but all attempts failed.  These ravages of 
the Cimbri brought,  for the moment, infinite misery upon the 
Gauls.  The whole country between the Rhone, nay we may say 
between the Rhine and the Pyrenees,  was ravaged and weak- 
ened; and thus was prepared the way for the victories of Caesar, 
for the towns were  taken  and destroyed,  and the inhabitants 
cruelly treated.  Of all the Gallic tribes the Belgae alone made 
a successful stand against the Cimbri. 
Tlze greatest defeat which the Romans suffered  in this war, 
was on the river Rhone,  the year  after the first consulship of 
Marius.  The proconsul  Q. Servilius  Caepio  and the  consul 
Cn. Manlius undertook the war in that year with two consular 
armies.  The number of the slain, which is stated to have been 
80,000 Romans and Italians1"  does  not seem to be historical, 
unless  we  supposc  that  a  great number  of  Gallic auxiliaries 
served in the Roman armies.  The two consular armies, how- 
ever, were  totally annihilated.17  The consequence  was,  that 
Marius,  now again the only man on whom the nation fixed its 
hopes,  was  made consul  for  the second  time; and  even  his 
political adversaries, seeing the very existence  of  the republic 
endangered, supported his elevation.  It was fortunate for the 
Livy, Epit. 66 and 67; Florus, iii. 3; Asconius I'edian.  in  Cornel. 
l4  Orouius, v.  15. 
Livy, Epit.  65; Orosius, v.  15; compare Caesar, De  Bello Gull.  i.  12. 
According to Orosius (v.  16,)Valerius Alltias was the only authority fbr this 
numbcr.-N.  Compare Livy, Epit. 67. 
"  Dion  Cass.  Excerpt.  Vales. p. 631 ; Florus, iii.  3 ;  Eutrop.  V.  1 ;  Vell. 
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Romans that  the Cimbri,  after  their great victory,  turned to 
Spain,  either because they drcaded the passage over the Alps, 
or because  they shrunk  from  attaching  the Romans  in their 
own country.  They now for  a few years ranged  over  Spain, 
which the Eomans were  unable to protect,  and the  ravages 
which they made thcre were perhaps as great as those inflicted 
on the same  country by the  Suevi and Vandals,  in tlle fifth 
century of  our aera.  Even  places which  surrendered  to the 
barbarians,  were  treated  in the most  fearful  manner.  The 
Celtiberians shewed their usual bravery, and maintained tliem- 
selves in their towns, preferring to fecd on the corpses of their 
own citizens, to falling into the hands of the barbarians;  while 
other places were  taken  and destroyed.  This perseverance of 
the Celtiberians  induced  thc  Cimbri to give up the hope of 
conquering Spain, and to go back to Gaul. 
The devastation of Gaul bclongs to tlic tinie of the Jugurthine 
war  under  Metellus,  and the expedition  of  the Cimbri into 
Spain, to the second and third consulships of Marius.  For the 
ill success of  their arms induced the Romans  to  confer  upon 
him tlie consulship for the third time, and even his enemies sup- 
ported him, seeing that there was no one else to save the republic. 
All the Roman armies were destroyed except that which came 
from  Numidia.  Marius  therefore  devoted  the  time  of  his 
second and third consulships to the forming and training of a 
new army.  The elements  of  which the Roman  armies  con- 
sisted  had  degencratcd  with  the social  and  political  condi- 
tion  of  the pcoplc:  the population  no longcr  consisted  of  a 
free  peasantry,  and  armies could be  raised  only from a mass, 
which dcscrved no other name than that of  a populace.  The 
taslr of Marius,  to  make well  disciplined  soldiers  out of  such 
materials,  was  very difficult  incleed,  and one which  he alone 
could accomplish,  being himself  an excellent soldier,  and re- 
quiring every one else to be the same.  The reinnants of former 
armies were  for  the most  part  utterly  demoralised,  and the 
army which he formed, consisted of foul-hearted recruits of the 
very worst  description,  and of veterans whom he had brought 
ovcr from Africa.  That Ma]-ius was the originator of the great 
change in the Roman tactics whicli we see in Caesar, is a con- 
jecture which has been  expressed  even  before this time,  espe- 
cially by  Coloncl  Guichard.  The  cl~ange  can  in fact  have 
been the worlr only of a man who always made his arrangements 
so as to answer present  purposes.  Until the time of  hlarius, 
and even as late as tile Nuinidian campaigns,  we find mention 
of the princQes,  triarii, and hastati;  it is true, we have no great 
historical  in the Latin language relative  to the period 
subsequent to Marius,  but we  have an  accurate  knowledge of 
the legions of  Caesar,  and in them we  find neither princ@es, 
haslati, nor triarii;  nothing but pilani ;  the lance had been dis- 
used, and only the pilum and sword were retained.  The drawing 
up of  the soldiers in maniples1"ikewise  disappears,  and the 
legion is drawn up in a line ten men deep, with a corresponding 
reserve; when an army is divided into corps, the dispositioll is 
not thereby altered; for the differcnt corps, too, arc not drawn 
up in maniples,  en e'chelons,  but in lines one behind the other, 
A legion is divided into sixty centuries, whereas in the earliest 
times it was divided into five cohorts,  each cohort  containing 
thirty centuries of  thirty men  each; and the legion is raised 
from 4,500 to 6,000 men.  The light troops are kept separate; 
and the legion  is no longer a brigade,  but has become  an ex- 
tremely strong regiment,  in which all the mcn  have the same 
armour; and the cavalry is independent of the legion.  Another 
very  essential  change  for  whicli  Marius  has  been  grcatly 
censured  is,  that in levying an  army he did  not  act  in the 
manner which  had previously becn  customary.  Formerly all 
those who possessed less than 12,500, but more than 1500 ases, 
were employed only as a reserve;  subsequently all men whose 
property came  up to 1000 sesterces  (400 denarii) were  levied 
for the line, and those who possessed less were employed in the 
flect; but Marius now took every able-bodied man, though he 
might be as poor as  a  bcggar.  According  to  the  notions  of 
the olden time, this was certainly a bad  thing; for in the early 
times  it was  quite  right  to  employ in the  defence  of  their 
country only those who were  expected to have  an interest in 
the preservation  of  the constitution:  but at that time,  there 
were no stancling armies; and as soon as these became customary, 
it was less hard for a  person  who had  no property  to remain 
for years in a province, than for the only son of a family wl~ich 
had property to do SO.  That which  hiid  formerly been right, 
had  therefore now  ccascd  to  be  so,  in  consequence  of  the 
change of circumstances.  1 may say in general, that, although 
I fully admit the heavy  sins,  and, if  you  like,  the  vices, of 
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Marius, yet I consider it unreasonable to speak of him,  as if it 
had been a misfortune for the republic that he was born.  There 
can be no doubt that he deserved  his great reputation.  His 
cruelties are not to be excused; but he was a great man, and it 
is  our duty to try to understand  and explain  his  sins.  Two 
such different characters as Cicero and Caesar were very partial 
to Marius.  Caesar,  as  a boy,  was  attached  to him with  his 
whole soul, his aunt Julia being married to Marius; and Cicero, 
in spite of his party, was proud of being a native of  Arpinum 
and a countryman of Marius. 
LECTURE LXXXII. 
ELEVEN  years had now elapsed  since the first  appearance  of 
the Cimbri, a proof of  the rapidity of those migrations west- 
wards which never had  any bounds.  Had the Cimbri  been 
successful in Spain, it is very possible that they would  have 
crossed  over  into  Africa.  Marius  was  obliged  to  raise  an 
army as  well  as  he could; the veterans  from  Numidia  were 
the only soldiers that were not in a demoralised condition, and 
he accordingly was obliged to prepare the new soldiers for the 
war, by mixing among them the few victorious  veterans.  In 
his  fourth  consulship  the army was  ready  to take the field. 
Even in his third consulship he was in southern Gaul, on the 
banks of the Rhone, probably on the frontiers of Provence and 
Dauphin&,  between  Arles and Avignon.  He had chosen that 
district, as  near as he could safely to the enemy, as the place 
for  exercising  his troops, which he had compelled to acquire 
extreme activity.  Whoever was unable to bear the hardships 
perished;  but the rest  were  all  the better  soldiers.  As the 
Rhone,  like all  the rivers  of  the Mediterranean,  fills up its 
mouth with mud and sand, he quickly formed a canal to keep 
up a free communication with the sea.  In his fourth consal- 
ship  he advanced  as  far  as  the confluence  of  the IsQre and 
Rhone, expecting that the Cimbri and Teutones would return 
from  Spain.  It was  generally believed  that they would  take 
the same road  across the Alps as  EIancibal  had  chosen; the 
~~~l~ had of course forgotten their hostile feelings towards the 
R~,~~~~~,  and now looked upon thein as their protectors.  If it 
is true that Blarius was  obliged to have recourse to intrigues 
to obtain his fourth consulship, it is a bad sign, and shows the 
blindness of the oligarchy. 
The barbarians,  for  reasons which we do not know, shewed 
no inclination  to attack  Marius.  The Cimbri separated their 
troops  from  those  of  the Teutones,  and marched  round  the 
northern foot of the Alps towards Noricum, in order to invade 
Italy from that quarter, while the Teutones reiiiained in Gaul. 
The reason why Marius now retreated from Valence to Aquae 
Sextiac is  not mentioned in our meagre accounts, like many 
other things connected with this war.  The Cimbri passed by 
the  Roman  camp,  jcering  and  mocking  their  enemies,  and 
marched around Switzeriand, for  between  the Pennine Alps 
and those  of  Trent there was  at that period  no practicable 
road for  such hosts with their waggons.  The only road was 
that over the Little St. Bernard, and this they could not take 
on account  of the Romans.  Some, however, may have gone 
across  Mount  St. Gothard  and  the  Splugen.  The  Romans 
sent another  army under the consul,  C. Lutatius Catulus,  to 
meet  the Cimbri in the Italian  part of  Tyrol, in the neigh- 
bourhood  of  Trent: but in point  of  discipline this army was 
quite  the reverse  of  that of  Marius; just  as  Catulus  himself 
was the very opposite  of  Marius in acquirements  and accom- 
plishments;  for according to Cicerol,  he was  well acquainted 
with  Greek  literature,  having even  left his  memoirs  written 
in Greek,  as was then customary with  well educated men  at 
Iiome,  for Latin prose had not yet been  sufficiently cultivated 
by grcat authors, just  as Frederic the Great wrote his memoirs 
in French.  The loss  of  Livy's  books  on this period  is irre- 
pamble,  for  we  know  absolutely  no more  of  it than  of  the 
earlier  centuries;  and properly speaking, we know less of the 
enormous  efforts made  in t,he war  against  the  Cimbri  and 
Teutones, than of the migration of nations, and of the struggles 
against tile barbarians at the beginning  of  the fifth century of 
our era.  Orosius is  here our best  authority,  and sometimes 
we must be satisfied with Florus.  All these epitomisers, how- 
ever,  Orosius,  Eutropius, Florus,  though  full of mutual con- 
tracliction% derive their lnaterials froin Livy.  The account of 
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Plutarch is independent of  Livy, and furnishes most detail on 
the Cimbrian mar. 
Inen the  Ciinbri  had  gone  away,  the  Teutones  and 
Ambrones followed  Marius with increased confidence  in their 
own strength,  as is generally the case when  an enemy seems 
to take  to  flight.  In what  direction  the Tigurini went  is 
unknown.  From  an  expression  in  the  epitomisers  which 
Plutarch passes over, it would appcar that the barbarians took 
the camp  of  Marius; but this  cannot  have  happened  at the 
encampment near  which  the  battle  was  fought,  for  in  the 
march towards it, and in the whole  disposition  of  the army, 
we  recognise  a  retreat  and a  forced  pitching  of  the  camp. 
Marius, therefore, was obliged to pitch  his  camp in a position 
where there was no water, so  that the soldiers had to fetch it 
from a  distant well, and could not  safely do so without  their 
arms.  Hence  they  demanded  to  be  led  to battle.  Marius 
wanted first to form a fortified camp, for the enemy was quite 
near,  and the circumstances  unfavourable;  but he could not 
carry his point, for the distress was so great, that some of the 
men  attending  on  the baggzge  went,  in their  despair,  to a 
piece  of  water  quite close to thc enemy.  There  they  were 
attacked by the Ambrones.  The soldiers went to their assist- 
ance;  first  the  Ligurians,  then  one  cohort  after  another 
hastened  towards  them  without  Marius'  orders.  Thus  an 
engagement ensued, in which,  for  some unknown  reason,  tlic 
Teutones took no part; but they had probably not yet arrived. 
Even in this skirmish  the Romans gained  a brilliant victory, 
and the greater  part of  the Alnbrones were  destroyed; but, 
nevertheless,  the  Romans  not  having  a  fortified  camp  spent 
the following  night  in  uneasiness,  and in working  at their 
ramparts.  The next battle  was  not fought on the following 
day, as was expected, but on the second day, probably because 
the Teutones and the rest  of the Ambrones did not arrive till 
then.  Marius prepared every thing with the talent of a  great 
general, and sent M. Claudius Marcellus (whose  family always 
had able men, and who was probably a grandson of the worthy 
illarcellus  in the  Iberian  war,  who  was  five  tiines  consul), 
probably with  a  detachment  of  allies,  to attack  the enemy's 
rear.  This plan was successful, as it frustrated the attacks of 
+(he  barbarians upon the Roman camp.  Even before, the fury 
of  the  Teutones  had  failed  against  the firmness  and  perse- 
verance of the Romans, especially as it was summer, for south- 
ern nations have lnucl~  stronger muscles, and can endure much 
more, both cold and heat,  than we  can.  It is  an erroneous 
.+ion  tllat  tlley can bear less cold than we; for in Napoleon's 
in Russia  the  Italians held out much longer than 
the otller soldiers.  The Romans therefore  supported the heat 
of the sun far better than the Teutones.  The Romans were 
stationed 011  a hill, where they were attacked, but drove down 
the enemy, and when they endeavoured  to rally again in the 
+in,  Marcellus  fell upon their rear.  One part  edeavo~red 
to save  itself  by  flight,  but was cut to ~ieces  by the Gauls. 
The chief of the Teutones was  captured by the Sequani;  the 
remainder  of his army retreated  to their waggons, but could 
not maintain their ground, the Romans attacking them there 
also;  the whole  nation  was  literally  almost  annihilated,  for 
those who survived  the battle put an end to their own lives, 
and only a few were sold as s1,zves.g 
Whcn half of  the danger had thus been removed, the Cim- 
bri marched  through  Tyrol,  and descended from the Alps of 
Trent into Italy.  It  was  not  thc fault of  Catulus  that they 
succeeded in this, the cause  being the immense  superiority of 
the barbarians in numbers, and the terror which they spread. 
Orosius3 is  the only ancient writer  on these  events, in whom 
we  rejoicc  to  find  a  pure source of  information;  the narra- 
tive  of  Florus, where he describes  the manner in which  the 
Ciinbri opened  the roads  is  perfectly  childish,  for  he speaks 
of  them  as  if  they  had  been  the most  senseless  of  barba- 
rians,  who  wished  to  check  the  current  of  the  Adige 
with their  hands.  Had Florus  not  been  the  homo  umbra- 
ticus  he  really  was,  hc  would  have  known  that when  an 
arlny has to march through a river, the cavalry ride through 
it in close  columns  at a highcr  part,  which  most  assuredly 
docs  check  the  current  of  the  river,  and  greatly  facili- 
tates the passage for the inf:antry below:  in many parts of the 
river Ad&,  this method is particularly successful.  The Cimbri 
haye tried something of the same kind, and have believed 
that with their gigantic bodies, they might check the river;  but 
this is impossible  in the Adige as it is at Legnano.  Florus 
f'lrthe*  says  that  tllcy  threw trees  into the river,  intending 
P1utxr~llt  Jfc~rills,  19, foil.; Livy, Epit,  69; Veil. Paterc. ii. 12. 
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thereby  to stop  its course;  but  I  cannot  believe  that  they 
were so foolish  as to imagine anything of  the sort.  If they 
threw trees into the river, it was certainly because they wanted 
to make a bridge, or to break down the bridge of the Romans; 
and this plan could not but succeed.  The  Romans  were sta- 
tioned at each end of the bridge, on both  sides  of  the river; 
one part  was  cut off, and obliged to surrender to the Cimbri, 
but they were set free in an uncommonly humane manner.  It 
must be regarded as true, also, that on their  passage  over  the 
most impassable Alps, they slided down the sides of the moun- 
tains, seated on their shields as on sledges.  Lutatius Catulus, 
being unable  to hold  out  against  the rapid progrcss  of  the 
Cimbri, retreated even bcyol~d  the river Po.  The whole coun- 
try north of  that river was  laid  waste;  the towns of  Verona, 
Mantua, Brescia, and others, were left to the protection of their 
own walls, and defended themselves, but the open places were 
destroyed.  From the winter until the following summer, the 
Cimbri, we do not know why, tarried in the country north of 
the  Po.  We  are completely in the dark as to what else  took 
place. 
Marius was informed in Gaul of the invasion of the barbarians, 
ordered his army to march, apparently towards Genoa in Ligu- 
ria, and went himself to Rome.  There all were full of admir- 
ation of  him; and the belief  that he alone  could save Eome 
was so universal, that even the oligarchs supported his re-elec- 
tion to the consulship for the fifth time.  The anxiety to gain 
his good-will was so great, that a triumph was offered to him, 
but he declined it until he should have conquered the Ciinbri; 
and this confidence on his part found its way  into  the hearts 
of  all.  Marius  now  united  his  forces with those of Catulus, 
who had remained with his army as proconsul.  Both  crossed 
the Po with a force of solnewhat more than 52,000 men.  We 
are told that the  Cimbri knew  nothing  of  the  defeat  of  the 
Teutones, which is a perfect absurdity; for it  is impossible that 
during the period from the autumn till July, they should not 
have received any information.  There can be no doubt that 
the feeling, that half  their  power  was  destroyed, led them to 
demand of Marius a country to live in; and if  they made  the 
same demand for their brethren, they can  have been  no other 
than the Tigurini. Whether the Cimbri wished to secure their 
passage back into Gaul, in orcler that in case of need they might 
be able to retreat across the little St. Bernard, and whether for 
this  reason  they  went  to Vercelli, is uncertain; but notwith- 
standing all the different readings, it seems to be an established 
fact, tllat the battle was  fought near Vercelli, on  the slope  of 
the Alps.  I cannot see how it could have occurred to any one 
to place it in that corner of  Loinbardy, had  it not been so rc- 
corded.  The  place  of  the  battle  is  called  Calnpi  l3audii. 
Contrary to the Roman custom, the battle was announced three 
clays beforehand, and it was  fought on the 3rd before  the ca- 
lends of  Sextilis, that is, on  the 29th of July, as the calendar 
then stood.  Thus long had the Cimbri tarried in that unhealthy 
country of .Lombarciy, where fevers are so common and water 
so bad for drinking.  They had ravaged it ever since the begin- 
ning of  winter, and epidemics had already broken  out among 
them.  On  the  clay  of the battle, Marius placed  the army of 
Catulus in the centre, and distributed his own on the two flanlrs. 
The account of  the battle, which we have  in Pl~~tarch  alone, 
is PO confused, that nothing can be made clear.  It  is incredible 
that the Cimbri sllould have formed a square mass, each side of 
which was several miles in lcngth, for such a mass would have 
consistcd of several n~illions;  the sides of the square, moreover, 
are said to have been bound together with chains, so as to form 
an impregnable wall."  Marius is said to have placed his lines 
in such a position, that the sun and the wind werc against his 
enemy5, but  we  cannot  dccide  whether this  is true or  not. 
Catulus  hacl  to bear  the  brunt of the battle; at lcast, it was 
fiercest in the centre.  The fate of the Ciinbri was the same as 
that of the Teutones : they fled to thcir waggons, where women 
and childrcn joined in the fight, and at last made away  with 
thernsclves.  A great number  were  taken  prisoners, the Alps 
preventing  their  escape:  in  short,  all  the Cixnbri who  hati 
come across the Alps, were extirpated;  the only remnant was 
the tribe of  the Aduatici, whom they had left behind  on  the 
lower Rhine, where accordingly they nzust at one time have had 
their fixed abode.6 
It was a controverted point whether the merit of this victory 
belonged to Marius or to Catulus; but this is only a proof of the 
existing party-spirit, ancl I believe  that there is no ground  at 
all  for  loolring  upon  the inatter  as doubtful, for it cannot be 
hied  that  (:atulus  was  jealous  and  envio~xs  of the  v~~lg~r 
Plutart'l,  1.  c. 27.  10  iii. 3.  6  Cnesnl., De  Bello Gall. 11.  29. 
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upstart.  Marius celebrated  his victory by thc most  brilliant 
triumph tlvat  had ever been seen at Rome; but how giddy he 
had become in his lofty position was  seen most  strikingly by 
his entering the scnate in his triulnphal robe.  He was rewarded 
for his unexampled services by being madc consul for the sixth 
time,perl~aps  the first instance of a man being so often invested 
with this honour; for it cannot be said with certainty, whether 
Valerius  Corvus  had  been  consul  six times7, though I am 
almost convinced  of  it;  still it  may be  that  the consulship 
which was regarded as his sixth, belonged  to a member of  his 
family with whom he was confounded.  Thc general  opinion 
at Rolrle was, that some one before C. Marius had been invested 
with the consulship six times, and the Romans evinced no sur- 
prise, until he obtaincd the same dignity for the seventh time. 
In his  sixth  consulship, he  was  callcd the third founder of 
Rome, after Romulus and Camillus ;  but that consulsl~ip,  although 
in the end Marius was useful to the republic, was followed  by 
such  sad  consequences,  that  it  would  have  been  better  for 
Marius if he had died on the day of  his triumph; for then the 
world would have seen him only in his glory, a glory greater 
than that of Scipio himself, and-have  been deceived.  Mrtrius 
was not the man to be anything in quiet times of  peace;  the 
dissolution of  Rome was rapidly progressing, and was of  such 
a nature that  Marius was obliged to act.  There are differcnt 
kinds of courage in reference to danger, for a person either stares 
death in the face with indifference, or he  forgets it in the joy of 
the action.  This in itself  is noble, though  the motive is not 
always so; it is only he who has a pure mind, and is conscious 
of  a noble object, that is in the full enjoyment  of  individual 
freedom, and can accomplish great things.  Many persons  are 
deficient  in this kind  of  courage, but  have  a  definite  moral 
courage by which they place themselves above  all  prejudices, 
it being indifferent to them  whether  thcy  are  mis-judged or 
not.  Others are extremely timid in this respect, and though in 
danger they shew a lion's courage, yet they cannot prevail upon 
themselves  to act upon an opinion which appears to be hereti- 
cal.  In this latter kind of courage, Marius was weak; for if it  is 
true that he allowed himself to be  used  as a tool  by the men 
who, during his sixth consulship,  exercised such an influence 
upon him,  he  would appear  to us in a  very  miserable  light. 
'  Compare vol. iii. p. 124. 
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~h~ truth is, that at one time he was afraid ofthc demagogues, 
at another of the senate: he had that sad ~nrtial  weakness 
of a great Inan who is not a great character. 
He had formed connexions with a knave, L. Apuleius Satur- 
n;,,,,  a  man  who  is frequently  coupled  with  the  Gracchi, 
although there can  hardly be  any  difference so  great as that 
between Saturninus and the Gracchi.  This Saturninus was a 
mail like Catiline, and a  strangc phenomenon.  I can  hardly 
believe  that  thcrc  wcre  real  foundations  for  all the charges 
brought against Catiline;  for, in regard to some of them, it is 
impossible to discover what could have bcen his object.  Ambi- 
tion may drive men to dangerous enterprises, but  it is  really 
difficult to account for a man acting so madly as Saturninus did. 
It  would seem that he was a revolutionary spirit, who did not 
clearly conceive what mould bc the result  of  a revolution, and 
ncver  thought  of  institutions  and  government,  but  only  of 
-violence  and  destruction.  He  was  by no  means  of  vulgar 
origin:  he bclongcd  to one  of  the noblcst plebeian families, 
just as in the French revolution, men  of  the highcst  nobility 
placed  themselves  at  the  hcad  of  the  mob.  I  do  not 
recollect  at this  moment  whcthcr  it  is  of  him  or  of  his 
companion,  C.  Servilius  Glaucia,  that  Ciccro  says  that 
he had  never  known a  mail  of  a  more  malign  wita;  and it 
was by that means that they swayed the people.  In his career 
to the higher offices of the republic, which he had commenced 
as a partisan of the nobles, he had been offended.  There wcre 
then eight quaesturae, which wcrc given cithcr to consulars or 
to others, and with  which  revenues  were  conncctcd;  onc  of 
them was the quaestura  Ostiensis,  to  which  the duty of pro- 
viding for the granaries  at Rome  was  attached.  Saturnin~~s 
had held the office  of puaestor  Ostiensis, and had availed Iziin- 
self  of  the  ~rivilegc  of  the nobles to make  himself guilty  of 
peculation.  But circu~nstsnces  changecl,  and  thc  oligarchs 
were  no longer  able  to  screen  the sins of  their  friends; all 
honest party  had  been  formed from both  frictions,  under the 
leadership of  C. Memmios, and thus Satllrninos was  deprived 
of Iris  office.  Just  as  this  punishment  was, it gave  him  a 
sevcrebl~w,~  and he threw himself into the arms oftho  populncc, 
Something to thi.1 effect is said by Cicero  (~r~t~~,  62) of  ~l~~~i~;  camp. 
de  Orut.il.61,  Gj. 
Ciccroy  Pro  lYext.  17, DeHclrldsp  Ikipons. 20;  Ciodoroq, Bayn.  1111. xxrl. 
fl~log.  2, p.527. 
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a  combination  of  the  dregs  of  the nobles  and  the middle 
classes.  He then  becallle tribune,  and in  this  capacity  dis- 
played the most scandalous conduct towards the first men, such 
as  the censors  and others.  When he offered  hilnself for  the 
tlibunesliip a second  time,  and  a certain  A. Koricus was  put 
forward  as  his  competitor,  Saturninus incited  the pcople so 
much against him  that the unfortunate man was  murdered in 
the market place  Saturninus  thus obtained  the tribuneship 
by force.  The ~na~istratcs  had  no longer  any authority :  he 
who had the power, acted as he pleased. 
One of  his accolnplices was the praetor C. Servilius Glaucia, 
a man of  very noble  birth, and not  a  libertinus  as  we  might 
infer from his  name.10  It is difficnlt  to  say  what these two 
in reality wanted, but however wild their scheme may appear, 
one of  thern  seems  to  have  intended, in his frantic folly,  to 
establish himself as  tyrant;  but if  they imagined  that Marius 
woulcl allow this, they must have been as mad as the drunkard 
in Shakespeare's Tempest.  In  order to comprehend the charac- 
ters of the men who lived during this period of Roman history, 
we  must  look  upon  many  of  them  as  complete  madmen. 
Robespierre was  a  man  of  similar stamp, for  no  one can say 
what  his  real  object  was,  and probably  he had none  at all. 
Men of  that description  merely  wish to rule at random, with- 
out having  themselves any distinct  notion of what they want. 
The second tribuneship of Saturninus was  contelllporary with 
the  sixth  consulship  of  C. Malius.  I3e  began  a  complete 
course  of  legislation,  and  by  a  series  of  seditious proposals 
tried to win  the favour  of  the  people.  His intentions were 
very different from thosc of  the men  who are called seditious 
in former times; for he aimed at tyrannical power, a ~lan  in the 
execution  of  which  only  such  generals  as  Sulla  or  Caesar 
could  have  becn  successful.  Thc  accounts  of  the laws  of 
Saturninus are  very  obscure, but we know that a comprehex- 
sive agrarian law was  one  of  the most prominentll,  and that 
he changed the furnishing  of  corn  at  a  low piice  into real 
largesses.  It would seem as if all the lands, which were to be 
distributed according to his  agrarian law, were in Gaul, north 
of  the Po, for it is  improbable  that they should have been  in 
France.  Hc is said to have  also  carried  a /ex  jucliciaria.  He 
10  In  like manner one of  the Scipios was called  Serapio, from an actor whom 
he resembled. -  N.  Plutarch, Marius. 29. 
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flattered MariLls in every possible .\yay, by telling him that  he 
illtended  to  colonies1"  which were to consist  of  Ro- 
mans and  Italicans ; for as the Italian allies had greatly distin- 
guished themselves in the army of Jlarius, Saturninus favoured 
theln just  as lnllch  as  the Romans,  and this was  the reason 
*]ally of  the poor  Romans were exasperated  against  the 
lam.  l\f,zrius was to have  the  honour  of  bestowing on three 
ItiL1ian allies,  in each  of  thcse colonies, the  rights and privi- 
legcs of Roman citizens, a privilege far beyond  the  bounds  of 
all civil powcr.  If in firmcr  tiines a general  had had  sucll 
presumption, it would  have called forth a rebellion.  Even at 
this time the measure was  regarded  as  somet12ing quite enor- 
mous, but in later times no one thought of  taking offence :~t 
an iinperator  conferring  the franchise,  and  thus exercising a 
part  of  the  right belonging  to  the  sovcreign  people  alone. 
These laws, partly on account  of  their author, and partly  011 
account of  their manifest aim, were opposed by all honest men, 
and even by those who had before  resisted the oligarchy  with 
all their might, as well as by the broken-down oligarchs, who 
now dcmanded no more than what was fair.  Hence C. Memmius, 
who twelve years before,  as tribune, had called upon the peo- 
ple to break the powcr  of the oligarchy, became the object  of 
furious hatred with the seditious party, though he acted then 
as he had done before, only as an honest man. 
The new agrarian law when passed  by the pcople, did not 
require, according to the Rortensian  law, to be sanctioned  by 
the scnate; but that the senate might not  afterwards prevent 
its being  carried  into  effect,  Saturninus dcmanded  that the 
senators  sliould  expressly  swear to observc  it five  days  after 
its being passed by the tribes.'3  The matter was discussed  in 
the scnate, and Marius rcfused taking thc oath, perhaps because 
he had acquired some insight  into the contemptible character 
of  Saturninus.  It was thought that he refuscd  from malice, 
to induce his enemies,  espccially  Metellus,  to  follow  his  ex- 
alnplc.  This may  have been the case, but the more probable 
cause  was  a  want  of  fixed  principles,  which  he shewed  on 
nl:lny  occasions;  for soon afterwards he changed his mind, and 
advi~d  the senators to take the oath, declaring that it was im- 
possible to refuse it any longcr.  Cicero  had  a  moral  power 
A~r~ian,  De  Bell. Ciazl.  i.29;  Cicero,pro BalLo, 21 ; Livy, Epit.69. 
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which did not allow him to be  overawed; in his  oration pro 
Rabirio perduell.,  he says: 'Nihil  me  clamor  iste commovet  sed 
consolatur,  quum  indicat  esse qztosdam  cives  imperitos sed non 
multos.  Neither Plutarch nor Appian explain the connection. 
At the end of all  laws there occurs this formula:  si quid sacri 
sanctique est quod non jus sit rogari, ejus hac lege nihil rogatur, or 
si quid jus non ess~t  rogarier, ejus ea lege nihilum r~gatum.~"ow 
the t~nhappy  advisers of Marius said, that matters would come 
to civil bloodshed, if  the law  were not passed;  and that if it 
were passed, that formula  would  be  a ~rotection  against any- 
thing which thereby became null and void  in the law.  This 
circumstance  was  not  understood  either  by Plutarch  or by 
Appian, and still less by their  translators.  By this piece  of 
casuistry, they prevailed  upon  Marius, to declare on the fifth 
day in the senate, that even if the oath were taken, there yet 
remained that loop-hole;  and Marius then took the oath,  and 
after  him  all the other  senators.  Metellus  Numidicus alone 
resisted, and showed  a  determination  of  character which was 
more honorable than his Numidian victories, and which makes 
us forgive him his pride towards Marius.  In  the time of trials 
he showed  himself  resolute  and  consistent.  But Saturninus 
persisted  in his plan; he ordered his viator  to  drag Metellus 
out of the senate-house,  and declared  hirn  an outlaw (aqua et 
igni interdicebat),  so  that Metellus went into exile to Rhodcs. 
The  year  passed  away  amidst  the  greatest  atrocities.  The 
stain in Marius'  character is his wcakncss;  thenceforth he was 
always undecided; he negotiated with both parties, and was at 
the mercy of the storms which surrounded him.  But fortunately 
Saturninus and his followers carried their excesses so far,  that 
they produced a fusion of  parties; and Marius abandoned their 
causc. 
When  the  time  of  the  new  consular  elections  came  on, 
M. Antonius was unanimously  electcd,  and it seemed  certain 
that on the following  day C. Memmius  would  be  chosen  the 
other consul:  he was one  of  the  most energetic  and upright 
men of the time, and probably thc same who had been tribune 
in the time  of  the Jugurthine war; if not, he was  at least  a 
near  relativc  of  that  tribunc.  Against  him  Glaucia  and 
Saturninus created a tumult.  They had the audacity to cause 
l4  Cicero, ad Att. iii.23,  pro  Caecin. 33;  Walter, Gesch. des  Rom.  Rechts, 
vol. ii. p. 12. notes 45 and 46.24 edit. 
him to be  in the  public  market  place,  and having 
fled into olle of  the stalls,  he was murdered.l5  This was  too 
glaring  a crime, and Marius was  applicd to, to put an end to 
these atrocities, and he at once resolved to do SO.  He received 
from the senate the command, videret, nequid Yes  publics detri- 
menti capwet.  He forthwith  summoned  all  the  equites and 
honest citizens.  In this danger,  it became  evident  that the 
nobles, at other times  also,  might have averted much  evil,  if 
they  had  not  neglected  their  own  protection.  When the 
mutineers  saw  that  all  rose  against  them,  they  retreated 
to  the  Capitol,  where  they  were  besieged.  Marius  again 
shewed  himself  a  skilful  gcneral:  the  clivus  was  taken, 
and  the  guilty  fled  into  the  massively  built  Capitoline 
temple,  to storm which woulcl  have  been  considered  sacrile- 
gious.  Into this tcmple, the  water  was  conducted  by  ~ipcs 
from the aqua Marcia:  these pipes  Marius  ordered  to be  de- 
stroyed, so that the besieged would have perished with hunger 
and thirst.  The ancient well  which  I have  discovered, and 
which during the siege of the Gauls had ~rovided  the Romans 
with water, must tl~ercfore  at that timc have been in the same 
condition  as  it is  at present,  otherwise  the besieged  would 
have been able to satisfy their thirst.l6  This well is now in the 
most  wretched  condition; and  it 1s  impossible  to drink  the 
water, all kinds of dirt being thrown into it.  Glaucia proposed 
to set fire to the temple, and thus to destroy  themselves;  but 
the others, hoping  to  save  their  lives, refused  to do so, and 
surrendered at  discretion.  The ring-lcaders  were shut  up in 
the curia Hostilia, that they might be tried.  But  whcther  it 
was that  the  populace had  altered  their  minds, or  that  the 
governmcnt  got up a  mutiny  to  escape  from  the odium  of 
executing so many  nobles, the roof  of  the curia  was  scaled, 
and the  prisoners were  killed by  the  mutineers  from  abovc. 
Marius'  conduct  reconciled  thc people  to him;  and  hc now 
tool< a second step  towards a  bctter  course,  by  causing  Me- 
tcll~~s  t~ be recalled from exile.  The laws of  SatLlrninus seem 
to have  been  abolished, as were  afterwards  those  of  Livius. 
Marius then retired to the station  of a private man, for he had 
never entertained the idea of making himself tyrant. 
l5  Cicero, in Catihn.  iv. 2; Appian, De Bell. Civil.  i. 32. 
lG  l'll~tarch, Mar. 30;  Anrcl.  Victor,  De  Vtr. Illustr.  73;  Appim,  1.  c. 
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The rep~~blic  was  shaken to  its  very  foundations.  The 
grcat dispute was about  the  courts  of  justice.  The  equites, 
from their jealousy  and hatred of  the senate and of  individual 
senators in the provinces, had abused their judicial powers in 
such a way that they were looked upon as tyrants, and parties 
again began to apply to  the senate.  The system  of  farming 
the public revenues had  become  more  and  more  developed; 
societies of  farmers rented mines, tolls, tithes, etc., and others 
carried  on  usurious  business  with  their  capital;  they  had 
amassed  the  most  exorbitant  treasures,  and  extorted  in the 
provinces  far  greater  sums  than the laws permitted.  In the 
Bible we see  the manner  in  which  the  reAhva~,  the  agents 
of  the publicnni, carried  on  their  proceedings.  Such is the 
state of  things evcn  at this day at Rome:  it is not long since 
the providing of necessaries for the galley  slaves was given  in 
contract by the government to  an  actrcss, who  made  a  very 
lucrative business of it.  She  took quite a  sufficient  sum per 
head, but  farmed out to  others  the actual  supplying  of  the 
provisions:  every one took for himself a small profit, and thus 
it  went  downwards,  the prisoners  almost  literally  dying  of 
starvation.  When a  consul  or  proconsul oppressed the pro- 
vincials, and protected  the publicani, he was  safe;  but  when 
an  honcst  man  checked  the  abuses  of  the farmers  of  the 
revenue, they  took  vengeance  by  accusing  him of malversa- 
tion, repetundarum, and got him condemned by false witnesses. 
Such was the fate of P. Rutilius, which  created general  exas- 
peration.  It  was  impossible  to  exercise  any  control,  the 
publ~cani  always supporting one another, for when one of them 
was accused, he had only to  write to his  colleagues at  Rome, 
and request them to deal gently with him, and he was sure to 
escape.  As  soon  as  the  cquites  had  once  established  the 
system of regarding only their own interest, every attempt on 
the part of the provincials to  obtain justice was  useless.  The 
hostility  which  then  existed  between  the senate  and  the 
equites shows itself, in all  nations at  a  certain  stage of  their 
development, between landed property and moveable property, 
as is now the case throughout Europe.  The senators or  opti- 
mates were  the  great land-owners, and  the equites  possessecl 
the capital  with  which commcrcial  speculations were carried 
on.  Thzre wcrc, moreover, at  Rolne  many circumstances  in 
which  nioveable  property  might  be  employed  against  the 
nation,  and  every  one  belonging  to  the  government  was 
dependent on the equites i11  consequence of  their forming the 
courts  of justice.  ~~ontesquieu  who  is  other~vise  excellent, 
sees  these  things in a  wrong  light, and  it may  be  said  in 
general that modern writers have thrown no light upon them; 
but we may yet form a very clear notion of them.  There was 
a  manifest  hostility  against  the  courts of justice,  which  had 
been called forth by their own tyranny. 
LECTURE  LXXXIII. 
THE happy  termination  of  the  war  against  the Cimbri and 
Teutones and the suppression of the disturbances of Saturninus 
were  followed  by  a period  of  precarious tranquillity, during 
which no reflecting  man could be mistaken  as to the internal 
condition of the republic and its prospects, although the  great 
mass undoubtedly continued to live on  quietly and heedlessly. 
The condition of the rich and powcrful was brilliant, but those 
who saw deeper cannot  have overlooked the  state  of  disease, 
and even  the  decomposition  which  was  taking  place;  they 
must  have seen the necessity  for coming to  a  determination 
respecting the great question of  the Italian subjects  of  Rome. 
But  no  one  seems  to have thought of  a reform calculated to 
avert the threatening evil ;  though various changes were under- 
taken.  It is a characteristic  sign  of  these  times,  that  those 
who  wanted  to  get  power  began  by  making  themselvcs 
popular,  and  after  havino  obtained  their  ends  went  over 
to  the  opposite  party.  %bus  Cn.  Domitius  Ahenoharbus 
deprived the college  of  pontiffs and the other priests  of  the 
right  of  Ellling  up  (by  cooptatio)  the  vacancies  which  oc- 
curred  among them, and transferred  it to  the  tribes in such 
a manner that only seventeen tribes (the smaller half of thirty- 
five)  were  chosen  by  lot  to  elect  the  priests.1  Originally 
the pontiffs  had  been  chosen from among  the patricians, and 
by  them  in  their  curiae;  when  subsequently  the plebeians 
were  admitted  to  share  the  pontificate  with  the patricians, 
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they naturally took part in the elcctiolls also; but afterwards 
when the curiae no longer  met, and  had  become  something 
quite different from what they had been originally, the college 
of  pontiffs  itself  naturally  acquired  the right  of  cooptation. 
Now, how was  it that Cn. Domitins transfcrred  this right to 
seventeen  out  of  the  thirty-five  tribes?  Thc origin  of  the 
measure must  have been  that  Cn. Domitius attributed a  dif- 
ferent  meaning  to an ancient expression, according to which 
the  Luccres had  bccn  called  (perhaps  in the twelve  tables) 
the minor pars jsopuli,  and which  he applied  to the scventeen 
tribes.  This Domitian law is the latest instance of  an occur- 
rence in whicli we can trace any of  the characteristics of  the 
primitive constitution of  Rome. 
The great questions which were now brought forward on all 
occasions,  were  that  concerning  tlle judicial  power  of  the 
equitcs, and the franchise of  the allies.  It had, as I said ycs- 
tcrclay, become  more  and  more evident  every year  that  the 
equitcs exercised  their right  no better than the senators had 
done before,  and that they were  just  as accessible to bribes. 
Their courts of justice  had  reduced the senate to a real  state 
of  dependence,  and  the  senate  and  government,  the  best 
among  them as well  as the worst, must  have felt the urgent 
necessity  of  a  remedy.  Among the  best  we  may mention 
Q. Mucius  Scaevola, who showed  such cxemplary and  truly 
affecting conduct in Asia2, coming among  the Asiatics  like 
an angel from  heaven, that had  the publicani, against  whom 
he protected  the provincials, becn  ablc to find any pretext for 
accusing  him, he would  hare been  condernned like a guilty 
criminaL3  Here  thcn  was  a  case in which  the need  of  a 
reform must have been gencrally fclt; but it is a misfortune to 
which all frce  states  are cxposed, and from which  Rome was 
not exempt, that although every one may be convinccd of  the 
necessity of  a  reform, yet no one  appears  to see  the way in 
which it is to be effected. 
r  7  Ihe question respecting the civic franchise of the Italicans, 
resembles  the present Catholic emancipation question in Great 
Britain.  Every one was convinccd that the francllisc must be 
and was inclined  to grant it; but then again, so soon 
as private  interests  werc  consulted,  thc affair  appeared  in  a 
Ciccro, C.  Verrem, ii.  10; Pseudo-Asconius, in  Verr. ii. p. 210,  in  Dlvinat. 
p.  122. ed.  Orclli.  Cicero, pro Pluncio, 14. 
different  light;  thus while the Romans were one year willing 
to bestow the franchise upon  the Italicnns,  another year they 
refused  to do so.  The idea  of  demanding  the franchise  or 
had been  entertained among  the Italicans 
as early as the tribuneship of  Tib. Graccllus;  since that time 
thirty years had elapsed:  they had often had great hopes, but 
had  eacll  tilne  been  disappointed.  There had  formerly been 
a  better  between  Rome  and  her  allies  than 
between  any other  ruling  city  and  its  subjects;  but  great 
bitterness was now spreading, and the Italicans came forward, 
and  resolutely  demanded  the  Roman  franchise.  'The  very 
men who  had  before  inspired  the Italicans with hopes, now 
became their zealous opponents, when they made their demands 
too insolently.  So far as we can  see, nothing  at all was done 
for them, with the exception of  a  single law, which abolished 
the tithe on  the ager publicus, and which is known only from 
Appian.  Their demands now became  more and more  clam- 
orous, as the franchise  became  more and  more desirable for 
them.  They  had  gradually  assimilated  themselves  to  the 
Romans,  they had  lost their dialects, and yet were expected 
in peace  as  well  as  in war  to submit  to the arbitrary  pro- 
ceedings  of  their  Roman  rulers.  During this  ferment  the 
Roman government was in great fear; but whenever a measure 
was adopted, it only increased the exasperation.  Some Italian 
allics, for example, had  silently assumed  the rights of Roman 
citizens, and one of  them  M. Perperna4, had even been  made 
consul and censor, but at length it was cliscovered that he had 
no  title  to the franchise.  During  the  general  dissolution, 
everything at Rome had fallen  into confusion:  the calendar 
in Caesar's  time was  more than eighty days behind  hand, in 
consequence of  arbitrary intercalations;  so also in the census: 
allics  had  been  enrolled  as  citizens,  because  they  acted  as 
citizens,  and  had  been  entered  by  the  censors  in  a  tribe. 
Now on a  sudden, a  senseless enactment was  passed, the lez 
Va1c1-a  Max. iii. 4,  5.  It is impossihle to decidc whether the M. perperna 
who was consul  in the year 622  is the samc as he who wtls  in 660, and 
censor in 666; though it is not  impossible, since,  to pliny, $1 N. vii. 
49* he lived  to the age of ninety-eight.  In this ease, however, pcrperna's  ten- 
sorship would belong  to a later date than the Zex  i~u~i~  ~i~i~i~  (657), and thus 
be Out  place I1erc.  If they wcre two different persons, the words 
censor  be  from the text.  But thc whole qucstion is rather doubtful, 
as in Vdcrius  Maximus  read  Iege  Pupiu, which  cannot possibly belong  to 
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Mucia  Licinias,  directing  that  a  strict  inquiry  should  be 
made, and that the names of  all  those who were  not citizens 
in the strictest  sensc of  the term  should be erased  froni  the 
lists.  This law did  not  indeed forbid  the allies  to reside in 
Rome, but deprived them of  the privileges connected with the 
residcnce,  and  thus took  from  them  rights which they had 
acquired by custom.  Thus at the very time when the Italicans 
demandcd  more than they ~ossessed,  the little which they did 
posscss  was  talcen  froin  them.  The degree af  exasperation 
produced  by this measure  may easily be  imagined; but such 
blindness then prevailed in everything. 
Gradually, however, a considerable party in the senate came 
to the conviction that a rcform must take place; and this party 
consisted  of  the sons of  those who had thwarted the plans of 
C. Gracchus.  They wanted  to  make  an attempt to improve 
the state of  affairs; the most urgcnt  necessity was  to reform 
thc courts  of justice.  But this  was  opposed by the  whole 
influence of thc equites, which was so great that even Polybius 
said, that  in  his  time  there  wcre  few people  who were  not 
in some  way or  other subject  to  it.  In order  therefore  to 
carry this point, it occurred  to them  to grant the franchise to 
the Latins and allies, a thing which ought to have been done 
independently  of  every  other  consideration.  Under  these 
circumstances  the tribune,  M. Livius  Drusus,  a  son  of  the 
opponent of  C. Gracchus, came boldly forward with a remcdy 
for  the distressed  state  of  Rome.  IIe was  a  man  of  extra- 
ordinary  talents;  his  hands  wcre  unstained,  and  he was  of 
a  better  nature  than  his  fathcr.  The  eyes  of  the  whole 
nation  were  directed  towards  him,  and  the  rational  and 
leading  men  of  the  rcpublic  joincd  him  in  his  endea- 
vours  to prevcnt  a  revolution  by  introducing  the  necessary 
reforms.  Here again many things are obscure.  It is strange 
that, in the history of  this late period,  there  are  more  things 
which we can only guess at than in the early times of  Roman 
history.  In regard  to  the latter, the traditionary  forlns  are 
firmly established, apd we may draw conclusi~ns  from them as 
evident as those drawn from  mathematical premises,  alld say: 
"  If such or such a thing took  place, this or  that other thing 
must  of  necessity  have taken  place  lilrewisc."  But in these 
Cicero, pro  Cornel. f/agnl. 10. p.  429;  Asconius,  in  Cornel.  p.  67,  ed. 
Orelli; De Oficzzs, iii. 11, De Oratore, ii. 64. 
llLter  times, when all institutiolls had lost their stability, we can 
no longer  draw such inferences.  It  is for this reason  that the 
cllanges introduced by 11. Livius  Drusus are  SO  very obscure. 
TIle most probable opinion is that Appian6 is  right in stating 
that the main object of Drusus was  to introduce  a mixture in 
the composition of the courts of justice.7  Had he attempted to 
give  them  back  entirely into  the hands of  the senators, the 
consequence  would  have  becn  a  revolution.  Even  the  lea 
Se~vilia  had enacted that the courts should be divided between 
equites  and  senators,  but  that  regulation  had been  of  short 
duration.  The number of scnators amounted to three hundred; 
to these he wisllcd to add three hundred equitcs,  who were to 
be received into the senate; and out of these six  hundred  the 
juryR were to be  taken, half of  whom would  undoubtedly be 
senators.  As hc thus admitted the equites into the senate, he 
offered then1 an advantage which might be an ample compen- 
sation for  their loss of  the exclusivc possession of  the judicial 
power.  With this he connected  another law,  providing that 
quaestiones concerning  judges  who  had  judged  partially  or 
accepted bribes  should bc instituted before the same tribunal: 
an awful symptom of the times !  What was to be the form of 
such quaestiones, we do not know, but it was probably intended 
that they should be  appointed according to the tribes.  This 
plan  determined the equites to  oppose thc bill,  as we  clearly 
see from a passage in Cicero.9  Many of the equites  also  had 
no wish to enter the senate,  but preferred a position in which 
they wcre lords  and masters of  the state,  and which  enabled 
them to censure others,  to one which  imposed  upon  them  a 
moral  responsibility and exposed them to $he danger of being 
ccnsurcd  and accused.  It moreover  appears that it was not 
the intention of  the law of  Drusus to keep up constantly  the 
numl~cr  of  three  hundred  cquites  in the senate  by filling up 
'  Appian, De Bell. Civil. i.  35.  Comparc Livy,  Epit. 7 1 ;  Aur. Victor,  De 
vir.  iilustr. 66. 
'  Comp. Vcll. Patcrc. ii. 13; Ciccro, pro Rabir. Postumo,  7,  pro  Cluent. 56; 
Livy, Epit. 70 
From the time of C.  Gracchus, the judices at Rome may bc looked upon as 
analogous  to our jury,  a tcrm which  some  English  scholars have improperly 
applicd to a much carlier pcriod.  But previously to the time of the Gracclii we 
rcad only of  single judices,  or of  popular  courts.  In civil  cascs,  individual 
urhztri  still continued to be appointed;  but for  all  state-offences  and  also for 
some  criminal cases,  tlierc were  the quaestiones perpetuae,  analogous to our 
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vacancies  as  they occurred;  on  the contrary,  the addition of 
three hundred  equites  seems to  have been  only a temporary 
measure.  The equites may therefore  have  said,  "  the conse- 
quence  of  this bill will be,  that in the end the judicial power 
will again fall into the hands of  a  senate of  600 nobles,  and 
vacancies will be filled up at the discretion of the senate,  as if 
we did not  exist  at all:  the bill therefore is only a scheme to 
deceive  us."  But, notwithstanding  all this,  the  measure  of 
Drusus seems to ine the best  that could  have been*devised, 
because it was not his intention to stop short there, but at the 
same  time,  to  confer  the  franchise  upon  the  Italicans, and 
thereby to impart fresh life and energy to the higher classes of 
the Romans,  and to extend tlie body of  Roman citizens,  so as 
to make them a  nation with a  new aristocracy.  His agrarian 
lawlo, on the other hand, respecting which scarcely anything is 
recorded,  aimed at raising the lower and restoring the middle 
classes,  and was intended to benefit  both the Italicans and the 
Romans.  Now,  as the Italicans were more nearly related  to 
the Romans than the Umbrians and Etruscans, the same divi- 
sions now arose as had existed between the Italicans and Latins 
on the one hand, and the Romans on the other, in the time of 
C. Gracchus.  The Latins consisted of tlie colonies scattered all 
over Italy, from Valentia in Bruttium to the foot of the Alps, 
and of the few old Latin towns which had not yet obtained the 
franchise, as Tibur and Praeneste.  By the term Italicans were 
understood the Sabellian nations,  Sabines,  Marsians and their 
confederates,  the Piccntians,  Samnites,  and probably aleo the 
I>ucanians,  unless the relations of these latter had become worse 
through the Hannibalian war.  It was  probably not intended 
to  favour  in  this  way the  Apulians  and  S:~llentincs among 
whom the Greek language ~redominated.  All the others were 
regarded as foreigners, so that the Umbrians, Etruscans, Brut- 
tians, and the Greck maritime towns,  did not come into con- 
sideration.  In what  manner  such divisions of  claims  spread 
further and further, may be seen in the history of  the internal 
disputes  of  other  free states, with which  our scholars arc so 
seldom a~quainted.'~ Thus the tribuneship of Drusus has been 
lo Aurel. Victor,  De Vir. illustr. 66; Scholia Bobiens. pro Mzlone, p. 282 ed. 
Orelli; Diodorns, Excerpt. Vatic. p. 128 ed.  Dindorf;  Vell. Patere. ii.  14. 
In Geneva, for instance, there was a long dispute between the citoyens ant1 
the bourgeois, the latter claiming and obtaining the rights of  the fonner.  After 
these  two  parties were placed  on a  footing of  erlnal ty,  the Abtzfs, being the 
a real crux hhzstoricorum, and people have asked 'L  how could the 
bitter  hostility  between  Drusus  and  the  consul  L. hlarcius 
Pllilippus  have arisen?  Drusus was  popular,  and would  not 
his laws have strengthened the aristocracy?  TVllere then was 
the difference ?"  The  answer  to  these  questions  must  he 
looked for  in the nature of  the circumstances.  The equites 
resisted  the two  bills with the utmost  fury, and yet,  as the 
Italicans came  to Rome in large numbers,  ready  to take up 
arms  in  case  of  need,  they were  passed.  Now  as  this  was 
accomplished  in the most  illegal  inaizner, the majority of the 
senate, as soon as the Italicans had left Rome, adoptcd, with 
incredible blindness, the plan not to concede to the allies that 
which  had been  promised  to them;  and they even  declared 
this determination  opeilly  to Drusus.  This caused  exaspera- 
tion  betwcen  him  and  the  dishonest  senate,  a  Fact  which 
explains  the words  of  Cicero,  that the  tribunatus Drusi pro 
senatus  auctoritate  susceptus  infrinyi  jam  debilitarique  videha- 
tur.12  IIc  accordingly  appeared  either  as  a  cheat,  or  as 
cheated.  The stupid ruling  party  of  the  oligarchs  were  as 
dissatisfied with Drusus as the equites.  They said, ''  Shall we 
allow 300 equites whom  wc  cannot bear,  to be placed  on  a 
footing  of  equality with  us  for  ever?"  Such people  cannot 
see  the unavoidable  necessity  for  making  concessions;  but 
imagine  that by  their mere  "No"  they  can  uphold  the old 
state of things.  What now followed  was the natural conse- 
quence  of  the character  of  the human  heart.  Drusus,  until 
then a zealous  supporter of the government, began  to oppose 
the senate quite contrary to  his  fbrmer policy.  The ruling 
party  in the senate  was  as  anxious to get rid of  Drusus  as 
the equites.  Philippus  was his sworn enemy; it was he who 
sons of  foreign parents, but born at Geneva, supported the party of  the Repr6 
sentr~nts  in their  dispute  with  the  N(qatfs; and  when  the  demands  of  the 
Repr~sentunts  were  satisfied  in  1789, the rcsident  aliens,  or Habitants, came 
forward and made the same claims.  Such is always the ease in free states, and 
by this  and  similar instances, we may see  clearly how  impossible it  is  for  a 
scholar like Freinsheim, though he was a learned and industrious  man, to form 
a clear notion of tho real condition of the ancient republics.  Freinsheim might 
have had an accurate knowledge of  many things,  if  he had  concerned himself 
ahout tho history of  the constitution  of  his own native  city of  Strasburg; hut 
he knew nothir~g  beyond  his library, and thus whenever  he touched  upon  the 
livillg reality of  ancient  history, he saw nothing but  hollow words.  It is only 
when we eonecive ancient Listory as something actual and red  that  it  has  any 
meaning. -N.  l2 De Orat. i. 7. 352  ASSASSINATION  OF  DRUSUS. 
pronounced the awful sentence preserved by Cicero'"  revealing 
the secret that there were no more than 2000  families whose 
property  was  unimpaired;  from  which  we  at once  catch  a 
glimpse of  the abyss of  destruction, and of  the forlorn state of 
the republic.  Such was the real state of things in those times, 
and we  cannot wonder  how it happened  that the unfortunate 
Drusus found himself  abandoned by both parties.  He was an 
impetuous man, and had  undertaken  the dangerous  part of  a 
mediator  between  the Romans and Italicans (the  Latin colo- 
nies wcre quiet, for they were sure to be the first to obtain the 
Roman  franchise,  and  therefore  allowed  the others to bring 
forward  their claims, only a few of the~n  having entered into 
the interests  of  the Italicans).  Things went  so  far that the 
Italicans swore an oath of  allegiance to Drusus, which in  the 
Excerpta  Vaticana  of  Diodorusl*  is  absurdly  called  by  the 
editor  dptcop  @~Xlmrov. This oath is  extremely remarkable, 
for it shews an association  of a peculiar  kind, such as existed 
in  Ireland thirty years  ago.  The  Italicans  swore  that they 
would  obey  Drusus  unconditionally,  and  endeavour to per- 
suade others to undertake tlze  same obligation.  During this 
period  Drusus was  really in a  feverish  state: he was  not in 
full  possession  of  his  own  free  will:  he knew not  what he 
was  doing.  Had he been  supported by the ruling party, he 
might have still been able to solve the difficulties, and the war 
between Marius and Sulla would perhaps not have broken out. 
But he was irritated to the extreme, and his conduct towards 
Philippus, against whom he did things which he ought not to 
have done, showed that he was in a fever;  but Philippus may 
have  driven  him  to  despair.  While  things  were  in  this 
critical  state, Drusus was assassinated by a wound in his side, 
which  he received while he was walking in the evening up 
and down in the hall  of  his house,  and conversing  with  his 
friends  to prepare himself  for  a great discussion.15  The per- 
petrator  of  the  crime  was  nevcr  discovered.  Scarcely  a 
few  hours  after  his  death  his  laws  were  annulled,  with the 
13  De Ojiciis, ii. 2 1.  l4  P. 128, ed. Dindorf. 
'5  Vcll.  Patcrc.  ii. 14; Appian,  De  Bell.  Civil.  i. 36; Livy, Epit. 71.  In 
the great houses  of  the Romans, a9 in thc baths  of  Titus, there wcre spacious 
hall5 without windows, which wcre lighted only by candclabm.  In these halls 
numbers of persons, both known and unknown, used  to assemble, to ohtam  an 
audience of the master of the house, for the noble Romans were in reality more 
like princes than anything else.-N. 
exceptioll  of  that  concerning  the  courts  of justice,  in doing 
wllicll  the senate assumed a power until then unheard of. 
The  death  of  Drusus  happened  at the  most  unfortunate 
moment, for the Italicans were now in  a state of  the greatest 
excitement;  the best prospects had been held out to them, and 
there was now no one to realisc them.  At Rome there was as 
gellcral a disinclination to  grant them  the franchise  as  there 
was, for  instance,  in England  to grant  independence to  the 
Americans, and as there is at the  present moment to  concede 
the  emancipation  of  the  Roman  Catholics.  The Italicans 
were, in  fact, looked  upon  as  rebels.  The party  of  Drusus 
was now again in the senate itself;  they had  lost thcir  senses 
completely.  Crassus died just at this time, and the wisest men, 
such  as  M. Antonius  and  the two  Scaevolas, did  not  know 
what to do, and were  intimidated.  As the storm  could  not 
be  averted,  men  threw  themselves  right  in its  way.  The 
equitcs  accused  the  senators as  traitors.  They had  gained 
over  the  tribune  Q.  Varius,  a  Spaniard by  birthl6,  whom 
Cicero  calls  homo  vastus  et foedus.l7  This uncouth  fellow, 
whose franchise even was not certain, and with  whom  impu- 
dence  supplied  the  place  of  talent, brought  forward  a  bill, 
' 
providing  that  a  commission  should  be  appointed  for  the 
purpose of inquiring who had had  any public or private  com- 
munication with the Italicans about their einancipation.'"he 
lower classes at Rome, although  they had  nothing to lose  by 
the laws of  Drusus, were  most  furious  against  the  Italicans, 
and the equites condescended to ~nake  con~mon  cause with the 
to support  the bill  of  Q. Varius.  It was  carried, 
notwithstanding the greatcst opposition of the most respectable 
men in the senate;  for, as the people appeared in tho forum in 
arms, the  rational  opposition  of  the  ruling  party  was  soon 
overwhelmed.  This law gave rise to a  great  many  lawsuits, 
and several noble senators were condemned as having treacher- 
ously encouraged  the Italicans.  A  singular  state  of  feeling 
had at that  time  sprung up at Rome:  the senators  acted  the 
part  of  democrats, and  the populace, guided by  the equites, 
that  of  aristocrats,  the  former  wishing  to  emancipate  the 
Italicans, the latter not. 
EIis father  was  a  Roman,  but  his  mother  was  a  Spa~iish  woman.-N. 
-Cicero,  Brutus, 62; Appian, De Bell. Czvil. i. 37. 
"  De  Oratore, i.  25.  App~ao,  I. c.; VaL  Maxlmus, ~ii~.  6. 4. 
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salne tiinc intended to strengthen Rome.  Aftcr the murder of 
LECTURE LXXXIV. 
THE  Social war is one of those periods during which the scanti- 
ness of our information is particularly painful.  1,ivy had devoted 
four books to the two  years  of  the Social war, but nearly all 
we  know  about it is  contained  in the meagre narrative  of 
Appian, who not unfrequently makes statements which are in- 
credibly one-sided, and in a few isolated passages which are ex- 
tremely brief.'  The passions, the exertions, the various changes 
of fortune, and the excellent  conduct  on  both  sides, warrant 
the assertion that this war is one of the  greatest in all antiquity. 
The first symptoms  of  the tendency of  the Italican allies to 
separate themselves from Rome and  to  form  a  new  kind  of 
Roman state had been manifested as early as the second Punic 
war.2  Subsequently  Fregellae  had  revolted  against  Rome. 
Those who had been the first to determine  on  begininng  the 
war were not those who actually took the field, but the people 
who lived  at a  greater  distance.  We do  not  know  which 
nations were the first that resolved  to take up arms; but it is 
said that in  the year 662, in the tribuneship of M. Livius Drusus 
it had been the intention of  the Latins during the celebration 
of the Feriae Latinae, to put the Roman senate and the consuls, 
especially Philippus, to death.3  The plan was,  on that  occa- 
sion, to throw Rome into a state of anarchy, and then to put to 
death as many persons as they could.  All the Roman magis- 
trates (avvapXla),  thc consuls, praetors, and  even the tribunes 
of the people were present at that festival, so that only a young 
noble, under the title ofpraefectus urbi Latinarum causa remained 
behind at Rome.  Now as the Latins appeared at this festival 
in great numbers,it is very probable that they had this intention, 
especially the Tiburtincs and Praenestines; but it may also be 
that so many Italicans flocked  to  thc festival, that they con- 
sidered themselves alone sufficiently numerous to carry out  the 
plan.  Drusus heard of this fearful scheme, and informed the con- 
suls of it4,  for even if he had not been a man of honour, Ile was a 
Roman, and what he wanted to do for  the allies  was at the 
1  In 1827 Nicbuhr had remarked, L'We  shall  probably soon learn more par- 
ticulars about it from the fragments  of  Diodorus, lately  discovered  by  Mai, if 
they are really new." 
a  See above, p.  139.  Florus, iu  18.  '  Aur. Victor, De  Vir  illuatr. 66. 
- 
Drusus, the Italicails did not conceal their unbounded cxaspcr- 
ation:  they formed  an association  among themselves,  and se- 
cured their mutual fidelity by giving hostages to one another. 
But the Romans  sent commissioners  with proconsnlar  powcr 
to Picenuin, where the ferment was greatest, in order  to keep 
the allies  within  the bounds of  their duty, as they called  it, 
and to thwart their  undertaking.  There was  at this time,  a 
day of assembly of the Picentians at Asculum, and on this  OC- 
casion the proconusl Q. Servilius Caepio came forward with his 
legate Fonteius (I do not recollect his praenomen5), to address 
the assembly, and deter them  by threats and admonition from 
their undertaking;  but the feelings  of  the Picentians were so 
irritated, that a word heedlessly uttered provoked them to opcn 
insurrection, and Caepio and his lcgate were  murdered in  the 
theatre of Asculum.  The  Italicans, who had at first only wished 
to obtain the Roman franchise, wcre now bcnt upon dcstroying 
Rome,  ancl  establishing  an  Italian  republic,  of  which  they 
themselves were to bc the centre.  The exasperation at Ascululn 
rose to such a pitch, that all the Romans who hsppcncd to  be 
in the place were seized ancl put to denth.6 
The insurrection now broke out everywhere, but apparently 
not cverywhere with the same cruelty as among thc Piccntians; 
and it is  highly  probable  that  such nations as  the  iMarsians, 
who were not inferior  to the Romans in point  of  civilization, 
did  not  make  thcinselves  guilty  of  such atrocities  as  the 
Hcentians,  who  were  a  cowardly  and  contemptible people. 
I11  thc Epitome of  the  seventy-sccond book  of  Livy  and in 
Orosius, the following people  are  mentioned  as having thcn 
revolted : -  the  Picentians,  Vestinians,  Marsians,  Pelignians, 
Marrucinians,  Sainnites,  and  Lucanians.  Appian7  adds  the 
The pracnomcn is not certain.  Comp. Orelli,  Onom. Tull, s.v. p.256. 
I will here make a remark mcrcly because I want to mcntion to you a eon- 
jectnre  which  I havc  made.  In one  of  the  ncwly  discovered  fragments of 
Diodorus (p.120,  ed.  Dindorf.)  we  read  a little story, according to  which a 
clown, who was  a  great favourite among thc  Romans, happcned to appear in 
the games at Asculnm.  The people, thinking that he was a Roman, wanted  to 
kill him, and he savcd himself only by proving that hc was a Latin.  His name, 
according to my conjecture,  was  not  Saunion,  but  Sannion, the ancient name 
for Pulciuclla; and this is the most ancient rncntion of  the mask.-N.  In  the 
Eulluchus of  Terence and in the Adclphi, the name indeed occurs,  but not in 
its later character. 
'  De  Bell. Civil. i. 39.  Compare also Diodoru~,  xxxvii.  Eclog. 1. p. 538 foll. 
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Apulians; and they mere indeed in arms, but it is not probable 
that they had any share in the Italian  state.  All the peoples 
of  whom the state was to consist,  were  Sabellians or  Sabine 
colonies; the others  like the A~ulians,  who  belonged to the 
Oscan race, joined  them merely out of hostility towards Rome. 
Some of  the  places  on  the  gulf  of  Naples  lilie~~ise  rose  in 
arms; but of the Latin colonies, Venusia alone joined  the in- 
surgents.  Afterwards the Umbrians  also were in arms, and for 
a short time even the Etruscans; but they too did not belong 
to the new republic. 
These confederate Italian nations are said  by Diodorus, who 
alone has preserved  this  fact, to  have  established  a  senate of 
five hundred, and to have  appointed  two annual consuls  and 
twelve praetors, thus imitating the forms of the Roman  senate 
and magistrates.  Their first consuls were Q. Poppaedius Silo, 
a Marsian, and C. Papius  Mutilus,  a  Sabine.  Poppaedius was 
the soul of the whole  undertaking,  and had  been  a  friend of 
Livius Drusus, with whom he had carried  on the negotiations 
peaceably, but he was now determined to obtain his objects by 
force.  The senate of five hundred was entrusted with the care 
of providing the armies with all that was  necessary.  Among 
themselves, these nations were actuated  by very different feel- 
ings:  they had been  isolated for  centuries, cach  having stood 
by itself, and even  now  that they were making themselves in- 
dependent of  Rome,  the temptation  must have been  great to 
remain independent  of  one another.  The Samnites still  bore 
their old grudge against  Rome :  hence  the implacable hatred 
of  Pontius Telesinus, who declared in the battle at the Colline 
Gate, that, unless  the den  of the wolf  was  destroyed,  Italy 
could  never  be  safe  against  her   ravage^.^  He probably  be- 
longed to the gens  of  C.  Pontius, who  is so prominent in the 
second Samnite war, and so fearfully  humbled the Romans at 
Caudium.  The Marsians, on the other hand, had never  been 
cngaged in any fierce  or  long  war  with  the  Romans, as the 
Romans  had  always  faithfully observed honourable conditions 
towards them.  The Marsians and Samnites  accordingly  wcre 
still as  heterogeneous as before:  thcy  also differed  from each 
other in language; the Marsians  spoke Oscan,  but in writing 
they used the Latin character?.  The Samnites used tllc Oscan 
language, because the ruling  class  among them were Sabines. 
VeU. Patcrc. ii. 27. 
TIle  Marsians and their confederates were much purer '3  b'  a  riles ; 
althoUgll  in  a  wider  sense they  mere  all  Sabii~es.  We still 
possess coins with the portrait of  C. Papius Afutilus.  The seat 
of tile Italian government was Corfiniurn, in the coulltry of the 
Peligniaas, a small but brave ~eople,  and its name was changed 
into Itnlica. There still exist many denarii with the inscription 
Italia or viteliu, the latter  or  Oscan  mode  of  spelling  bcillg 
probably  Samnite, while  the Latin form  Italia  is  that  of  the 
Marsians.  It is not improbable  that here, too, the differences 
among the confedcrates had their influence. 
When the war broke out, the advantage was  clecidcdly on 
the part of  the allies;  and the only thing which saved  Rome 
was  the hct, that the Latin colonies  remained faithful to her; 
for tllcre can be no doubt that itnmediately after the commence- 
ment of  the war, the Romans  made up their minds to grant 
to them all  the rights of  Roinan citizci~s.~  This was cffectcd 
by the lex  Julia,  proposed  by  the consul  L. Julius  Caesar, 
which is so often spolien of  in worlcs on Jurisprudence.  It is 
a very common  but erroneous opinion  that the lex Juliu con- 
fcrrcd  the privileges  of  Roman  citizens  upon  the  Italicans, 
~110,  in fact never acquired  those privilcgca  by any one law, 
but gained  tllcin  successively by scveral  laws:  unfbrtunately 
we do not  know the details.  It is quite certain that the lex 
Julia affected the Latins only; its benefits extended over from 
forty to fifty Latin colonies, and not only to such as wcre esta- 
blished in Italy, but also to Narbo and Aquae Sextiae ill Gallia 
Narbonensis.  The former is afterwards mentioned as a colonia 
civium Romanorurn.  The old Latin towns of Tibur and Praeneste 
also, and all the other parts of  Latiurn, which had not received 
the  full  franchise  in  4171°  were  ~nqucstionabl~  included 
among the places which now  received  it.  We may furtller 
take it for  granted that  it was  bestowed  upon the Hernican 
towns, and ~erhaps  also on those places which, until tl~cn,  had 
been pruefecturae, such as Venafrum, Atina, and several others. 
This  prudent  law  greatly  increased  the  number  of  Roman 
citizens;  for  even  in  the  Hannibalian  war  the  number  of 
Latin soldiers  amounted to 80,000, all of  whom  spolrc Latin, 
and were more or less mixed up with t,he Eomnns.  Here then 
the Romans had  a  people on whom they could rely, and it is 
Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i.  49 ; Cicero, pro  Bulho. 8;  Gellius, iv. 4 
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only to be lamented  that the  rights of  Roman citizens had 
not been granted to them before.  Had Rome been  stubborn 
towards the Latins, it would  have been  lost.  This granting 
of  thc franchise  to the Latins belongs  to the beginning  of 
the year. 
Although Hiero had said that the Romans used only Italian 
troops, yct they now carried  on the war with soldiers  drawn 
from all quarters.  Hence we find in the Roman armies Gauls, 
Mauretanians,  Numidians, and Asiatics, in short every place 
had  to send  its contingent, so that in point of  numbers the 
Italicans were surpassed by the Romans.  Another very great 
advantage possessed  by Rome was its central  position  and its 
colonics,  which,  being  scattered, all  over  Italy,  divided  the 
countries of  the enemy, separating the north from  the south, 
and obliged  them  to leave  every where  strong  garrisons  as 
protections against those colonies. 
If we had sufficient materials, I might describe to you  this 
war in such a  manner as  to lay before  you the great masses 
into which it must be divided.  Our principal  authorities are 
Diodorus and Appian.  I have taken much troubIe about this 
war and endeavoured  to  arrange the materials;  but I  have 
suoceeded only very imperfectly in forming a clear conception 
of  the whole.  I will, therefore, gmive  you  only brief  outlines. 
The scene of  the war must be divided into three regions:  the 
southern, the middle, and the northern.  The southern field 
of  the allies' operations was Campania as far as the river Liris; 
the middle comprised the banks of the Liris and the country of 
the  Sabines  as  far  as  Picenum;  and  the  northern  was  in 
Picenum  itself, which formed the boundary of  the operations. 
The Greek  cities  in the rear of  the Italicans remained  indif- 
ferent.  The  Bruttians  are  not  mentioned  in  this  war,  a 
circumstance  which  shews  how nearly they must  have  been 
annihilated in the Hannibalian war.  The Messapians also are 
not  named,  probably  because  they  had  become  completely 
Hellenised.  The  colony of Venusia, as I have already observed, 
joined the allies, for its population had become  almost entirely 
Apulian  and  Lueanian.  The army of  the south was  under 
the command  of  C. Papius  Mutilhs,  and was  opposed  by the 
Romans under the consul L. Julius Caesar.  Mutilus conquered 
a number of towns, Nola, Nuceria, Pompeii, Stabiae, and trans- 
ferred  thc scene of  war  to  Campania;  but  Capua was  main- 
tained by the Romans;  Naples and the Greek towns remained 
faithful, and acted as if the war did not concern them at all. 
The contest  became concentrated around Acerrae.11  Towards 
the close of the year  the advantage  was  still  on  the side of 
the allies. 
p. Rutilius  Lupus, commanded  the middle army, and was 
opposed by Poppaeiedius or Pompaedius Silo, who displayed the 
q~lalities  of a very great general.  Tile Ronlan consul, Hutilius 
Lupus, was personally by no means able to cope with him, and 
lost his  life in battle.  Marius and Sulla served as lieutenant- 
generals  in that army, which  formed  the main  body  of  the 
Roman forces;  and Rome  had  to thank these  men  alone for 
checking the progress of the enemy.  Aesernia, a Latin colony 
in the heart of  Samnium, was conquered by the Samnites after 
a vigorous defence, and not until it was compclled to surrender 
by the most fearful fii~mine.  Its citizens relied too much on the 
good fortune of  the Roman  arms; but their resistance  shows 
the  hatred  existing  in  those  colonies  against  the Italicans. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that the  Sainnites had  previously 
offered  the people  of  Aesernia  a  free  departure.  The first 
Roman who gained  a  brilliant  advantage was  Cn. Pompeius 
Strabo,  who  eoizductcd  the war  as  procoizsul  in  Picenum. 
He was  the  father  of  Pompey,  surnamed  the  Great,  and 
then  held  the  office  of  praetor  proconwlari  potestate;  al- 
though he was marked by all the profligacy  of  the  times, he 
was  nevertheless  a  distiizguisl~ed  general.  He defeated  the 
Picentians  in a  battle  in which  75,000 Italicans and 65,000 
Romans fought, near Asculum.12  The Eomans  gained  a  de- 
cided victory;  Asculum was taken by the sword, and the fate 
of its inhabitants was fearful.  The Picentians in general had 
to endure the severest punishments.  Pon~peius  now penetrated 
into the country of the enemy from the north; and some ofthe 
allies, having lost their confidence in fortune, already began to 
abandon the cause of  their  friends, not being able to maintain 
themseives from want of unity.  The first who did so were the 
Vestinians; and the Romans,  perceiving  this  wavering spirit, 
tried to gain thcir antagonists over, by granting peace and the 
Roman franchise to those who were willing to lay down their 
arms.  On  what  conditions  the franchise was given in these 
" Appian, De Bell. Civil. i.  42. 
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cnscs is not known; but what these allies received, must have 
been more than the mere civitas sine sufragio, for we afterwards 
hear of disputes as to the real meaning of the franchise of these 
people;  and it would seem that the Romans purposely avoided 
being explicit and distinct in their concessions. Velleius Pater- 
culus, who, whatever may be said against him, is an ingenious 
writer and master of his subject, says1?  that in this war upwards 
of 300,000  Italicans lost  their lives, and that the Romans did 
not grant them the franchise until they had lost their life-blood. 
We  may, therefore, suppose that half the men engaged on both 
sides fell, and that the contest was carried on with the greatest 
fury, just as in a  civil war, whence Appian, in fact, relates its 
history aniong the civil wars. 
The course of the war during the second year  can be traced 
with even less accuracy than during the first.  This much only 
is certain, that the northern Sabellians, the Marsians,  Peligni- 
ans, and  Marrucinians, had, like the  Vestinians, concluded  a 
separate peace  for  themselves, and that, perhaps, even  at the 
end of the first year.  After their abandonment  of  the cause of 
the Italicans, the seat of the Italian government was removed to 
Aesernia, and Italica again received its old name, Corfinium. 
The Samnites now formed the centre of the war, which they 
carried on with the same perseverance  as  in former  times, at 
least, the three cantons of the Hirpinians, Caudines, and Pen- 
trians;  they would not hear of peace, and an immense number 
of battles was fought.  The  Romans, in their usual way, marched 
into Apulia and completely surrounded  thc Samnites, so  that 
at the close of the year 663, the war was very near its decision. 
The Samnites, indeed, still maintained themselves;  but, besides 
them, only a part of  the Apulians and Lucanians continued to 
be in arms, and these people  persevered  only  out  of  despair. 
They  either reckoned upon the movements of  Mithridates in 
Asia1"  or they were determined to perish sword in hand. 
In the course of  the second year, the Umbrians and Etrus- 
cans  also  took  up  arms, but  soon  became  reconciled to the 
Romans : their insurrection had quite a different character from 
that of the Italicans.  A Roman praetor conquered  the Etrus- 
cans,  and the franchise  was  immediately  granted  to  them. 
Formerly the Etruscans had furnished no troops to the Roman 
armies, hut now they were ready to take up arms in defence of 
i3 ii. 15.  l4  Diodoixs, xxxvii. Eclog. i. p. 538,  foll. 
honour to which hitherto they had attached no value.  The 
anlbition of the noble Romans obtained very dangerous rivals in 
the Marsians;  while  the  Etruscans, as  foreigners,  were  quite 
distinct from the Romans, and had therefore much less prospect 
of  obtaining any of  the high offices  at Rome.  The Marsians 
did  not  differ  from  the Romans more than, for example, the 
inhabitants of lower from those ofupper Gerlnany, and therefbre 
readily  united  with  the  Romans.  But the  Etruscans  and 
Romans were quite distinct, standing to each other in the same 
relation  as  exists  between  the French or Slavonians and the 
Germans, and hence it was less repugnant to the feelings of the 
proud Romans to grant the rights of equality to the Etruscans, 
than to the Marsians and others.  The Samnites, as of old, were 
bent upon the destruction of  Rome.  The history, as I have 
related  it here, is not contained in any ancient author; it can 
only be gathered  from  a  careful  examination  of  the circum- 
stances-a  source of information which is too much neglected. 
LECTURE  LXXXV. 
TIIE Italian war raised the fame of Sulla to the highest  itch, 
and his  ill feeling and hostility against  Marius  now showed 
themselves clearly.  In the year 664 he was elected consul;  he 
was  then  forty-nine years  old1,  while  Marius  was  upwards 
of  seventy.  Sulla  therefore  belonged  to  quite  a  different 
generation,  and this circumstance cornplcted  thc mutual aver- 
sion which  existed  between  them.  While the former was a 
man of noble birth, the latter was a soldier, who had risen by 
his talcnts and by fortune.  Sulla was a very original character, 
and it is difficult to pronounce a brief  and definite opinion on 
him.  He was a great general and intimately acquainted with 
Greek  literature;  he  spoke  and  wrote  Greek  in a  masterly 
manner,  and entertained  the greatest partiality for  Greck re- 
finements  and for  Greeks  of  literary  pursuits.  In the  war 
against Jugurtha he had distinguished himself  as the quaestor 
of'  Marius,  and had taken a prominent  part in the transactions 
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with king Bocchus.  He therefore looked upon the termination 
of  that war  as  his  own  work.  Fortune  accompanied  him 
everywhere.  He  hil~~self  attached much weight to this fact; and 
it was this good fortune which especially drew the attention of 
the people towards him.  It  is not, indeed,  an idle dream that 
certain men are always, or for a long time, favoured by fortune. 
He had also  distinguished  hirnself  in the Cimbrian war,  but 
still more in that against the Italicans, in which he far eclipsed 
the Came  of  Marius;  and it lnay be said  that  in that war he 
was  the only  Roman who  displayed  brilliant  qualities.  He 
belonged to the illustrious gens of the Cornelii, and was in the 
sixth degrce a descendant of P. Cornelius Rufinus, who acquired 
fame in the war against Pyrrhus; the family, however, to which 
he bclongcdz,  was not illustrious, and was even poor.  EIcilce 
he rose amid great dificultics, just as if he had belonged to an 
obscure family;  the bond which had existed among the patri- 
cians  had ceased to exist,  so  that the Scipios and the Lentuli 
were  of  no use  to him.  Marius was under the influence of 
the sad  feeling  which must be 1)articularly painful  to an old 
man, that thc rising sun outshone him, and made him invisible. 
The extraordinary qualities of  Sulla called forth in Marius a 
spirit of opposition and envy,  and this again excited in Sulla 
a resistance which  produced  a mutual aversion,  of  which  no 
doubt, Marius was the originator.  We  know that Marius  en- 
deavoured to keep his rival down, even at the time of the war 
against Jugurtha; and a man like Sulla must  have owned to 
' 
hiinself that he would  have done the same,  if he had  been in 
the place of Marius.  Thus the old man,  by his wish to crush 
thc younger,  gave rise to the bitter  feelings which afterwards 
vented themselves in so fatal a manner. 
Marius, notwithstanding his advanced age, was insatiable in 
his ambition and his love of power,  and he was now anxious 
to obtain the comnlilnd in the war against Mithridates, which 
had been  given to Sulla,  the consul  of  the year.  As I have 
been  led by circumstances to mention  this war,  I will  here 
relate its origin.  The cause of it was, as far as Ilithridates was 
concerned, most just;  whereas  the conduct of the Rornans was 
the most  glaring injustice.  The kings  of  Pontus  probably 
2 Gronovius corrcctly explains the name Sulla from Sura, Sa,.ula.  contracted 
Sulla, an apparent din~inutive  but with the meaning of  a primitive.  Sura is an 
agnomen of the Lentuli and others. -N. 
belonged  to  one  of  the seven great families  of  the Persians, 
w14ich alone had freedom, and being in a measure sacrosnncti, 
had maintained  their government  as satraps  over  those  parts 
ever since  the time of  the kings of  Persia.  The first of  the 
family  is  known,  is probably the Ariobarzanes  who was 
governor of  those districts  in the reign  of  Occhus;  and the 
ancestors of  Afithridates had  therefore  been  powerful,  and in 
possession of Pontns at a very early tin~e.~  The nation  con- 
sisted  of  Syrians,  though  the  mass  of  the population  must 
originally have  been  Armenians  until  the mighty empire of 
Assyria sent its colonies  into those quarters,  where they were 
called  Leucosyrians.  The kingdoms  of  Pontus  and  Cappa- 
docia  had  been  left untouchcd  by  Alexander of' Macedonia; 
and it was only under his successors that they were drawn into 
the llacedonian wars.  The son  of  the then governor,  Mith- 
ridates,  who assumed the rank of  a tributary ~rince,  escaped 
the envy of Antiocl~us  the one-eyed, through the influence of 
his  son,  Demetrius  Yoliorcetes.  Those countries were  afier- 
wards strengthened, so  that as  early  as  the fifth  century  of 
Rome their  governors  styled themsehes kings.  During the 
long  wars  of  Alexander's  successors, especii~lly  between  the 
Syrian kings and Egypt, they became completely consolidated, 
but subsequently they were divided into two kingdoms, Cappa- 
docia and Pontus (in its narrower sense) which were governed 
either by members of  the same dynasty, or at least by Persian 
families.  This  division  existed  about the  year  620,  when 
a hiIithridates ruled over Pontus Proper, and a part of Paphla- 
gonia, and not only afforded the Romans considerable assistance 
against Aristonicus,  but  sent galleys  even  against  Carthage. 
The Romans  had  rewarded  him,  as  they  said,  with  Great 
Yhrygia,  which  until then had  belonged  to the kingdom  of 
Pergamus; but from  a fragment of  a speech by C.  Gracchusd, 
we see that he bought it at Rorne with his  own money.  The 
kingdom had thus acquired a great  extent; its power and re- 
sources wereconsiclerable, and on a quite different scale from what 
we should so designate in our poor Europe.  Asia accordingly 
was then divided into the large kingdom of  Pontus, Bithynia, 
which mas smaller, the Roman province,  Cappadocia  and the 
sea coasts, where Cilicia,  Caria,  Pamphylia,  and  a number of 
other small  independent  states existed in a  chaotic condition. 
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Jfithridates left these dominions to his son,  Xlitllridates  VI., 
justly surnamed  the Great,  who  TWI~  yet under  age;  and the 
Romans,  we  know  not  why,  unceremoniously  took  Great 
Phrygia from  him.5  But the young  monarch, in whom  an 
implacable desire for revenge had thus been roused, shewed a 
great mind while he was growing up, preparing himself quietly, 
and endeavouring to extend his dominions, whcrever lie could 
do so without coming in contact with the Romans;  for among 
many  unusual  qualities  he  had  an  extraordinary  talent  for 
dissimulation.  He  subdued  the  Cimmerian  Bosporus,  and 
the Crimea, so that in the end his empire extended as far as the 
Ukraine and the river Dnieper.  It might seem wonderfuI that 
the Rorrians did not interfere to el~eck  his progress; but Mith- 
ridates availed himself of the fi~vourable  time during  which the 
Romans  were at war with  their  allies.  But the  fact of  the 
Romans bcing nevertheless fully aware of  what was going on, 
shews that nothing escaped their notice.  An opportunity soon 
offered of making himself master of Cappadocia also.  Disputes 
had  there  arisen  about  the succession,  the person  who  then 
occupied the throne being declared supposititious, and hlithri- 
dates gave the throne to Ariarathes, his son or brother.  This 
provoked  the Romans,  and  they  set  up an  opposing  king 
against him.  Ever since Mithridates had come of age, he had 
done all he could to collect a fleet and a large army, evidently 
with the intention of using them against Rome.  13c calculated 
tllat  the war which was  raging  in  Italy,  would  weaken  the 
Romans,  and he was no doubt in connection with the Italian 
allies.  But his preparations were not completed  at the right 
time,  and  this circumstance,  as  had  becn  the ease so often, 
saved  Rome from an  iinminent  danger.  EIad  he commcnced 
the aEztir two years earlier, at the beginning of the social war, 
that war  might have taken a  different  turn.  IIe trusted  too 
much in the success of  the Italicans,  and believed  that they 
wouild make his conquests all the easier. 
Home meantime recovered from the Marsian war, whicli was 
continued only with feeble efforts.  In the second  year of  the 
war, the Romans  had  sent comrnissioncrs  to  Asia  to  dictate 
laws to Mithridates, and this nlay have made an imposirlg im- 
pression  upon him;  for  however  low  the  Romans  had  sunk 
morally, politically they were as great as ever.  Although thcy 
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were  most  alarmingly threatened  in  Italy,  yet they did not 
lose sight of  Asia.  I11  the mean  time  Alithridates  supported 
the undertaking of a brother of Nicomedes,  king of  Bith~nia, 
ill  Tvllose contemptible  family parricide  and  fratricide  were 
things of common  occurrence.  Nicomedes  was  expelled, and 
Jlitllridates became  the ally  of  the new king; but  still  he 
allowed himself  to be so fix  intimidated  by the Romans as to 
allow the restoration of  Nicomedes  in Bith~nia,  and of Ario- 
barznnes in Cappadocia,  though  without  giving up his  plans 
of revenge.  The Romans  might  still have  avoided  the war 
ibr  a  long  time,  if  they  had  wished  it;  the  government 
undoubtedly  did  wish  it, but the individual governors,  who 
hoped  for  booty,  would  not  hear  of  peace,  and  compelled 
Nicomedes  to  comlnence  hostilities  against  Mitl~ridater.  that 
they might have a  pretext for coming to his assistance.  Cap- 
padocia was not  died  with the Romans,  and Nicornedes  had 
had forebodings that matters would not turn out well for him. 
Mithridates naturally took  vengcance  by invading  Bithynia : 
he defeated  the king and restored  Nicomedes'  brother,  as  a 
pretcnder against him.  The Roman scnatc  now openly inter- 
fered, and spoke to the  Pontic king in a tonc which  implied 
that he had been the aggressor; thcy demanded that he should 
cease all hostilities against Bithynia, and recognise the king of 
Ca~padocia  whom  they patronised.  Nothing  could  be  more 
unjust.  Mithridates bitterly complained of the injustice, allud- 
ing also  to their  having taken  Phrygia  from him.  In the 
meantime the war  in Italy was almost decided,  the  Samnitcs 
and Nolanians alone being in arms,  the rest  having obtained 
the franchise.  The Romans however were  so  exhausted  that 
the war  happened  inconveniently for  them.  They collected 
three armies,  in which  there wcre scarcely any Rornans7, but 
which  were  for  the most  part  composed  of  the effeminate 
inhabitants  of  Asia  Minor.  They were  to  act  against  the 
well-disciplined  troops of  Mithridates, and the issue of the un- 
dertaking  accordingly was  such  as  it deserved  to  be.  Two 
Roman  armies  wcre  comp1eteIy defeated,  and the king met 
with  scarcely  any  resistance  to  his  progress;  he conquered 
Bith~nia,  restored  his  son  to the throne of  Cappadocia,  and 
s~bdued  the whole Roman province of Asia, all the inhabitants 
of which enthusiastically received him as their deliverer.  The 
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rage against the Romans there was so great, that all the places 
in Asia  Blinor,  which were pite I-Iellenised, and considered 
the war to be at an end,  in one day murdered all the Romans 
and Italicans that were  staying among them,  in order to give 
to  Mitliridates  a  proof  of  their  fidelity.  The  number  is 
stated  to  have  been  70,0008,  which  is  almost  incredible. 
as it was  chiefly wealthy persons  and merchants who resided 
there.  The massacre was perpetrated with the greatest cruelty. 
Thus perished the numerous usurers and leeches of the country, 
who after the destructive wars of Aristonicus had extorted the 
highest interest  from the poor people,  and under the protec- 
tion  of  the Roman  governors  indulged  in every crime,  and 
levied taxes and duties with unbounded  tyranny.  Nearly the 
whole continent of Asia Minor recognised  Mithridates as their 
sovereign, and some of the maritime towns likewise submitted 
to him.  As lie had received  a Greek  education, he had  re- 
jected  the doctrine  of  the Magi  (no  trace of  this religion is 
found in his history except  on coins where  the sun and moon 
appear), and the Greeks  looked  upon  him  as  a  Greek,  and 
placed all their hopes iiz him.  This induced him  to advance 
even into Greece,  and he was  everywhere received with joy. 
Athens allowed itself to be persuaded by a  sophist  Aristion to 
open its gates to him;  the consequence of which was, that the 
sophist himself  usurped  the government.9  Peloponnesus and 
Boeotia,  in short nearly  the whole  of  Greece  submitted  to 
Mithridates;  Mitylerie and Chios were wavering;  Cyzicus and 
the Rhodians  alone remained  faithful  to Romc.  The latter 
foresaw the issue of  the war,  and were actuated only by pru- 
dence, endcavouring by a steady fidelity to make amends for the 
fault they had committed in the eyes of the Romans, during the 
war with Perscus; for they could not possibly fcel any attach- 
ment to Rome.  Mithridates occupied the whole of the Roman 
province as far as Magnesia, and besieged Rhodes.  These occur- 
rcnces excited enormous indignation at Rome, and the determi- 
nation to carry on the war in good earnest.  But the dispute as to 
who was to have the command occasionerl the first civil war. 
The senate, in whose  power it was,  according to the Sem- 
~ronian  law,  to appoint  a  general  for  conducting  the war, 
gave the command to Sulla.  Marius, who could not keep up 
Appian, I.  c.  22, 23. 
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his ,great name by distin~uishing  himself in time of  peace and  b 
was impelled by his irresistible desire to hu~nble  his adversary, 
likewise  to obtain  the command.  Twelve years 
had  elapsed since  his  triumph; he had grown old, and sunk 
in public  opinion.  He may  still have been  an able general, 
although  in the social war he had distinguished himself only 
once.  The older he grcw,  the more  he sank morally, and he 
no longer  possessed  the great qualities which  had formerly 
concealed  his faults.  However he still had  a party, nlld was 
still the man whom  the anti-aristocrats  put forward as  their 
champion.  We must not, however, believe that all the com- 
motions of that time proceeded from party spirit, but all things 
assumed more and more a personal character. 
When Sulla entered upon the consulship, no one appears to 
have thought that tlic  republic was threatened by an internal 
war.  Before taking the iield  against Mithridates, he wanted 
to bring tlic war in Italy to a close.  Nola was  still defending 
itself:  we know not by what means.  This part of the social 
war is  called  bellurn  Nolanurn, just  as its beginning  is  called 
bellum  Marsicurn.  The bellurn  Nolanurn was  chiefly sustained 
by the Samnites who were still in arms;  but it was  rather an 
insurrection than a war,  for  tlicre was no large army.  It was 
one of Sulla's great qualities, that he never abandoned  a great 
undertaking  which  he  had  once  entered  upon,  whatever 
inducements  there  might  be  to do so; and in this  case the 
Mithridatic  war,  which  was  already  breaking  out,  did  not 
induce him  to withdraw from  Nola.  While  Sulla was  still 
engagcd there, P.  Sulpicius,  the same who in Cicero's work, 
"  I)e  Oratore," as a young man taltcs part in thc conversation, 
was  tribune  of  the  people  at Rome.  Whatever  may  have 
induced  this young  man  of  noble  family  to  take  such  false 
steps-it  was  probably personal  hatred of  Sulla-he  was the 
cause  of Rome's  misfortunes.  He made the proposal that the 
command  against  Mithridates should  be  given  to Marius, as 
the people, said he, had (according to the Hortcnsian law) the 
right to decide, even although the senate should have already 
distributed the provinces.  At the same time he proposed that 
the new citizens, by whom we havc to understand the Latins, 
Etruscans, and Umbrians, should be distributed among the old 
tribes, although it was intended to form them into new tribes. 
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tribus  u~banae  voted  after  the tribus  rusticae,  whereby  they 
w011ld  have lost much importance, for  the praerogativa  was of 
great weight.  The new citizens indeed possessed the suffrage; 
but they recognised it as a mockery to obtain a right which, 
in nine times  out of ten, they would not be even called upon 
to exercise, because  the old  Roman tribes in most cases quite 
agreed in their votes;  for as soon as the majority of votes was 
ascertained the voting ceased.  It was an extremely rare  case 
that eighteen voted against seventcen.  The proposal of Sulpi- 
cius, therefore, was  on the one hand  an injustice towards the 
old citizens; but Velleius Paterculus  represents  the matter in 
too bad  a  light; for  as  most  people  belonging  to  the tribus 
rusticae  lived  at a  distance,  and did not come  to the city at 
all, and as the libertini who resided in the city had succeeded 
in getting registered  in the tribus  rusticae,  the proposed  plan 
must,  after  all, be  called  an essential  improvement.  Much, 
therefore, might be said for and against it. 
It is inconceivable to me  that this Sulpicius, whom  Cicero 
loved so  tenderly,  should  have  deserved  the severe  censure 
passed upon him by Appian  and Plutarch.  That his conduct 
towards Sulla  is  unjustifiable  requires  no proof;  nor  can  we 
say that he acted from  pure motives.  According  to Cicerolo 
he was  highly  educated,  and  a  man  of  the most  brilliant 
genius.  It is true, that a man ever so great may be placed in 
circumstances in which he would act in the way that Sulpicius 
did; but I  cannot  believe  that  Cicero, *even from  youthful 
recollections,  would  have spoken  so  favourably of  him,  espe- 
cially if we consider how he elsewhere expresses himself' of the 
democrats, had he seen his actions in the light in which they 
appeared  to  Greek writers.  Ciccro  also  admires  him  for  his 
talent as an orator,  and he had hcard him in his youth.  We 
must further remember that the memoirs of Sulla were almost 
the only source from which those  Greek writers  derived their 
information;  and that Sulla should  speak  of him in a deroga- 
tory manner cannot be surprising.  This circumstance should 
put us on our  guard in receiving such statements.  Sulla was 
naturally exasperated  in the highest  degree at this injustice; 
and  his  resistance  to  it is  a  circumstance  which,  however 
formidable  its  consequences  were,  must  not  be  censured too 
severely, if we consider the spirit of the times. 
lo Brutus, 55, aid se5eral other passages. 
The  old citizens, for here we can no longer speak of  aristo- 
crats and democrats, opposed  the  proposals of  Sulpicius.  He 
invited a ilulnber of  new citizens  to come  to Rome,  in order 
to carry his schemes by main force.  But as the bill concerning 
the command  in the Mithridatic war was one  of  the  things 
affected by them,  Sulla  made  up his mind to  interfere, arms 
in hand.  In  former  times,  a  Fabius  Maximus  Rullianus 
would have submitted to necessity, but those times were gone. 
Sulla resisted because he knew  that Sul~icius  and his associates 
would not  stop short thcrc, but aim  at his  life,  for  such  was 
the spirit of the times.  He assembled llis army at  Nola,  and 
told the men that Marius would form a new army and disband 
thcm, so that they would  have no share in the profitable war, 
and would be disgraced.  They therefore unanimously  resolved 
to follow hiin to Rome.  He took six legions, and marched with 
them along the Via Appia against the city.  The senate which 
-was  swayed  by Sulpicius, wae  alarmed at the approach of an 
army, and  sent  ambassadors  to ask  what Sulla  wantcd.  He 
returned  an evasive answer, but advanced  and was joiizcd  by 
his colleague Cn. Octavius.  Marius and Sulpicius had  indccd 
made  preparations  to  defend  thcmsclvcs, but  thcy wcre  in- 
sufficient, Rome not being a fortress;  the  eastcrn suburbs, tlie 
most  splendid  portion  of  the city,  were  quite  opcn.  Tlle 
gates were closed against Sulla, but this was of no use;  houses 
had  been built close  up to the walls, as in  the  old  towns  of 
our own country; and the walls themselves wcre in some parts 
so much decayed that it was easy to step over  then1 from  the 
suburbs.  In the Hannibalian war, it had still bccn possible to 
defend Iiome; but now, after an intcrval of morc than a century, 
when fortifications had ceased to be thought  neccesary, a great 
part of  thc city lay open, and the rest could  not be  dcfmdcd. 
Msrius did not attempt to  defend the gates, but  withdrew  to 
the intcrior of  the city.  An engagcment  took  place  in thc 
Carinae.  Sulla  with  his  superior  numbers  thus  entered  the 
city without  any difficulty, and marched down  the Via  Sacr:~ 
to the Forum, so that all his opponcnts dispersed. 
Sulla used his victory with modcration, which shews him at 
that time in a favorable light.  Marius with his son, Sulpicius, 
and nine othcrs of his followers  who had fled, wcre  outlawed, 
but Sulpicin3 was ovcrt"tkcn ant1 killed; besides him only two 
Or  t1ll-e~  others weie put to death  3Iarius with his son fled to 
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Ostia, and thence southward along the sea-coast.  At  Terracina, 
which he reached  by a boat, he was  in the greatest danger of 
being deliverer1 up to his enemy.  Thence he went to the Liris 
and Minturnae, where he was found concealed in tlic marshes in 
the ncighbourhood, and thrown into prison.  The magistrates 
of  Minturnae,  not  venturing  to  put  him  to death,  sent  a 
public  slave to kill him, for  a price had  been  set  upon  his 
head.  But the barbarian, a  captive  Cimbrian, was  daunted 
by the sight  of  the aged  warrior,  and  recognising  in  him 
his  own  conqueror  tools  to flight,  loudly  exclaiming  about 
the changeableness  of  fortune.  As fortune on  tliis  occasion 
seemed  to declare in Marius'  favour, the decurions  sent him 
off in a boat.  He first  sailed to  Ischia and  thence  to  Africa, 
where during the subsequent tumultuous period he dwelt amid 
the ruins of  Carthage,  forgotten  and  overlooked.  At that 
time there either was no governor in Africa, or he belonged to 
the party of Marius.  No onc  thought  of  saving  himself  by 
going to Mithridates. 
Sulla used his  victory with  such  moderation, that he  con- 
tented  himself  with  making  some  peaceful  regulatibns,  the 
particulars of which are not known.  13e was  so far  from  ty- 
rannical, that he even allowed the  election of  the consuls  for 
the following year  to take place  without  any interfcrence on 
his part.  The mcn who obtained  the consulship  belongcd to 
different  parties:  Cn. Octavius, perhaps  a  son  of  the tribune 
M. Octavius, to that of  Sulla, and L. Cornelius Cinna to that 
of  Marius.  It may seem  strange  to find  that Cinna  and  L. 
Valerius Flaccus, although descended of noblc patrician familics, 
were now at the head of the demagogues; but this is another 
proof that the division into patricians and  plebeians was  then 
forgotten.  Towards the end of the year, when  Sulla  thought 
that he had made a11 the necessary arrangements,  and saw that 
the war against the  Samnites  might yet  last for a  long  time, 
he wcnt over to  Greece, and there carried  on the war against 
Archelaus,  who  commanded  the army  of  Mithridates,  and 
about whom I shall say more hereafter. 
The senate in  the meantime  gave  to  Q. Pompeius  Rufus, 
the colleague of  Sulla in the consulship, Italy as his  province 
for the following year, that he might counteract Cinna, support 
Cn.  Octavius,  and  bring  the  social  war  to  a  close.  Cn. 
Pompeius Strabo, the father of  I'ompey  the Great, was  at tliis 
time  still commanding his army on the coast of  the Adriatic 
and in Apulia.  Of this man, Cicero says: homo diis nobilitatique 
perin&  invisus, for no one was so generally hated:  he ~ossessed 
more malice and artfulness than  we can  conceive, and  in this 
respect resembled the men of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, 
especially in Italy.  He cared about no party, and  only calcu- 
lated  how in the end he might  gain the greatest power  from 
the greneral confusion.  The senate ordered  him to resign  the 
command  of  his  army  to  Q.  Pompcius;  he  pretended  to be 
quitc willing to do so;  but in secret incited his  troops  against 
Quintus, and while the latter was  administering to them  their 
military oath, he was murdered by them."  Cn. Pompeius Strabo 
assuincd the appearance of  intending to institute an investiga- 
tion of the matter, but  allowed himself  to  be  prevailed  upon 
by the soldiers to resume the command,-a  farce  like that in 
Spanish South America with Bolivar and  the like.  He then 
wrote to the senate of the inisfortune  which had  befallen him, 
and begged to be confirmed in his command, that he might be 
able to institute an  inquiry, and as far as  possible provide  for 
the good of  the  republic.  The senate was  wcals  enough  to 
grant his request;  but he soon  forgot  the investigation.  He 
was  now  at the head  of  the  army in Italy, and  waitcd  for 
what might happcn.  As Sulla had led his army into  Greece, 
the Samnites had again obtained breathing time. 
But this state of  tranquillity did not last long,  for early in 
the year following (665) the rupture between Cinna and Cn. Oc- 
tavius became complete.  The Romans had adopted the system of 
forming new tribcs to contain the new citizens;  for, if they had 
distributed  them  among  the existing tribcs, the new citizens 
would, on all occasions, have far outvoted the Romans, and the 
old citizens would have sunk into insignificance."  To prevent 
the old  citizens being  complrtcly overruled by the new ones, 
it was necessary to follow the plan which had been  adopted in 
earlier times with regard to the Volscians and others.  Respect- 
ing  the  number  of  the new  tribes which were addcd to  the 
thirty-five old ones, we have two diffcrent accounts;  the one in 
Vcllcius Paterculus, the other in Appian.  The former states 
thcir number to  have  been  eight;  but  in Appian,  we  read 
a~xa~f~ovreq  &~C+~vav  &ipap  (viz.  +vhdF).  The word 6t~a- 
" Appian, Dr  Bell. Civil. i. 63; Vell. Paterc. ii. 20. 
" Appian, De  Bell.  Civzl. i.  49; Vell. Paterc. ii. 20. 
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TE~OVT~F  in this passage is an absurdity, and has been changed 
into 661ca  +vhdp; but then 6c~a ahuiv would more likely have 
been written.  I believe that we must read Gilca  ~VTE  &~&7~vav 
Erkpac..  What induces me to make this conjecture, is a feeling 
of symmetry.  If fifteen new tribes were added, the total num- 
ber  was  fifty, against  which  number,  nothing  can  be  said. 
Thirty-five was a very awkward number, but had been  made 
up gradually without any intention of  stopping there.  More- 
over, the number 15  bears the same ratio to 35, that 3 bears to 
7 ; thus the number of the fifteen new tribes is a little less than 
half the number of  the old ones.  The different  statement of 
Velleius presents, in my opinion, no difficulties;  and I account 
for it by the supposition, that at first  the Latins were formed 
into eight new tribes, to which  afterwards seven  others  were 
added, which  were formed of Etruscans and Umbrians.  The 
custom  at Rome  henceforth  was, that the fifteen  new tribes 
did not give their votes until the old  ones  had  given  theirs. 
P. Sulpicius had promised the new citizens that they should be 
distributed  among  the  old  tribesl3,  which  was  a  manifest 
injustice towards the latter.  Most of  the Romani rustici lived 
at a  great  distance  from  the city; and  it was an important 
advantage to those who lived in the city to bc inscribed in the 
rustic tribes. 
LECTURE LXXXVI. 
Trr~  discussion about the franchise in Italy called forth different 
interests  among  the Latins,  Italicans and  Etruscans.  Cinna 
who evidently aimed at sovereign power, came forward as the 
avowed  head  of  the Marian  party, and in order to win  over 
the Italicans,  he offered  to  distribute  them  among  the  old 
tribes.  The  Samnites  were  still  in  arms,  hoping  either  to 
conquer Rome or to remain  indcpendent, whence they would 
not acccpt the franchise.  This however  alienated  thcm froin 
the rest who were anxious to obtain it.  The divisions among 
the Italicans were almost as great as those among the parties at 
Rome.  The party of  Cinna consisted of  the old  Latin towns 
from Tibur to Capua,  comprising  Tibur, Praeneste, the towns 
of  the Hernicans,  and several places  between  the Liris  and 
Vulturnus.  He demanded that the tribes formed out of  these 
places sllould be dissolved, and be distributed among the thirty- 
five old ones.1  I cannot conceive why Sulla did not adopt this 
very  same  measure,  as  it was  the only method  of  forming a 
strong  and  powerful  aristocracy  amid  the  democracy;  but- 
perhaps he liked best the shadows of the old tribes.  Multitudes 
of  the new citizens  now flocked  to  Rome, in order to carry 
Cinna's  measure  by  their  superiority in  numbers.  Cinna's 
colleagu~,  Cn.  Octavius,  declared  against  it,  and  a  fierce 
contest  arose within  the city, in which  Cinna  was  defeated, 
and many of  the new citizens fell.  The statement that 10,000 
new  citizens  were  killed  in  this  struggle  is  exaggerated, 
and cannot  be  believed.  Thc senate now  had  the couragc 
to come forward  against  Cinna, but committed  an illegal  act 
in declaring,  by a  senatusconsulturn,  the consular  dignity  of 
Cinna  to be forfcited.  Such a  power  might in former times 
have been exercised  by the curies and centuries, but never by 
the senate alone;  the  decree  was  in fact void,  unless  it was 
sanctioned by the people.  Matters, it is true, had gone so far, 
that the sovereignty of  the people could no longer be recog- 
nised, but in form, at all events, tlie proceeding  of the senate 
was rcvolutionary. 
The war  against the Samnitcs was  still  carried  on  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Nola,  and  a  Roman  army, which  cannot 
have been  equal to that of  the Samnites, was  bcsieging  that 
city.  Thither Cinna now repaircd, and bribed both the officers 
and the soldiers, who had  learncd from  Sulla that they held 
the fate of the republic in their hands; they supported him, and 
requested him to re-assume tlie ensigns of the consular dignity, 
and  to lead  them  against  Rome to humble the pride of  the 
oligarchs.  This he did.  A truce must  have been concluded 
with  the  Samnitcs.  In  order  to  raise  hls  and  his  party's 
authority, he invited the aged  Marius  and the other exiles to 
return.  Marius  sailed  from  Libya  to the coast  of  Etruria, 
where he formed  Etruscan  cohorts;  for Marius was  not at all 
delicate in collecting troops, and restored all slaves to freedom 
on condition of  their taking  up arms for him.  Another exile 
who was recalled, was Q. Sertorius, a man who had joined the 
Livy, Epzt. 77; Appian, I.  c. i.  55.  ' Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i. 64;  Vcll. Paterc. ii.  20. 374  Q. SERTORIUS.  MARIUS AND  CINNA  ENTER  ROME.  375 
party  of  Marius,  chiefly  on  account  of  his  aversion  to the 
rulers, and who had no share wlyatever in the tyrannical acts 
of  the demagogues.  I-Ie  is one of  the best  Romans of  those 
times;  he was  noble-minded,  open,  humane,  free  from  thc 
narrow prejudices  of  his  countrymen,  and endowed  with all 
the qualities  requisite  to make a  great  general.  He was  in 
that position  in which, at the outbreak of  a revolution, excel- 
lent men so often find themselves:  they are not aware of  what 
will  take place, and in their innocence allow themselves  to be 
led away.  Afterwards they cannot get out of  the connexions 
into which circumstances  have thrown  them, and  thus they 
share disgrace and crimes with those  by whom  they are sur- 
rounded.  Sertorius was  innocent, and kept his hands clear, 
although  he was  obliged  to witness  the horrors which  took 
place  at Rome after the victory.  We  often cannot avoid pro- 
nouncing unjust  opinions  upon  men,  if  we judge  of  them 
merely  from  the  observation  that  they  are  connected  with 
such  or such  persons.  Sertorius was  with  Cinna,  who  ad- 
vanced with his army from Campania, on the same road which 
Sulla  had  taken  when  he  marched  against  Rome.  Carbo, 
an accomplice of Cinna, who afterwards acquired a great name 
in  those  disturbances,  joined  his  army.  Marius  meantime 
advanced  against  Rome  from  Etruria.  The  senate  had 
called  upon  Cn. Pompeius  Strabo for  assistance,  and he had 
accordingly given up the war on the Adriatic, and proceeded 
to Rome.  Cn. Octavius  was  encamped  on  the  Janiculum, 
and Cn. Pompeius at the Colline  gate.  The conduct  of  the 
latter was  for a time so suspicious that the senate began to fear 
trea~on.~  At  last, however, he commenced an engagement with 
Cinna,  which  is much  exaggerated  in some  accounts3,  but 
seems in reality to have been  only an insignificant  skirmish. 
Its issue, indeed, was advantageous to the rebels; but the senate 
had  at  least  some  guarantee  that  it  was  not betrayed  by 
Pompeius.  After  this a  pestilence  began  to  rage  in  both 
armies outside the city, by which many thousands were carried 
off.  Cn.  Pompeius  Strabo  fell  a  victim  to it, according to 
some accounts; but according  to others, he was  killed in the 
camp  by a  flash  of  lightning.4  The people,  rejoiced  at his 
death, gave vent to their exasperation  against him,  and when 
'  Vell. Paterc.ii. 21 ;  Livy, Epit.  79; Appian, De  Bello Civi1.i.  67. 
"ell.  Paterc. I. c.  "ompare  Livy, Epit. 79;  Appian, 1.c. i. 68. 
his body  was  carried  through  the  city, tore it from the bier 
ancl  mutilated it, for lie had beell thc object of general hatred. 
One army of  the Ronlans was encamped near Albano, at the 
foot of  Moxte  Cavo,  and  was opposed  to  one  of  the rebels. 
Latiurn,  which  after  suffering dreadful  devastations  in  the 
Volscian  and  Salnnite  wars,  had been  in the  enjoyment of 
pence for some centuries, now received its death-blow; and the 
condition in which we find it  under  Augustus must be traced 
to the effects of  this war.  Marius took Ostia, Antium, Aricia, 
Lanuviurn, and other places  by storm,  and laid  them  waste; 
Tibur and Praeneste joined  him of  their  own  accord.  Four 
cainps cncloscd the city; and though the rebels wcre not strong 
enough to take it by storm, still the effect which they produccd 
in the  city was  a complete famine.  Both  thc generals  and 
soldiers were so desponding, that at last the senate resortcd  to 
negotiations,  and the  deputies  of  the senate  were obliged to 
comply with all the demands that were made.  Cinna, who had 
been declared a rebel, was rccognised in his dignity of  consul, 
and Marius, as a private person, stood by the side of the curulc 
chair with contemptuous smiles  and looks, in which the depu- 
ties read their own scntence of  death.5  It  was stipulated that 
no blood  should  be shcd; but Cinna  made  a  very  equivocal 
promise,  saying  that  it should  not  be  done  with  his  will. 
Cinna  then demanded  that  Merula, who had bccn appointed 
consul in his  place, sliould be deposed.  This humiliation also 
the  senate  seems  to  have  submitted  to.  The othcr consul, 
Octavius,  however  would  not  give  way,  and  with  a  small 
band went to the Janiculum, with the senseless idca of dcfend- 
ing himsclf.  Towards  the end  of  the year  when the rebels 
entered the city, thc slaughter, of  which Marius was  the chief 
cause, began.  Cn. Octavius was slain, even  while  Marius and 
Cinna were entering the city; and the flamen dialis, L. Merula, 
bled himsclf to death at the altar of  the Capitoline temple,  in 
order to escape a similar fate.  Marius  now caused  himself to 
bc proclaimed consul for the seventh, and Cinna for the second 
time, without any elections.  This  was  the point after which 
Mt~rius  had  always  bccn  striving, in order  to  realise  a  pro- 
phecy  which  had  been  made  to  him,  in conscquence  of  an 
eagle's nest, with seven young ones,  having fallen into his  lap 
from an oak tree  (Cicero  calls it Marius' oak), when he was  a 
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child.  He had often consoled his friends with his prospect  of 
seven collsulships when  they began  to despair  of  his fortune; 
for as I  have already remarked he was extremely superstiti~us.~ 
The victory which  the rebels had thus gained was  followed 
by the wildest cruelties.  Marius had a  body-guard of  slaves, 
~vhom  he sent out to murder those whom he wished to get  rid 
of.  In this manner all  the most  distinguished persons of  the 
opposite  party,  the flower  of  the senate,  were  despatched, 
especially his ~ersonal  enemies:  no reasons were assigned, and 
no proscription was made; all was done by the simple command 
of  Marius.  Among these unhappy victims were the celebrated 
orators M. Antonius and  Craasus.  Q. Catulus  who  had  beell 
the  colleague  of  Marius  in  the Cimbrian  war,  was  likewise 
destined to be killcd, but put an end to his own life.  Marius' 
conduct towards  him  is  one  of  the meanest  actions  of  this 
unhappy man.  There  were  but  few  good  men  with  Cinna, 
such as Sertorius.  Marius Gratidianus too, a cousin of Marius, 
must  not  be  judged  severely;  but  Cinna,  Carbo  and their 
friends were monsters, whereas  the senate was  headed by the 
bcst  educated and noblest  characters,  if we  make due allow- 
ance for the corruption of  the age.  The butchery was carried 
on to such an extent  that at length  even  Cinna  hiinself  was 
induced, by the advice of  Sertorius,  to put to death  the band 
of  servile assassins kept by Marius.  In the middle of January, 
on the sixteenth day after  Marius had entered  on his seventh 
consulship, he died, apparently  in a fit of rage.  The shedding 
of  blood  now ceased, but not the bitter spirit of the Cactions7, 
with which however we are but little acquainted. 
At  the timc when Cinna was approaching the city with his 
army, the senate had given Q. Metellus, who was stationed ncar 
Nola, full power to conclude peace with the Samnites on what- 
ever terms he might think pr~pcr.~  The Samnites abused the 
favourable  moment, and  demanded the Roman franchise, not 
only for themselves, but also  for  their allies, the Campanians 
and Lucanians;  and that all their captives and deserters should 
be given up to them, whereas  the  Romans  were not  to have 
theirs restored to them, but were even to be  obliged to confer 
It is not improbable that his Syrian prophetess, Martha, may have suggested 
to 11im the  number  seven,  which  was a  sacred number  among tllc  Jews  and 
Syriaus, as three was among the Romans.-N. 
7  App:nil,  I.  c. i.  i5; Vcll. P:~tcrc  ii  23; l'lutarch,  Murius, 4.5. 
Ap;>i,u~,  I.  c.  i.  68, who, howevcr, gives a somewl~i~t  tllfercnt acconnt. 
the franchise  upon  then1.9  Metellus concluded the peace on 
these conditio~l~;  and the Sainnites, by a subsecluent law, becanle 
Roman  Thenccforth, they were the strongest support 
of the Marian party.  The new tribes of the Italicans were now 
broken up, and their members were distributed among the old 
tribes;  but we do not know whether this was the case with all 
of them.  In  manner, however, it may have been done, 
it gave the new  citizens a dangerous numerical preponderance. 
At the timc of  Cicero, it would seem  as  if a11  the Italicans, 
according to their nationalities, were collectively contained in a 
tribe; so that e.g. the Marsians and their neighbours were con- 
tained in the tribus Sergia, and all the municipia about Arpinum 
in the Acmilia.  If this was so, it was, in my opinion, one of 
the  changes  introduced  by  Sulla, in  order  to render  their 
numerical preponderance harmless. 
The death  of  C. Marius was  followed  by a period  of  three 
years, during which Sulla was  conducting the war  in Achaia 
and Asia, and Italy was coinpletely in the hands of the party of 
Cinna, who  prepared  himself  for  the  war  with  Sulla.  But 
Cinna  made  himself  inore  and more  hateful  by  his  acts  of 
oppression, and soon found that he had reason  to mistrust his 
own followers, so that he found it necessary to demand hostages, 
which however wcre rcfused.  His collcagne, L. Valerius Flaccus, 
the successor of C. Ma~ius,  had been commissioned to undertake 
the war against Mithridates :  he had marched through Illyricum, 
Macedonia, and  Greece, to  Asia, where  he was  murdered by 
C. Flavius Fimbria.  In his  fourth  consulship, Cinlza was  at 
hrirninum, forming a numcrous army to attack Sulla in Greece 
-a  vcry sensible plan.  But  the soldiers refuscd to  embark, 
and slew Cinna in his camp.  Cn. Papirius Carbo, whom Cinna 
had chosen  for  his  colleague  after  the death  of  L. Valerius 
Flaccus,  now  remained  consul for a  whole  year without  a 
colleague.  These  men retained indeed the name  of  consuls, 
but they wcre in fact true tyrants. 
In the year 665, Sulla had gone over to Achaia and Thessaly. 
Archelaus and Taxiles were at the time  the generals of Mith- 
ridates, and in possession of Pelopo~lnesus  and southern Greece, 
as far as Thermopylae.  Sulla gained the battle of  Chaeronea 
against an innumerable host  of  barbarians-a  battle which he 
himself probably did not  reckon  among those upon which  he 
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restcd his military glory:  the men,  100,000 in number,  were 
as  cowardly  as the Persians  or  the  armies  of  Indian chiefs. 
They formed a phalanx, and were  armed as Macedonians, but 
a Scipio or a Rannibal would have said of thein that, notwith- 
standing all this, they were like fish prepared by a clever cook, 
in various  ways  and under  various  names, but wcrc aftcr  all 
nothing but fish.  Sulla lii~nself  lost only a fcw of his soldicrs.1° 
Archelaus defended himself very differently in Piraceus.  The 
long walls connecting the city of Athens with the port-town had 
bcen  destroyed, perhaps, by Demetrius  Poliorcetes; the com- 
munication does not appear to have been free even during the 
sicge of  Antigonus Gonatas;  but Piraeeus, as well as the city, 
was still protected by the strong walls of  Themistocles, wliich 
had becn  restorcd  by  Conon.ll  Piraceus  was  occupied  by a 
Pontic garrison, and the city was defendcd by the mcrceiiarics 
of  thc  tyrant  Aristioa, to whom  Archelaus had entrusted it. 
Archelaus also did all he could  to introduce  provisions  fi.orn 
l'iraecus  into  the city,  but  with  no  succcss;  for  Sulla  was 
watchful, and supcrior in both power and talent.  The distress 
in the city rose to such a degree, that thc inhabitants were  at 
last completely exhausted.  The walls amounted to four or five 
milcs in circumference, anti  there  was not a sufficient numbcr 
of men to dcfend them.  The city was taken by storm, and the 
massacre which followed was  enormous;  as if  the  conquerors 
had  acted  under  the  influence  of  an  implacable  hatrcd  of 
Athens's,  for which thcre was no reason.  Few of the buildings 
ol thc city were dcstroyed, and not even the walls;  but whcn 
Piraeeus was taken soon afterwards, the walls of this place were 
pulled  down,  and  the  magnificent  arsenal, as  well  as  othcr 
buildings, was burnt to ashes:  in short, Piraceus was complctely 
dcstroyed, so  that from  this  time  it rcscmbled  the  decayed 
towns in the north of Holland, where grass grows in the streets. 
In the time of  Pausanias, it was  only a small village  near the 
port.  Athens  itself  was  almost  dcpopulated, and henceforth 
we may apply to it Lucan's words:  "  rarus et antiquis habitator 
in  urbibus errat."  After this, Sulla had some further advantages, 
and thc Pontic commander was driven back into Asia. 
10  Plutarch, Sulla, 19, full;  Appian, De  Bell. itd~thrid.  42, foll. 
11  Appian, 1.  c. 30. 
"  Appian, I.  c.  38; Plutarch, Sulla, 13, foll.;  Vell. Paterc. ii.  23. 
I mentioned  before  that  L. Valerius  had  led  an  army to 
Asla,  but  that he was  murdered  by his  quaestor  or  Icgate, 
C. Finlbria, who assumed the command of the army.  Mithri- 
dates was thus pressed  by two armies which were  hostile  to 
each other.  He first marched against Fimbria, who destroyed 
Ilium.13  Sulla then concluded  a peace with the king of  Pon- 
tus, on conditions which appear scarcely credible1*: the king 
gave up all  his  conquests,  Bithynia,  Phr~gia,  Pa~hlagonia, 
and Cappadocia, and thus confined himself to his former domi- 
nions; he paid  a war  contribution  of  2000 talents,  and sur- 
rendered  seventy  ships  of  war.  It was  impossible  to make 
more  moderate terms,  and  Sulla  did  not  even  demand  the 
surrendcr of the king's advisers. 
Sulla now bcgan  to press  C. Fimbria with  all  his  energy, 
and the latter,  who  saw  himself  deprived  of  every hope  of 
success,  put  an  end to  his  life.  His soldiers  went over  to 
Sulln, who, however,  mistrusted  them  as  men who were con- 
taminati  caede  consulis, and as  partisans  of  Marius, for  they 
were  for  the most  part  Italicans,  and had been  enlisted  and 
trained against Sulla in the time of Marius.15 
It  had becn the wish  of  Cinna  that C. Fimbria should con- 
clude peace with Mithridates, and enter into an alliance with 
him.  But this plan was now frustrated.  Sulla, after having 
cor~cluded  the peace,  settled the affairs of  Asia,  and punished 
the Grecks,  and  the  Hellenised  inhabitants  of  Asia  Minor, 
the  Ionians,  Lydians,  and Carians,  in whose  dominions  the 
Romans had been  murdered  before  the outbrcak  of  the war. 
They were compelled  to pay down at once five years' tribute, 
that is probably all the arrears for  thc time that the war had 
lasted, and in addition to it so hcavy a war  contribution, that 
those beautiful countries were ruined  for  a  long time.  Thc 
first  generation  after  these  events  was  so  completely borne 
down  that recovery  was  impossible;  but still  they gradually 
gained new strength, and in the time of the Roman  emperors 
we  find  them  in  the  most  flourishing  condition.16  Nearly 
l3 Appim, 1.  C. 53.  I4  Appian, I.  c. 55, foll.;  Plutareh, Sulla.22. 
Is  These soldiers remained in Asia  for  many years,  and were known under 
the name  of  the  Valeriani down to the time  of  Pompey and Lucullus.  After 
the battle of  Cannae, such a corps of  soldiers had been sent out to Sicily.--N. 
-Sallust,  up. Non. xviii. 7. 
l6  Caria, Lydia, and Ionia,  form  a true earthly paradise.  These countries, 
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five millions of  our money were raised  there with the utinost 
harslincss, and within the shortest tinie.  We  have seen similar 
things under  Napoleon,  who  did  not  trouble himself  much 
about  their  practicability.  The  Roman ccluites, who always 
formed the retinue of tlie generals,  advanced the money for the 
towns on interest at the rate of 24, or 36, or even 48 per cent., 
and afterwards raised their capital, together with thc interest on 
it, by the aid of  Roman soldiers.  This was horrible tyranny, 
and thc sword  did  not injure those  countries half as much as 
the usurers;  but Sulla wanted money to carry on the war. 
During all this time he had shewn an extraordinary great- 
ness of character.  His house at Rome had been pulled down, 
his property  had been  wasted,  his  friends  put to  death,  his 
family  driven  into  exile,  and  inany  of  them  came  to him, 
bcgging and entreating him to come  back and take vengeance 
upon  his  enemies.  But he was  resolved  to bring the war  in 
Asia to a close, and to obtain the most favourable peacc before 
returning.  If he had not been a great man, he might have con- 
cluded a  peacc with Mithritlates at an earlier  period, and the 
king would have bcen glad of  it.  But Sulla acted differently, 
and wished  to fulfil his  duties towards the republic,  before he 
thought of occupying himself  with his private affairs.17  And 
this was indeed the wisest course, for he was now in a condition 
to return with a victorious  army which was attached to him, 
and with large sums of money at his disposal.  But the under- 
taking  on which  he  now  entcred,  was  nevertheless  one  of 
extreme boldness;  for  hc  had  not  more  than  30,000  men, 
while his enemies had at their conimand a force of 450 cohorts, 
that is, upwards of 180,000 men, including such brave soldiers 
as the Samnites.l8  From the time of  Marius,  military forces 
unless it be lilre that of  the Turks-such  as that of  the Byzantines or Persians, 
may be rcstored to the highcst degrcc of  prosperity in tlie course of a few gene- 
rations.  If they wcrc withoot any population, and werc coloniscd by Europeans, 
thcy would, within fifty years,  be  in a  very flourishing condition.  This is the 
unanimous opinion of  all travellers, to whatever nation they belong:  all declarc 
that thcy do not  know a finer country in thc world.  An officer  otice told  mc 
that  he  had  seen one beautiful  country after anothcr, first ltotne, thcn Naplcs, 
which  is  much  more  flourishing than the formcr, next Peloponnesus, which is 
infinitely richcr than Naples in fertility and the luxurioasncss of  the vegetation, 
and lastly Smyrna, which by far surpasses all the rest.-N. 
'7  Appian 1.  c. 51 ; Vcll. Paterc. ii. 24. 
'"ell  Paterc. ii. 24, who  states the uumbcr  of  his  encmics to have  been 
200,000.  Comp. Appian, Ue  Bell, Crivzl.  i.  79. 
are always  counted  by cohorts  or  small batallions,  each con- 
tailiillg  420  men,  less  frequently by legions.  The troops of 
his enemies, moreover, had to fight for their existence, and the 
Salnnites were  determined  not to conclude peace with  Sulla. 
But lie attacked the eneiny boldly, with confidence in his good 
fortune  and  his  own  strength,  and  conducted the war  in a 
brilliant manner. 
LECTURE  LXXXVII. 
THE  consuls of the year,  in which Sulla  led his army back to 
Italy, were L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Julius Norbanus,  who, 
like most of the few surviving patricians,  Cavoured the demo- 
cratical  party.  If superiority  in numbers  had  decided  the 
issue, or if one of the consnls had been invested with dictatorial 
power, and had known what use to make of it, Sulla could not 
possibly have  met with  success.  But the republic  was  in a 
state of dissolution;  and its leaders after the  death  of  Marius 
were as unfit as those of  France in 1'799, when the Directory 
was so paralysed,  and in such a state of  decay,  that the whole 
6abric would have broken down, if Napoleon had not returned 
from  Egypt.  Rebellions  are multiplied  under  such  circum- 
stances,  as  the  people  cannot  help  expecting  more  hm  a 
change than from a continuation of  the actual state of  things. 
Sulla calculated upon the inability of  tlie  leadcrs of his oppo- 
nents, and what the talented Caelins Rufus wrote to Cicero re- 
spccting tlie struggle between Caesar and Pornpey, then actually 
happened1;  for  even  the majority  of  the  new  citizens  were 
disgusted with the rulers, who,  had they bcen  able to rcly on 
the new citizens and a pslrt of the old ones, might have thwarted 
all the attempts of  Sulla.  But the cohorts  consisting of  new 
citizens  went  over  to him,  even  in his  first  campaign,  and 
concluded a treaty with him, in which lie confirmed their newly- 
'  This passage, belonging to the year 1827, is writtenin all the MS. notes that 
I have seen, with equal brcvity, and can bc explained only by conjecturc.  Nie- 
buhr probably alludes to Cicero, ad Fam. viii.  14:  In hac  dzscordzu  video  Cn. 
Wmpeium senutctm puigue  res judicant  secum  habiturzcn~: ad Caesarem omnes 
QUI CUM,TIMORE AUT nrnLn  SPE VIVANT  accessuros: exercitum conferendurn non 
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acquired privilcgcs -an  occurrence  resembling  those  which 
had  taken  place  in  earlier  times  between  patricians  and 
plebeians. 
Under such circumstances, Sulla landed at Brundusium, and 
was received with open arms.  It had  been intended to make 
preparations to opposc  him, but those which  had  been  made 
by  Carbo  had  broken  down  in consequence  of  the  general 
opposition.  Sulla advanced through Apulia, as if the country 
had  bccn  in the enjoyment  of  perfect  peace.  According  to 
one  account,  the  truth  of  which,  however,  is  not  certain, 
though  it is very  probable,  he  had  an engagement,  of  no 
great  importance, with Norbanus  near Canusium2; but how- 
ever  this may be, we laow that he found the main force of 
his enemies encamped near Capua at the foot of  mount Tifata, 
where  Norbanus  was  defeated,  and  large  numbers  of  his 
soldiers  deserted to Sulla.  The latter had commenced nego- 
tiations whilc yet  in Greece, and he now did  the same with 
the consul  Scipio.  A  truce  was  concluded,  and  hostages 
exchanged.  But the negotiations  which were  protracted  by 
Sulla  with  a vicw to deceive  the consul  and  to seduce  his 
troops,  werc  interrupted,  perhaps  intentionally,  by  Q.  Scr- 
torius, who saw that the soldiers were gradually deserting  thc 
consul.  Accordingly  the  truce  was  broken,  and  Sertorius 
occupied  Suessa, which had declared for Sulla.  The desertion 
among Scipio's troops became so general, partly from contempt 
of  their own leadcrs, and partly becausc they werc dazzled by 
Sulla's glory, that at length hc found  himself  lcft complctcly 
alone.  Towards the end of  the year, when  Sulla had gained 
such advantages,  and was  cxtending  his  power  in southern 
Italy, many of  his supporters took up arms in various parts of 
Italy.  Among  these  were  Metcllus  Pius  in  the  modern 
Romagna;  and  Cn. Pompey, thcn twenty-three years of  age, 
in Picenum, where  he had  great influence, for  that  country 
which had been subdued by his father stood in a sort of client- 
ship to him.  M. Lucullus ancl sevcral others likewisc took up 
arms for  Sulla.  Thcir party, and  the forces with which they 
carried on the war, consisted for the most part of  ncw citizens, 
with  the exception  of  the army of  Metcllus, who  may have 
had morc old citizens from Cisalpine Gaul aiid Rornagna. 
The beginning of  the following  year,  the fiecond  of  the 
Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i. 84. 
war, is  by  the most  bloody  and decisive occurrences. 
yiarius tllc  younger,  then  twenty-seven  years  old,  who  is 
solnetilnes called a son, and sometimes a nephew of  C. Marius, 
but was  an adopted son, was consul with Cn. Papirius 
Garbo.  The latter had the comnland  in thc northern districts 
of  Etruria,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ariminum,  especially 
&gainst  LLetellus, l'ompcy,  and  Lucullus; young  Marius was 
stationed  on the fi-ontiers of  Latium.  Sulla  advanced  from 
Campania where he had passed the winter.  A decisive battle 
was fought  near  Sacriportus (it was  not a  town, but perhaps 
only  a pass)  probably on  the road  froin  Scgni to Palcstrin:~, 
and near the latter place;  thcre Marius  had concentrated his 
forces, chiefly  Samnites,  to protect  Roivle  against  Sulla.  In 
consequence of  this position  Sulla could  not advance towards 
IZolne by the Via ilppia.  But hiarius was defeated, and a part 
of  his troops deserted to the enemy, whose loss is said to have 
been  vcry slight.  These districts and  Etruria were  the real 
seats of  the party  of  Cinna, and  the  Latin towns were pas- 
sionately interestcd  in the cause.  The rest of  Italy, with thc 
cxccption  of  Samnium  and  Lucania,  seems  to  have  bccn 
foreign to this party, or at least indiffcrcnt towards it.  After 
the dcfeat of  Sacriportus, Marius fled to Praeneste, which was 
quite devoted to his  cause, well  fortified, and at that time a 
very  large  towi~.~  Sulla  followed  him,  and  blockaded  the 
place; but he soon after led his  army towards  Rome, leaving 
behind  him  Q. Lucretius  Ofclla  to sontinue the blockade of 
Pracnestc, which containcd within  its walls  old  Roman  citi- 
zcns, Sainnites, and tlic inhabitants of thc place.  Sulla himsclf 
went to Romc.  Hc still  showed  great moderation,  and but 
for  the blind  iilfi~tuation  of  his opponcnts, he might perllaps 
llavc detcrinined to makc an unbioody  use of  his victory;  but 
thy  were intoxicatcd  with rage, aiid  tlierc  prevailed  among 
tllcln a fanaticisln  like that among the Jews  at the destruction 
of  Jcrusalcm.  Even  in  the last  days of  thc ascendancy  of 
Cil1na's  party,  the  praetor,  L. Junius  Brutus  Damasippus, 
caused a great massacre among the real or suspected favourers 
of  sulla, in which  the venerable pontiff, Q. Mucius  Scacvola 
was murdcrcd, bccausc he rclicd on his innocencc and disdained 
The modcrn  town  of  Palcstrina,  which  contains  about  6000  inhabitants, 
occupic.; only  :L  part of the ancient arx, that is, thc space of  the ancient tcmple 
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to flee.*  This fury however,  did  not  give them  strength to 
defend  thc city, and while  the perpetrators  of  these  horrors 
escaped, Sulla entered  the city:  he promised  moderation, but 
his promise was meant in an awful sense.  He next followed 
Carbo into  Etruria, which was now the scene of  the war-so 
f~~r  as  the  Etruscans  were  concerned,  a  real  national  war, 
because  Sulla  deprived  them  of  the privileges  which  they 
had obtained.  Carbo was  near  Clusium.  The detail of  this 
war  is  wrapped  in  dccp  darkness,  and  is  very pcrplcxing. 
Carbo, who had  still a considerable army, made two attempts 
to  relieve  Praenestc, but  llc  failed  in both.  He also  made 
some other undertakings, as that against Carinas in Mcenum, 
which  likewise failcd, and his  troops deserted  to the enemy. 
The forces of  the Marian  party melted away under his hands, 
desertion  increasing  continually.  Many  cases  of  desertion 
which  then  occurred  are quite  unaccountable;  even  at the 
beginning, P. Cethegus, one of  the men who had been exilcd 
with  Marius,  had  surrendered  to  Sulla  at  discretion;  and 
Albinovanus  murdered  his  colleagues  and  lieutenants  at  a 
banquet, and then made peace with Sulla. 
The war was  brought to a  decision  by a last  cndcavollr of 
Pontius Tclesinus, whose brother coinmandcd the Samnitcs at 
Praeneste.  He and the Lucanian general, C. Lamponius, made 
an attempt to relieve Praeneste;  but not being  ablc  to  effect 
anything against the line of  fortifications  by  which thc place 
was surrounded, they hastened towards Rome, which they hoped 
to  take  by  surprise.  But  Sulla, who  was  informed of  their 
movement, threw hiinself into the city, and averted the danger. 
The battle  which decided the fate of the world, was fought at 
the Colline gate. The Samnitcs and their allies are said to havc 
amounted  to  40,000  men.5  Had  they  succecded,  Rornc, 
according  to  the  cxpresscd  intentions  of  Pontius  Telesinus, 
would have been razed to tlie  ground.  The fear  excited  by 
the prescnce of such allies, inust have made many of the parti- 
zans of Marius inclined  to become rcconciled  with Sulla.  To- 
wards thc evening  on  the day of  thc battle, which had long 
been uncertain, and had uftcn been favourable to the Samnitcs, 
Sulla succeeded in breaking the lines of the Samnites; and their 
defeat was so great that Telesinus, in despair, put an end to his 
life.  After  this  loss, Ilarius, and the younger  Telesinus at 
Appian, De  Bell. Cml.  i. 66;  Vell. Patelc. ii. 26.  Vell  Paterc. ii. 27. 
praeneste, began to despond also:  they endcavoured to escape 
by subtcrraneo~ls  passages which led through the roclis into the 
fields; but finding that their flight was discovered, they killed 
each other."fariu~  the younger cannot claim  to be called a 
man ofanyextraordiiiarygreatncss :  lie was a detestable man,  and 
had all  the faults of his father; but of his father's great qualities, 
we caanob discover any but his perscversnce;  and this cannot 
excite our admiration, as it was comrnandcd by necessity.  Carbo 
also despaired, and fled to Africa.  Thus endcd this civil war. 
Italy  was  now  cleared  of  all  hostile armies; and only a few 
isolated  towns  in  Spain,  of  which  I  shall  speak  presently, 
contiiiued to offer resistance. 
In  the battlc of  the Collinc gate, 8,000 Salnnites  had been 
taken  all of wlioin werc surrounded and cut down in 
the field of Mars by the command of  Sulla.7  Alter the death 
of  Marius,  Praeneste  surrendcred  at discretion  to  Lucrctins 
Ofella: it made no capitulation.  Sulla dividcd all its inhabitants 
into thrce great masses-the  old Roman citizcns, thc Pracncs- 
tines, and the Sarnnites;  and, sparing the livcs of  tlic first, he 
put a11  the rest to thc sword.  The towns of Etruria surrcndcreil 
one by one, and the inhabitants of  most  of  thein expcricnced 
the same  fate  as the Pracnestines.  Pracncste it~elf,  howevcr, 
was not  destroycd, while  most  of  thc largc  Etruscan  towns, 
such as Clusium, Aretiurn,  Populonia, Volatcrrae, which  last 
had defendcd itself  for two years, werc  razed  to the ground. 
Faesulac, perhaps, escaped this fate, though it is possible that 
it may have been afterwards rebuilt. 
At Rome, Sulla  acted  according  to  his  own  discrction. 
1Iithcrto he had  bccn  humane, but he now actcd as a blood- 
thirsty monstcr:  lic sct the first cxsmple of a proscription, that 
is, he made out s list of thosc whom any one was at libcrty not 
only  to  kill  with impunity, but  for  whose heads prizcs were 
~fered.  Few, indced, ol  those who were then murdered, could 
be compared with those who had been  put to rlcrth by Marius 
Cinna; but  in  extent  the  calamity  wirs  unsurpassed, for 
sulla wreaked his vengeance even up011 whole nations.  It is 
said that,  in this manncr, no less than 2,400 equites lort tlloir 
livcse8  metller the nanlcs of all of them were in  proscrip- 
'  vc11.  Paterc. 1. c;  Appian, De Bell. Ctvil.  i  94. 
A~~ian,  I.  c.  i. 93.  Compare Plotarch, Sulla, 29. 
'  A~~'idn?  1.  r.  i.  103,  2,600,  W~IC~I  IIII~I~J~~,  hone~cr,  cornp~iscs  all the 
e(ll~~L~'s  nho penshall In this nar. 
VOL.  11.  C  C tion list may be doubted.  Twenty-three, or, according to other 
but probably  incorrect accounts, forty-three, legioils had mili- 
tary colonies assigned to them in Italy.9  In former  times, no 
such colonies had been founded;  tlle first colonies were simple 
settlements, serving as garrisons, to which a third of the territory 
of the town they  occupied  was  assigned, and one member of 
each  gens went  out as  colonus?0  As each colonist  did  not 
receive  more  than two jugers  of  land, they  must  have  had 
some  other advantages besides11 ; we know that they retained 
their  arms,  which the old  citizens  of  thosc  towns did  not. 
At a  later  period, we find  Latin  colonies, in which  Rornans 
and  Latins had equal shares;  but both kinds of  colonies  must 
be  considered  as  garrisons  to  protect  the  frontiers,  and 
we may  take it for  granted that in most  cases the colonists 
werc  soldiers,  who llad  fought  in  the  legions.  But there 
existed no relation  between  colonisation  and military service; 
and  the  former  was  by  no  mcans  a  reward  for  the  latter. 
It  is not till after  the second  punic war, that we find assign- 
ments of public land being made to veteran soldiers.  Bononia 
was the only colony in which there  was a reference to an  ac- 
tual war,  for  the allotments  given  to  the  horsemen differed 
from those of  the centurions, common soldiers,  etc.12  But the 
colonies  of  Sulla  were  the  first  real  military  colonies,  the 
meaning  of  which  term  is this:  a  certain  legion,  when  dis- 
missed from service, was constituted as the body of citizens  of 
a certain town, the whole territory  of  which  was  given up to 
the legionaries.  If its extent  did not  come  up to  what  the 
imperator had promised, portions were taken away from neigh- 
bouring districts, and added to the colony.  The soldiers thus 
obtained a  right to claim  assignlnents of  land, a right which 
had  formerly  belonged  to the plebeians  alone.  We do not 
know all the places which were thus colonised.  According to 
an ancient tradition of  Florence, which is extremely probable, 
and which though it cannot  be traced to any ancient author, 
yet is almost proved by an old reading in one of  Cicero's  Cati- 
linarian speechesl3, we  may take it for  granted that Florence 
arose  as  such  a  military  colony  out  of  the  old  town  of 
Faesulae;  so  also  new  Aretium  and other places  in Etruria, 
YAppian, I.  c. 100; Livy, Epit. 89.  '0 Compare vol. ii. p. 45. 
Compare vol.  ii. p.47, foll.;  vol. iii. p. 176.  Livy, xxxvii. 57. 
l3 Cic. in Cat.  iii  6; comp. however, Frontin. de Colon. p. 112, ed. Goes. :  colonia 
Florenti~za  deducta a iii. viris assignutu lege Julia. 
Pracneste, anti others;  bnt, in regard to several  places, it can- 
not be proved  satisfactorily.  The inhabitants  of  such  places 
were in most cases put to death.  It was  these colonies which 
famed the firm  basis  of  Sulla's  power.  Sinlilar  things  also 
llappencd  in places  where the old inhabitants were not extir- 
p"ted:  in these the new settlers bccame  the cleruchi, and the 
old illhabitants had to pay a  tax for the farms  which they re- 
tained;  this was the case especially with the old Latin colonies. 
Those which did not share this fate, had bccorne munickin  by 
the lex: Julia, and  remained  so; those which  were  proscribed 
by  Sulla, were  now  called  coloniae not  Latinae, but Romanae 
militares.  These are the colonies of which Pliny14 speaks, and 
the  nature of  which  has  always  been  misunderstood.  The 
sul~ject  is one of those which were obscure even to the ancients; 
and even Asconius  I'edianus,  who  knew  history well,  could 
not understand why Cicero called Placcntia a colony, since  by 
the lex Julia it had become a munic@ium.l5  Nearly the whole 
of Etruria became  a  desert,  and the  towns which  had  not 
become military colonies, were  in ruins  as  late as tlle time of 
Augustus.  The nation of  the Samnites also was so far reduced 
by Sulla that nearly the whole  country of  the  Hirpini was 
changed  into a  wilderness.  Wherever  he did  not  cstablish 
colonies, he gavc the land, which in former times would  have 
bccorne ager publicus, to his favourites. 
Sulla is remarlcable  for  his  fantastic belief  that he  had  a 
vocation to accomplish  great  things,  and  cspecially  that hc 
was  to be  a  reformer.  He saw the state of dissolution in the 
republic, but he was unable to  see  that when  old institutions 
have decayed, and an effectual  remedy is to be applied, new 
institutions  must be  created in the spirit of  the old ones,  but 
adapted to the circumstances of  the time.  That ~vhich  Sulla 
wanted,  do no good, for  it was  a mere  dead restoration 
of  what had  perislled  horn want  of  vigour  and  vitality:  he 
recnlled  the  ancient  filrms  of  tho  republic,  imagining  that 
Would be able to  sustain  themsclvcs,  and  that, like tile 
l4  H. fl. xiv. 8, 2. 
'"his  is  evidently  :i  lal~sus  memorix,  for  the  passltge  of  Asconius,  (in 
Pison, p.3, erl. Orulli)  run# thus:  Mugno  opere  me  hesitare confiteor  quid sit 
q~rccre Cicero Placentium mzmic@ium esse dicit.  Video enim in annalibus  eorum 
qui Punicum 6ellum secunrlum scripsertmt tradi, Plucentiam deduchmpridie Kal. 
Jnn.  printo  cinno  Gelli  P.  Cornello  Sc@ionr,  pcttre  Afiicani prtoris,  Ti. 
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man in Tieck's  novel, he would  push the worlcl  back  to the 
point  where,  in his  opinion,  it  ouglit  to  have  stopped  its 
course.  However,  as  regards  himself,  he  believed  that  he 
was  destined to rule,  and indulged in every ~ossible  licence, 
considering himself fLr above those forms. 
He now began  to  change the laws,  and to  constitute the 
scnate.  It had been expccted that, according to the principles 
of  the party  for  which  he  had  declared  himself,  he would 
complete the senate, which  had been dreadfully reduccd,  out 
of the old nobility, but such was not the case:  witli a curious 
inconsistency, which  shews  how  much  even he, witli  all his 
absolutism, was  under thc influence of  circumstances, he filled 
up tlie vacancies in the senate not only with equites, but even 
with his own  centurions  of  quite vulgar dcscent, who,  how- 
ever  were ready  to  do anything that he might wish.lG  He 
had none of the elements  of  an  aristocracy:  tlic party  which 
was  really  active, powerful  ancl  intellectual, was that of  the 
capitalists, i. e. that of  the equites  and the Italian municipia. 
Gut this party he hated, and wished to crush it; and as in such 
circumstances  men  throw  themselves  into  the  arms of  the 
populace, Sulla,  aftcr the model of  all oligarchs  and  counter- 
revolutionists, filled the senate with low people; just as in 1799 
at Naples, arms were put into the hands of the lowest  rabble. 
Thus while  lie  aimed  at  saving  the rcpublic  by forms,  he 
himself  disregarded  them,  and forgot  the device of  his own 
party. 
The  Cornelian  laws, when  looked  into  attentively,  are  a 
highly remarkable instance of  the conduct of  a  short-sighted 
and obstinate  man,  who  imagines that he can bring back by- 
gone times by restoring the ancient forms, and that nations can 
be made to assume any shapc or form, like inanimatc matter. 
The number of patricians was so much reduced that, sometimes 
for four or fivc successive years, both the consuls had been ple- 
beians; but from henccforth,  and so  long as  Sulla  lived, the 
consulship  was  regularly  divided between  a patrician  and a 
plebeian, -further he could not have gone without driving the 
people  to madness,  for  all  the Coryphei  of  his  party  were 
~lcbcians. This change was in those times perfectly  childish, 
although many othcrs besides Sulla himself  may have looked 
upon it as a very salutary measure.  I-Ie miglit have done many 
things, which  would have been far more profitable. 
He  reduced  the  tribunician  power  to  what  it had  been 
previously  to  tlie Publilian  law  (283),  and  thus  undid  the 
work  of  four centuries.  The tribunes  accordingly  were  de- 
prived of the power of proposing laws to the assembly, which 
became now the  exclusive  privilege  of  the  consuls  and  the 
senate.  I almost  wonder  that  he did not try to restore  the 
curies;  but he may have been  prcvented by tlie circumstance, 
that the curies had bcen so coinplctely changed, that he would 
have had in them a  democratic assembly.  Tliis also accounts 
for the fact that Dionysius saw in thcni somctliing quitc cliffer- 
cnt  from  what  they  had  been  originally.  Sulla  ncglectcd 
everything that he ought to have  done  to rcstore the rcpublic 
to healtl~;  and despairing  of  evcry licalthful dcvclopment,  he 
hacl rccoursc to coups cl'e'tat and violent changes.  His depriving 
the  tribunes of  their power  was  a  mcasure, for which  much 
miglit be said, for the tribuneship was incapable of any furthcr 
dcvclopment ;  and there rcally was sometllingrevolting in it. But 
thcrc are things which, however necessary and salutary, cannot 
be donc without thc greatest caution, because thcy run counter 
to common prejudices.  Sulla,  remembering that the tribunes 
had originally been only a protecting magistracy, and that they 
had not bcen allowed  to  holcl  any  of  the curulc magistracies, 
which were  reserved  for the patricians, again went back  and 
orclercd that tribunes should be electcd only  ad auxilium feren- 
dum,  and that no tribune,  aftcr the year of  his office,  should 
bc admitted to any ofice leading into the senate. 
In order to secure the safety of  his  own  person  still  morc, 
he dcprived  the children of those who had bccn proscribed of 
their full francliisc, that is, of the right of holding  any oflice 
whatsocver.17  Tliis shameful law rcmained  in force,  until  it 
was abolished by Julius Cacsar. 
Sulla's  greatest  change,  however,  was  that  by  which  he 
restored  the judicia  to the scnatc.ln  The senators ought now 
to have endeavoured to cxcrcise their judicial power as impar- 
tially  as  possible;  but  very  far  from  it !-justice  had  ncvcr 
been so venal as it was now;  tllc system of bribery was carricd 
On  by the faction of  Sulla to so  intolerublc and detestable an 
I'  Veil. l?atcrc. ii. 28; I'lutarch,  Su11u, 31. 
Is  Tacitus, Annul. xi. 22; Vcll. Paterc. ii. 32; Cicero, c.  Verr. i. 13. extent, that the senators then~selves  appeared to be purposely 
undermining their own power;  and had it not been  for  the 
military colonies of  Sulla, severe  would have been 
the well-deserved  fruit of their proceediags. 
Sulla also increased the numbers  of magistrates  and sacer- 
dotal officers.  In early times  there  were  only  four  pontiffs 
and the pontifcx maximus,  two being  taken from each of  the 
two  most  ancient  tribes.  The nuinber  of  augurs  was  like- 
wise four in those timcs, and when subsequently the plebeians 
were admitted to a share in these dignities, each of these two 
colleges,  by the admission  of four plebeians, was increased to 
nine members, including the pontifex maximus,  whose office 
was  comlnon  to  both  orders.19  At that  time  it  was  the 
intention to divide  the priestly  dignity  equally  between  the 
two orders.  When this ceased  to be observed  is uncertain, 
but it was probably before  the enacting of the Domitian law. 
Sulla himself  no  longer  thought  of  dividing  the augurate 
and pontificate  between  patricians  and plebeians-such  was 
the  power  of  circumstances  over  the fancies  he otherwise 
indulged in-but  lie abolished the Domitian law, and restored 
to the colleges the right of  co-optation, increasing at the same 
time the number of pricsts  in each college  to firteen.20  This 
nuinber was  a  inultiplication  of  three  by five,  whereas  the 
former number was three times three; for we must remember 
that the pontifex maximus was included in either case. 
This change had no great influence upon the state, but the 
increase of the number of  praetors to eight, and of that of the 
quaestors to twenty, was  of  great importance; to the former 
he assigned in his reform  of  the criminal law, the quaestiones 
perpetuae.  The number  of  qinaestors was so greatly increased, 
because owing to the vast extension of  the state, many more 
officers  were  required  to keep  the accounts  of  the treasury. 
The number  of  officers possessing the curule dignity was thus 
eonsidcrably increased by the additional praetors.  The quaes- 
tors became members of the senate by virtue of their officc, so 
that the twenty quaestors, who were  elected  every year, were 
almost  sufficient to keep up the regular number of 600  sena- 
tors.21  This was  perhaps  not  so  much  the result  of  Sulla's 
'9  Compare vol.iii. p. 351, foll. 
2"Livy,  Epit. 89; Pseudo-Ascon. in Divinat. p.  102, ed. Orelli. 
2'  Tl~ere  is no direct authority for this numbcr of. senators;  but see Appian, 
De  Bell. Civil. i. 100; Taeitns, Annul. xi. 22.  Ciccro, ad Attic. i. 14, in speak- 
intention,  as  of  the  natural  course  of  things.  No  one  mas 
auaestor more than once.  Tlze arbitrary power of the censors,  -  ilcrefore,  to  create  new  members  of  the senate  was  almost 
abolished.  The question, whether the senate was  an elective 
body,  thus appears in quite a different light.  The senate now 
was  St  body  representing the people,  as  in the very earliest 
t,imes it had  represented  the burghers,  being  elected  by the  -.-- 
curies thcmselvei;  for the yearly election  of twenty q~iaestors, 
became at the same time members  of the senate, gave to 
that body the character of an elective assembly; for whether the 
people  elected every year twenty new scnators, or appointed 
the same number  of magistrates, who  completed the scnate, is 
one and the same thing."  But in thc intermcdiatc period it 
cannot bc regarded as a representative assembly. 
Sulla  was  very  activc  as a  legislator; and scnselcss as  he 
shewed himself in matters connectcd with the political consti- 
tution, he must have had vcry supcrior advisers  in his  admi- 
nistrative, and especially in his criminal legislation; for it was 
he  who  first  introduced  any  tolerable  arrangements  in  the 
criminal laws, which had before been in a dreadful state.  His 
remulations respecting the manner of conducting criminal law-  e 
sriits are evidently improvements;  but the particulars  of  this 
part of his legislation belong  to a history of the Roman  law. 
EIe  also  framed a  lex  annalis,  determining the succession of 
public offices. 
He kept a kind of body-guard of freedmen under the name 
of  Cornclians,  who  soon  became  the most  powerful  persons. 
The state of  Italy, especially in country towns, after the first 
storm was over, may be best lcarnt from the excellent speech. 
of young Cicero for Roscius of Amcria, and from that for Clu- 
entius.  A person  connccted with these Carnelians, especially 
with  Chrysogonus,  the  favourite  of  Sulla,  might  rob  and 
murder  wit11  impunity:  no one was  safe  from  such persons, 
not even at the very gates of Rome.  The condition of Italy 
was frightful beyond all description. 
ing of  thc senators voting on a particular subject in his time, states the number 
to have been 415, fifteen voting on one side,  and 400 on the other.  From this 
we can infer no more, than that  the total number  of  senators must have been 
greatcr than 415.  In  Muccub. i.  8.15, that is towards the end of the sixth cen- 
tury, it is stated to have been 320; but not much weight can be assigned to this 
pmage, considering tllr other statements which are there made. 
Compare vol. iii. 11.551, foil. 392  RETIREMENT  OF  SULLA. 
Sulla gave all these laws as dictator; for  after the death  of 
Mari~~s  and Carbo he had causcd  himself to be  made dictator 
for  an indefinite space  of  time,  by the interrex  L. Valerius 
Flacc~~s"~  and with this title he governed the republic for two 
years.  KO  onc expected that he would  ever  resign  his dicta- 
torship, but he was  probably exhausted  by his long struggles; 
he may have felt that hc was too old to carry on wars in foreign 
countries,  or he may not have wished to do so.  He may have 
believed  that in the republic  itself  all  the ncccssary reforms 
were effccted, or else he inay have despaired of their successful 
working":  in short,  he laid down  his  power  to the surprise 
and astonishment of every one.  This was by no means a bold 
step, as Appian justly observesz5, for he had his military colo- 
nies  and  the  senate  to  rely  upon,  and  his  opponents  were 
crnshed into the dust.  He retired to Puteoli, where he is said 
to have been  attacked  by phthiriasis,  the most  disgusting of 
diseases : his body was covered with ulcers out of which vermin 
grew.  I believe  that the fact of  his  having had this  disease 
cannot  be  denied;  and he deserved  such a  punishment.  It 
occurs chicfly in the case  of tyrants,  such as  Philip II., the 
Jewish  king,  Herod,  Antiochus  Epiphancs, and of rich land- 
owners who had been  guilty of  brutal  conduct towards their 
tenants:  but it is mentioned also in the case ofthe philosopher 
Pherecydes.  Sulla  wasted  away  from  this  disease;  but he 
died in consequence of  an accident.  It was  fortunate that he 
did die before  his frame  actually fell  to pieces.  At Puteoli, 
he attcmptcd to deccive  history and make the world  bclieve 
that  a11  his  measurcs  failed  only  because  they  were  badly 
managed  by his  successors;  but he in fact continued to rule 
through his trembling creatures.  He ~layed  with the lcgisla- 
tion of Puteoli, and insisted upon his wishes being carricd into 
effect, although he pretended to live as  a simple  citizen like 
everybody elsc."  He died at the age of sixty of a haemorrhage, 
occasioned by a fit of rage against a young man who had con- 
23 Appian, De Bell.  Civil. i.  98. 
'4  In 1827 Nicbuhr thus expressed himself on this point: "  It  was in the natural 
course of things that he could not be satisfied with the success of his legislation; 
hence he who had shed  so much hlood in order to obtain supreme powcr, when 
he rccogniscd  the unsuitahlcness  of his institutions, which he had crcatcd by so 
many acts of horror, resigned his dictatorship after having held it for two years. 
This is the rnost natural  way of accounting  for his resignation,  about  which so 
much hnr l~cen  said ; even ingenious pcoplc have looked for his motives in more 
distant clirections."  25 De Bell.  Clvll. i. 103.  26 Plutarch, Sulla, 37. 
tradicted him.  Had he lived ten years loager, he would have 
died as qllietly as now, for no  one would hmc ventured to do 
,).hing  a,oninst  lzirn,  since  his  opponei~ts  were  annihilated, 
tile tribunes pnralysed, and all Italy in the hands of the military 
colonies which werc attached to him.  His body was conveyed 
to Rome, and the pomp of  his bnrial was not less magnificent 
tllan that of Augustus,  a fact which  shews that his iizfluencc 
dicl not depend  upon his person  nor upoil  the moment alone, 
and that the attempts of Lcpidus wcre scnscless. 
LECTURE  LXXXVIII. 
BEFORE  with  the political  history, let us  cast  a 
at the statc of literature and the manners of the Romans 
at that  period.  The  Historiae  of  Sallust  bcgan  with  the 
consulship of M. Aemilius  Lcpidus  and  Q. Lutatius  Catulus. 
If we  may  judge  of  its  importance  from  the speeches  and 
lettcrs, forming part of the work which are still cxtant, its loss 
is one of  the most painful that we have to  lament in  Roman 
literature; though, perhaps,  less  on account  of  its  historical 
value than of its merits as n work of art, as a masterly specimen 
of historical  composition.  The social war and the period  of 
Sulla  had been  described by Sisenna, a  sort of  forerunner  of 
Sallust, IL  cotemporary  and early acquaintance  of Cicero, who 
does  not  judge  very  favourably  of  his  work  as  a  literary 
production?  But I am inclined to think that  we  ought  not 
to receive Cicero's opinion on this point as absolute truth; for 
he disliked the style of Siscnna because it was the  antiquum et 
horridum,  and  an imitation  of  the puerile genus of the Greek 
historian  Clitarchus.2  He wrote  q~~ite  diffcrently  from  his 
prcdccessors  in rcading  whose  fragments  we  cannot  refrain 
from considering that any onc should  have been  able to write 
in such a manner.  At that time the whole aspect of literature 
De Legib.  i.  2,  Brut. 64.  Compare  De  Divinat.  i.  44,  and  Sallust, 
Jugurth. 95. 
The contradiction bctwecn this passage and  Lectures, vol. i.  p. 436, where 
Clitarchus  is called  an  elegant writer,  must  it  seems, be  solved by supposinz 
that that cpitllet was mcant to convey censure, with reference to Longinus, c. 3, 
who  calls  him  9Ao166qs  K~Z)  .pun&.  Cicero  (I. c.)  says  of  Siscnna.  H~ius 
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underwent  a great  change, just as mas  the  casc  in  Gcrmally 
about tlle time of  the Seven Years'  war, yet there were  sane 
who  ~vonld  not  abaltdon  the  old  style  and manner, sucll as 
Claudius Quadrigarius, who still adhered to the stiff and awk- 
ward antique Sashion.  The opinion of  Cicero upon writers  of 
this class must be received with great caution, though we can- 
not  deny  that  Siseniza  must  have shewn great  awkwardness 
and a want of refinemcnt. 
Pacuvius, of whom I have  already spoken, and who was  a 
little  younger  than Ennius, and  eonsidcrably  younger  than 
Plautus, ranks vcry high arnong thc Roman poets.  If his works 
wcre  still  extant, they  would  undoubtedly  excite  our  high 
admiration.  He wrote only tragedics", which werc, no doubt, 
exccllcnt.  Anything like the satiric drama ol the Greeks, does 
not occur among the Romans.  At  the beginning of the sevcntli 
century,  Terence  introduced  quite  a  new  style;  and if  we 
compare  him  with  Ennius,  Pacuvius,  and  still  more  with 
Plaut~~s,  he is infinitely more modern.  The .rrivo~  of antiquity 
completely disappears in him ;  for there is every appearance that 
his  compositions were not revised.  Caecilius  Statius, a Cam- 
panian, was  somewhat  younger  than  Terence:  his  skill as  a 
comic and gracef~~l  writer is praiscd  by  the ancients4, but his 
language is ccnsurcd.~Iis  ' fragments,' especially a large one 
in Gellius, do not give us any high idea of him.  L. Attius (not 
Accius nor Actius) was a far  greater poet;  he lived to a very 
old age, so  that  Cicero  knew  him; he was  a true genius in 
tragedy, the subjects  of  which  he partly borrowed  from  the 
Greeks.  He chicfly followed Aeschylus;  and thc fragments we 
still possess of  his pieces are so beautifid  that they will bear  a 
comparison with the works of the Greck poct.  But he was not 
a  mere  imitator; he also  composcd  praetextatae  resembling 
Shakspeare's historical dramas, which  are  not  bound  by any 
restrictions  as  to timc  and  place, though  Attius  approached 
superiores,  tum indicat  tamen  quantum  absit  a  summo,  quamque  l~oc  genus 
scriptionis nondum sit satis Latinis illzcstratwm,-  and (De  Leg. i. 2.) in  historia 
~uerile  quoddam consectutur, ut unum  Clitarchum neyue  praeteren  quemquam 
de  Graecis legisse  videatur-so  that  Nicbuhr  calls this puerile  horridum, inas- 
much as it abest a summo. 
Fulgcntiu~,  Exposit. Sermon. Antiy. p. 562, however, mentions a comedy of 
Pacuvius entitled "  Pseudo." 
I-Iorat. Epist. ii.  1, 59; Veil. Paterc. i.  17; Charisius, lib. ii. in fln. 
Cicero, ad Attic. vii.  3, Brutus, 74. 
nearer  to the Gieek  tragedics  than his predecessors.  In his 
tragedies, he scelns to lll~~~  chiefly used the  senarius and the 
mapaestic verse of  feet; in the former, he did not strictly 
confaorln  to tl~e  laws laid down by the Greelis;  but the anapaests 
in  his  choruses  were  composed  with  the greatest  strictness 
according to the Greek rules of versification.  In  his anapacstic 
metres, he displays greater freedom even than Terence; for his 
annpaests are metrical and no longer rllythmical.  His praetex- 
tatae,  however,  were  written  in long  trochaic  and  iambic 
octonarii according to rhythm, but werc more refined than those 
of his predecessors.  Attius may serve to prove how much morc 
refined the ears of the Romans had become in his timc.  His con- 
temporary,  C. Lucilius,  of  Suessa Aurunca, was  not so distin- 
guishcd in this respect; he used the hexameter verse, consisting 
indecd of dactyls and spondees, but with licenses, which somc- 
times exceed anything that even Ennius had ventured upon, so 
that his hexameters must be read according to rhythm, being 
actually sermoni propiora.  He was either unacquainted with the 
laws of Greek versification,  or else  despised  them.  A remark 
which I  believe  no  one has  yet  made  is,  that most  of  his 
books of satires were written in hexameters, but not all,  seine 
being coinposed in trochees.6  His satires inust have been very 
spirited and witty.  If we possessed  them we should  not, like 
Horace, naso adunco suspendere, but should read his cutting and 
biting  satires  with  pleasure.  It must  have  been  about the 
same time that Laeviusy,  the lyric poet,  lived,  who perhaps 
attained the highest  possible  degree of  elegance and euphony 
in the old Roman style. 
But however great may have bcen the care that was bestowed 
upon  poctry down to  the time of  Sulla,  the cultivation  of  a 
refined and  elegant prose was  completely  neglected.  A  frag- 
ment of C. Laelius8,  which has lately been discovered,  shews 
that the prose written during this period was even harsher and 
ruder than in the time of Cato.  C.  Gracchus was the only one 
whose prose was distinguished for its numerus, and wanted little 
to deserve the epithet of perfect.  The men of  the sixth cen- 
tury, who were great as orators, either did not write at all, or 
'  Dunlop,  History of Roman  Literature  (published in  1824), ~01.  i. P.  362, 
says "  Twenty books of his Satires, from the commencement, were in hexamet;; 
verse, and the rcst, with the  of the thirtieth, in iambics or trochalcs. 
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exceedingly  awkwardly,  and  much  worse  than  they  sp01;~. 
Tllc historians previous to Sisenna can claiin as little inerit for 
the style of their productions, as our old knights of thc sixteenth 
century, Gijtz von  Berlichingen,  Scl~iirtlin,  and  others of  tllc 
sanie class.  The Roinans were even inferior to thcm, fbr those 
knights wcre mcn of action,  while the Romans were men of a 
school, and cven as such, worthless. 
As regards the manners and mode  of  life  of  the Eomans, 
their great object at this time was the acquisition and possession 
of  money.  Their moral  conduct,  which  had  becn  corrupt 
enough before the civil war, became still more so by their sys- 
tematic plundcr and rapine; for the imincnse  riches  accuinu- 
lated were squandered upon  brutal pleasures.  The simplicity 
of  the old  manners and mode of  living had  bcen  abandoned 
for  Greek  luxuries  and  frivolities,  and  all  their  household 
arrangements had become altered.  L. Crassus, the orator, was 
the first who had marble columns imported from Greece,  four 
of which  adorned  a  large saloon  in his house.  The Itoman 
houses had formerly been quite  simplc,  and were built  citl~er 
of bricks or peperino, but in most cases of the formcr material, 
and  the  furniture had  been  of  a  corresponding  lrind:  now, 
on the other  hand,  every one would  live in a  splcndid housc 
and  be  surrounded  by  luxuries.  The  condition  of  Italy 
after the  Social  and  Civil  wars  was  inclcscribably wretched. 
Samniu~n  had bccomc almost a dcscrt;  and as  late as the time 
of Strabog there was scarcely any town in that country which 
was not in ruins.  But much worse things were yet to corne. 
At the time of Sulla's death, Cicero was in his twenty-cighth 
year;  he had  already spoken several  tiines  and excited great 
attention.  Q.  I-Iortensius  was  oldcr  than  he,  and  not  free 
from envy,  but rathcr inclined to keep down  the young man, 
though he was  in no way  to bc compared with  Cicero.  I-Ie 
had his sharc of all the  depravities  of  his age; and it is  an 
undoubted fact that he sold his own convictions, a thing  fcom 
which  Cicero  was  altogether  free.  Such  drcadful  times  as 
those were,  generally produce  grcat inental  excitement.  All 
studies  and  philological  learning  were  indeed  destroyed  in 
France during the time of the League; but the grcat comino- 
tion  of  that period  quickened  and  ~harpcned  the intellect. 
and  feeling.  The  Thirty  Years'  war  which  was  purely 
vi, I). 253. 
destructive, produced 110  effect in Germany; but tllc Seven 
Tears1  war gave a fresh ilnpnlsc to cvcry tiling,  and awakcllcd 
tile muses.  Owing to similar circuinstsnces, the age of  Cicero 
.cvas rich  in talentcd  men of  different descriptions; but none 
atllollg his conteinporaries could stand a coinparison with llim. 
sallust was considerably younger tllan Cicero, and at this time 
only a boy;  and when he had grown to manhood,  Cicero was 
still shining in undiininished glory. 
Sulla  was  yet  alive  when  M.  Lepidus  came  forward  as 
the head  of the democratic party against C. Lutatius Catulus, 
tile  lcader  of  the aristocracy.  This movement  was  one  of 
those collvulsions  which  so  often  follow  after  great  events, 
through thc folly of  those who do not  comprehend  what has 
happened.  Lepidus  was  blind  to  the fact  that the  present 
state of  things was thc result of the shocks which thc republic 
had  experienced;  he wantcd  to  rescind  the  acts  of  Sulla, 
and  to make  a  countcr-revolution.  But  in order  to  effect 
this  he  would  have  been  obliged  to  abolish  the  military 
colonies of  Sulla, to dismiss a  nnmbcr of  senators, and to fill 
up their places with sons of  thc proscribcd;  for  scarcely any 
of  the proscribcd  thernsclvcs  had  escaped  death.  His wholc 
undcrtaliing  was  impracticable; for  the victory  of  Sulla  had 
been  as  decisive as  possible,  and  Lepidns  himsclf  was  not 
qualified, cither by his intellcct or his character, to carry such 
a  plan  into effect.  From a fragment of  Sallust's  I-Iistoriael~ 
we see that he had belongcd  to the phrty of  Sulla, had  pur- 
chased  confiscated  estates for  a  mere triflc, and had  dcrivcd 
considerable  advantage  froin  the plundcr  which  was  carried 
011  so long as Sulla was in powcr.  During the French rcvolu- 
tion nlany people were compelled to purchasc confiscatcd cstates, 
it being intended thereby to attach thcm to the interest of  the 
revolution; and in likc manner S-t~lla  had gained ovcr thousands 
who otherwise would  havc been  hostile to him, by seIIing to 
tllcm the property of the proscribed for almost nominal priccs. 
Howcvcr, Lepidus may havc bccn a worthless fellow, and tile 
breach was quite natural.  He camc forward as the avenger of 
the old Romans whose fortunes had becn ruined.  Every party 
which rules by blood, must split into fractions;  many who had 
been  intoxicated  and afterwards  became  ashamcd  of  it, now 
joined  together  to  undertake  the cause  of  humanity.  The 
'" Tile spueuil of  L. Philippus against Lrpidus. 398  FAILURE  OF LEPIDUS.  M. SEBTORIUS.  399 
colleague of Lepidns, C. Lutatius Catulus, was an honest man,  and 
had not enriched himself; he was a Sullanian with all his heart; 
he had no doubt approved  of  Sulla's cruelties up to a certain 
point; but he was an honourable man, unstained by any crime; 
he possessed great experience, and was considered a wise adviser. 
He  thus enjoyed a high reputation, whereas Lcpidus had none. 
Fuel for a new conflagration was not wanting.  In all  the 
towns which had  reccivcd  military colonics the whole of  the 
old  had  bccn  expelled  and  reduced  to  beggary, 
unless, lilte Ofellus in Horace, they $armed their former estates 
as tenants of  their new lords, and thus had an opportunity of 
waiting till the licentious soldiers werc reduced to the necessity 
of  selling  their  property.  The number of  the latter class of 
persons  may have becn  considerable.  All those unibrtunate 
creatures from  the  Etruscan  and  Umbrian  municipia,  who 
must have wandered about as beggars, as wcll as many of  the 
nzilitary  colonists  who had  already  squandered their newly- 
acquircd  fortunes, were  ready to take up arms in any cause. 
It would  thus have been  very easy to form an army of  des- 
peradoes.  In  order to prevent ally outbreak, the senate seeing 
in the undertaking of  Lepidus only tl~c  commencement of new 
misery, made  the consuls  Lepidus  and  Catulus, swear not to 
take up arms against each other, and this precaution did good 
so long as thcy were consuls and at Rome.  It was at that time 
the custom, probably introduced  by  Sulla, for  the consuls  to 
remain  at Romc during  the year of  their ofice, and  then to 
go to their provinces.  But after the termination  of  his  con- 
sulship, when  Lepidus went to his  province of  Gaul, the war 
broke out.  He himself  had  collcctcd a  large number of  des- 
 erad docs  in  Etruria,  and  M. Brutus, a  relation  of  the last 
Brutus, had done the same in Cisalpine Gaul.  An attempt of 
Lepidus upon Rome was frustrated, for Catulus had taken wise 
precautions;  and  thc whole  undertaking brolie down  lilie  a. 
~nerc  bubble.  Lepiclus himself  lost  all  hopes, alld  embarked 
for  Sardinia, wllere  he died  soon  afterwards.  Ilis soldiers, 
after having maintained  themselves for a timc in Gaul under 
Pcrperna,  went  to  Spain  to  join  the  army  of  Sertorius. 
81.  Brutus was defeated by Pompey, and put to dcath.11 
Thc war  of  Sertorius is  of  infinitely greater  importance. 
'I Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i.  105--108;  Livy, Epit. 90; Plutarch. Pomp. 16; 
Flurus, iii. 23. 
We shonl~l  be  glad  if  we  could  read  the detailed  account 
ml~icll  Sallust llad  writtell  of  it.l"ertorius,  by no means a 
mall of noble birth, was a Sabine of  the praefccture of Nursia, 
subsequerltly the birth-place of Vespasian.  The whole district 
was  proverbial  ai~~ong  the  Rornalls  for  clingiilg to  thc  old 
lnanncrs and disciplinc.*3  It forllls a sort of Alpinc vallcy (val 
di Norciu), in the Apelmines;  and it is a singular fact that the 
placc  preserved  its frcedom  throughout  the middle agcs, and 
never lost it until the tilnc of the Frcnch revolution.'~t  was 
a  small  democratic  republic,  whicll  possessed  even  criminal 
jurisdiction  without  any  appcal  to  Itomc.  The  inhabitants 
of  the Val di Norcia  arc still considered  as  robust  and  free  -- 
mountaineers; but at  the  same  timc,  even  according to  the 
Italian  expression,  as fucinorosi.  When they go into  other 
districts, they do not always make the best  use  of their love 
of libcrty, easily becoming notorious as banditti and criminals; 
12  We cannot  say of  how  many  boolrs  the  Historiae  of  Sdl~~st  consisted. 
We have  many  fragments of  the first  five  boolrs,  but  there  must  have  been 
many more boolis.  From the fragments of  the spccchcs contained in the work, 
we must  infer, that  it  comprised  the period from  the consnlship  of  Lepidus 
down  to the end of  the war of  Pompey in  Asia.  Sdlust was  here perhaps 
obliged to some extent, to adopt the annalistic form which he otllerwise despised. 
The work bclongs  to a  late period  of  his  life:  his earliest  production was  the 
Catiliiie, wl~irh  was followed  hy the Jugurtha, and  his last work was  the His- 
tories.  That thcy commenced with the conwlsl~ip  of  Lepidus  and Catulus, is 
attcstcd  by evidence, and may also be inferred from  the probable fact that this 
was the point to which Sisenna llad carried his historical wor1i.-N. 
I3  Nursina duritia.  Bronto, p.  242, cd. Nicbuhr. 
l4  I>own to the French revolution sevcral places within  the papd dominio~is 
had thcir omn constitutions and juriscliction, and even  small places had their 
own  criminal  jmisdiction  without  any appeal  to a  higher  comt.  Very few 
persons have any correct notion of  the state of  Italy previously to the revolution; 
:md  there is no work from wliicll wc could  derive .zny satisfactory infortnatioa 
npon  it.  I was therefore greatly sorpriscd  at the results  of  my inquiries  in 
Italy.  Tivoli, to mention one instance,.was almost free, and the interference of 
the papal  legate or delegate in its affairs was like that of  a Roman  proconsul, 
who arbitrarily cncroachcd npon thc liberties of a free town.  This, and similar 
pIicnoillen:~,  wcrc  remnants of  tho timcs of  the Eomans.  (Cornpare upon  this 
suhjcct  an interesting  letter of  Nicbuhr  to Savigny in Lebensnacl~riclzten  vow 
B. G. Niebuhr, vol, ii. p. 402, foll.)  Thus, while some places  had a rcyubliciun 
collstitution, others werc oppressed by baronid despotism, or had a badly organ- 
iscd locnl constitution.  In Ancona, the towns had a diet with great privileges, 
and the country was prosperous; in other places the magistrates acted according 
to their  own discretion,  and witllont  any control.  Within  the Ecclesiastical 
State alone there were, perhaps, no less than a hundred petty constitutions and 
"ate%,  which were kept together only by the Pope.  Dnring the French revolu- 
tion, hon,ever, all of them wlrc tzl~olished  and s~~~~lnnted  1)y  pi-gectures.  I have 
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but  in their own country  they are peaceful.15  Among  the 
Romans  the Nursians,  in Cicero's  time, had  the  reputation 
of  having,  like the  Allarsians, Marrucinians,  and Vestinians, 
preserved their old  Sabcllian manners in their purity.16 
Sertorius was the work  of his own hands, and he owed  his 
elevation to none but himself.  In the time  of  Cinna he had 
delivered Rolne froin the freedmen of Marius; and afterwards, 
when  Sulla came  to Italy, Sertorius was legate of the consul 
L. Corlzelius Scipio.  In the year after, when Carbo conducted 
his  affairs in  Etruria  so wrctchedly  that all hope  was  lost, 
Sertorius contrived to obtain a  commission  for  Spain, which 
he was to maintain for his party.  Had he been at the head of 
the Marian party, which was not the casc, because he was not 
an intriguer,  Sulla's  plans  would  have been  thwarted.  The 
manner in which lie acted in Spain did not arise by any meails 
from  mere  policy,  but from  his  noble  disposition, and could 
not fail to win  for  him  the affections  of  the  Spaniards.  He 
paid  attention to their just  complaints,  afforded  relief  when- 
ever he could, and did not treat the Spaniards as contemptible 
provincials, but tried to amalgamate thein as much as possible 
with  the  R0mans.l'  The  plan  of  maintaining  himself  in 
Spain arose as early as that time, for Italy was almost entircly 
lost  to  his  party.  He had  an  army  in the  eastcrn  part  of 
the Pyrenees,  on the road  coming from  the district  betwecn 
Perpignan  and Collioure,  which  faced  the enew;y, and  was 
commanded  by Livius18 Salinator.  This army,  after having 
repulsed an attack of Annius, whom Sulla had sent against it, 
allowed itself to be seduced to descrt.  This treachery ~vas  thc 
greatest  piece  of  good  luck  for  Sulla.  After  Salinator,  the 
legate of  Sertorius,  hacl  been  killed,  Sertorius,  dcscrted  by 
his troops,  could only  save his lifc, and with a few attached 
followers  he  cruised  for  some  time  in  the  Mediterranean, 
where thc Romans hacl little power, and where the pirates had 
extendcd thcir sway.  Afterwards he endeavoured  for  a time 
to maintain  himself  at Iviza.  Thence  he  flcd  to  the  Lusi- 
tnnians, the encmies of the Romans.  IIe met everywhere witl.1 
15  I am intlcbted for my lmowledge of  tlic Val di Norcia  to  an  old  Roman 
Abbi.. -N. 
16  A  dircct  mention of  the  place  docs not  seem to occur in Ciccro, but he 
praises  thc  Sahines in  gcneral  as  severissimi  hornznes, in  Vatin. 15, ad Fam. 
xv. 20.  H~~tarch,  Sertor. 6 
l8 It would perhaps be more coirect torcad Jul~ns  Salinator; see Plnt. Se1 t. 7. 
great  confidence,  and was  welcoined  by the people;  but he 
could  not  hold  out  anywhere,  on  account  of  the numerical 
superiority of his enemies.  He therefore embarked for Maure- 
tania, where  he maintained  himself for  some time, and took 
part in a war between two pretenders in that kingdom.19  EIe 
took Tangcrs,  and after  having  made  rich  booty  in Africa, 
to sail to the Canary islands, and to spend the rest of 
his  life  there  in retirement  and independence;  but  at  that 
moment  he was  invited by  the  Lusitanians, with  whom  his 
success in Mauretania  had made him  still more popular;  and 
the Roman governors in Lusitania, who belonged to the party 
of  Sulla,  had  indulged,  in  the meanwhile,  in plunder  and 
persecution, under the pretence of acting against the friends of 
Sertorius.  Sulla  himself  had  died; and  the  bclief  that the 
edifice, which  the dictator had  built  up, would  now  fa11  to 
pieces, very naturally took root in the mind of  Sertorius, who 
lived at so great a distance, and he gladly accepted the invita- 
tion of the Lusitanlans, in the hope that something could be 
effected.  Wherever he appeared,  both the Spaniards and the 
Romans declared for him.  He found his  greatest strength in 
that part  of  the population which consisted of the children of 
Roman  soldiers and  Spanish  women  (hybridae), who did not 
possess the franchise, but had Roman names,  spoke  both  lan- 
guages,  and considered  themselves  as  Romans ; they formed 
the  mediators  between  him  and  the Spaniards.  Proscribed 
Romans, who till then had concealed themselves,  also sought 
refuge  with  him; and the Spaniards,  especially  the Celtibe- 
rians, who became enthusiastic  in his  cause,  tool:  up arms to 
support him. 
LECTURE LXXXIX. 
AS soon  as  Sertorius had made  such  progress  that he could 
look upon himself as the chief general of Spain, he began acting 
upon a well-considered plan : he wished to blend the Spaniards 
and Romans together in such a manner, that thc real character 
of Roman civilisation should be imparted to the nation, without 
however their giving up any of the peculiar and great qualities 
19  Plutarch, Sertor. 9. 
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which distinguished them as Spaniards.  He formed  a  senate 
of  three  hundred  members,  consisting  partly  of  proscribed 
Romans, partly of other Romans scattered in the provinces, and 
partly  of  the hybridae,  and  no doubt  also  of  distinguished 
Spaniards.  He thus  constituted  a  Rome  at a distance from 
Rome.  This  senate is known in history  as  the senntus  His- 
pniensis.l  At Osca, the modern  Huesca in the north of Spain, 
he established an acaderny, and collected the sons of  the most 
distinguished families, whom he caused to be instructed in the 
Latin language and grammar in the ancient sense.  They were 
also dressed like the sons of noble  Romans, and wore the bulla 
and praetcxta, at which their parents felt not  a  little pleased.2 
It is quite evident that he m~st  have promised them the Roman 
fraiichisc.  Thesc boys were at the same time a sort of hostages 
for their parents-a  necessary precaution against the ficklcness 
of the Spaniards.  There was moreover formed a kind of body- 
guard  of men  who,  according  to the noble  custom  of  tllc 
Spaniards, vowed  not to survive their general.  Sertorius re- 
marked with pleasure, that the number of  those who gathered 
around hiin  and vowed  to dic with him was greater than had 
ever before entered into that rclation with  any other general. 
He also  worked  upon  their imagination, by  accommodating 
himself to their opinions.  It  may be that the story about the 
white fawn, by which he gained  so  much  confidence, was, as 
PlutarchQays,  a piece of imposition on his part; but I do not 
see why he should not, like his master, Marins, have been sus- 
ceptible of  such notions himself; and it seems to me not at all 
improbable that he himself entertained the same views  on this 
point as the Spaniards. 
Reckoning from the time when  Sertorius  first  appeared  in 
Spain, the war lasted eight years;  but if we calculate from the 
time when, after the fall of his party, he placed himself at the 
head of  Spain, it lasted only  six years.*  Q. Metellus  Pius- 
the surname refers to his filial affection for his father, Q. Metel- 
lus Numidicus,-was  sent into Baetica, and entrusted with thc 
conduct of  the war  against  Sertorius.  Metellus, at first, was 
rather  succcssful;  but  Sertorius soon  gained  more and more 
1 Sallust, Hisl. iii. ap. Serv. ad Aen. i. 698; comp. Appinn, De  Bell. Civil. i. 
108.  Plutarcli, Sertor. 14. 
3  Flutarch, Sertor. 11 ; comp. Appinn, De Bell. Civil. i, 110. 
"pl~ia~~,  De Bell.  Civil. i.  108; Livy, Epit. 96; Eutrop.  vi. 1. 
decided advantages over him; and things went at last so much 
backward, that the senate sent  out Cn. Polnpey  with a  fix& 
army. 
pompcy was then  a simple equesg; that is, he had not yct 
been invested with any office that conferred upon him the rigl~t 
of being  elected  into  the  senate.  He was about thirty years 
old, and in the prime of life.  It  is very difficult to pronounce 
a decided opinion upon Pompey:  he is not one of those charac- 
ters whose outlines are clear and iiidisputable, as in the case of 
Marius, Sulla, Sertorius, and Caesar; and it is even difficult to 
say whether he was a great general or not:  he was one of those 
men who, in order to be great, must be favoured by fortune, if 
not  throughout, at least  up to  a  certain  point.  He did not 
possess  sufficicnt  strength  and  greatness to  act  consistently 
throughout life, in good  as  well as in cvil days, and to bc the 
same unclcr all circumstances.  There can be no doubt that hc 
had  distinguished  himsclf  very much in the social war ~~nder 
Sulla; for Sulla, who was certainly able to judge on a point like 
this,  treated  him  with  marked  respect;  nor  that  in  the 
war against Sertorius he very far excelled  Mctcllus, though in 
point of  generalship  Sertorius surpassed him.  The war against 
the pirates  was  well  planned  and  speedily  concluded;  that 
against  Mithridates  was  not  dificult  indeed,  but  Pompey 
shewed himself  resolute  and active  in employing  the incans 
which he had at his command.  If, on the other hand, we con- 
sider him in his civil proceedings, especially during the period 
from his triumph until the war  against  Caesar,  it cannot be 
denied that he had a cowardly fear of the Clodian faction, and 
that he had a mean  jealousy  of  Caesar,  whom  he designedly 
wished to kccp  down,  and to whose superiority he would be 
blind, although he knew  it.  In the accusation  of  Cicero, he 
behaved in a cowardly way; he was in  fact, never a trustworthy 
friend.  In the tinic of  Sulla, when hc was  yet a young man, 
he was cruel, and Cicero himself does  not  doubt that, if the 
civil war had taken a different turn, Pompcy would have dis- 
played the same  cruelty  as  Sulla?  In other respects too, not 
much good can be said  of  him, for  in eloquence and acquirc- 
mats he  was below  mediocrity.  His head  in  statucs  ard 
busts, which we  have no reason to consider spurious, shews  a 
considerable degree of vulgerity and rudeness, whereas Caesar's 
' Vell. I'aterr ii,  30  6  Ad A1lic.i~.  10 and  11.  Compare x.4. 
nu  2 404  SUCCESS  OF SERTOBIUS.  MURDER  OF  SEKTORIUS.  405 
head  displays  all his  great  intellectual  activity.  I will  not 
deny that I have a  dislike for Pompey ; for I know that, from 
weakness and vanity, he was a different man at diffent periods 
of  his  life, and that in his later years there was a great falling 
off in his character, which cannot have been the consequence 
of  old age, since, at the time  of  his death, he was  not above 
fifty-six or fifty-seven years old. 
Sertorius succeeded in several campaigns, and in two of them, 
so far as to compel Metellus to withdraw  into Andalusia, and 
Pompey to retreat across the Pyrenees.  Had the Spaniards been 
unanimous among themselves, Sertorius might have defied the 
whole power of Rome, and have annihilated his two opponents, 
but he had  unfortunately  to  struggle against  the rebellious 
attempts  of  the  Spaniards,  as  well  as  against  the  Roman 
legions.  He fought two battles in Andalusia, on the Guadal- 
aviar and on the Sucro, against the united  Roman proconsuls, 
in both  of  which  one  wing  of  each  army  gained a  victory, 
so  that  they  were  not  productive  of  any considerable  ad- 
vantage.'  But,  as  the  Spaniards  did  not  remain  faithful, 
Sertorius in the end fell into difficulties, notwithstanding  the 
immense resources of his mind.  Some towns deserted him, but 
on the part of others he  experienced  everything  that faithful 
attachment could  afford.  Calagurris  sustained  a  very  ener- 
getic siege, and Sertorius, who exerted all his powers to relieve 
it, at length succeeded.  But the  faithlessness  and  cowardice 
of many places roused his indignation,  under  the influence of 
which  he  committed  an  act  which  is  the only stain on his 
character:  he sold the hostages assembled at Huesca as  slave^.^ 
This would have been quite natural in any other general; but 
Sertorius was  of  too  noble a  character,  and should not have 
done it, for  it was  at variance  with  his humane disposition; 
and his  power  and  influence  were  of  a moral  nature.  The 
consequence of  this act was, that the attachment  of the other 
towns also began to give way. 
M. Perpernag,  probably a son  of the consular  M. Perperna, 
had led the remainder of the army of Lepidus from Sardinia to 
Spain, wishing, however, to carry on the war in his own name; 
7  Appian, De Bell Civi1.i.  110; Plutarch, Sertor. 18. fall. Pomp. 19. 
8  Plutarch, Sertor. 25. 
9  He  was a noble Roman, probably of an Etruscan family, for the termination 
na is Etruscan.  It has been said that all  gentile names must terminate in is, 
but  his  soldiers compellcd  him  to  submit to Sertorius as  his 
superior.  TO  take vengeance for this, he, in conjunction with 
a number  of Romans,  formed  a  conspiracy  against him; for 
Sertorius  had before put to death several who had made similar 
attempts,  whence  Perperna  found  many ready  to join  him. 
sertorius was murdered  at a  repast.1°  An incredible number 
of Spaniards who had remained faithful to him,  shewed  their 
attachment  by  killing  themselves  at  his  burial.  Perperna 
coinpelled the Spaniards to recognise him as their general ;  but 
he lost the first  battle he fought against Poinpey, and was put 
to death.ll 
Pompey now  returned to Rome to  sue for the consulship. 
The people  admired  him  enthusiastically,  and he was their 
favourite to an unprecedented degree;  a fact for which I can- 
not account,  unless I supposc they expected he would restore 
the tribuneship.  There might, indeed, have been  reasons for 
such enthusiasm in favour of Caesar,  though I do not mean to 
say that his conduct was altogether praiseworthy; but  men of 
ability and strength could not help loving him, and Cicero, in 
reality,  always  loved  him.  Thcre arc times when  a  people 
feels  the noble  want  of  shewing  enthusiasm  for  something. 
Pompey had not yet held any curule office, and had been in- 
vested with  proconsular  power without  having had a  magis- 
tracy; but he was now nevertheless made consul, together with 
M. Licinius Crassus, to whom  he was then so  hostile  that the 
Romans  tremblcd  with  fear  lest  they  should take  up arms 
against  each other.  But at  the urgent  request  of  the senate 
they made a  reconciliation,  and behaved  honourably12;  they 
were  never  afterwards false towards each  other, though  they 
lived together for nineteen years.  Sometimes it even appeared 
as if  they wcrc good friends; but this appearance would again 
vanish. 
Crassus has acquired his historical importance mainly by his 
and that consequently Perperna must be a mere cognomen; but the Etruscan na 
answers to the Roman ius.  We cannot think  of  Ernesti without  loving  and 
respecting him, but he was mistakcu in a grcat many things; for example, when 
he said that Caccina was a cognomen, and sought a Gentile namc for it; forthe 
i~ls~nptions  show that  it is  a  Gentile  name.-  N.  Compare vol. i. notes 344, 
922. 
'O Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i. 113; l>lutarch, Sertor. 26; Vell.  Paterc. ii. 30. 
" The Lectures in the year  1826-27, were  not  continued beyond the  death 
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conquest of  Spartacus.  About  five  years  after  the death  of 
Sulla, a Thracian of  the name of  Spartacus had  broken. forth 
from  a  barrack  of  gladiators at Capua,  with about forty,  or 
according to some authorities seventy-four,  other gladiators.13 
The number  of  gladiators  had  increased  at that  time  to an 
immense extent; and the rage of  the Romans for this kind of 
public spectacles spread more and more every day.  Ambitious 
persons availed themsclves of this rnania as a means of gaining 
popularity.  Spartacus,  after  having  broken  forth  with  his 
fellow-prisoners,  took his  position on mount Vesuvius,  which 
then formed an old decayed  crater and was difficult  of  access. 
Many have  acknowledged  that  Spartacus must  have  been  a 
great man,  and if he had lived in diffcrent circumstances,  he 
would have shown this still more clearly.  He and his followers 
concealed  themselves  in the crater,  and an incredible number 
of runaway slaves joined them.  Spartacus and his  associates 
at first  formed  a band  of  robbers,  and not  only escaped the 
regular  troops  that  wcre  sent against them,  but made  grcat 
havoc among them,  and thus acquired  arms and ammunition, 
with which they must have been very scantily provided at the 
beginning.  Spartacus now  proclaimed  the freedom  of  the 
slaves, and numbers flocked to him from all parts of  southern 
Italy,  which  was  either  lying  quite waste,  or  covered  with 
slaves.  The  consequences  of  Sulla's  dcvastations in  those 
districts now became visible at once;  for there were no freemen 
to check the insurrection.  It  is surprising to find that Germans 
also are mentioned among those slaves1*.  It may be that there 
were sorne of the Teutones; but it is  more probable that they 
were  introduced  there  through  comlnercium  by  the  Gauls. 
Two Gauls, Crixus and Oenomaus,  were the generals of  Spar- 
tacus,  who  ruled  his  men with  dictatorial  powcr.  The war 
lasted upwards of  two years.  Three praetorian and two con- 
sular  armies  were  completcly  defeated,  a  great  number  of 
l3 Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i.  116;  Livy, Epit. 95 and  96;  Plutarch, Cmss. 
8.  There is at Pompeii an edifice similar to a barrack;  it has parapets  and a 
number of arms have been  fonntl in it.  At first I thonght  the huilding might 
Iiavc been a barrack; but I could not collceivc why thc Romans should have had 
a garrison in that place, and on a closer examination I found that the arms wcre 
those of the Samnites, which were, as Livy (ix. 40) says, afterwards given to the 
Cwnpanians and then to the gladiators.  Hence I have no doubt that the above- 
mentioned edifice was a ludus ylndiatorius,  in which the gladiators were locked 
np during the night.-N.  Plutarch, Cras~.  9; Livy, Eptt. 97. 
towns, such as Nola, Tliurii, Grumentum in Lucania, and per- 
haps Compsa in the country of the Hirpinians, were taken and 
ravag~d  with all the atrocities committed by bands of baiiditti; 
in hct few  places  escaped  destruction.  We know only  the 
smallest  part  of  those  events.  At length,  however,  in the 
third  year,  Crassus baffled  the slaves.  They possessed large 
establishments for  the manufacture of  arms; and they firmly 
believcd that they might conquer and govern the greater part 
of Italy, though they would not, perhaps, destroy Rome.  This 
plan of theirs would not  indeed  have  been  impossible,  unless 
Rome had drawn its forces together from all quarters; but they 
were  thwartcd by  Crassus  and their  own  divisions.  They 
were divided  into three armies; and it was this circumstanck 
alone that enablcd  Crassus to defeat  them in detail.  His last 
victory was gained near  Pctilia in Lucania,  and he made the 
same cruel use of it as the German princes did of  their victory 
after the Peasant war  in the sixteenth  century.  The bodies 
and limbs of  the conquered were seen  iinpaled  along the high 
road from Capua to Rome,  or their torn limbs scattered  over 
the roads.15 
Italy was thus delivered from the most fearful of all dangers; 
but the ravages in the south were so great that the country has 
never been able to recover even that slender degree of prosperity 
which it enjoyedafter the Marsic  war.  I believe that even its 
present wretched condition  is  better, and the population more 
numerous, than in the best periods of the Roman empire.  This 
is evident from the very few monuments of this time.  The fi.ee 
population  was extirpated, the towns were  destroyed;  and the 
few in Lucania which are mentioned in the itineraries of  the 
emperors, were scarcely anything more than placcs for changing 
horses.  The country was out up into large estates, which served 
as pasture for cattle and horses. 
At  the time when thcse events took place in Italy, a war was 
carried  on  in Asia  against  Mithridates,  which  is  sometimes 
called the second, but more properly with Appian16, the third 
Mithridatic war.  It arose out of  that against  Sertorius.  After 
Sulla had left Asia, Mithridates fulfilled the greater part of the 
terms on which pcace had been concluded :  he gave up Bithynia 
to Nicomedes, and Paphlagonia to the prince appointed by the 
'J Appian, De  Bell. Civil. i.  120; Plntarch, Crass. 11. 
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Romaos;  and  delivered  up his  ships, prisoners,  and  money, 
but of Cappadocia, he gave only the greater  portion  back  to 
Ariobarzanes, who was likewise protected by the Romans, and 
kept the rest for himself.  KO one, surely, can  blame him for 
this; ibr the peace had never yet received  the sanction of  the 
Roman senate and people.  Mithridates had only  Sulla's word; 
alld as he had signed it, he demanded of the Romans to do tllc 
same.  The reason why Mithridates had  not  at the very first 
demanded the document guaranteeing the peace, was  the fact 
that Sulla himself  had to recover  Italy before anything could 
be done.  Afterwards the  senate alone was  in fault, for Sulla 
hi~nself  was not dishonest in this affair, but the senate was, and 
Mithridates was unable to get any document. 
L  Murena, a Roinan general, marched  into Cappadocia, in- 
vaded the territory of  Mithridatcs, plundered the rich temple 
of Anaitis at Comana; and although Mithridates did everything 
to avoid the war, Murena carried his aggressions so far, that at 
length open war broke out, in which he was  defeated.  Mith- 
ridates, with strict truth, declared that he had merely acted on 
the  defensive  in  this whole  a&ir,  and  demanded  that  the 
Romans should ratify the peace.  As Sertorius was still in arms, 
the Romans accepted  his  excuses;  but  the documents  of  the 
peace seem never to have  been exchanged.  The Romans left 
him in possession of  his part of  Cappadocia, on his betrothing 
one  of  his  daughters,  who  was  then  only  a  child,  to 
Ariobarzanes." 
The great and last war against Mithridates, which lasted for 
nearly  twelve  years, was  brought  about  by  his  negotiations 
with  Sertorius, who  sent two proscribed  Romans, L. Marius, 
probably a Campanian new citizen, and L. Fannius, to Mithri- 
dates, and concluded an alliance with him.  Mithridates was to 
assist  Sertorius with his fleet;  and it was  especially stipulated 
that he should  place the Cilician  pirates, who were under his 
influence, at the disposal of Sertorius. Mithridates was to have 
the sovereignty of  all  Asia, in case  of  their  being  successful 
against the Romans.l8 
'7  Appian, De  Bell. Mzthrid. 64-67. 
'8  Appian, De  Bell. M~tT~rid.  68; Flutarch, Sertor. 23 and 24. 
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